Public Opinion Briefing No. 109: Changes in Key Political Indicators in January 2012

Public Opinion Briefing No. 109: EAI Regular Public Opinion Barometer Survey

1. Political Indicators in January 2012

2. 2012 Presidential Election Variables: Park Geun-hye's Support Decline and Moon Jae-in's Rise

【Key Political Indicators in January 2012】

1. Presidential Approval Rating in January of the Fifth Year of Administration Hits a Low of 25.2% Since the Candlelight Protests

- Can the Presidential Approval Rating Reverse? Difficult due to a Flood of Major Negative Issues, Erosion of Support Base, and Distrust in the Co-Prosperity Theory

■ In the January survey, which opened the new year of 2012, the presidential approval rating stood at a mere 25.2%. The proportion of respondents who believed the president was not doing a good job exceeded 70% at 71.2% (Figure 1). Can the presidential approval rating, which had maintained a high level of 40-50% after the second year of the term, even amidst significant crises such as the candlelight protests and economic crises over the past four years, reverse its current downward trend? The outlook is undeniably bleak.

■ Particularly, since the beginning of the year, a series of scandals involving relatives and close associates, such as KT&G Welfare Foundation Chairman Kim Jae-hong (cousin of First Lady Kim Yoon-ok) being implicated in lobbying for the dismissal of charges in the Jeil Savings Bank case, allegations of illegal lobbying funds received by the office of Assemblyman Lee Sang-deuk (President's elder brother), the mid-term resignation of Broadcasting and Communications Commission Chairman Choi Si-joong, and allegations of vote-buying by the office of National Assembly Speaker Park Hee-tae, along with the DNC attack incident by the National Election Commission and suspicions of ballot box tampering, have been revealed as facts. This has likely led to a withdrawal of support not only from opposition and undecided voters but also from a portion of the support base. Even among the conservative base, which has been the political foundation of the current administration, positive evaluations stood at 32.5% and negative evaluations at 64.3%, indicating a significant departure of the support base.

■ The erosion of support from the conservative base is crucial at this juncture as it will be a major variable in determining the timing and extent of differentiation from the MB administration by former Representative Park. In the case of former Representative Park, who led the insistence on the original plan for Sejong City, she succeeded in solidifying support from the Chungcheong region. However, when the conservative base was rallying behind the president during the early to mid-term of the administration, the president's support base withdrew their support for former Representative Park, keeping her approval rating (simple presidential candidate support) consistently in the 20% range. Her support entered the 30% range after reconciling with the president in 2010. As the conservative base itself deviates from the president's governing base, former Representative Park's differentiation from the current administration is expected to accelerate.

[Figure 1] National Approval Rating in January 2012 (%)

■ The trend of approval ratings in [Figure 2] shows that despite the intensification of public criticism following the defeat in the October 26 by-election in late 2011, the Korea-US FTA, and the ruling party's surprise passage of the new year's budget bill, the presidential approval rating, which had remained in the mid-30% range, entered the 20% range in the December survey at 29.7%. It has since fallen by an additional 4.5 percentage points in the current survey. While the approval rating temporarily dropped to the 20% range at 28.5% during the periods of former President Roh Moo-hyun's and former President Kim Dae-jung's funerals in June 2009, remaining in the 20% range for two consecutive months is the first time since the candlelight protests in 2008. This suggests that the current downward trend may not be a temporary phenomenon.

[Figure 2] Trend of National Approval Rating Changes

f2e34dd1a320d063

f2e34dd1a320d063

f2e34dd1a320d063

■ Until 2010, the administration successfully managed approval ratings by developing agendas that garnered broad support from the conservative base as well as centrist voters, including the moderate pragmatism approach and the fair society theory, and by relatively improving the economy as perceived by the public. However, throughout 2011, the worsening of the economy as perceived by the public, and the questioning of the sincerity of pro-commoner initiatives built through the moderate pragmatism approach and fair society theory, due to the ruling party's opposition to free school lunches and repeated attacks on welfare populism, led to a decline. As a result, although there was a temporary rebound in approval ratings in 2011 due to the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics bid, there has been no clear rebound in approval ratings since the ambitious 'co-prosperity theory' proposed in the August 15th National Liberation Day address. Maintaining approval ratings in the 30% range can be considered the only achievement.

■ However, by proclaiming itself a "morally perfect administration" as if unaware of the major negative issues continuously announced daily, the government has inadvertently amplified political distrust, making the situation more difficult to resolve. Furthermore, with the ruling Saenuri Party (Grand National Party) shifting its focus to Representative Park Geun-hye's emergency committee system ahead of the 2012 general elections and presidential election, it appears difficult for the president and the government to exert initiative in the political landscape.

2. Reversal in Party Support Ratings - The Reason Why the Democratic Party's Lead is 'Unstable'

Saenuri Party Down 12.1 Percentage Points Compared to Last Year, Democratic Party Up 5.7 Percentage Points

■ The Saenuri Party's (Grand National Party) approval rating fell by 5.7 percentage points from the previous month to 30.2%, while the Democratic Party's approval rating rose by 4.3 percentage points to 33.8%. This marks the first time the party support rankings have been reversed since the June 5 survey conducted immediately after the death of former President Roh Moo-hyun in June 2009. The Unified Progressive Party garnered 3.6%, lower than last month's 4.9% (Figure 3).

[Figure 3] Changes in Party Support Ratings: Pattern of Fluctuation in Support Gap

* Note: The red box indicates periods when the support gap between the Grand National Party and the Democratic Party narrowed to within 10 percentage points.

■ Compared to a year ago, the decline in the Saenuri Party's support rating is significant. In the January 2011 survey, the Grand National Party's approval rating was 42.3%, and the Democratic Party's was 28.1%. Compared to this period, the Grand National Party's approval rating has fallen by 12.1 percentage points, while the Democratic Party's has risen by 5.7 percentage points. During the same period, the proportion of undecided voters increased slightly from 20.4% to 24.9%. Consequently, half of the decline in the Grand National Party's support has shifted to the Democratic Party, and the other half to undecided voters.

■ Prior to this survey, the Grand National Party's approval rating had been steadily declining, albeit gradually. The Democratic Party's approval rating rose to 32.1% during the April 27 by-election period, then fell to 19.4% in September amidst the Ahn Cheol-soo phenomenon, but began to rise again after Ahn Cheol-soo distanced himself from politics and following the victory in the October 26 by-election.

(1) Decline in Saenuri Party Support: Disappointment with Emergency Committee Activities and Erosion of Support Base

Post-Emergency Committee Activities of the Grand National Party: "Improved" 37.9%, "Not Improved" 51.4%

■ Amidst the recent series of scandals involving the ruling party and the government, the Saenuri Party's approval rating is rapidly declining. This is because the emergency committee, initially noted for its relatively fresh composition with members like Kim Chong-in and Lee Jun-seok and its efforts to resolve internal party conflicts, has failed to achieve significant results beyond a change in the party name as time has passed.

■ In fact, in response to the question "How has the Grand National Party changed since the formation of the emergency committee?" in the current survey, 37.9% responded that it had "improved compared to before," while 51.4% responded that it had "not improved," and 10.8% answered "don't know/no response." More than half provided a negative response (Figure 4). Negative responses exceeded the majority among progressives (64.7%) and centrists (51.9%). Among conservatives, positive responses were 49.6% and negative responses were 41.4%, with the remainder being "don't know/no response." Although there were more positive evaluations among the conservative base, which is the political foundation of the Grand National Party, the fact that nearly half responded negatively or withheld their answer indicates a lack of success in gaining consensus even among the support base.

[Figure 4] Evaluation of Grand National Party Activities Since the Emergency Committee (%)

Sharp Decline in Support Among Centrist and Conservative Voters: The Three Calamities - Power Corruption / Identity Crisis / Economic Crisis

■ It is noteworthy that the decline in support ratings even among conservatives, the traditional support base of the Grand National Party, is exacerbating the overall drop in the Saenuri Party's approval ratings. As shown in [Figure 5], a comparison of party support ratings by ideological inclination at the same point in the previous year reveals a significant drop in support among centrist and conservative voters. While the Saenuri Party's support rating among progressives fell by 8.2 percentage points from 26.1% to 17.9% compared to the January 2011 survey, it dropped by 12.2 percentage points among centrists (39.6% to 27.4%) and by 12.6 percentage points among conservatives (57.6% to 45.0%).

■ Generally, factors causing a party's support base to deviate can be categorized as follows: (1) Power corruption by relatives and close associates (e.g., the arrest of Kim Hyun-cheol during the YS administration, involvement of the third son in corruption during the DJ administration, the Choi Ki-sun scandal, etc.), (2) Conflict with the support base's identity (e.g., the grand coalition theory during the Roh Moo-hyun administration), and (3) Economic performance crisis (e.g., the IMF crisis during the YS administration, the economic crisis theory in the latter half of the Roh Moo-hyun administration). These are policy failures on issues where a consensus exists regardless of political orientation, rather than ideological positioning issues.

■ The current situation, characterized by the worsening of the economy as perceived by the public (economic performance crisis), power corruption incidents (money envelopes in the party convention, involvement of Assemblyman Lee Sang-deuk's office in corruption, involvement of Vice Minister Park Young-joon in the CNK scandal, etc.), and the Saenuri Party's emergency committee's ideological shift/the government's promotion of profit-sharing (identity crisis for the support base), is likely the primary reason for the significant decline in support not only among opposition and centrist voters but also among the current support base. In essence, the party appears to be facing a political triple threat, risking the loss of both its core supporters and potential new ones.

[Figure 5] Changes in Saenuri Party Support by Ideological Inclination Compared to the Previous Year

(2) Reasons Why the Democratic Party's Lead is Unstable

■ What, then, is the outlook for the Democratic Party, which has regained the lead in party support, albeit within the margin of error, for the first time since 2009, surpassing the Saenuri Party? Firstly, the "three calamities" of the ruling party and government serve as a boon for the opposition party, which is benefiting significantly from high public sentiment for government judgment. Furthermore, the fatigue associated with the "Ahn Cheol-soo phenomenon" is evident as Ahn Cheol-soo has distanced himself from politics, which had been a black hole in the political landscape. The convention effect from the party's national convention, where 490,000 ordinary citizens participated in mobile voting, is also driving the Democratic Party's rise in support. In addition, Ahn Cheol-soo's deliberate distance from politics appears to have led to the consolidation of progressive and opposition party supporters around Chairman Moon Jae-in and the Democratic United Party.

■ Last year, the "September shock" occurred, where the "Ahn Cheol-soo whirlwind" led to a concentration of support around Ahn Cheol-soo, even among centrist voters and the opposition's support base (progressives and Democratic Party supporters), causing party support ratings to drop to 19.4% and raising expectations for a third party. However, in Seoul, the number of preliminary candidates registered for the Democratic United Party (151) has more than doubled that of the Grand National Party (75). Since the election of the party leader on January 15th, the reversal in party support ratings has been confirmed, indicating that the Democratic United Party has regained its presence as the leading opposition party. However, there are significant underlying factors that warrant caution and prevent complacency.

The 100-Day Jinx of Rising Approval Ratings: Temporary Increase in Support → Neglect of Reform → Return to Original Support Levels

- Evaluation of the Democratic United Party Since the Election of the New Leadership: "Improved" 38.1%, "Not Improved" 46.3%

■ However, it remains uncertain whether this reversal in support ratings will become a new balance of power throughout the 2012 general and presidential elections, or if it will end as a temporary surge, as has been repeated during this administration. Firstly, examining the gap in support ratings between the two parties since 2009, the Democratic Party's rise in support has repeatedly failed to exceed two to three months, with the gap widening into double digits.

■ This is the fourth time the Democratic Party's support has approached or surpassed that of the Saenuri Party. These instances occurred during the period of former President Roh Moo-hyun's death in May-June 2009, in August following the victory in the 2010 local elections (June-August), in April-June following the April 27 by-election in 2011, and currently, following the victory in the October 26 by-election and the surprise passage of the Korea-US FTA. In most cases, the Democratic Party's support ratings returned to their original levels, either by resting on anti-Grand National Party sentiment or by becoming complacent after electoral victories.

■ Furthermore, in the current survey, when asked about the evaluation of the Democratic Party since the election of its new leadership, negative responses ("not improved" - 46.3%) outnumbered positive responses ("improved" - 38.1%), although the ratings were relatively better than those for the Saenuri Party. The lukewarm evaluations from progressives and centrists also cast a shadow on the outlook.

[Figure 6] Evaluation of the Democratic Party Since the Election of the New Leadership

Expanding Support Among Centrist Voters is the Challenge: Rise in Support, Consolidation of Progressive Support

- Compared to 2011, Democratic Party Support: Centrists Up 1.6%p, Progressives Up 12.4%p

■ Moreover, the fact that the current rise in support ratings is primarily due to the consolidation of support among progressives, rather than a fundamental shift in the balance of power between the ruling and opposition parties, raises questions about the sustainability of the Democratic Party's lead. As shown in [Figure 7], while the proportion of respondents who identify as progressive has fluctuated between 22% and 28%, with conservatives comprising the early 30% range and centrists exceeding 35-40%, it is difficult to argue that the ideological balance of voters has shifted towards progressivism, despite a slight increase in progressives since late 2011.

■ Furthermore, as can be seen in [Figure 8], the Democratic Party's rise in support is primarily a result of the consolidation of support among progressives, not an expansion of support that has absorbed centrist or opposing voters. Among conservatives, the Democratic United Party's support rating was 19.3% in the January 2011 survey and 22.4% in the January 2012 survey, showing little difference. Among centrists, the Democratic United Party's support rating remained almost unchanged at 29.3% in January 2011 and 30.9% in January 2012. However, among progressives, the Democratic Party's support rating, which was only 39.8% in January 2011, increased by 12.4 percentage points to 52.2% in the current survey. Support increases driven by base consolidation are inherently limited, and the lack of an increase in support among centrist voters, where the balance of power is crucial, represents a significant challenge for the new leadership of the Democratic United Party.

[Figure 7] Changes in Distribution of Subjective Ideological Self-Identification

[Figure 7] Changes in Democratic United Party Support by Ideological Inclination Compared to the Previous Year

[Table 1] Changes in Party Support Ratings Since 2010

【2012 Presidential Election: Park Geun-hye's Support Decline and Moon Jae-in's Rise】

1. Park Geun-hye's Support Declines, Ahn Cheol-soo Stagnates, Moon Jae-in Rises

(1) Simple Presidential Election Support: December Park 29.2%, Ahn 23.3% (5.9%p gap) → Park 26.7%, Ahn 23.6% (3.1%p gap)

■ First, in a simple multi-candidate presidential election scenario, Representative Park Geun-hye's approval rating has fallen again to 26.7%. This is a decrease of 5.3 percentage points compared to the 32.0% recorded in the September survey when the Ahn Cheol-soo phenomenon began. In contrast, Ahn Cheol-soo, after a continuous rise from 20.1% in the September survey to 25.9% in October and 27.3% in November, showed stagnation with little change at 23.3% in the December survey and 23.6% in the current survey.

■ Conversely, Chairman Moon Jae-in, who experienced a decline in support due to the Ahn Cheol-soo phenomenon, and Representative Han Myeong-sook, who won the party leadership election, have shown a rising trend, benefiting from the decline in former Representative Park's support and the stagnation of Ahn Cheol-soo's support. Chairman Moon Jae-in, who recorded only 5.5% in the December survey, has re-entered the double-digit support range at 11.1% in the current survey. Representative Han Myeong-sook, who recorded 1.9% support last month, has risen to 5.3%, placing her as the fourth-ranked candidate.

■ On the other hand, other opposition candidates such as former Democratic Party Representative Sohn Hak-kyu (2.3%, 6th place), Assemblyman Chung Dong-young (1.0%, 9th place), and co-leader Yoo Si-min (2.9%, 5th place), as well as Grand National Party Governor Kim Moon-soo and former Representative Chung Mong-joon, remain in the 1-3% support range and have failed to seize an opportunity for a breakthrough in the race for the next presidency.

[Figure 8] Overall Support for Next Presidential Election (%)

[Table 2] Changes in Simple Presidential Election Support Over the Last 5 Months

(2) 1:1 Matchups: Ahn Cheol-soo's Stagnation vs. Park Geun-hye's Decline, Widening Gap

- Ahn Cheol-soo 49.2% vs. Park Geun-hye 35.6%, a 13.6%p gap; Park Geun-hye 47.2% vs. Moon Jae-in 35.1%, a 12.1%p gap

■ [Figure 9] In a one-on-one hypothetical matchup, Ahn Cheol-soo led Park Geun-hye by 10 percentage points (49.4% vs. 39.4%). However, in this survey, Ahn Cheol-soo's approval rating remained stagnant, while Park Geun-hye's rating declined further, widening the gap to 13.6 percentage points, similar to the simple approval rating results.

[Figure 9] 1:1 Hypothetical Matchup: Approval Rating Change

Park Geun-hye's Approval Rating Decline: A Result of Disappointment with the Emergency Committee's Activities

■ Park Geun-hye's declining approval rating appears to be a result of negative evaluations of the Emergency Committee's activities. Among all respondents, 57.1% supported Park Geun-hye and 32.3% supported Ahn Cheol-soo in the group that responded that the Saenuri Party had improved since the Emergency Committee was formed. However, in the group that responded that the Saenuri Party had not improved, Park Geun-hye received 21.8% support and Ahn Cheol-soo received 65.0% support (Figure 10-1).

■ Since respondents' political leanings may be reflected in their evaluation of the Saenuri Party, we can see that the evaluation of the Emergency Committee's activities is influencing presidential support even when considering only Saenuri Party supporters. When selecting only the 267 Saenuri Party supporters (excluding those who did not respond) and comparing the 1:1 hypothetical matchup results based on their evaluation of the Saenuri Party since the launch of the Emergency Committee, 83.6% of those who positively evaluated the Emergency Committee's activities stated they would support Park Geun-hye. In contrast, among Saenuri Party supporters who negatively evaluated the party, stating it had not improved, Park Geun-hye's support rating dropped significantly to 52.5%. Meanwhile, 31.3% of this group stated they would support Ahn Cheol-soo, and 16.2% withheld their answer (Figure 10-2).

■ However, while the impact of the Emergency Committee's activities on Park Geun-hye's approval rating is currently negative, the potential for recovering and increasing approval ratings if the Emergency Committee achieves results could be a latent opportunity factor. Ultimately, considering that Park Geun-hye's leadership and the Emergency Committee's activities will be ultimately evaluated by the general election results, this general election is bound to be the most crucial battleground for Park Geun-hye.

[Figure 10] Impact of Emergency Committee Activities on Presidential Support

f2e34dd1a320d063

f2e34dd1a320d063

f2e34dd1a320d063

Gap between Park Geun-hye and Sohn Hak-kyu Maintained, Gap between Park Geun-hye and Moon Jae-in Significantly Reduced

■ Meanwhile, in a one-on-one hypothetical matchup between former Representative Park Geun-hye and Democratic Party leader Sohn Hak-kyu, and Roh Moo-hyun Foundation chairman Moon Jae-in, Sohn Hak-kyu is currently unable to significantly narrow the gap with Park Geun-hye. However, Moon Jae-in is emerging as a leading contender after the integration of parties. In [Figure 11], Sohn Hak-kyu trailed Park Geun-hye by over 20 percentage points (51.2% vs. 29.1%). Moon Jae-in, who trailed by 25.5 percentage points in the December survey (54.4% vs. 28.9%), has narrowed the gap to 12.1 percentage points in this survey.

[Figure 11] Park Geun-hye vs. Sohn Hak-kyu, Park Geun-hye vs. Moon Jae-in 1:1 Hypothetical Matchup

f2e34dd1a320d063

f2e34dd1a320d063

f2e34dd1a320d063

2. Moon Jae-in's Strength and Challenges

(1) The Strength of Moon Jae-in's Approval Rating Surge: Consolidation of Progressive and Opposition Party Supporters

Increase in Support among Democratic Party Supporters: 50.8% in September 2011 → 66.6% in January 2012

Increase in Support among Progressives: 43.4% in September 2011 → 55.8% in January 2012

■ The primary reason for the surge in Chairman Moon Jae-in's approval rating in the January 2012 survey is that progressives and opposition party supporters, who had previously gravitated towards Chairman Ahn Cheol-soo during the 'Ahn Cheol-soo phenomenon' in September, began to recognize Chairman Moon Jae-in as a viable alternative. In fact, the political figure most affected by the emergence of Chairman Ahn Cheol-soo in September 2011 was Chairman Moon Jae-in, who had been on an upward trend, in contrast to Representative Sohn Hak-kyu, who was facing headwinds from the resident referendum.

[Figure 12] Change in Moon Jae-in's Approval Rating in 1:1 Matchup Against Park Geun-hye

f2e34dd1a320d063

f2e34dd1a320d063

f2e34dd1a320d063

■ Comparing this with the September survey, this phenomenon is easily confirmed. Let's examine the approval rates for Chairman Moon Jae-in in a 1:1 matchup against former Representative Park Geun-hye, broken down by ideological tendency and party support. Firstly, by ideological tendency, in the September survey, he received 16.1% support from conservatives and 28.8% from moderates in a 1:1 matchup. Support from progressives was higher at 43.4%, but did not reach a majority. At that time, Chairman Ahn Cheol-soo received 56.3% support in a 1:1 matchup. However, in this survey, support from conservatives rose slightly to 18.1% and from moderates to 35.0%. Support from progressives increased by 12.4 percentage points to 55.8%, confirming that progressives largely consider him a viable alternative.

■ By party support, while approval ratings declined among Saenuri Party supporters and undecided voters, they surged by a remarkable 15.8 percentage points to 66.6% among Democratic United Party supporters. This is a stark contrast to the 50.8% recorded in the September survey.

■ While Chairman Ahn Cheol-soo still leads Chairman Moon Jae-in with 78.6% support in this survey (compared to 68.9% in September), it is confirmed that if Chairman Ahn Cheol-soo does not participate in the presidential race, Chairman Moon Jae-in is considered the most likely contender against Park Geun-hye, at least among progressives and Democratic United Party supporters, who had previously been hesitant.

■ However, the fact that the increase in support among moderates is significantly less than the increase among progressives, and that support has actually declined among undecided voters, presents a key challenge to be addressed going forward. Beyond these internal factors, the possibility that external variables, such as Chairman Ahn Cheol-soo's influence in securing support from moderates and undecided voters, similar to the post-unification support in the Seoul mayoral election, cannot be ruled out. Of course, the fatigue with Chairman Ahn Cheol-soo's 'neither close nor far' approach, which is reflected in his stagnant approval ratings, makes its impact variable. However, this is why Chairman Ahn Cheol-soo's distancing from politics and his potential role as a variable in the presidential race, regardless of his own candidacy, are significant.

(2) Challenges: Comparison of Ahn Cheol-soo's Support Base

- Inevitable Central Front Warfare with Former Representative Park

Ahn's Base - 20s-40s, Seoul Metropolitan Area/Hohnam, College Graduates and Above, Middle Class and Above, Progressives/Opposition Party Supporters, encompassing Moderates/Undecided Voters

■ Examining the demographic support rates in a 1:1 matchup against Representative Park Geun-hye, the strengths and weaknesses of the newly emerging support base for Chairman Moon Jae-in become clear (see Tables 3 and 4). Firstly, in this survey, Chairman Ahn Cheol-soo held an advantage among the 20s-40s age groups, while former Representative Park led among the 50s-60s. Regionally, Chairman Ahn Cheol-soo was stronger in the Seoul Metropolitan Area and Hohnam, and neck-and-neck in Busan/Gyeongnam, while Park Geun-hye led only in Daegu/Gyeongbuk, and the two were neck-and-neck in Chungcheong. By education level, Park Geun-hye led among those with junior high school education or less, while Ahn Cheol-soo led among college graduates and above. Among high school graduates, Ahn Cheol-soo was neck-and-neck. By income, they were neck-and-neck only in households with less than 2 million won in monthly income; in other income brackets, Ahn Cheol-soo led. By ideology, Ahn Cheol-soo led among progressives and moderates, and by party support, he led among Democratic United Party supporters and undecided voters.

■ Compared to the September survey, Park Geun-hye's support rating declined among 40-somethings, shifting from a neck-and-neck situation to Ahn Cheol-soo's advantage. Regionally, areas like Gyeonggi, Chungcheong, and Busan/Gyeongnam, which were neck-and-neck or favored Park Geun-hye in the September survey, have now shifted to neck-and-neck or Ahn Cheol-soo's advantage due to Park Geun-hye's declining support. By education level, Ahn Cheol-soo's support increased and Park Geun-hye's decreased among high school graduates, shifting from Park Geun-hye's advantage to a neck-and-neck situation for Ahn Cheol-soo. By income, Park Geun-hye's advantage or neck-and-neck lead in the less than 2 million won and 4 million won income brackets shifted to neck-and-neck and Ahn Cheol-soo's advantage, respectively. Ideologically, the moderates shifted from a neck-and-neck situation to Ahn Cheol-soo's advantage. Ahn Cheol-soo's support among undecided voters slightly decreased, shifting from an advantage to a neck-and-neck advantage.

Moon Jae-in, the Opposition's Leading Candidate: The Challenge is to Strengthen Influence in the Seoul Metropolitan Area, Busan/Gyeongnam, 40s, and among Moderates/Undecided Voters

■ In contrast, Chairman Moon Jae-in is neck-and-neck or slightly ahead among the 20s-40s age groups, while Park Geun-hye leads among the 50s-60s. Regionally, a notable characteristic is that Moon Jae-in has not yet caught up to Ahn Cheol-soo's advantage in the Seoul Metropolitan Area. While neck-and-neck in Seoul and slightly behind in Gyeonggi, Moon Jae-in leads only in Hohnam. Park Geun-hye leads in all other regions, and Moon Jae-in's support significantly trails Park Geun-hye's in Busan/Gyeongnam, foreshadowing a difficult contest in the upcoming general election. By education level, Moon Jae-in trails Park Geun-hye among those with junior high school education or less, and is neck-and-neck among college graduates and above, contrasting with Ahn Cheol-soo's firm advantage. By income, Moon Jae-in is neck-and-neck or slightly behind Park Geun-hye in the 3 million to 5 million won and above brackets, and Park Geun-hye holds a firm advantage among low-income earners. Excluding progressives and Democratic United Party supporters, Moon Jae-in trails Park Geun-hye among moderates/conservatives and Saenuri Party supporters/undecided voters. This contrasts with Ahn Cheol-soo's advantage among moderates and undecided voters.

■ However, in the September survey, Moon Jae-in trailed in most groups where Ahn Cheol-soo led, but he is emerging as the next leader in competition with former Representative Sohn Hak-kyu among progressives and opposition party supporters, indicating that the consolidation of support from voters with opposition leanings is the basis for his expanding approval ratings. Furthermore, the shift to a neck-and-neck or slightly ahead position in the Seoul Metropolitan Area and among college graduates and above appears to have contributed to narrowing the approval rating gap. Ultimately, for Chairman Moon Jae-in, the extent to which he can demonstrate support expansion among so-called swing voters in the Seoul Metropolitan Area, among 40-somethings, and among moderates and undecided voters will be the biggest determining factor in the subsequent presidential primary race. An inevitable central front war with former Representative Park appears likely.

[Table 3] Analysis of 1:1 Support Base by Demographic Group

[Table 4] Change in 1:1 Matchup Approval Ratings by Group