[Public Opinion Brief No. 105] Implications and Repercussions of the October 26 Seoul Mayoral By-election Results

[Public Opinion Brief No. 105] Joint Project of EAI, YTN, JoongAng Ilbo, and Korea Research October Regular Public Opinion Barometer Survey

Complexity and Uncertainty of the Electoral Landscape

1. Significance of the October 26 By-elections

2. Political Repercussions of the October 26 By-elections

3. Policy Repercussions of the October 26 By-elections

【Evaluation of the October 26 By-elections】

1. Factors Behind Park Won-soon's Victory in the Seoul Mayoral Election

■ The October 26 by-elections concluded with the victory of independent candidate Park Won-soon for Seoul Mayor and the Grand National Party winning in 8 out of 11 local government head races. Interpretations of the election results vary. Seoul Mayor Park Won-soon described it as "the citizens defeating power," the Democratic Party labeled it "a victory for the opposition bloc," while Grand National Party Chairman Hong Joon-pyo, citing the party's performance in the closely watched local government head elections, defined it as a "draw." What is the voters' assessment?

Expectations for New Politics > Anti-MB Sentiment > Ahn Cheol-soo Effect

■ Regarding the reasons for Park Won-soon's victory, 34.1% responded that it was because he seemed likely to pursue new politics different from established politicians. Next, 17.2% cited criticism of President Lee and the government, and 16.9% attributed it to the unification with Professor Ahn Cheol-soo and Professor Ahn's support, which garnered significant attention. Meanwhile, support for the opposition's unification and backing from the opposition bloc was cited by only 13.2%. During the actual election campaign, the Democratic Party and progressive parties effectively countered the negative campaigning by candidate Na Kyung-won and the Grand National Party, taking the offensive. However, this appears to have been overshadowed by factors such as Professor Ahn Cheol-soo's endorsement. On the other hand, the response that it was due to the mistakes of candidate Na Kyung-won and the Grand National Party was the lowest at 11.5%.

■ Park Won-soon's victory in Seoul appears to be the result of a newly emerging confrontation between "established political forces and new political forces," expressed as the "Ahn phenomenon," unlike previous elections that were framed as a contest between "stability versus judgment" and "the Grand National Party versus the united opposition." This foreshadows that the 2012 general and presidential elections will also be contested under a complex framework of regime change and political force change.

[Figure 1] Factors Behind Park Won-soon's Victory

2. Overall Assessment: Who Won the October 26 By-elections?

No Winner 32.2%, Civil Society 20.0%, United Opposition 12.8%, Grand National Party 13.5%, Democratic Party 7.6%, Don't Know 14%

■ Regarding the overall results of the by-elections, there is a coexistence of views seeing it as a victory for the anti-Grand National Party coalition and cynical assessments. When asked, "Who do you believe won the October 26 by-elections held in 42 regions nationwide?", 32.2% responded that no one could be declared a winner, 20.0% believed civil society won, 12.8% considered it a victory for the united opposition, 13.5% saw it as a Grand National Party victory, and 7.6% viewed it as a Democratic Party victory. A significant 14.0% also responded that they did not know.

Victory for the Anti-Grand National Party Coalition in a Party Confrontation, with Numerous Cynical Assessments

■ Viewing the election as a confrontation between the Grand National Party and the anti-Grand National Party coalition (civil society + united opposition), it is clear that the coalition forces won. Combining the responses identifying civil society, the united opposition, and the Democratic Party as the victors yields 40.4%, significantly exceeding the 7.6% who believed the Grand National Party won. Considering the political significance of the Seoul mayoral election, Chairman Hong Joon-pyo's assessment of a "draw" based on the Grand National Party's performance in the local government head elections appears to be distant from public opinion.

■ However, the fact that 32.2% believe that no one won the election is noteworthy. Additionally, 14.0% responded that they did not know. These cynical assessments are primarily observed among Grand National Party supporters. Among Grand National Party supporters, 32.6% responded that there was no winner, and 13.1% did not know. This likely implies a form of political non-compliance, refusing to acknowledge the defeat of their supported party.

Cynical Assessments Prevalent Among Unaffiliated Voters and Those in Their 20s and 40s

■ However, as shown in [Table 1], the fact that among unaffiliated voters (those without party affiliation), 40.3% responded that it could not be determined who won, and 17.5% did not know, is a point that the winning coalition forces should consider. This is particularly concerning given that unaffiliated voters are not supporters of the losing party.

■ Notably, a considerable portion of the younger demographic, who played a crucial role in Park Won-soon's victory, also expressed reserved opinions. While only 24.1% of those in their 30s responded that there was no winner, and only 10.9% did not know, 30.8% of those in their 20s stated there was no winner, and 20.8% responded that they did not know. Among those in their 40s, 28.2% believed no one could be declared a winner, and 14.4% responded that they did not know. This means that approximately four out of ten respondents expressed a reserved opinion regarding the election's winner.

■ While the expectation for new politics, expressed through the Ahn Cheol-soo phenomenon, was the primary factor in the Seoul mayoral election victory, the ruling party's negative campaigning in the early to mid-stages of the election had some impact. Furthermore, as Park Won-soon also shifted to negative campaigning, the overall election process became muddled. In this context, it is inferred that Park Won-soon failed to present a clear vision and concrete strategy for new politics, leading to a considerable number of cynical assessments.

[Figure 2] Who Won the October 26 By-elections in 42 Regions?

[Table 1] Assessment of Election Winner by Party Affiliation

【Political Repercussions of the October 26 By-elections】

1. Repercussions on the Next Presidential Election Landscape

1) Cracks in Park Geun-hye's Dominance and the Momentum of the Ahn Phenomenon

Head-to-head Presidential Approval Ratings: Park 31.1%, Ahn 25.9%, Gap Narrows to 5.2%p

■ The most significant impact of the October 26 by-election results on the future presidential election landscape is the tangible crack it has created in the "Park Geun-hye dominance" narrative that has dominated media coverage. In simple head-to-head presidential approval ratings, former Representative Park remained largely unchanged at 31.1% compared to the previous month, while Ahn Cheol-soo garnered 25.9%, narrowing the gap to 5.2 percentage points. This represents more than a halving of the 12% point gap from the September survey.

■ The most significant casualties are opposition leaders such as Representative Sohn Hak-kyu and Chairman Moon Jae-in. Representative Sohn maintained second place after former Representative Park until July, but ceded the position to Chairman Moon Jae-in in August. In the October survey, he dropped to sixth place with only 3.2% support. Chairman Moon Jae-in, who had shown an upward trend before the Ahn phenomenon, also began to decline, with 5.1% support. This appears to be the result of anti-Grand National Party voters largely shifting their support to Ahn Cheol-soo and the party's loss in the Dong-gu constituency mayoral election in Busan, which had generated high expectations.

[Table 2] Overall Head-to-Head Presidential Approval Ratings (%)

1:1 Matchup: Ahn 47.7% vs. Park 42.6%, a Reversal

■ In a one-on-one hypothetical matchup, the power of the Ahn phenomenon has intensified. In the September survey, former Representative Park led Ahn Cheol-soo 43.7% to 42.8% in a very close race. However, in the current survey, the results have reversed, with Ahn Cheol-soo leading Park 47.7% to 42.6%, widening the gap within the margin of error.

■ The pattern of younger generations and progressives supporting Ahn Cheol-soo, while older generations and conservatives support him, continues. Compared to the October survey, former Representative Park is maintaining his position by consolidating support from conservatives and Grand National Party supporters, and appealing to moderates. In contrast, Ahn Cheol-soo is widening the support gap among progressives, opposition party supporters, and unaffiliated voters.

[Figure 3] 1:1 Hypothetical Matchup: Changes in Approval Ratings

[Table 3] Changes in 1:1 Matchup Approval Ratings by Ideology, Generation, and Party Affiliation

2) The Bright and Dark Sides of the Park Geun-hye Phenomenon

Cracks in the Park Geun-hye Dominance Narrative: Shift from a Pro/Con Park Geun-hye Framework to a Park vs. Ahn Competition

■ With Ahn Cheol-soo's endorsement of Park Won-soon gaining renewed attention in the final stages of the election, Ahn Cheol-soo's political trajectory is now drawing focus. In a one-on-one contest, Ahn has taken the lead, making the "Park Geun-hye dominance" narrative, which has gone unchallenged since the current administration took office, increasingly untenable. Ahn Cheol-soo's rise highlights former Representative Park Geun-hye's expansion challenges, particularly with his advantage in the Seoul metropolitan area and significant vote share in the Busan/Gyeongnam region. Despite the limitation that Ahn Cheol-soo's emergence is not yet a solidified reality, it signifies a shift from a "pro/con Park Geun-hye" framework to a "competition with Ahn Cheol-soo."

■ In fact, the Park Geun-hye dominance narrative had already shown differences from a deterministic dominance narrative due to factors such as Park's entrenched conservative image, limitations in expansion, and checks from the pro-Lee faction. Therefore, the assessment of this dominance being challenged is not entirely new. In other words, there were variables that made it difficult to consider the outcome of the next presidential election as predetermined. Nevertheless, the Park Geun-hye dominance narrative exerted influence largely because the absence of a strong opposition contender meant the election was perceived as a pro/con contest regarding former Representative Park. However, with the emergence of a formidable competitor, the situation has now transitioned into a genuine competitive race, necessitating a shift from a relatively relaxed approach based on a solid lead to a more proactive and direct campaign.

The Resilience of the Park Geun-hye Phenomenon

■ However, it would be premature to conclude that the Ahn Cheol-soo phenomenon has only had a negative impact on former Representative Park or dealt a decisive blow to her presidential prospects. Above all, despite Ahn Cheol-soo's emergence, Park Geun-hye has maintained her approval ratings based on her strong support base, which is a hallmark of her political brand. She has demonstrated the most stable support base among current presidential contenders against the Ahn Cheol-soo surge. Unlike opposition candidates who have been relegated to minor contenders, former Representative Park has maintained stable approval ratings, paradoxically showcasing the strength of her support base. Furthermore, while the "Queen of Elections" image may have been tarnished by the loss in the Seoul mayoral election, her victories in most local government head by-elections outside of Seoul indicate that her influence in regions beyond the metropolitan area cannot be disregarded.

■ Moreover, the free school lunch referendum and the by-elections have helped consolidate the potential rival group within the party, creating an environment that is relatively favorable for the party's primary election. At one point, the party primary was considered a greater variable than the general election. With the resignation of Mayor Oh Se-hoon, Governor Kim Moon-soo's presidential bid has become virtually impossible. The Grand National Party supporters and conservatives, lacking other viable alternatives, are increasingly rallying behind former Representative Park. [Table 2] shows that in the 1:1 hypothetical matchup, former Representative Park's approval ratings are rising among conservatives and Grand National Party supporters, with a remarkable 84.5% loyalty shown among Grand National Party supporters.

■ The suitability rating for the Grand National Party's presidential nominee shows Park Geun-hye's clear lead, while the suitability rating for opposition presidential candidates is expected to be highly contested. In this survey, 56.9% responded that Park Geun-hye is suitable as the Grand National Party's presidential nominee, significantly ahead of Kim Moon-soo, who ranked second. In contrast, among the opposition, Ahn Cheol-soo leads with 30.9%. Representative Sohn Hak-kyu, whose support rose to 41.4% around the April 27 by-elections, has sharply declined to 16.1%. Support for Chairman Moon Jae-in was only 10.1%.

[Figure 4] Suitability Ratings for Grand National Party and Opposition Candidates

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3) The Bright and Dark Sides of the Ahn Cheol-soo Phenomenon: Limitations of Hypothetical Matchups and the Dilemma of Political Positioning

Avatar of Ahn Cheol-soo's New Politics?: "I hope he does not run" - 50.3% Overall, 48.1% Among Unaffiliated Voters

■ While Ahn Cheol-soo's support has surged due to antipathy towards established politics and expectations for new politics, propelling him to the forefront of the next presidential race, it is hasty to interpret this "Park Geun-hye vs. Ahn Cheol-soo" dynamic as a realistic political confrontation. This is because he has not officially announced his intention to enter politics, nor do the public fully recognize and accept him as a realistic political leader yet. In fact, there is considerable lukewarm sentiment regarding his actual entry into politics.

■ Indeed, a majority of public opinion advises against Ahn Cheol-soo's presidential candidacy. In this survey, 50.3% responded that they hope he does not run for president, while only 28.0% expressed a desire for him to run. 21.8% responded that they did not know.

■ Notably, the sentiment urging Ahn Cheol-soo not to run is high among unaffiliated and moderate voters. Among Democratic Party supporters, 47.3% favored his candidacy, while 36.8% preferred he not run. Among supporters of other parties, which are predominantly progressive, 35.2% favored his candidacy and 38.7% preferred he not run. In contrast, among unaffiliated voters, only 27.3% believe he should run, with 48.1% expressing the opinion that he should not. Meanwhile, 66.7% of Grand National Party supporters, who perceive Ahn Cheol-soo's emergence as a threat, oppose his candidacy.

■ Although public support for Ahn Cheol-soo is rising in hypothetical matchups against Park Geun-hye, the fact that he is lukewarm about running for president suggests a need to consider whether he is being perceived not as a realistic political leader or presidential candidate, but rather as a conduit for expressing aspirations for new politics and deep dissatisfaction with established politics. Ultimately, he may be understood as an avatar for voters yearning for new politics, rather than as a realistic political figure. Therefore, public perception and evaluation of Ahn Cheol-soo as a realistic politician are likely to be readjusted after he officially declares his entry into politics. In this regard, it is necessary to view the impact of the Ahn Cheol-soo phenomenon not as a constant, but as a variable that may change depending on Ahn Cheol-soo's future actions.

[Figure 5] Public Opinion on Ahn Cheol-soo's Presidential Candidacy and Future Path if He Runs

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Is He the Hope for a New Politics? Or the Key Player for Regime Change? The Dilemma of Selecting a Political Position

■ Even if he runs, the issue of whether to unify with opposition candidates is also a point of contention. This presents the greatest dilemma for Ahn Cheol-soo in selecting his political position. Should he prioritize regime change, which is desired by the opposition party's supporters, or should he prioritize the replacement of the current political establishment, which is more desired by unaffiliated centrist voters? This is a difficult issue to compromise on. In other words, it is a dilemma arising from the conflicting interests of opposition party supporters and unaffiliated centrist voters who desire new politics.

■ If Ahn Cheol-soo runs for president and maintains an anti-Grand National Party stance, opposition party supporters will react negatively. Subsequently, if he expresses support for the Grand National Party, his approval ratings among centrist and unaffiliated voters will decline. This presents a dilemma. The case of Park Won-soon, who ran as an independent and faced confusion between these two stances during the early stages of the election, suggests that it is not easy to coordinate and compromise between these two positions.

■ Currently, public opinion favors independent candidacy with 42.0% support, while 37.6% believe it is better to unify with opposition candidates. Among opposition party supporters, there is strong positive sentiment towards unifying with opposition candidates, but among unaffiliated voters, a majority prefers independent candidacy. While 62.7% of Democratic Party supporters, who focus on regime change rather than a complete overhaul of the political establishment, prefer unifying with opposition candidates, only 33.3% of unaffiliated voters favor candidate unification, which is about half. Conversely, 45.2% prefer independent candidacy.

■ This is a result of changes in Ahn Cheol-soo's support base (see EAI Public Opinion Brief No. 103). While in the early stages of Ahn Cheol-soo's emergence, he represented public opinion for a change in the overall existing party system, after emphasizing an 'anti-Grand National Party' stance, the center of gravity of his support base shifted from unaffiliated centrist voters to opposition party supporters. Consequently, his approval ratings among centrist voters are only on par with those of former presidential candidate Park, and among unaffiliated voters, his support is just over half, contrasting with the overwhelming support from other opposition party supporters.

[Table 4] Attitude Towards Ahn Cheol-soo's Future Course by Party Support (%)

2. Possibility of Reforming the Existing Party System

Rising Public Opinion for Regime Judgment, Grand National Party Support Maintained and Democratic Party Rising, Slight Increase in Demand for a Third Party

■ As shown in [Figure 6], public opinion has already formed a high level of sentiment for regime judgment and a call for unified opposition since the beginning of the year. In the April survey, 61.9% supported regime judgment and 57.2% agreed with opposition unification, indicating a sentiment for judging the ruling party.

[Figure 6] Public Agreement with Regime Judgment/Opposition Unification/Need for a Third Party

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■ Looking at party support rates, despite the defeat in the October 26 by-elections, the Grand National Party maintained a support rate of 35.8%, similar to 33.0% last month, while the Democratic Party showed an upward trend following its victory in the by-elections. This result confirms the rallying of the Grand National Party's support base following the resident registration tax referendum and the October 26 by-elections, and the emergence of Ahn Cheol-soo.

■ Meanwhile, the Democratic Party's support rate rose to 27.9%, an increase of 8.5 percentage points from the September survey where it had fallen to 19.4%. The proportion of unaffiliated voters, however, significantly decreased. It appears that following the victory in the October 26 by-elections, where the opposition achieved unification and the Democratic Party led the election campaign for Park Won-soon's victory despite not fielding its own candidate, public opinion favoring the winner has largely translated into support for the Democratic Party.

■ Support for minor progressive parties such as the Democratic Labor Party (3.5%), Creative Korea Party (0.1%), Progressive Party (1.5%), and Participation Party (2.7%) remains stagnant. The current efforts by the Democratic Labor Party, the Participation Party, and the defectors from the Progressive Party including former leaders Noh Hoe-chan, Sim Sang-jung, and Cho Seung-soo to unify and create a new turning point are interpreted as attempts to escape this stagnant support and expand their presence within the opposition's unification.

[Figure 6] Grand National Party and Democratic Party Support Rates

[Correction] In EAI Public Opinion Brief No. 105, the party support rates for October were previously reported as Grand National Party 29.7%, Democratic Party 21.0%, and unaffiliated 38.7%. These figures are hereby corrected to 34.4%, 27.9%, and unaffiliated 21.2%, respectively. Generally, party support rates are calculated by summing the responses from an initial question and a follow-up question asking for the preferred party among those who initially stated they had no party affiliation. The previously reported figures were the results without the inclusion of the follow-up responses. It has been confirmed that this was an error in the data processing by the survey organization, Korea Research, which typically occurs in statistical table generation programs. Based on the corrected figures, it is more appropriate to interpret that the proportion of unaffiliated voters decreased and the Democratic Party's support rate increased following the October 26 by-elections, rather than interpreting that the Grand National Party's support rate declined and the unaffiliated segment increased. Accordingly, the content of Issue 105 has also been revised. We will strive for greater accuracy in future data reporting and analysis.

3. [MB Administration] Will Lame Duck Accelerate?

MB Approval Rating at 36.3%, Declining for Three Months Since Pyeongchang Olympics Bid

■ The defeat in the October 26 by-elections, combined with the declining presidential approval rating, is expected to act as a factor constraining government administration. In other words, the lame duck phenomenon is likely to accelerate further. In this survey, the president's approval rating for government administration was 36.3%, showing a continuous decline for three consecutive months.

■ Following the defeat in the April by-elections, the Pyeongchang Olympics bid temporarily boosted approval ratings. However, subsequent events such as the savings bank corruption scandal, corruption involving close associates, and the recent process of relocating the Naegok-dong presidential residence appear to have led to widespread fundamental distrust in the government's 'fair society' narrative. The ruling party's defeat in the October 26 elections further complicates the situation, making it difficult to lead the political landscape proactively.

[Figure 8] Trend of Government Approval Ratings

【Policy Issues】

1. Top National Agenda - Policies Related to Macroeconomics and Quality of Life Improvement are Important

■ Given that the recent by-elections were held following the failure and resignation of Mayor Oh Se-hoon in the resident registration tax referendum, which framed voters' demands for expanded welfare as 'populist free welfare,' this issue is expected to emerge as a major national agenda item not only during the election campaign but also in the subsequent presidential election race.

[Table 5] Top National Agenda

■ Above all, this indicates that the public prioritizes economic polarization as a national agenda item. In the surveys conducted in December and February following the Yeonpyeong shelling in 2010, the issue of economic polarization was the majority concern, although its prominence weakened, allowing national security or inter-Korean relations issues to emerge as major agendas. However, as the economic crisis deepened and the perceived economy worsened (see EAI Public Opinion Brief No. 103), the proportion of respondents citing the mitigation of economic polarization has risen again to the 30% range.

■ Furthermore, prior to 2010, the proportion of respondents who selected the improvement of quality of life as the top national agenda item was in the single digits. However, as issues affecting the quality of life, such as the housing crisis and soaring prices, have become severe, the demand for direct improvement in individual quality of life, not just addressing social polarization, has grown. In this survey, it received the second highest support for the first time. Economic growth followed as the next agenda item.

■ As the election season approaches, voices emphasizing political reform and national integration are growing. Therefore, the upcoming election period fundamentally requires the development of measures to address economic polarization and the economic downturn, which are the greatest sources of public anxiety, as well as solutions that can help improve the quality of life experienced by individuals. Concurrently, there is a need to establish political reform agendas to resolve political distrust and national integration agendas to alleviate political conflict during the election process.

2. Public Opinion Favors Swift Ratification of the Korea-US FTA, but Decreased Compared to February

Public opinion in favor of the prompt ratification of the Korea-U.S. FTA: 65.8% in February → 57.7% in October

■ Immediately after the October 26 by-elections concluded, the political arena became abuzz with the issue of the Korea-US FTA ratification. The government's movements have become more active to pursue FTA ratification in South Korea, following the US Congress's ratification. However, the current public opinion situation suggests that it may not be easy to achieve national consensus on the process of ratifying the Korea-US FTA.

■ In fact, as recently as February of this year, public opinion favoring the swift pursuit of the Korea-US FTA was at 65.8%, with only 27.9% expressing negative sentiment or reservations. However, as details of the renegotiation process became known, the number of respondents adopting a wait-and-see attitude increased. In this survey, support for swift ratification declined to 57.7%, while opposition to ratification increased to 34.3%.

[Figure 9] Attitude Towards Swift Ratification of the Korea-US FTA

The Korea-US FTA Issue Transitions from a Consensus Issue to a Conflict Issue

■ The attitude towards the National Assembly's ratification of the Korea-US FTA has shifted from a consensus issue with a high level of agreement to an issue that triggers ideological conflict, especially after the October 26 by-elections. This signifies that ratification by the National Assembly will not be easy. In the February survey, support for FTA ratification was high among conservatives and Grand National Party supporters at 74.4%, and while lower than among conservatives, a majority of centrists (64.3%) and progressives (59.7%) also supported swift ratification of the Korea-US FTA. In terms of party support, even among Democratic Party supporters, 59.9% showed strong support for National Assembly ratification, although lower than among Grand National Party supporters (82.3%).

■ However, in the October survey, while attitudes among centrist and conservative groups, and Grand National Party and unaffiliated supporters, did not change significantly, attitudes towards the Korea-US FTA changed considerably among progressive groups and Democratic Party supporters. Support among progressives dropped from 59.7% to 40.8%, and among Democratic Party supporters, the proportion favoring swift ratification fell from 59.9% to 38.8%, reversing from support to opposition. The discussion has now devolved into a typical dichotomy of the Grand National Party in favor and the Democratic Party opposed, making it even more difficult to find a resolution. This is because public attitudes towards the FTA appear to have shifted to being influenced by political partisanship, transforming it from a consensus issue into a conflict issue. Furthermore, it is not only the case that the ruling party and government just lost the Seoul by-election, but also that voices pointing to the lack of communication from the government and ruling party as a major cause of the defeat are high. Therefore, if they push forward ignoring the Democratic Party's opposition, there is a significant possibility of a backlash.

[Figure 10] Changes in Attitude Towards Swift Ratification of the Korea-US FTA by Ideology and Party Support

If Ratified, When? Within This Session 20.4%, Within This Year 27.5%, Within the Current Administration's Term 36.7%

■ When asked about the timing of ratification among those who support it, 20.4% preferred within the current session, 27.5% within this year, and 36.7% within the current administration's term, indicating a strong sentiment for a more relaxed approach. Only 9.2% believed it should be implemented by the next administration. Overall, there is a desire for the issue to be resolved within the current government's term. On the other hand, when asked for alternatives by those who oppose swift ratification, a significant 76.6% advocated for ratification after renegotiation, while only 20.4% demanded the termination of the FTA. This appears to be a result of the widespread perception that the balance of interests has worsened during the renegotiation process. Consequently, the political conflict surrounding the promotion of the Korea-US FTA ratification issue is likely to intensify due to the election defeat and the subsequent shift in the stance of opposition party supporters. Given the public opinion favoring a less hurried approach to ratification and the strong calls for renegotiation, the path to FTA ratification with public consent appears to be long.

[Figure 11] Timing of Ratification if Approved and Alternatives if Opposed

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