[Public Opinion Brief No. 108] One Year to the 2012 Presidential Election: Public Opinion and Future Prospects

[Public Opinion Brief No. 108] Joint Project of EAI, YTN, JoongAng Ilbo, and Korea Research: December Regular Public Opinion Barometer Survey

1. Basic Political Indicators One Year to the 2012 Presidential Election

2. Variables in the 2012 Presidential Election: Will the 'Ahn Wind' Continue?

【Basic Political Indicators One Year to the 2012 Presidential Election】

1. Will a 29.7% Presidential Approval Rating Consolidate the 'Punish the Government' Sentiment?

- First time below 30% since the period following the death of former President Roh in June 2009

■ Despite criticism of the government and ruling party's surprise passage of the Korea-US FTA, which peaked in a survey last November, the president's approval rating, which had remained in the mid-30% range, recently dropped to 29.7% following the arrest of Kim Jae-hong, the chairman of the KT&G Welfare Foundation and cousin of First Lady Kim Yoon-ok, on charges of receiving hundreds of millions of won in bribes in exchange for lobbying efforts for Jeil Savings Bank, as well as allegations of a presidential office cover-up regarding the National Election Commission's DDoS attack.

■ While it may be premature to categorize a 29.7% approval rating as firmly in the 20% range, this is the first time the presidential approval rating has fallen below 30% since the 28.5% recorded in June 2009, immediately after the death of former President Roh. Despite various negative factors, the approval rating had been maintained in the mid-30% range following the ruling party's defeat in the April 27 by-elections, the failure of the free school lunch referendum, the ruling party's defeat in the October 26 Seoul by-elections, and the emergence of the Ahn Cheol-soo phenomenon, which led to the consolidation of the Grand National Party's supporters and conservative base. Considering that past administrations have experienced accelerated lame-duck periods and consolidated the 'punish the government' sentiment due to recent scandals involving close associates and relatives in their final years, the government and ruling party face considerable challenges.

[Figure 1] Trend of National Approval Ratings

2. Stable Grand National Party Support: Will the Democratic United Party Overcome the '100-Day Jinx'?

Grand National Party 35.9%, Democratic United Party 29.5%, Progressive United Party 4.9%

■ Despite President Lee Myung-bak's declining approval rating, the Grand National Party recorded 35.9%, similar to the previous month, even amidst internal strife and confusion surrounding party reform measures following the resignation of Chairman Hong Joon-pyo. In contrast, the Democratic United Party, a unified opposition party formed by the Democratic Party, the Citizen United Party, and the Federation of Korean Trade Unions, which was established the day before the survey on October 16th, showed a relatively positive start with 29.5%, nearing 30%. The United Progressive Party, which had achieved double-digit support at 10.5% following the merger agreement last month, saw its support halved to 4.9% within a month.

■ Despite recent scandals affecting the government and ruling party, and the violent incident at the unified party convention, the merger of the Citizen United Party led by Chairman Moon Jae-in with the Federation of Korean Trade Unions has shifted opposition support towards the Democratic United Party rather than the United Progressive Party, narrowing the gap with the Grand National Party to 6.4 percentage points.

■ However, as shown in [Figure 2], the gap in support between the two parties has historically narrowed to single digits and then widened to double digits within two months since 2009. The support gap between the Grand National Party and the Democratic Party has been in the single digits following the April 27 by-elections in 2011, the victory in the October 26 by-elections and the surprise ratification of the Korea-US FTA, and also during the period of former President Roh's death in May-June 2009 and after the victory in the June 2010 local elections in July-August 2010.

■ Given that the Democratic Party's support has consistently plummeted when it has either rested on anti-Grand National Party sentiment or become complacent after electoral victories, attention is focused on whether the leadership of the Democratic United Party, which needs to expedite the reorganization of its party structure, can demonstrate leadership and break the '100-day jinx' of declining support after a period of increase.

[Figure 2] Trend of Party Support: Pattern of Changes in Support Gap

【Variables in the 2012 Presidential Election】

1. The 'Ahn Wind': Entering a Consolidation Phase? Support Declined for the First Time Since the Ahn Cheol-soo Surge in September

1) Simple Presidential Election Support: November Park 29.8%, Ahn 27.3% → December Park 29.2%, Ahn 23.3%, a 5.9%p gap

■ In a simple multi-candidate scenario, Ahn Cheol-soo showed a continuous upward trend in the September survey (20.1%), October survey (25.9%), and November survey (27.3%). However, in this survey, his support declined to 23.3%, indicating stagnation or a downward trend.

■ Former Representative Park Geun-hye also saw her support drop from 29.8% in the November survey to 29.2% in this survey. While she has widened the gap with Ahn Cheol-soo again, she still falls short of widening the gap beyond the margin of error even in simple presidential election support, where the dispersion of support among opposition candidates is significantly reflected.

■ Former Representative Sohn Hak-kyu of the Democratic Party, who resigned as party leader after the merger, and Foundation Chairman Moon Jae-in, who is increasingly vocal politically, along with Grand National Party Governor Kim Moon-soo and former Representative Chung Mong-joon, remain at 3-5% support, failing to seize an opportunity for a turnaround in the race for the next presidency.

[Table 1] Overall Support for Next Presidential Election Candidates (%)

2) Suitability as Grand National Party Candidate and Unified Opposition Candidate

- Suitability as Grand National Party Candidate: Park Geun-hye preferred by 54.3% of all respondents, 77.5% of Grand National Party supporters

- Suitability as Opposition Candidate: Ahn Cheol-soo 33.8%, Sohn Hak-kyu 13.3%, Moon Jae-in 9.3%; among Democratic Party supporters, Ahn 39.8%

■ Former Representative Park Geun-hye, who is set to return as the savior of the Grand National Party for the first time since the impeachment crisis of 2004, received 54.3% support in the evaluation of suitability as a Grand National Party candidate, showing a significant gap with Governor Kim Moon-soo (8.2%) and former Representative Chung Mong-joon (7.2%). The crisis facing the party and the government appears to be consolidating support for former Representative Park Geun-hye among the conservative base. Notably, 77.5% of Grand National Party supporters chose former Representative Park as the most suitable candidate.

■ Meanwhile, support for Ahn Cheol-soo as a unified opposition candidate slightly increased to 33.8% compared to the previous month. Representative Sohn Hak-kyu saw a decline to 13.3%, and Foundation Chairman Moon Jae-in also remained at 9.3%, failing to maintain the upward trend after entering double digits at 10.1% in the October survey. It is noteworthy that among current Democratic United Party supporters, Ahn Cheol-soo is preferred over party leader Sohn Hak-kyu, with 39.8% support, an increase from 30.9% in the October survey.

■ While support for former Representative Park is concentrated among Grand National Party supporters, among Democratic Party supporters, there is still high expectation for Ahn Cheol-soo, who has clearly stated his intention not to run in the next general election and not to form a new party. However, overall, there is considerable dispersion of votes among Sohn Hak-kyu, Foundation Chairman Moon Jae-in, and others.

[Figure 3] Evaluation of Suitability for Grand National Party and Opposition Candidates

[Figure 4] Evaluation of Candidate Suitability by Grand National Party and Democratic Party Supporters

3) Stagnation in the Ahn Cheol-soo vs. Park Geun-hye Support Gap in 1:1 Scenarios

- Ahn 49.4% vs. Park 39.4%, a 10% point difference; end of a 3-month upward trend

■ In a hypothetical 1:1 scenario, Ahn Cheol-soo led Park Geun-hye with 49.4% to 39.4%, a 10 percentage point difference. This is a narrowing from the 11.7 percentage point gap in the November survey (Ahn 50.1%, Park 38.4%). The proportion of respondents who believe Ahn Cheol-soo should run for president increased from 28.2% in the November survey to 32.5% in the December survey.

■ The proportion of respondents who believe he should not run also decreased from 50.3% in the November survey to 43.9% in the December survey, indicating growing expectations. Despite these rising expectations, Ahn Cheol-soo's emphasis on his intention not to run in the general election next year and not to form a new party appears to have led to stagnation in his support, both in simple polls and 1:1 scenarios. The period of rapid monthly support increase since September seems to have concluded, entering a consolidation phase.

■ If the Grand National Party successfully navigates its internal issues and the unified opposition party effectively consolidates its base, there is a possibility of a downward trend in support. Conversely, if the Grand National Party and the unified opposition party continue to disappoint the public, the 'Ahn wind' may persist as a potential alternative.

■ Despite entering a consolidation phase, Ahn Cheol-soo maintains an advantage over Park Geun-hye in 1:1 matchups. This advantage is sustained by overwhelming support from progressive/opposition party supporters (younger generations, ideological progressives, etc.) as a counter-candidate to Park, and an expanding support gap among the centrist demographic (unaffiliated, moderates, those in their 40s), as shown in [Table 2].

[Figure 5] 1:1 Hypothetical Matchup: Support Trend

[Table 2] Trend of 1:1 Support by Ideology, Generation, and Party Affiliation

4) Park Geun-hye vs. Sohn Hak-kyu 53.0% vs. 31.3%, Park Geun-hye vs. Moon Jae-in 54.4% vs. 28.9%

■ In hypothetical 1:1 matchups between former Representative Park Geun-hye and Democratic Party leader Sohn Hak-kyu or Roh Moo-hyun Foundation Chairman Moon Jae-in, both Sohn and Moon prove to be no match for Park. As shown in [Figure 6], the support gap is over 20 percentage points, with Sohn at 53.0% versus 31.3% and Moon at 54.4% versus 28.9%. There has been little change since the September survey.

[Figure 6] Park Geun-hye vs. Sohn Hak-kyu, Park Geun-hye vs. Moon Jae-in 1:1 Matchup

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2. 2012 Presidential Election Agendas and Issues

1) Top National Task: Prioritize Domestic Affairs over Foreign Policy

Resolution of economic polarization 29.5%, Economic growth 18.8%, Improvement of quality of life 14.9%

■ The next presidential election appears to be centered around economic agendas such as resolving economic polarization and economic growth, and agendas for improving individual quality of life. The response that the top national task is the resolution of economic polarization was the highest at 29.5%, followed by economic growth at 18.8%, and improvement of individual quality of life at 14.9%.

■ Following the surge of Ahn Cheol-soo, the response that political reform issues, such as the innovation and party reform being undertaken by each party ahead of the election, are the top priority task was 9.6%, followed by national integration and educational reform, each at 5.8%. In contrast, strengthening national security was cited by 4.0%, and external tasks such as strengthening international competitiveness or improving inter-Korean relations each received relatively low response rates of 3.2%. Ultimately, domestic affairs, particularly economic agendas, are expected to emerge as the core issues of the next presidential election, rather than foreign policy areas.

[Figure 7] Top National Task for the Next Government

2) Economic Downturn and Judgment of the Administration

■ The fact that domestic affairs, particularly economic issues at national and individual levels or quality of life issues, are being highlighted more than foreign policy is likely related to the worsening perceived economy this year. As shown in [Figure 8], the perceived state of the Korean economy is continuously deteriorating.

■ In particular, the evaluation of the Korean economy's condition is rapidly worsening. In fact, until last year, the perceived economy had shown a slow but steady improvement trend since the 2008 global financial crisis. In the survey conducted in February 2009, immediately after the global financial crisis, 93.1% believed the Korean economy had worsened compared to a year prior. However, from the second half of 2009, the perceived economy improved, and in the December 2010 survey, positive evaluations that the Korean economy was improving increased to 25.8%, while negative opinions that it had worsened fell to 35.9%.

■ However, since February of this year, concerns about the national economy have rapidly increased due to the worsening livelihood economy, including the "Jeonse crisis" and the "price crisis," compounded by instability in exchange rates, interest rates, and raw material prices. In the September survey, opinions that the economy had improved decreased to 9.4%, while opinions that it had worsened rose to 59.4% in November and 58.1% in December.

■ Meanwhile, the perception of the household economy, although not showing significant improvement, had shown a moderate recovery trend, with opinions that the household economy had worsened falling to 26.1% in May 2010. However, the proportion of those stating it had worsened rose to 31.0% in the February 2011 survey, and for the past 4-5 months, opinions that the household economy had worsened have fluctuated around 36-37%. In the September survey, opinions that the household economy had worsened were 36.5%, while positive evaluations were 6.8%. In the December survey, responses that the household economy had improved fell to a moderate but continuous decline level of 5.8%, with 57.7% indicating maintenance of the status quo and 32.6% evaluating it as worsened.

■ This worsening of the perceived economy strengthens the sentiment for a vote to judge the current administration. As shown in [Figure 9], when examining the agreement rate with the 'judgment of the administration' theory based on perceptions of the national economy, 35.4% of those who believed the national economy had improved argued for judging the administration in the next election. In contrast, 57.8% of respondents who felt the national economy was no different from a year ago agreed with the judgment of the administration theory. Among those who believed the economy had worsened, a remarkable 74.6% agreed with the judgment of the administration theory. The worse the economy is perceived to be, the clearer the intention to judge the administration becomes.

[Figure 8] Perception of Korean and Household Economy (%)

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[Figure 9] Ratio of Judgment of Administration Theory by National Economic Perception (%)

3) Political Issues: What is the Alternative for a Change of Administration? Expectations for a Change of Administration and New Politics

Judgment of administration theory 64.8%, Opposition party unification theory 57.2%, Ahn Cheol-soo phenomenon indicates expectation for new political forces

■ The current 2012 presidential election landscape is unfolding around the theory of judging the current ruling party and the theory of unifying the opposition parties as an alternative. As can be seen in [Figure 10], with the presidential approval rating falling from the 40% range to the 30% range in 2011, support for the theory of changing the administration has exceeded 60%. Although it slightly decreased from 61.9% in the April survey to 55.8% in the July survey, it rose again to 67.2% after the October 26 by-election, and currently, about 64.8% agree with the necessity of judging the administration.

■ As one of the alternatives, more than half of the public agrees with the theory of unifying the opposition parties. In the April survey, 57.2% agreed, followed by 53.9% in the July survey, 59.3% in the October survey, and 57.2% in the current December survey showed positive sentiment towards opposition party unification. This confirms a stable level of support for the judgment of the administration theory and opposition party unification.

Democratic United Party: Support 35.4%, No interest 40.1%, Opposition 18.9%. The challenge is to establish itself as an alternative.

■ However, the current unification of opposition parties does not seem to be demonstrating a clear presence as an alternative. Despite majority support for the opposition party unification theory, only 35.4% supported the unification of the Democratic Party, the Civic Participation Party, and the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions, which was carried out under the banner of opposition party unification, while 18.9% opposed it. However, the remaining 40.1% responded that they had no interest in the Democratic Party's unification decision. While there is broad consensus on the principle of opposition party unification, the approval rating for the unified Democratic United Party is below 30%. Among Democratic Party supporters, 60.7% expressed support for the current unification of the Democratic United Party, while the rest opposed it or reserved their position. The biggest challenge for the Democratic United Party will be how to translate the consensus held by a majority on the opposition party unification theory into support for the current Democratic United Party.

Third Party: Mixed expectations and concerns - Necessary 49.1%, Ultimately depends on Ahn Cheol-soo's participation

■ Another alternative being considered is the promotion of a third force, a third party, represented by Ahn Cheol-soo. Following the emergence of the "Ahn Cheol-soo phenomenon" in September, a survey asking whether a party different from existing parties like the Grand National Party and the Democratic Party was needed showed an upward trend: 44.2% in September, 47.8% in October, and 51.3% in November. However, in the December survey, the proportion of agreement on the necessity of such a party stopped its upward trend, standing at 49.1%. This is likely due to Ahn Cheol-soo's press conference earlier this month stating he was not considering founding a new party or running in the general election, which dampened expectations for an "Ahn Cheol-soo new party," as well as the emergence of unified new parties within the existing opposition, such as the reorganization of the opposition parties into the Democratic United Party and the Unified Progressive Party.

Grand National Party's Innovation Direction: Relaunch 22.1%, Maintain and Innovate Party 50.2%, Don't know 27.7%, Grand National Party Supporters: Maintain Party 64.6%

■ Furthermore, in the process of preparing for the presidential election, both the ruling and opposition parties are focusing on consolidating their ranks. Following the resignation of former party leader Hong Joon-pyo, former presidential candidate Park Geun-hye is leading the emergency response committee to formulate innovation measures for the Grand National Party. While the reformist faction prefers the dissolution and relaunch of the Grand National Party, the pro-Park faction prefers maintaining the party while implementing substantial reforms. Park Geun-hye has promised reforms that go beyond a relaunch. Survey results show that 22.1% of all respondents prefer a relaunch, while 50.2% prefer to maintain the party and innovate it. Notably, 64.6% of Grand National Party supporters responded that the party should be maintained while undergoing reform. This result indicates that public opinion favors substantive change and stability of the party system over superficial changes.

[Figure 10] Attitudes towards Judgment of Administration Theory/Opposition Party Unification Theory and Democratic United Party Unification

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[Figure 11] Evaluation of Suitability of Grand National Party and Opposition Candidates

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4) General Election and Presidential Election: Will the General Election Vote Carry Over to the Presidential Election?

■ For next year's general election, the current situation suggests a favorable environment for the opposition parties rather than the ruling party due to strong sentiment for judging the administration. If the effect of Ahn Cheol-soo persists until the presidential election, both the general election and the presidential election are expected to be favorable to the opposition. Furthermore, given that the general election serves as a preliminary battle for the presidential election, it is clear that the party that wins the general election will have an advantage in the presidential election.

■ However, this cannot be absolute. In the 2002 elections, although not this survey, respondents who indicated they would vote for the Grand National Party in both the general election and the presidential election were 15%, and those who would vote for an opposition candidate in both elections were around 18%. Only about three out of ten people said they would vote for candidates of the same political leaning in both elections. Those who responded that it depends on the candidate accounted for 54%. Ultimately, candidate selection in the general election and the presidential election appears to be important.

■ Moreover, the choices of the active unaffiliated voters, who are actively voicing their opinions, and the smart centrist voters with anti-Grand National Party and non-Democratic/non-opposition leanings will determine the outcome of the general and presidential elections. Under the current conditions where anti-Grand National Party and non-Democratic/non-opposition sentiments coexist, it is possible that the choices of these centrist unaffiliated voters may lead to votes for balance and checks rather than full support for a specific force. This is a point worth closely observing in the 2012 election season.

[Figure 12] Difference in Voting Preferences between General Election and Presidential Election