[Public Opinion Brief No. 106] Ratification of the Korea-US FTA and the Subsequent Political Situation

[Public Opinion Brief No. 106] EAI · YTN · JoongAng Ilbo · Korea Research Joint Project November Regular Public Opinion Barometer Survey

1. Public Opinion on the Surprise Vote for the Korea-US FTA

2. The Political Situation After the Korea-US FTA

3. Appendix: Security Consciousness One Year After the Yeonpyeong Island Shelling

【The Political Situation After the Surprise Vote on the Korea-US FTA】

1. Evaluation of the Gains and Losses of the Korea-US FTA and Procedural Legitimacy

Korea-US FTA: 41.9% believe it will benefit national interests, 37.8% believe it will be detrimental; Surprise vote deemed wrong by 51.3%

■ The public is uneasy about the surprise vote on the Korea-US FTA. While a majority in Korean society had supported the conclusion of the Korea-US FTA as a trading nation, concerns about rising medical costs due to privatization of medical services and criticisms of the treaty's unequal nature have intensified during the recent FTA debate, leading to a slight decrease in public support for the National Assembly's ratification of the FTA in the October survey. In this survey, the evaluation of gains and losses was evenly split, with 41.9% believing it would benefit national interests and 37.8% believing it would be detrimental.

■ However, regarding the surprise vote by the ruling party, 25.8% evaluated it as correct, while 51.3% evaluated it as incorrect, with the latter more than double the former. While opinions were divided on the substantive legitimacy, the procedural legitimacy was overwhelmingly viewed negatively.

[Figure 1] Evaluation of Gains and Losses of the Korea-US FTA and the Surprise Vote

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Korea-US FTA Public Opinion Polarized, Intensifying Ideological Conflict

■ The survey results indicate that perceptions of the Korea-US FTA are influenced by ideological and political stances, potentially intensifying ideological and political conflicts. Specifically, in the evaluation of gains and losses, 53.7% of the ideologically progressive group perceived it as detrimental, while 56.9% of the conservative group viewed it as beneficial to national interests. By generation, negative evaluations were dominant among those in their 20s and 30s, while positive evaluations were overwhelming among those in their 50s and 60s. Support for political parties also showed a clear divide: positive evaluations were prevalent among supporters of the Grand National Party, while negative evaluations were dominant among supporters of the Democratic Party and the Unified Progressive Party (scheduled for party registration on the 5th of next month, comprising the Democratic Labor Party, the People's Participation Party, and defectors from the Progressive New Party including Roh Hoe-chan, Sim Sang-jung, and Cho Seung-soo).

■ However, among the middle ground (ideologically centrist, unaffiliated with any party, and those in their 40s), opinions were evenly split between positive and negative perceptions regarding the gains and losses of the Korea-US FTA. In contrast, for the surprise vote, evaluations of it being "wrong" exceeded a majority among the ideologically centrist, unaffiliated, and the middle-aged group in their 40s. While public opinion diverged based on ideological and political stances regarding the substantive legitimacy, the public reaction to the procedural legitimacy was notably indifferent. This is expected to place considerable pressure on the government and ruling party's management of state affairs.

[Table 1] Gap in Korea-US FTA Gains/Losses Evaluation and Perception of Surprise Vote by Ideology, Generation, and Party Support (%)

2. Expected Effects and Concerns Regarding the Korea-US FTA

Expected Effects: Increased exports to the US (23.9%), higher economic growth rate (16.4%), lower prices (15.4%)

Concerns: Damage to agriculture and livestock industries (56.3%), privatization of the medical sector (13.3%), increased dependence on the US (11.0%)

■ Among the expected effects of concluding the Korea-US FTA, respondents cited increased exports of key industries such as automobiles at 23.9%, contributions to the Korean economy's growth rate at a macroeconomic level at 16.4%, and lower prices at 15.4%. Responses citing effects on foreign direct investment and job creation accounted for 11.5%, and contributions to strengthening the Korea-US alliance were only 8.0%.

■ Conversely, a significant majority of respondents, 56.3%, expressed concern about the impact on the agriculture and livestock sectors. Concerns about the privatization of the medical sector accounted for 13.3%, increased dependence on the US for 11.0%, a rise in trade deficits for 4.7%, and damage to vulnerable manufacturing sectors such as medical supplies and cosmetics for 1.5%. These results underscore the need for the government's follow-up measures to focus on mitigating the impact on the agriculture and livestock sectors and alleviating concerns about the public sector, including healthcare.

[Figure 2] Expected Effects and Concerns

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2. Future Policy Response Directions and Outlook

1) Government Response Direction: "Measures for Affected Sectors" (54.9%), Renegotiation of ISDS (20.5%), Complete Abolition (10.1%)

- Serious distrust in government measures: "Skeptical about renegotiation of ISDS and promises for damage mitigation measures" (53.9%)

■ With a majority of public opinion disapproving of the procedural legitimacy, protests and demonstrations condemning the surprise vote and demanding the withdrawal of ratification have continued since the ratification. Amidst growing attention to the possibility of a second candlelight vigil situation, when asked about how the government and political circles should proceed, over half of the respondents (54.9%) chose "Measures for Affected Sectors." "Renegotiation of the Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) system," which carries a high risk of infringing sovereignty, was chosen by 20.5%, and "Complete Abolition" was chosen by 11.7%.

■ The fact that a majority of public opinion favors focusing on measures for affected sectors, rather than the withdrawal and abolition demanded by anti-FTA protests, offers some relief to the government and ruling party, which pushed for ratification unilaterally. However, given the high level of distrust in government measures, the government must consider the possibility of facing public backlash due to complacent responses. When asked about the extent to which they trust the government's promises of "ISDS renegotiation and measures for affected sectors," only 25.0% responded with trust, while 53.9% expressed skepticism. A significant 21.0% remained undecided.

[Figure 3] Evaluation of Government Response Direction and Trust in Government Measures

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2) Opposition Parties Should Parallel Street Protests with Budget Processing (54.5%)

Need for Moderation: Legitimacy of street protests acknowledged, but concerns about parliamentary paralysis also coexist

■ When asked how opposition parties should respond, a majority of respondents (54.5%) favored a parallel approach of participating in parliamentary schedules, including budget processing, alongside street protests. This suggests that public opinion acknowledges the legitimacy of street protests and the distrust in government measures, which is forming the basis for the ongoing demonstrations in downtown Seoul and the opposition parties' street actions. Public opinion supporting the withdrawal of street protests and a return to parliamentary proceedings, such as budget processing, accounted for 28.4%, while only 9.6% called for a complete boycott of parliamentary schedules and engagement in street protests.

[Figure 4] Opposition Party Response Strategy

■ However, the high proportion of public opinion favoring parallel participation in parliamentary schedules, including budget processing, also reflects concerns about the prolonged parliamentary paralysis that has hindered budget deliberations during political confrontations between the ruling and opposition parties throughout the current government's term. This highlights the need for the opposition parties to exercise appropriate moderation and cautious engagement.

■ Reflecting on the 2008 candlelight vigils, the government's mishandling and hardline response, coupled with widespread distrust in the negotiation process, significantly amplified political resistance. Furthermore, given the high public criticism regarding the procedural legitimacy of the current ratification and the incumbent government's lame-duck status in its final term, the effectiveness of the government and ruling party's concrete measures and sincere efforts to fulfill promises of renegotiation and damage mitigation will be crucial for resolving the political situation.

【The Political Situation After the Korea-US FTA】

1. Impact on the Existing Political Sphere: Support bases for ruling and opposition parties have solidified, resulting in minimal changes in approval ratings.

1) Presidential Approval Rating and Ruling Party Support: No significant changes

■ Despite rising public criticism of the government and ruling party's surprise ratification and significant distrust in their policies, there have been no major changes in the presidential approval rating or the ruling party's support. The presidential approval rating stood at 37.1%, showing little difference from the 36.3% recorded in the October survey. The Grand National Party's support rating also saw a slight decrease from 35.8% in the October survey to 34.4%, a difference of 1.3 percentage points, which falls within the margin of error.

■ Since the beginning of the year, following the April 27 by-elections, the failure of the Seoul free school lunch referendum, the defeat in the October 26 Seoul by-elections, and the emergence of the Ahn Cheol-soo phenomenon, the support base of the Grand National Party and conservatives has become more cohesive, while critical public opinion towards the current government has also significantly consolidated. Consequently, despite the worsening public sentiment due to the surprise ratification of the Korea-US FTA, no further decline in approval ratings has been observed.

[Figure 5] Trend of National Approval Ratings

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[Figure 5] Trend of Party Support Ratings

2) Democratic Party's Support Stagnant, Unified Progressive Party Enters as a Viable Party

■ For the Democratic Party, there have been no significant changes in its party support ratings before and after the Korea-US FTA. Following its victory in the April 27 by-elections, the Democratic Party's support rating rose to the 30% range. However, due to the free school lunch referendum and the arrest of the Superintendent of Education, Gwak No-hyun, its support rating declined to 19.4% in the September survey. Nevertheless, after leading the campaign for the unified opposition candidate Park Won-soon in the October 26 by-elections, its support rating rose to 27.9% in the survey conducted immediately after the election. In this latest survey, however, it decreased by 2.8 percentage points to 25.1%, remaining within the margin of error.

■ The conclusion of the Korea-US FTA during the Roh Moo-hyun administration, coupled with internal divisions within the Democratic Party between opponents and negotiators, and the emergence of responsibility arguments against Governors Ahn Hee-jung and Song Young-gil, led to discord, preventing the absorption of public opinion opposing the surprise passage of the FTA into its own support base. Meanwhile, the Unified Progressive Party, composed of defectors from the Democratic Labor Party, People's Participation Party, and Progressive Justice Party, which is set to officially register as a political party in December, garnered 10.5% support, entering double-digit approval ratings. The integration of the Democratic Labor Party (which had been hovering around 3-5% support), the People's Participation Party (1-3%), and the Unified Progressive Alliance led by former Progressive Justice Party leaders Noh Hoe-chan, Sim Sang-jung, and Cho Seung-soo, is expected to become a variable in future political dynamics.

[Correction] In EAI Policy Brief No. 105, we reported the party support rates for October as follows: Grand National Party 29.7%, Democratic Party 21.0%, and independents 38.7%. We hereby correct these figures to 34.4%, 27.9%, and independents 21.2%, respectively. Generally, party support rates are calculated by summing the results of a primary question and a follow-up question asking those who stated no party affiliation, "Which party do you think is better?" The previously reported figures did not include the results of this follow-up question. We have confirmed that this was an error in the data processing by the polling agency, Korea Research, which typically occurs during the statistical table generation process. Based on the corrected figures, instead of interpreting a decline in the Grand National Party's support and an increase in the independent segment, it is more appropriate to view the increase in the Democratic Party's support and a decrease in the independent segment following the October 26 by-elections. Accordingly, the content of Issue No. 105 has been revised. We will strive for greater accuracy in future data reporting and analysis.

2. Prospects for the Next Election and Party Realignment Following the Ratification of the Korea-US FTA

1) Presidential Election Support: Strengthening of the Ahn Cheol-soo Phenomenon

Simple Presidential Election Support: Park 29.8%, Ahn 27.3%, the gap narrows to 2.5 percentage points

■ Examining the changes in support for potential presidential candidates following the surprise ratification of the Korea-US FTA, the most notable observation is the strengthening of the Ahn Cheol-soo phenomenon. In a simple multi-candidate scenario, Ahn Cheol-soo's support has shown a continuous upward trend, rising from 20.1% in the September survey to 25.9% in October and 27.3% in November.

■ Conversely, Park Geun-hye has been unable to break out of a stagnant support level since receiving 32.0% in the September survey, when the "Ahn wind" emerged. In subsequent surveys, her simple support dropped to 31.1% in October and 29.8% in November. As Park's support stagnated, Ahn Cheol-soo's support increased, narrowing the gap between the two candidates to within the margin of error in simple support polls.

■ In contrast, opposition candidates such as Democratic Party leader Sohn Hak-kyu and Moon Jae-in, who were considered the leading opposition figures before the emergence of the Ahn Cheol-soo phenomenon, as well as Grand National Party Governor Kim Moon-soo and former party leader Chung Mong-joon, are trailing significantly in the race for the next presidential election, with support ratings hovering around 3-5%.

[Table 2] Overall Support for Next Presidential Election (%);

2) 1:1 Matchup: Ahn Cheol-soo 50.1% vs. Park Geun-hye 38.4%

- Support gap doubles compared to the previous month

■ In a hypothetical one-on-one matchup, the power of the "Ahn wind" is even more pronounced. In the September survey, the race was extremely close with Park Geun-hye at 43.7% and Ahn Cheol-soo at 42.8%. By the October survey, Ahn Cheol-soo had taken the lead at 47.7% to Park Geun-hye's 42.6%, widening the gap within the margin of error. In the current survey, the gap has widened to 11.7 percentage points, with Ahn Cheol-soo garnering 50.1% support compared to Park Geun-hye's 38.4%, who showed a downward trend. Park Geun-hye's recent efforts to increase engagement with vulnerable demographics, such as those in their 20s, and her participation in the Korea-US FTA ratification vote appear to be strategic moves to counter these changes.

[Figure 6] 1:1 Hypothetical Matchup: Support Rate Changes

Widening support gap among centrist voters

- While the gap slightly narrowed among independents, it widened among ideological centrists and those in their 40s.

■ While younger generations and progressives tend to support Ahn Cheol-soo, and older generations and conservatives support Ahn Cheol-soo, the pattern of support remains consistent. Park Geun-hye's support is consolidated through the mobilization of conservatives and Grand National Party supporters, while Ahn Cheol-soo relies on strong support from progressives and opposition party supporters. As shown in [Table 3], the direct cause for the widening support gap in this survey can be attributed to the increased difference in support among centrist voters compared to September and October. This suggests a potential shift towards strengthening Park Geun-hye's centrist strategy.

[Table 3] Changes in 1:1 Matchup Support Rates by Ideology, Generation, and Party

3. Rising Expectations for a Third Party, Indifference to Realignment within Existing Political Circles

1) From lukewarm public opinion to growing consensus on the need for a third party

- Consensus on the necessity of a third party at 51.3%, increasing for two consecutive months

■ Following the ratification of the Korea-US FTA, movements for realignment among political parties are actively underway. Furthermore, various projections and scenarios regarding the possibility of an Ahn Cheol-soo new party are being discussed in the media. The free school lunch referendum process demonstrated the political parties' loss of adjustment and compromise functions, ultimately leading to the referendum's failure. Similarly, the FTA ratification process replicated abnormal scenes, including a closed-door plenary session, a partial vote, and the use of tear gas, instead of parliamentary consensus and negotiation.

■ Amidst growing public criticism of the unresponsive ruling party and incompetent opposition party, expectations for a third party are rising along with support for Ahn Cheol-soo. As shown in [Figure 7], when asked if a new party is needed to replace existing parties like the Grand National Party and the Democratic Party, the response favoring a third party was 44.2% in the September survey, with 52.2% opposing it. However, in the October survey, support for a third party rose to 47.2%, equaling the 47.8% who opposed it. In the current survey, a majority of 51.3% responded that a third party is needed, while only 44.1% expressed the opposite opinion.

■ Disappointment with existing political parties appears to be strengthening the need for the establishment of a third party. The media attention given to diagnoses of the possibility of a third party through figures like Buddhist monk Beopjeon, Ahn Cheol-soo's mentor, and former minister Yoon Yeo-joon, reflects these shifts in public opinion.

[Figure 6] Consensus on the Need for a Third Party

2) Indifference to attempts at party realignment within existing parties

Integration of the Democratic Party and Moon Jae-in, Lee Hae-chan (Innovation and Integration): Support 31.8%, Opposition 20.2%, No Interest 45.7%

Integration of the DLP, PPI, Noh Hoe-chan, Sim Sang-jung (Progressive Integration): Support 29.3%, Opposition 23.9%, No Interest 45.1%

■ In contrast to the growing consensus on the need for a third party, public opinion on integration efforts within the opposition parties is mixed. Regarding the integration of the Democratic Party, Moon Jae-in's faction, and Lee Hae-chan's Innovation and Integration group, which is currently the focus of attention within the opposition, support stands at 31.8% and opposition at 20.2%. While support is slightly higher, the response of "no interest" at 45.7% indicates a lack of significant public engagement.

■ Already on November 20th, the Democratic Labor Party led by Lee Jung-hee, the People's Participation Party led by Yoo Si-min, and the Unified Progressive Alliance led by Noh Hoe-chan, Sim Sang-jung, and Cho Seung-soo agreed to form a new unified progressive party, with official registration scheduled for December 5th. However, despite the interest within the progressive camp, this initiative is not receiving as much attention as the merger talks between the Democratic Party and the pro-Roh faction. Support for the formation of the unified progressive party is only 29.3%, with 23.9% in opposition, while a significant 45.1% expressed no interest, indicating widespread indifference.

Park Se-il's New Party: Support 6.8%, Opposition 24.4%, No Interest 65.2%

■ Public reaction to the attempt to form a new centrist party led by former lawmaker Park Se-il, which has garnered attention for its potential to split the conservative base, is even more lukewarm. Support for the initiative was only 6.8%, with 24.4% in opposition, and a striking 65.2% expressed no interest. Although officially advocating for a centrist party, Park Se-il's past affiliation with the Grand National Party and his advocacy for conservative reform suggest that this move might be seen as a fissure within the conservative base rather than a genuine centrist endeavor. However, given the strong cohesive force of the Grand National Party and Park Geun-hye among their supporters, securing and expanding a support base for this new party is expected to be challenging.

[Figure 7] Attitudes Towards the Formation of New Parties and Integration of Existing Political Forces (5)

【Supplementary Note: One Year After the Cheonan Incident】

1. Evaluation of the Government's Response to North Korea's Military Provocations: Unchanged at 62.4%

■ One year has passed since the sinking of the ROKS Cheonan and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island by North Korea in 2010. The government and military have made efforts to establish deterrence and preparedness against North Korean military attacks. However, the public does not perceive significant improvements in the government's response posture to North Korean military provocations. Only 25.4% responded that the government's preparedness has improved compared to a year ago, while 62.4% stated it remains unchanged, and 9.1% believed it has worsened, indicating a predominantly lukewarm or negative assessment.

[Figure 7] Evaluation of the Government's Preparedness for North Korean Military Attacks

2. Security Anxiety Persists

- "Security is unstable" decreased from 81.5% immediately after the Yeonpyeong shelling in November 2010 to 61.0% one year later.

■ Tracking changes in security anxiety since January 2010, the proportion of respondents who felt insecure stood at 37.5% in January 2010. This figure rose to 59.6% after the government's investigation announcement regarding the Cheonan incident and surged to 81.5% immediately following the Yeonpyeong shelling. Subsequently, the proportion of those feeling insecure has declined to 70.0% in the January 2011 survey and 64.2% in the September survey, reaching 61.0% in the current survey. While over 60% of the public still experiences security anxiety, there has been a continuous downward trend since the military attack last year.

[Figure 8] Changes in Perceived Security Level (%)

3. Worsening Image of North Korea

- "North Korea is an enemy" increased from 8.0% in 2005 to 23.9% in 2011.

■ As a result of North Korea's nuclear development and military provocations, negative perceptions of North Korea have become widespread. In a 2005 survey, when asked to choose two terms that best describe their perception of North Korea, only 30.5% felt a sense of shared community ('Us'), which decreased to 20.5% in the October 2010 survey and further to 16.4% in the current survey. The image of 'Brother' has also declined from 25.2% in 2005 to 13.2% in the current survey. In contrast, the image of 'Neighbor' remained relatively stable, decreasing slightly from 21.0% in 2005 to 20.1% in 2011, and 'Southerner' increased slightly from 10.0% in 2005 to 11.8% in 2011. However, the perception of North Korea as an 'Enemy' has significantly increased from 8.0% in the 2005 survey to 23.9% in the current survey.

[Figure 9] Changes in Image of North Korea (%)

4. Growing Instability in Perceptions of the ROK-US Alliance

- Declines in April due to Agent Orange controversy, and in November due to Korea-US FTA and increase in crimes by US Forces Korea personnel.

■ Amidst the increasing security threat from North Korea, support for the ROK-US alliance had shown an upward trend. However, in 2011, the Agent Orange controversy in April and media attention on crimes by US Forces Korea personnel in October appear to have strengthened negative public sentiment towards the US and the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), leading to a decline in support.

■ Support for strengthening the ROK-US alliance rose from 34.7% in January 2010 to 43.2% in the July survey and 48.6% after the Yeonpyeong incident. However, it dropped to 33.0% in the survey following the Agent Orange controversy in April 2011. As US military authorities and the government actively engaged in investigations and disclosures, support rebounded to 46.7% in the August survey. Nevertheless, over the following two months, frequent media reports on sexual assault, theft, and assault cases involving US Forces Korea personnel caused support to fall again to around 33.4%.

■ Despite the government and military's efforts to enhance defense readiness and the easing of security anxieties following the Cheonan incident and Yeonpyeong shelling, hostility and distance towards North Korea have significantly increased among the public, while friendly images such as a sense of community and brotherhood, emphasized by previous administrations, have considerably weakened. In a situation where anxieties about the North Korean threat have not been fully resolved, we have observed that attitudes towards the ROK-US alliance, which has served as a lever for Korean Peninsula security, are being influenced by factors such as the Agent Orange controversy and crimes by US Forces Korea personnel. Overall, public sentiment remains unstable, fluctuating without fully dispelling the anxieties that emerged after the Yeonpyeong shelling.

[Figure 10] Attitudes Towards Desirable ROK-US Relations