[Public Opinion Briefing No. 103] The (?) Transformed Ahn Cheol-soo Phenomenon and the Possibility of Party Realignment

[Public Opinion Briefing No. 103] Joint Project of EAI, YTN, JoongAng Ilbo, and Korea Research September Regular Public Opinion Barometer Survey

1. The Aftermath of Ahn Cheol-soo: The Transformed Ahn Cheol-soo Phenomenon and the Possibility of Party Realignment

2. The Impact of the Economic Crisis on the Election Campaign

3. Current Issues

【The Aftermath of the Ahn Cheol-soo Phenomenon】 The Transformed Ahn Cheol-soo Phenomenon and the Possibility of Party Realignment

1. The Transformed (?) Ahn Cheol-soo Phenomenon: From Hope of the Centrist/Unaffiliated to an Alternative for the Progressive/Opposition

● Ahn Cheol-soo's Potential Remains: 1:1 Hypothetical Matchup, Park Geun-hye 43.7% vs. Ahn Cheol-soo 42.8%

■ Although Director Ahn Cheol-soo has resigned, his influence remains. In a 1:1 hypothetical matchup between potential candidates for the next presidential election—former Representative Park Geun-hye, Director Ahn Cheol-soo, Democratic Party Leader Sohn Hak-kyu, and Executive Director Moon Jae-in—when pitted against a Grand National Party candidate and an opposition unified candidate, the approval ratings showed an extremely close contest at 43.7% versus 42.8%. However, in a matchup between former Representative Park Geun-hye and Leader Sohn Hak-kyu, Park led significantly at 51.8% to 30.9%, and against Executive Director Moon Jae-in, Park led 53.5% to 28.1%.

[Figure 1] Hypothetical 1:1 Matchups for the Next Presidential Election between Ruling and Opposition Candidates

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● Transformation of the Ahn Cheol-soo Phenomenon: From Hope of the Centrist/Unaffiliated to an Alternative for the Progressive/Democratic Party Supporters

- Did not reach a majority among centrist and unaffiliated voters

- Recorded 56.3% among progressives and 68.9% among Democratic Party supporters

■ In various public opinion polls conducted in early September, immediately after the Seoul mayoral candidacy unification between Director Ahn Cheol-soo and Candidate Park Won-soon, Director Ahn showed support rates of 50-60% among unaffiliated and centrist voters in hypothetical 1:1 matchups against former Representative Park Geun-hye. This was analyzed as the origin of the "Ahn wind" among the unaffiliated and centrist demographics. In the current survey, his support rate among centrist and unaffiliated voters remained in the 40% range. Instead, he garnered over 60% support among ideological progressives, Democratic Party supporters, and supporters of minor parties such as the Democratic Labor Party and the 진보신당 (Progressive Party).

■ Ideologically, progressives overwhelmingly favored former Representative Park at 32.5% versus Director Ahn Cheol-soo at 56.3%. Conversely, among conservatives, 53.5% supported former Representative Park, while only 29.1% supported Director Ahn. In the centrist demographic, which was analyzed as the main driver of the initial Ahn Cheol-soo surge, former Representative Park garnered 42.5% support and Director Ahn received 46.9%, indicating a comparable level. By party affiliation, 74.7% of Grand National Party supporters backed former Representative Park, with only 16.6% supporting Director Ahn. However, among Democratic Party supporters, 24.3% supported former Representative Park, while 68.9% supported Director Ahn. Supporters of other minor parties showed 29.5% support for former Representative Park and 62.1% for Director Ahn. Among unaffiliated voters, former Representative Park received 30.4% support, and Director Ahn received 44.8%, indicating Ahn's advantage. However, his support among the unaffiliated did not reach 50%, with a high rate of 24.7% undecided responses.

■ Although the overall approval ratings remain similar, the composition of support indicates a weakening of Director Ahn Cheol-soo's support among the centrist/unaffiliated demographics, while support has consolidated among progressive/Democratic Party supporters. This suggests a transformation from being a hope for the centrist/unaffiliated to an alternative for the progressive/opposition parties. This result implies that Director Ahn Cheol-soo, by emphasizing his anti-Grand National Party stance after announcing his consideration of candidacy, has consolidated the expectations and support of the progressive/opposition base. Conversely, this may have contributed to a weakening of support among centrist/unaffiliated voters who distrust both existing parties, the anti-Grand National Party and the anti-Democratic Party factions.

[Table 1] Park Geun-hye : Ahn Cheol-soo Support Ratios (%) by Demographic Group

● Ahn Cheol-soo Strong in Seoul/Honam, among 20s/30s

In Seoul, Park Geun-hye 35.0% vs. Ahn Cheol-soo 51.9%; Park leads in all regions except Seoul and Honam

Overall next presidential election support: Park Geun-hye 32.0% > Ahn Cheol-soo 20.1% > Moon Jae-in 6.3% > Sohn Hak-kyu 4.8% > Chung Mong-joon 4.0%

■ By region, Seoul and the Honam region, and by age group, the 20s and 30s serve as Ahn Cheol-soo's support base. Former Representative Park, on the other hand, shows overwhelming strength in the TK region and maintains an advantage in the PK, Gyeonggi, and Chungcheong regions. While Ahn Cheol-soo shows a slight lead among the 40s and ideological centrists, who act as a balance of public opinion, the results remain within the margin of error compared to former Representative Park.

■ Meanwhile, in overall support for the next presidential election, former Representative Park Geun-hye remains in first place with 32.0%, while Ahn Cheol-soo has risen to the 20% range with 20.1%. Executive Director Moon Jae-in, who had been gaining momentum before Ahn Cheol-soo's emergence, is third with 6.3%, followed by Leader Sohn Hak-kyu at 4.8%. Former Representative Chung Mong-joon, following Mayor Oh Se-hoon's withdrawal from the race, is second among ruling party candidates and fifth overall with 4.0%. Representative Yoo Si-min and Governor Kim Moon-soo, who once ranked second and third overall, are in the lower tier with 2.8% and 2.7%, respectively.

[Table 2] Overall Support for the Next Presidential Election (%)

2. The Ahn Cheol-soo Aftermath: Challenging the Park Geun-hye Dominance, Cracks in the Democratic Party

● Decline in Support for Both Major Parties: Grand National Party 33.0% vs. Democratic Party 19.4%

Democratic Party's support decline is significant, falling into the 10% range for the first time since the death of former President Roh Moo-hyun in 2009

■ The impact of the Ahn Cheol-soo phenomenon on the party system is more complex than initially apparent. On the surface, it has challenged the Park Geun-hye dominance and instilled confidence in the opposition camp, suggesting that a candidate like Park Won-soon could be competitive in the Seoul mayoral election. It is undeniable that the current political climate favors the opposition, including the Democratic Party.

■ However, the ruling and opposition parties, particularly the leadership and members of the Democratic Party, cannot afford to be complacent. Not only have the approval ratings of existing opposition figures like Leader Sohn Hak-kyu and Executive Director Moon Jae-in declined with the rise of Director Ahn Cheol-soo, but party support ratings also show that the Democratic Party and other opposition parties are suffering more significant blows than the Grand National Party. Regarding party support, the Grand National Party showed a gradual but consistent decline, from 38.6% in the July survey and 35.8% in the August survey during the free school lunch referendum, to 33.0% in the current survey. The Democratic Party also saw a decline from 28.8% in the July survey and 22.6% in the August survey following the free school lunch vote, falling to 19.4% in the September survey. This marks the first time since the death of former President Roh Moo-hyun that their support has dropped into the 10% range in regular surveys conducted by EAI and Korea Research. While the Grand National Party's support decreased by 5.6 percentage points from the July survey, the Democratic Party's support dropped by 9.4 percentage points.

[Figure 2] Trend of Party Support Ratings for the Grand National Party and the Democratic Party (%)

●Acts as a Centripetal Force for the Grand National Party, a Centrifugal Force for the Democratic Party

Difference in Support Consolidation: 48.1% support for the Grand National Party among conservatives, 22.7% support for the Democratic Party among progressives

59.4% of Grand National Party supporters back Park Geun-hye; 27.7% of Democratic Party supporters back Ahn Cheol-soo, 14.0% back Sohn Hak-kyu

■ While the "Ahn wind" appears to be disadvantageous to the Grand National Party on the surface, the reason for the significant blow to the Democratic Party's support base lies primarily in the shift of the "Ahn wind's" nature from a hope for the centrist/unaffiliated to an alternative for the progressive/opposition supporters, leading to a greater exodus from the progressive/opposition segment of the Democratic Party's base.

■ Among the Grand National Party's support base, conservatives, support for the party after the "Ahn wind" decreased by 4.9 percentage points from 53.0% in August to 48.1%, but still showed near-majority consolidation. However, for the Democratic Party, support from progressives, which was 30.9% in the August survey, further declined to 22.7% in the current September survey. Among progressives, support for the Democratic Labor Party was 11.3%, the People's Participation Party 4.3%, the Progressive Party 4.2%, and the Creative Korea Party 0.6%, totaling 20.1%, nearly matching the Democratic Party's support rate. Meanwhile, among centrists, support for the Grand National Party was 27.6%, and for the Democratic Party was 21.7%, with the Grand National Party leading. The higher proportion of unaffiliated voters in the 20s and 30s, who are strong supporters of the Democratic Party, and in the Honam region, which is a traditional base, compared to other regions, can also be seen as an indicator of the loosening of Democratic Party supporter consolidation.

[Table 3] Overall Support for the Next Presidential Election (%)

The Grand National Party is Park Geun-hye

■ In the case of the Grand National Party, the consolidation of its support base is relatively high, centered around former Representative Park Geun-hye, who continues to record solid approval ratings, leading to a relatively low demand for a third party. However, for the progressive/opposition camp, the absence of a clear leading presidential candidate is likely to amplify centrifugal forces during the election. It is a fact that since the 2006 local elections, the Democratic Party has failed to nurture a next-generation candidate within its own party system and has consistently sought candidates from outside for elections. This was the case with Kang Kum-sil in 2006, Leader Sohn Hak-kyu in 2007, and it remains the same today. While it is fortunate if external recruitment is possible, when candidates like Director Ahn Cheol-soo and Candidate Park Won-soon are not amenable to joining a party, the Democratic Party, lacking competitive candidates, finds itself in an awkward position inconsistent with its status as the leading opposition party.

■ When examining the approval ratings for all current presidential candidates, rather than hypothetical 1:1 matchups, among Grand National Party supporters, 59.4% support former Representative Park Geun-hye, with only 10.9% supporting Director Ahn Cheol-soo. However, among Democratic Party supporters, Director Ahn Cheol-soo is the most favored candidate for the next presidential election with 27.7% support, followed by Leader Sohn Hak-kyu at 14.0%, former Representative Park Geun-hye at 13.2%, and Executive Director Moon Jae-in at 7.4%. This highlights the significant centrifugal forces at play among Democratic Party supporters compared to the Grand National Party.

[Figure 3] Approval Ratings for Park Geun-hye, Ahn Cheol-soo, and Sohn Hak-kyu among Grand National Party and Democratic Party Supporters (%)

● Increased Pressure for a Third Party: 44.0% Believe a Third Party is Necessary, 52.2% Disagree

Demand for a New Party Higher among Opposition Supporters: 47.2% of Democratic Party Supporters Believe a Third Party is Necessary, compared to 29.1% of Grand National Party Supporters

■ Amidst distrust of existing parties and the growing "Ahn wind," there are considerable voices calling for the emergence of new parties other than the Grand National Party, the Democratic Party, and existing parties. While 52.2% believe a new party is not necessary, 44.0% believe it is, indicating that the demand for a third party is not insignificant and suggesting considerable pressure for party system reform.

■ Notably, the response that a third party is necessary is higher among Democratic Party supporters than Grand National Party supporters, and higher among progressives than conservatives, suggesting that the pressure for party realignment will exert greater pressure on the opposition. Only 29.1% of Grand National Party supporters argued for the necessity of a new party, whereas nearly half of Democratic Party supporters (47.2%) responded that a new party is needed. Among unaffiliated voters, 50.5% expressed the need for a third party, demonstrating the greatest distrust in existing parties. Furthermore, by ideological orientation, 42.5% of conservatives and 41.2% of centrists responded that a third party is necessary. However, among progressives, the proportion favoring a third party exceeded a majority at 55.5%.

■ If Director Ahn Cheol-soo were to form a third party without joining the Democratic Party, the nature of election campaigns, which tend to revolve around candidates, suggests that Democratic Party supporters are likely to break away from the party's core, potentially hindering the Democratic Party's ability to lead the election campaign and creating significant internal division pressure.

[Figure 4] Stance on a Third Party by Party Support (%)

● Top Priority for Restoring Trust: Self-Reflection and Reform Measures within the Party are Paramount

■ To resolve this distrust in existing parties, the public believes that self-reflection and reform within the parties, rather than policy changes, alliances with external forces, or recruitment of external figures, should be the priority for both the Grand National Party and the Democratic Party. To regain trust, 44.3% of Grand National Party supporters and 45.1% of all respondents believe that self-reflection and reform measures within the party are urgently needed. Among Grand National Party supporters, 10.3%, and among all respondents, 14.7% cited strengthening policies targeting the centrist demographic. 9.7% of Grand National Party supporters and 7.2% of all respondents suggested the urgency of a coalition of conservative forces. The response advocating for strengthening conservative ideology was the lowest among Grand National Party supporters at 7.1%, and the lowest overall at 3.8%. The response suggesting the recruitment of new figures was 6.9% among Grand National Party supporters and 7.0% among all respondents. 8.2% of Grand National Party supporters cited differentiation from the Lee Myung-bak administration, while this response was lowest at 6.3% among all respondents, it was relatively higher at 8.2%.

■ Similar response patterns were found for the Democratic Party. To regain trust, 42.6% of the Democratic Party's supporters and 48.5% of all respondents believed that self-reflection and reform measures within the party were the top priority. Regarding the pan-progressive alliance, responses from party supporters and the general electorate diverged: it accounted for 17.5% among supporters but only 8.4% among all respondents. Responses prioritizing strengthening policies for the centrist demographic were similar for both groups, at 13.1% for supporters and 12.0% for all respondents. Recruiting new figures was cited by 9.8% in both groups. Strengthening checks on the ruling party garnered 7.2% among supporters and 6.4% among all respondents, while strengthening progressive ideology was cited by 2.6% of supporters and 2.6% of all respondents. Above all, it is unlikely that distrust in the current party system will be resolved without the party's own self-reflection and reform efforts.

[Figure 5] Urgent Tasks for Each Party to Regain Trust: Comparison of Responses from All Respondents and Each Party's Supporters (%)

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【Impact of the Economic Crisis on the Election Climate】

1. Worsening Perceived Economy: 59.4% Believe the Korean Economy Has Deteriorated Compared to One Year Ago

■ The public's perception of the economy continues to worsen. In particular, the assessment of the Korean economy's condition has rapidly deteriorated. Until last year, the perceived economy had shown a slow but steady improvement trend since the 2008 global financial crisis. In the survey conducted in February 2009, immediately after the global financial crisis, 93.1% believed the Korean economy had worsened compared to a year prior. However, from the latter half of 2009, the perceived economy improved, and in the December 2010 survey, positive assessments that the Korean economy was improving increased to 25.8%, while negative opinions that it had worsened fell to 35.9%.

■ However, starting in February of this year, concerns about the national economy have rapidly grown due to the worsening of the livelihood economy, including the housing crisis and inflation crisis, compounded by instability in exchange rates, interest rates, and raw material prices. In the September survey, opinions that the economy had improved dropped to 9.4%, while opinions that it had worsened rose to 59.4%.

■ Meanwhile, household economic perception, although not showing significant improvement, had shown a moderate recovery trend by May 2010, with opinions that the household economy had worsened falling to 26.1%. However, by the February 2011 survey, opinions that it had worsened rose to 31.0%, and for the past 4-5 months, opinions that the household economy had worsened have fluctuated around 36-37%. In the September survey, opinions that the household economy had worsened were 36.5%, while assessments of improvement fell to 6.8%.

[Figure 6] Perception of the Korean and Household Economies (%)

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2. Impact of Economic Deterioration on the Election Climate

● Deepening Economic Polarization

■ The worsening economic perception has various impacts on the current political climate. Firstly, it exacerbates class polarization, intensifying the potential for economic conflict. As shown in [Figure 7], among the upper class, 14.3% responded that their household economic status had improved compared to a year ago, 52.9% said it remained unchanged, and 28.6% said it had worsened. A similar pattern was observed among the middle class: 7.5% responded it had improved, 65.6% said it remained unchanged (the highest proportion), and 26.5% said it had worsened, similar to the upper class. However, among the lower class, only 5.3% responded it had improved, and 48.3% said it remained unchanged. Instead, 44.7% responded it had worsened, a significantly higher proportion compared to the upper and middle classes.

[Figure 7] Differences in Household Economic Perception by Class (%)

● Strengthening Calls for Government Judgment and Pressure for Party System Reform

■ Furthermore, the worsening perceived economy leads to politically significant outcomes. The survey results indicate that the deterioration of the perceived economy is expected to strengthen calls for judgment against the current government and the perception that a third party is needed instead of existing parties, leading to pressure for reform of the party system. [Figure 8] shows that the intensity of calls for government judgment varies significantly depending on the perception of the household economy. Among those who responded that their household economic status had improved, only 39.5% agreed with calls for government judgment. Among those who perceived it as unchanged, this figure rose to 49.2%. For those who perceived their household economy as having worsened, the proportion agreeing with calls for government judgment reached 69.5%.

■ Meanwhile, regarding the need for a third party, 30.3% of respondents who stated their household economy had improved and 38.0% of those who stated it remained unchanged believed a third party, distinct from existing parties, was necessary. However, among those who perceived their household economy as having worsened compared to a year ago, nearly half (49.9%) agreed with the necessity of a third party. Consequently, the worse the perception of the household economic situation, the higher the demand for party realignment appears to be.

[Figure 8] Agreement with Calls for Government Judgment and the Need for a Third Party by Household Economic Perception (%)

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【Current Issues】

1. MB's Approval Rating at 37.3%, Continues to Decline for Two Consecutive Months After Pyeongchang Olympics Bid

● Corruption Among Associates: 32.2% Say 'Worse Than Previous Administration,' 46.6% Say 'No Difference,' 16.0% Say 'Not Serious'

■ Following the Pyeongchang Olympics bid, President Lee Myung-bak's approval rating recovered to 43.1%. However, it has since declined for two consecutive months due to the worsening perceived economy and recent scandals involving associates and the savings bank crisis. In particular, corruption involving associates, such as former Senior Secretary for Public Relations Kim Doo-woo and former Vice Minister of Culture, Sports and Tourism Shin Jae-min, is noteworthy not only as a factor significantly eroding presidential approval ratings in the latter half of the administration but also as a factor intensifying the lame duck phenomenon.

■ When asked about the relative seriousness of the current administration's associate corruption compared to previous administrations, 32.2% responded that it was worse than previous administrations, double the 16.0% who responded it was not serious. This foreshadows significant burdens for the current government and ruling party. However, nearly half (46.6%) responded that there was no difference from previous administrations, suggesting that associate corruption at the end of an administration is perceived as a chronic phenomenon. This is a cause for concern.

[Figure 9] Changes in Lee Myung-bak's Approval Rating (%)

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2. Former Representative Park Geun-hye's Support for Seoul Mayoral Candidate: 41.1% Find it 'Desirable,' 61.1% of Grand National Party Supporters

■ Regarding former Representative Park Geun-hye's campaign support for the Seoul mayoral candidate in the October 26 by-election, 41.1% of respondents found it desirable (13.6% very desirable, 27.5% generally desirable), while 48.8% found it undesirable (32.5% not very desirable, 16.3% not at all desirable). However, among Grand National Party supporters, the proportion finding it desirable was high at 61.1% (26.8% very desirable, 34.2% generally desirable), while those finding it undesirable were 30.3% (22.2% not very desirable, 8.1% not at all desirable). Among Democratic Party supporters, responses were divided: 31.9% found it desirable (6.6% very, 25.4% generally), and 62.5% found it undesirable (35.0% not very, 27.5% not at all).

3. Representative Sohn Hak-kyu's Politics of Concession: 50.7% Say 'A Good Decision' vs. 27.3% Say 'A Bad Decision'

■ The confirmation vote for Supreme Court Chief Justice nominee Yang Seung-tae, which had been stalled several times, was passed not through a power struggle between the two parties but because Representative Sohn Hak-kyu persuaded Democratic Party lawmakers. The political community and media have termed this Sohn Hak-kyu's 'politics of concession,' receiving high praise for political compromise and negotiation. Public reaction is also favorable. Those who responded it was a good decision accounted for 50.7% (18.0% very good, 32.7% generally good), while those who responded it was a bad decision accounted for 27.3% (22.6% not very good, 4.7% not at all good). The response that it was a good decision was high not only among Democratic Party supporters (56.6%) but also among Grand National Party supporters (58.7%), indicating that the public, amidst distrust of conflict-ridden politics, is offering favorable evaluations regardless of political stance, recognizing the establishment of a precedent for concession and compromise.

[Figure 10] Stance on Former Representative Park's Support for the Seoul By-election (%)

[Figure 11] Evaluation of Representative Sohn Hak-kyu's Concession on the Yang Seung-tae Supreme Court Justice Confirmation Vote (%)