[Public Opinion Briefing No. 102] The Welfare Political Landscape and the Rise of Class Politics Following the Referendum

[Public Opinion Briefing No. 102] Joint Project of EAI, YTN, JoongAng Ilbo, and Korea Research: August Regular Public Opinion Barometer Survey

The Ruling Party Supporters' Concentration on Park Geun-hye and the Moon Jae-in Syndrome

1. Korean Society's View on the Referendum: A Referendum Requiring Review, Who is the Winner?

2. Variables in the Political Landscape After the Referendum

3. Key Political Indicators: The 8.15 Coexistence and Development Theory Failed to Gain Traction

【Korean Society's View on the Seoul Metropolitan Government Referendum】 A Referendum Requiring Review, Who is the Winner?

■ The referendum on the scope of free school meals, which had focused the Seoul Metropolitan Government's first referendum, ultimately ended without the ballot boxes being opened. Following Mayor Oh Se-hoon's promise to link his position to the referendum's outcome three days before the election, Mayor Oh Se-hoon declared his resignation as mayor. This has led to the political landscape rapidly shifting from the referendum phase to the Seoul mayoral by-election phase, ahead of the 2012 general and presidential elections. Already, some politicians have announced their candidacy for the next Seoul mayoral election, and about ten potential candidates are being discussed.

■ However, there is concern that the transition from the referendum phase to the election phase is proceeding too rapidly. This referendum implicitly contains a debate on the fundamental philosophy and methodology of the welfare agenda, which is emerging as a key issue in the upcoming presidential election, and it was held amidst an unprecedented boycott movement. Therefore, a review of Korean society's overall perception of welfare and the political establishment's overall response to this referendum is necessary.

■ Welfare issues are not only sensitive matters where the positions of progressives and conservatives, and the ruling and opposition parties, have clashed extremely, but they are also agendas directly linked to the lives of citizens more than any other issue. In reality, for welfare policies to proceed in the right direction, social consensus is required regardless of the chosen stance. The process of this referendum clearly showed how fragile social consensus is on welfare issues in our society. In fact, for an issue as specific as school meals, which is a very detailed aspect of welfare, it is questionable whether it was appropriate to decide through a referendum via political negotiation, and the opposition's response of boycotting the referendum must be carefully examined.

■ However, the referendum process, which should have been a platform for policy debate on school meal policies and broader welfare stances, degenerated into a battle over voter turnout, between participation and boycott. Consequently, due to the failure to meet the minimum turnout, the ballot boxes could not even be opened, making it impossible to directly gauge the will of the Seoul citizens. This has led to arbitrary interpretations by both the ruling and opposition parties. The Grand National Party (GNP) argued that despite the Democratic Party's boycott campaign, the turnout of 25.8% was higher than the votes Mayor Oh Se-hoon received in the previous Seoul mayoral election, and various surveys showed high support for Mayor Oh's proposal, thus evaluating it as 'effectively Mayor Oh Se-hoon's victory.' The Democratic Party actively praised the success of the boycott movement, stating, 'The good citizens' good refusal of a bad referendum ultimately triumphed over the bad mayor's bad referendum,' and vowed to expand the 'Welfare Series of Three Nos'.

■ The regular August survey, conducted on August 27th immediately after the referendum, was prepared to contribute to a more serious review of Korean society's welfare perceptions revealed during the referendum process and the future development of a more comprehensive and multi-dimensional welfare discourse, before the political circles prematurely transition to the election phase. It is hoped that this will serve as an opportunity to move beyond the existing dichotomy of abstract universal welfare theory and selective welfare theory towards a more comprehensive welfare debate. Furthermore, through reflection and evaluation of the problems that emerged during the referendum process, it is hoped that the hard-won platform for political participation will not end as a fruitless happening.

1. The August 24 Referendum with No Winner: "GNP Victory" 6.6%, "Opposition Victory" 23.5%, "No Winner" 70.0%

■ Contrary to the differing views of the ruling and opposition parties on the referendum results, the public did not see either the GNP or the Democratic Party as the winner of the referendum. Contrary to the view of Chairman Hong Joon-pyo, who declared Mayor Oh Se-hoon the winner, only 6.6% interpreted the referendum results as a victory for the GNP. Even among GNP supporters, only 11.2% agreed with Chairman Hong Joon-pyo's position. The public viewing the referendum as a victory for the Democratic Party and opposition parties was 23.5%, higher than those who saw it as a GNP victory. However, 70.0% of the general public did not consider it a victory for either the GNP or the opposition. Among Democratic Party supporters, 46.9% saw it as a victory for the Democratic Party and opposition parties, approaching a majority, but 49.5% saw it as a result where no party won. Notably, among unaffiliated voters, 83.0% believed there was no winner in this referendum.

[Figure 1] Evaluation of the August 24 Referendum: No Winner (%)

● Political Cynicism and Bi-Partisan Blame: "Lack of Policy Debate" (72.1%) and "Cannot Empathize with Referendum Boycott" (60.0%)

■ As a result, Mayor Oh Se-hoon's selective meal plan was defeated and the universal free meal plan advocated by the opposition parties was effectively established. However, the reluctance to view this as an opposition victory appears to stem from political dissatisfaction that, despite the significance of this being the first referendum on a policy issue in Seoul's history, it was not conducted as a policy debate between the ruling and opposition parties regarding welfare policies but was excessively influenced by partisan political processes. Furthermore, although the opposition's boycott ultimately succeeded in preventing the referendum due to insufficient turnout, the opposition's referendum boycott movement also appears to have intensified political cynicism and distrust. While 72.5% agreed with the assessment that 'political issues, rather than policy debates, decided this election,' the proportion of those who empathized with the referendum boycott movement pursued by the Democratic Party and the five opposition parties was 35.1%, while the proportion who did not empathize was 60.0%.

[Figure 2] Political Dissatisfaction During the Referendum: Lack of Policy Debate and Referendum Boycott (%)

● Strong Bi-Partisan Blame Regarding Referendum Responses: GNP Wrong 73.3%, Democratic Party Wrong 66.2%

-GNP Supporters "GNP Wrong" 62.5%, Democratic Party Supporters "Democratic Party Wrong" 60.2%

■ It is judged that the public did not view either Mayor Oh Se-hoon and the GNP, who took extreme measures such as abandoning presidential candidates and linking their positions to the referendum to counter welfare populism, or the Democratic Party, which countered with extreme measures such as boycotting the referendum, favorably. As many as 73.3% assessed the GNP's response to the referendum as wrong. The assessment that the Democratic Party's response was also wrong was 66.2%. Even among GNP supporters, 62.5% responded that the GNP's response was wrong, and among Democratic Party supporters, 60.2% responded that the Democratic Party was wrong. Among unaffiliated voters, 73.5% responded that the GNP responded wrongly, and 70.8% responded that the Democratic Party responded wrongly.

■ While there was strong public opinion holding Mayor Oh Se-hoon and the GNP responsible for distorting the referendum framework (replacing the debate between universal and selective welfare with a debate between comprehensive and phased approaches) during the process of pushing for the free meal referendum, thereby providing grounds for boycotting the referendum, and consequently leading to the referendum's failure due to insufficient turnout, there was also a prevailing negative evaluation of the Democratic Party for its weak response during the initial signature collection phase and its extreme choice of a referendum boycott movement. This result supports the assessment that there was no winner in the referendum.

[Figure 3] Evaluation of GNP and Democratic Party's Referendum Responses (%)

● GNP Support Rate Down 2.8%p (38.6→35.8%) from Previous Month, Democratic Party Support Rate Down 6.2%p (28.8%→22.6%)

■ Both major parties saw a decline in their support rates. The GNP's support rate, which was 38.6% in the July survey, fell to 35.8% in the August survey, a decrease of 2.8%p within the margin of error. The Democratic Party's support rate also decreased significantly from 28.8% in July to 22.6% in this survey, a larger drop than the GNP's. The GNP appears to have reduced the decline in its support rate due to a rally among conservative voters in the final stages of the election. Although the Democratic Party largely resolved internal conflicts among its supporters regarding the referendum boycott after the Seoul Metropolitan Office of Education's plan was excluded from the referendum framework, the cohesion of its support base weakened during the boycott campaign, and there appears to have been a relatively larger outflow of centrist voters.

[Figure 4] Approval Ratings for MB, GNP, and Democratic Party (%)

■ In the case of the GNP, support among progressive voters significantly decreased from 30.2% last month to 18.4%, but the decline among centrist voters was only 2.4%p, from 33.7% to 31.3%, while support among conservative voters increased by 2.9%p, from 50.1% to 53.0%. In contrast, the Democratic Party's support among conservative voters decreased by 5.8%p, from 21.8% to 16.0%, and among centrist voters, it decreased by 6.6%p, from 30.8% to 24.2%. The Democratic Party's support among progressive voters also decreased by 5.3%p, from 36.2% to 30.9%.

[Figure 5] Gap in Party Support Ratings Between GNP and Democratic Party Among Centrist Voters (%)

2. Impact of the August 24 Referendum Results on Presidential Candidates

● Mayor Oh's Image Decline: Won the Public Relations Battle, Lost the Referendum, but Improved Image Among Conservatives

Deterioration of Image Before and After the Referendum: Worsened 34.1%, Improved 20.9%, Remained Unchanged 39.7%

Improved Image Favored Among GNP Supporters: Improved 32.7%, Worsened 20.0%, Remained Unchanged 42.1%

■ As the referendum failed, Mayor Oh Se-hoon's image appears to have deteriorated before and after the referendum. Only 20.9% of all respondents answered that it improved, while 34.1% said it worsened. 39.7% responded that it remained unchanged. However, among GNP supporters, the opposite was true, with 32.7% responding that it improved, exceeding the 20.0% who said it worsened, indicating that Mayor Oh's strong stance against the opposition was positively received by at least GNP supporters. However, even among GNP supporters, 42.1% answered that it remained unchanged.

[Figure 6] Change in Mayor Oh Se-hoon's Image Before and After the Referendum (%)

● Former Representative Park Geun-hye's Image: Remained Unchanged 58.9%, Improved 18.1%, Worsened 13.3%

● Representative Sohn Hak-kyu's Image: Remained Unchanged 55.6%, Improved 13.9%, Worsened 17.7%

■ To examine the impact of the referendum on the approval ratings of key presidential hopefuls from the ruling and opposition parties, respondents were asked if their opinions of former Representative Park Geun-hye and Democratic Party Chairman Sohn Hak-kyu had changed. There was no significant change in their images. For former Representative Park, 58.9% responded that she had not changed, and for Chairman Sohn Hak-kyu, 55.6% said they had not changed. However, for former Representative Park, the percentage of those who said her image improved (18.1%) slightly exceeded those who said it worsened (13.3%), suggesting that the referendum did not negatively affect her. Conversely, for Chairman Sohn Hak-kyu, the percentage who said his image improved was 13.9%, while those who said it worsened was 17.7%, indicating a slight negative impact.

[Figure 7] Change in Image of Former Representative Park and Chairman Sohn Hak-kyu Before and After the Referendum (%)

● Presidential Preliminary Candidate Approval Ratings: Park Geun-hye Still Dominant, Moon Jae-in Emerges as Sohn Hak-kyu Weakens

Park Geun-hye 34.6%, same as previous month; Moon Jae-in 9.0%, second place; Sohn Hak-kyu 6.3%, third place

■ Former Representative Park Geun-hye, who faced pressure from Mayor Oh Se-hoon and the pro-Lee Myung-bak faction of the GNP regarding her passive stance on the referendum, did not suffer a significant blow in terms of presidential approval ratings. She maintained her undisputed first place in the preliminary presidential candidate approval ratings with 34.6% support, as in July.

■ In contrast, Chairman Sohn Hak-kyu's support, which rose to 12.0% in the May survey following the April 27 by-elections, stagnated at 8.0% in June and 8.2% in July, and dropped to 6.3% in the August survey, ceding second place to Lee Sang-gyeom Moon Jae-in, who garnered 9.0% support. Fourth place was former Prime Minister Han Myeong-sook (5.3%), who is mentioned as a potential Seoul mayoral candidate, rising three spots from the previous month. Representative Yoo Si-min was fifth with 4.5%, Mayor Oh Se-hoon, who announced his withdrawal from the presidential race and resignation as mayor, was sixth with 4.3%, and Governor Kim Moon-soo was seventh with 4.1%.

[Table 1] Changes in Approval Ratings for Potential Presidential Candidates (%)

* Gyeonggi Province Governor Kim Doo-kwan has been included in the survey since January 2011; Executive Director Moon Jae-in has been included since May 2011.

** Landline RDD method survey since the March 2011 survey.

● Moon Jae-in Rises to Second Place. Increased Support Among Progressive Voters Leads to Moon Jae-in's Emergence

Support Rate Among Progressive Voters: 5.2 (May) → 8.4 (June) → 10.2 (July) → 19.1% (August)

■ Executive Director Moon Jae-in's approval rating steadily increased from 2.6% in the May survey, to 4.1% in June, and 5.6% in July, and in the August survey, he rose to second place, surpassing Chairman Sohn, with 9.0% support. The rise in Executive Director Moon Jae-in's approval rating is largely attributed to the consolidation of support among progressive voters. Support for Executive Director Moon Jae-in among progressive voters, which was 5.2% in the May survey, steadily increased to 8.4% in June and 10.2% in July, reaching nearly four times that amount, or 19.1% support, in four months. Among centrist voters, his support increased from 1.8% in the May survey to 7.2% in the August survey, and among conservative voters, it rose from 2.2% in May to 4.4% in August, a less significant increase.

[Figure 8] Changes in Approval Ratings of Top 3 Candidates Among All Supporters and Changes in Candidate Moon's Approval Ratings by Ideological Tendency (%)

Change in Support Rate Among Entire Support Base











Change in Support Rate for Candidate Moon Jae-in by Ideological Tendency

● Concentration on Park Geun-hye for GNP Candidate Suitability

GNP Supporters 68.3%, Conservative Voters 59.1% - Increase from July

■ In the survey for GNP candidate suitability, Park Geun-hye received 53.7%, an increase within the margin of error compared to July. Mayor Oh, who received 11.7% last month, dropped to 6.8% this month, falling behind not only Governor Kim Moon-soo, who received 10.6% support, but also former Representative Chung Mong-joon, who received 8.1% support. Conversely, among GNP supporters and conservative voters, there is a trend of concentration on former Representative Park. In the July survey, the response that Park Geun-hye was suitable as a GNP presidential candidate was 59.0% among GNP supporters and 52.8% among conservative voters. In the August survey, this increased to 68.3% (up 9.3%p) among GNP supporters and 59.1% (up 6.9%p) among conservative voters. With former Mayor Oh Se-hoon, a potential strong contender, withdrawing from the race after the referendum, there appears to be a trend of concentration on former Representative Park, who is already leading.

● For Opposition Single Candidate Suitability: Sohn Hak-kyu 22.6%, Moon Jae-in Pursues at 16.5%

■ In contrast, in the survey for opposition single candidate suitability, Chairman Sohn Hak-kyu's rating decreased from 30.2% last month to 22.6% in August, while Executive Director Moon Jae-in's rating more than doubled from 7.6% last month to 16.5%, closely trailing Chairman Sohn Hak-kyu. Following the referendum, the opposition parties, including their boycott campaigns, have alienated not only opposition party supporters but also unaffiliated and centrist voters, leading to Executive Director Moon Jae-in's strong pursuit of the opposition single candidate position.

[Table 2] Suitability for GNP and Opposition Single Candidate (%)

Note: Executive Director Moon Jae-in has been included in the survey since May 2011.

Other candidates include (Kim Doo-kwan 2.9%, Roh Hoe-chan 2.0%, Lee Jeong-hee 0.7%, Others 1.9%)

【Variables in the Political Landscape After the Referendum】 Does the Welfare Debate Intensify Class Politics?

1. Perception of Economic Deterioration and Outlook for Welfare Debate: Expansionist Approach as Mainstream, Selective Approach as Methodology

■ A factor to consider when forecasting the political climate after the referendum is public opinion on welfare, which is likely to emerge as a core issue in the next presidential election. While the Democratic Party and progressive parties advocate for a transition from a neoliberal growth economy to a welfare state, the conservative camp has characterized such welfare states as populism and advocated for the primacy of a growth economy. However, significant changes are recently occurring in the traditional dichotomous confrontation between welfare approaches. This is because even within the Grand National Party and among its likely presidential contenders, and even in recent conservative media, there is a shift towards a more progressive stance on welfare, advocating for a transition to a 'warm market economy' as social polarization and economic crises deepen. The divergence in perceptions regarding welfare approaches, moving away from the past dichotomy of growth versus welfare, stems primarily from differing views on the current level of welfare in Korean society.

● Post-2008 Financial Crisis: Shift from Growth Priority to Welfare Priority: Welfare Priority 49.8% vs. Growth Priority 41.7%

Excessive Welfare 8.3%, Current Level Appropriate 22.7%, Welfare Level Should Be Expanded 66.8%

■ Figure 9 shows the change in perception regarding whether distribution or growth should be prioritized. During the Roh Moo-hyun administration, the discourse on economic crisis began to strengthen the emphasis on growth, which led to the election of President Lee Myung-bak, who also stressed growth. However, after the global financial crisis of late 2008, the growth-centric focus, which had reached its peak, rapidly shifted towards prioritizing welfare by 2010. This can be seen as a backlash against the perceived trickle-down effects of growth, as advocated by the Lee Myung-bak administration and the conservative camp, despite improvements in macroeconomic indicators following the economic crisis. In the October 2010 survey, 53.4% supported prioritizing welfare, while 39.2% supported prioritizing growth. In the current survey, 49.8% supported prioritizing welfare and 41.7% supported prioritizing growth, indicating that prioritizing welfare remains the majority view. However, the gap narrowed during the referendum process, possibly due to the mobilization of conservative voters.

■ Beyond the priority between growth and distribution, the perceived gap in the current level of welfare in Korean society is also a crucial question that differentiates attitudes toward welfare. The fundamental logic behind Mayor Oh Se-hoon's and traditional conservatives' mobilization for the free school lunch referendum was the premise that universal welfare would lead to excessive welfare spending, ultimately burdening taxation and national finances. Opponents argue that claims of excessive welfare are absurd, citing welfare expenditure that ranks among the lowest according to OECD standards. What do the public think? The survey results indicate that the public generally leans towards the view of welfare deficit rather than welfare excess. When asked about the 'stance on Korea's welfare level,' 8.3% of respondents believed welfare levels should be reduced, 22.7% thought the current level was appropriate, and 66.8% responded that welfare levels should be increased, indicating a lack of consensus with the welfare excess theory.

[Figure 9] Preference Change for Distribution Priority vs. Growth Priority (%)

● Social Consensus on Solutions to Economic Crisis Fractured

Majority favors distribution priority, but opinions on growth vs. distribution diverge based on economic conditions

■ The public opinion overwhelmingly favoring welfare expansion appears to be related to the recent deterioration of the perceived economy. Regarding the state of the Korean economy, after the 2008 global financial crisis, the survey in February 2009 found that 93.1% believed the economy had worsened. However, a year later, from December 2009 onwards, it began to improve. In the December 2010 survey, optimistic public opinion, stating it was improving, increased to 25.8%, while public opinion that it had worsened fell to 35.9%.

■ However, since February of this year, concerns about the national economy have grown due to worsening livelihoods, such as the 'Jeonse' crisis and inflation crisis, compounded by instability in exchange rates, interest rates, and raw material prices. In the current survey, only 12.0% believe the economy has improved, while those who believe it has worsened increased by 18.4 percentage points to 54.5% compared to six months ago. Regarding household finances, while the improvement in perceived economic conditions was not significant, the proportion of respondents who believed household finances had worsened steadily decreased until December 2010. However, since the beginning of this year, the proportion of those who believe household finances have worsened has again risen to 37.8%.

■ Crucially, the question is whether there is a social consensus on how to resolve these economic crises. During the Roh Moo-hyun administration in 2005, when the discourse on economic crisis emerged, there was a societal consensus on the principle of overcoming the crisis through growth, which likely contributed to the election of candidate Lee Myung-bak, who emphasized growth.

[Figure 10] Changes in Economic Perception: National Economy and Household Economy (%)

Changes in Perceived National Economy Changes in Perceived Household Economy

● Social Consensus on Growth as a Solution during the 2005 Economic Crisis

Majority favors welfare in 2011, but opinions on growth vs. welfare diverge based on diagnosis of the national economy

■ Figure 11 illustrates the change in preferred solutions during economic crises. In the August 2005 survey, among those who believed the national economy was improving, 38.5% favored growth, while 35.8% favored maintaining the status quo, and 40.8% believed it was worsening. Conversely, those prioritizing growth were 61.5%, 64.2%, and 58.4% respectively, indicating a consensus on overcoming the crisis through growth. However, currently, there are distinct differences in opinion based on the diagnosis of the national economy. Among those who believe the national economy is improving, 47.4% favored growth over distribution (37.1%), with 14.5% undecided. Among those who believe the economy is maintaining its status quo, opinions were evenly split, with 49.4% favoring distribution and 43.8% favoring growth. Conversely, among those who believe the national economy is worsening, 54.1% favored distribution, while only 39.2% favored growth.

■ Currently, as the perceived national economy has sharply deteriorated, public opinion overwhelmingly favors expanding welfare over reducing it. However, this situation harbors significant political contentious points and debates concerning the current administration's economic management policies and future presidential election strategies. The potential for intensified socio-political conflict in future elections, should these fissures in economic perception and welfare approaches overlap, warrants close attention.

[Figure 11] Solution to National Economic Crisis: Growth or Distribution? (%)

2005 Economic Crisis Solution: Growth Dominant 2011 Economic Crisis Solution: Growth vs. Welfare Confrontation

● Conflicting Solutions to Economic Crisis: Expand Welfare, but Prefer Efficient Selectivity

Selective Lunch Provision: 51.7% vs. 41.0% in August survey, 53.4% vs. 39.1% in June survey

■ Mayor Oh Se-hoon, through the referendum signature and voting process, characterized universal free school lunches as 'welfare populism' and strongly advocated for selective lunch provision and selective welfare. Amidst a growing public opinion favoring welfare expansion in Korean society, Mayor Oh Se-hoon's political gamble was likely based on the consideration that, alongside the public's desire for welfare expansion, public opinion favored a selective approach to welfare over the opposition's universalist approach. Indeed, opinion polls conducted by EAI since February have consistently shown a preference for selective welfare over universal welfare.

■ In the June survey, 53.4% of the public supported selective lunch provision for the bottom 50% of income earners, while 39.1% supported universal free lunches for all students. This preference has been confirmed in other survey results. In the national survey conducted immediately after the election, although the gap narrowed slightly, support for selective lunch provision was 51.7%, and support for universal free lunches for all students was 41.0%, maintaining a lead.

■ In terms of broader welfare approaches, support for selective welfare has slightly increased compared to universal welfare. While support for the statement 'The government should provide welfare services equally to all citizens, including healthcare, childcare, and education' (universal welfare) decreased from 68.8% to 62.7% (-6.2%p) from the previous month, support for the statement 'Welfare services should be selectively provided to urgent sectors and target groups' (selective welfare) remained high at 87.9% (up from 87.1%). As stated in EAI Opinion Review 201107-01, this is largely due to concerns about potential tax increases if universal welfare is implemented (Jeong Han-wool, "Analysis of Seoul Citizens' Perceptions on Free School Lunches and Referendum Prospects: Can Universal and Selective Lunch Approaches Be Reconciled?" 201107-01).

[Figure 12] Changes in Preference for Free Lunch Plans and Welfare Approaches: Consolidation of Selectivity (%)

Preference for Free Lunch Plans Consensus on Welfare Approaches: Universal Welfare vs. Selective Welfare

● Whichever side secures welfare expansion and selective welfare will lead future welfare debates

■ Cross-referencing the attitude towards welfare (reduction/maintenance vs. expansion) with the welfare approach (universal vs. selective) yields four categories: 'Welfare Expansion/Universal Welfare,' 'Welfare Expansion/Selective Welfare,' 'Welfare Reduction/Maintenance/Universal Welfare,' and 'Welfare Reduction/Maintenance/Selective Welfare.' The 'Welfare Expansion/Universal Welfare' stance, representing the opposition and progressive forces, constitutes the largest single group at 36.2% of all respondents. In contrast, the stance of Mayor Oh Se-hoon and traditional conservatives, who opposed this, was 'Welfare Excess/Selective Welfare,' comprising 22.9%. Park Geun-hye and Grand National Party leader Hwang Woo-yea, who maintained a distance from Mayor Oh Se-hoon despite his overtures, fall into the category of 'Welfare Expansion/Selective Welfare,' representing 32.8% of respondents. Lastly, the 'Welfare Reduction/Maintenance/Universal Welfare' stance, due to its logical inconsistency, accounts for only 8.1%.

■ Under conditions where no single category forms a majority, the outcome of welfare debates between the ruling and opposition parties depends on which axis forms the basic framework of the debate. Mayor Oh Se-hoon initially sought victory by framing the debate around welfare methodology, specifically the dichotomy of selective versus universal welfare. However, by grounding this logic in opposition to 'welfare populism/excessive welfare,' he effectively alienated political forces and voters who favored welfare expansion while supporting selective welfare. Park Geun-hye and GNP lawmakers from the Seoul metropolitan area, while opposing the opposition's uniform universal welfare approach, reflect the public opinion favoring welfare expansion (66.8%) in their welfare attitudes, thus diverging from traditional conservative welfare stances. This approach appears to have been advantageous in forming a majority coalition.

■ If the Grand National Party shifts its position to 'Welfare Reduction/Selective Welfare,' it will be difficult to form a majority coalition on welfare issues as long as the opposition adheres to its universal welfare approach. If the Grand National Party shifts its position and the debate axis between the ruling and opposition parties is formed as 'Welfare Expansion/Universal Welfare' versus 'Welfare Expansion/Selective Welfare,' traditional conservatives will naturally find the latter ('Welfare Expansion/Selective Welfare') much more agreeable than the opposition, as it aligns on the dimension of welfare attitude while only diverging on the dimension of welfare methodology.

■ The outcome of the welfare debate within the Grand National Party and among conservatives, regarding their future choices, will significantly alter the landscape of future ruling-opposition welfare debates. Considering the current distribution of welfare perception types, if the Grand National Party maintains its traditional stance of 'welfare reduction/selective welfare,' the opposition can effectively mobilize public opinion favoring welfare expansion, making it a winnable fight. However, if the Grand National Party adopts a 'welfare expansion/selective welfare' stance, it will face considerable challenges in the welfare agenda battle.

[Table 3] Size and Political Affiliation of Respondents by Welfare Perception Type (%)

2. Welfare Debate: Will it Realize Class Politics in Korean Society?

■ Equally noteworthy as confirming the public's ambivalence on welfare issues (coexistence of welfare expansion and selective welfare approaches) is the aspect that this welfare debate is activating latent class politics in Korean society.

■ The overwhelming support for Mayor Oh Se-hoon in the affluent Gangnam 3 districts and his struggles in other northern districts during the 2010 local elections have heightened interest in the possibility of class/stratum voting in elections and political processes. Studies have already emerged analyzing class voting patterns at the district level in the Seoul metropolitan area, showing higher support and turnout for the Grand National Party in wealthier neighborhoods and lower support and turnout for the Democratic Party in poorer neighborhoods (Son Nak-gu, 2010).

■ However, there has been limited attention to the possibility of class voting/class politics in Korean society for two main reasons. First, at the aggregate level of districts, the differences in turnout and vote counts between affluent and less affluent districts were merely statistical variations, and class factors were not significant determinants of individual voting preferences. Generally, it was explained that class/stratum factors did not significantly influence voting decisions at the individual level, whether based on objective income indicators or subjective perceptions of class. This is because, historically, the conservative Grand National Party received high support from low-income or subjectively lower-class individuals, contradicting the typical pattern of lower-income/lower-strata = progressive and higher-income/upper-strata = conservative.

● Stratified Perceptions in Welfare Attitudes Revealed

Upper class favors welfare excess theory vs. middle and lower classes favor welfare expansion

Significant class differences in the free school lunch debate: Support for selective lunch provision: Upper class 62.3%, Middle class 51.9%, Lower class 50.2%

■ Recent opinion polls reveal notable differences in political attitudes across different classes/strata. These differences become more pronounced when considering subjective class perceptions rather than objective income criteria, particularly in the realm of welfare issues, where significant perceptual gaps between classes/strata are observed.

■ Figure 13 shows that among respondents who perceive themselves as middle or lower class, 67.7% and 70.2% respectively believe welfare should be expanded. Conversely, among those who perceive themselves as upper class, only 47.5% believe welfare should be expanded, while 52.5% believe it should be reduced or remain at the current level.

■ Furthermore, regarding the specific issue of the referendum, support for selective lunch provision for the bottom 50% of income earners was 62.3%, while support for universal free lunches for all students was only 29.5%. However, among those who identify as middle class, support for selective lunches was 51.9%, and for universal lunches was 40.7%. Among those identifying as lower class, support for selective lunches was 50.2%, and for universal lunches was 43.2%. This confirms a trend where support for selective lunch provision increases with perceived higher class status, while support for universal lunches is relatively higher among the lower classes.

[Figure 13] Differences in Welfare Attitudes and Lunch Plan Preferences by Class (%)

Welfare Attitudes by Class: "Welfare Expansion Dominant" Lunch Plans by Class: "Selective Approach Dominant"

● Welfare Debate - Leading to Class Politics?

■ Beyond policy attitudes, the possibility of class/stratum politics is also evident in party support. In the 2005 Roh Moo-hyun administration era, clear class/stratum political patterns were difficult to discern in party support. Support for the Grand National Party showed little difference across income levels: 27.8% among the upper class, 27.2% among the middle class, and 24.4% among the lower class. The Uri Party received only 8.3% support from the upper class, but garnered 19.3% from the middle class and 15.4% from the lower class, trailing the Grand National Party in both. While there were some class-specific characteristics, such as strong veto sentiment towards the Uri Party among the upper class, the most notable aspect was the Uri Party's relatively higher support among the middle class during this period. However, a clear class cleavage, such as upper class = Grand National Party and lower class = Democratic Party support, was not evident.

■ However, the current survey results clearly show a class/stratum difference in party support for the incumbent Grand National Party. Support for the Grand National Party was 47.5% among the upper class, 39.5% among the middle class, and 31.5% among the lower class, indicating a tendency for higher support among the upper class and weaker support among the lower class for the more conservative Grand National Party. In contrast, no significant class-based differences were observed in attitudes towards the Democratic Party. This is likely reflected in the Grand National Party's consistent pursuit of policies targeting specific classes, such as corporate tax cuts and reductions in the comprehensive real estate tax, while the Democratic Party, beyond general welfare policy expansion, has not presented targeted class/stratum policies. Consequently, while it may be premature to declare the current party divisions as a realignment into a class party system, the possibility of class/stratum politics becoming more pronounced than at present, depending on the policy positioning and direction of class policies by each party, cannot be ruled out.

■ As mentioned earlier, if the Grand National Party maintains its existing stance against welfare populism and the opposition party emphasizes welfare expansion, the Grand National Party will likely solidify its support among the upper class, while the Democratic Party will expand its support base among the middle and lower classes. Conversely, if the ruling and opposition parties engage in a confrontation centered on the selective versus universal welfare debate, the upper and middle classes, who prefer selective welfare, could become a support base for the Grand National Party, while the lower classes, where universal welfare has relatively higher support, could see increased support for the Democratic Party.

[Figure 14] Changes in Party Support Patterns by Class (%)

2005 Roh Moo-hyun Administration: Economic Crisis 2011 Lee Myung-bak Administration: Economic Crisis

■ As the gap between policies preferred by each class widens (increasing policy differentiation) and the policy positions of political parties become more distinct, the class/stratum variable is expected to become more important as a criterion for political divisions between the ruling and opposition parties. However, the Grand National Party, likely anticipating the next general and presidential elections, appears to be focusing on expanding its support base by forming a coalition of the upper and middle classes, emphasizing welfare expansion and selectivity preferred by the majority middle class. Similarly, if the Democratic Party also targets the middle class as its core support base, both parties will present comprehensive class policies, thereby weakening the nature of class/stratum politics. However, if the Democratic Party adheres to a left-leaning progressive line, as seen after last year's local elections, and strengthens its class policies, class divisions in Korean society could emerge as a significant explanatory variable for political behavior, warranting close attention. This is especially true given the widening perceptual gap between classes on the welfare agenda.

【Presidential Approval Rating】 "Coexistence and Development" Theory on August 15th Failed to Gain Traction

MB's Approval Rating Drops to 30% Range as Pyeongchang Effect Fades

MB's Approval Rating Drops to 30% Range: 35.9% (April) → 39.3% (June) → 43.1% (July) → 39.6%

■ While the president's approval rating, which hovered in the mid-to-high 40% range until March of this year, dropped to the 30% range following the opposition's victory in the April 27th by-elections, it rose again to 43.1% in the July survey, boosted by external achievements such as the successful bid for the Pyeongchang Olympics. Over the past four years of his administration, President Lee Myung-bak has shown a pattern of rebuilding his governing platform around his August 15th Liberation Day address to boost his approval rating, especially in situations where political initiative was difficult. The pragmatic centrist approach in 2009 and the fair society for the people theory in 2010 successfully secured broad support from the moderate center, leading to an approximate 10% increase in his approval rating each year.

[Figure 15] Changes in National Approval Rating by Year (%)

Will the "Coexistence and Development" Theory Be Effective?

■ In his fourth year in office, President Lee Myung-bak introduced the 'Coexistence and Development' theory in his August 15th address this year. However, unlike previous major national agendas such as the pragmatic centrist approach, pro-people policies, and the fair society theory, which garnered broad public support, the public's reaction to the 'Coexistence and Development' theory has been lukewarm. The primary reasons appear to be: First, the referendum garnered significant public attention, overshadowing the 'Coexistence and Development' theory, and the effect of the Pyeongchang Olympics bid, which was the main driver of the previous month's approval rating increase, has subsided. Second, the worsening economic performance, a key factor in national evaluations, is likely playing a role. Third, although the pragmatic centrist approach, pro-people policies, and fair society theory successfully boosted approval ratings in the short term, they failed to bring about tangible changes that the public could feel, leading to doubts about their sincerity and effectiveness. Finally, the rapid transition to the political climate of the upcoming general and presidential elections, and the consequent onset of a lame-duck phenomenon for the incumbent president, are also likely contributing factors.