[Public Opinion Briefing No. 98] Evaluation of Political Changes After the April 27 By-elections

[Public Opinion Briefing No. 98] Joint Project of EAI, YTN, JoongAng Ilbo, and Korea Research: May Regular Public Opinion Barometer Survey

1. Political Changes After the April 27 By-elections: Reform Efforts by Ruling and Opposition Parties Fall Short of Public Expectations

2. Next Presidential Election Landscape and Candidate Approval Ratings: Stagnant Approval Ratings, Weak Alternative to Moon Jae-in

3. Issue Analysis: Half-Price Tuition / Seoul Citizen's Plebiscite / Korea-US FTA / Agent Orange Incident involving US Forces in Korea

【Evaluation of the April 27 By-elections and Political Changes】 Reform Efforts Fall Short of Public Expectations

(1) Presidential Approval Ratings Decline: 49.8% (January) → 44.6% (March) → 35.1% (April) → 34.9% (May)

- Trust in the "Fair Society" Initiative Erodes: 66.3% believe there are "no achievements," while 22.1% believe there are "achievements."

● Following the defeat in the April 27 by-elections, the President and the ruling party have attempted to reverse the political tide by modifying their tax reduction policy, introducing measures like profit-sharing, exercising pension fund shareholder rights, and recently highlighting the "half-price tuition" pledge. Since recording nearly a majority approval rating of 49.8% in January, presidential approval ratings have shown a downward trend, falling to 35.1% in April (a 9.5 percentage point drop from the previous month) and 34.9% in May. This represents a significant 14.9 percentage point decrease compared to January (Figure 1).

● Despite these efforts to reverse the political trend, the continued decline in approval ratings can be attributed primarily to public dissatisfaction with the worsening economic situation and livelihood issues (EAI <Public Opinion Briefing> No. 94). More directly, the Busan Savings Bank scandal has expanded to involve alleged illegal lobbying by individuals connected to the current administration, leading to a rapid erosion of trust in the "Fair Society" initiative, which had previously boosted the President's approval ratings.

● The public had responded very positively to President Lee Myung-bak's "Fair Society" initiative, introduced in his August 15th Liberation Day address last year, and this had indeed been effective in maintaining presidential approval ratings. However, when asked to evaluate this initiative in the current survey, only 22.1% (2.2% "very effective," 19.9% "somewhat effective") responded that there had been achievements, while a substantial 66.3% (49.5% "not very effective," 16.8% "not effective at all") stated there had been no achievements. Undecided/no response accounted for 11.7% (Figure 2).

[Figure 1] Trends in Presidential, Grand National Party, and Democratic Party Approval Ratings (%)

*Source: EAI･JoongAng Ilbo･YTN･Korea Research Public Opinion Barometer Survey. RDD household survey method used from the March survey onwards.

[Figure 2] Evaluation of the "Fair Society" Initiative and its Achievements (%)

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(2) Party Approval Ratings: Democratic Party's Upward Trend Slows, Gap Between Grand National Party and Democratic Party Maintained

GNP 38.4% : DP 22.2% (March) → GNP 37.5% : DP 32.1% (April) → GNP 36.4% : DP 30.0% (May)

● Meanwhile, regarding party approval ratings, the Grand National Party (GNP) stood at 36.4%, a 1.1 percentage point decrease from 37.5% in the previous month's survey. The Democratic Party (DP) garnered 30.0%, down 2.1 percentage points from 32.1% last month. Both parties saw a slight decline in approval ratings. In the March survey, the GNP had 38.4% approval, while the DP had only 22.2%. Following the April 27 by-elections, the DP experienced a noticeable surge, but this upward trend has stalled, preventing a reversal of the approval ratings between the two parties.

Reasons for Stagnant Approval Ratings: Unmet Expectations from Post-April 27 Reforms; 7 Out of 10 Say "Nothing Has Changed"

- Grand National Party: 67.2% say "No different from before the election," 11.7% say "Improved," 14.9% say "Worsened."

- Democratic Party: 67.6% say "No different from before the election," 12.1% say "Improved," 12.6% say "Worsened."

● Firstly, the GNP's approval ratings have stagnated or begun to decline. Currently, the GNP is attempting to reform its support base through the resignation of its leadership, the formation of a new leadership, and a shift towards a more left-leaning policy direction following the April 27 by-elections. However, internal party conflicts surrounding organizational restructuring and policy direction for party reform have deepened, failing to fully alleviate voters' political distrust and dissatisfaction with the administration. In fact, when asked to evaluate the changes before and after the April 27 by-elections, 67.2% of respondents replied, "The GNP is no different from before the election." "Improved" received 11.7%, while "Worsened" received 14.9%.

[Figure 4] Evaluation of Changes in the Grand National Party and Democratic Party After the April 27 By-elections (%)

● Meanwhile, perceptions of the DP are also not favorable. For the same question, an overwhelming 67.6% responded that the DP "has not changed from before the election," while "doing better than before the election" received 12.1% and "worsened" received 12.6%. Since the party convention last year, the DP has shifted towards a more progressive, left-leaning stance, which led to a decline in support from the centrist demographic. Following the April 27 by-elections, DP support from the center surged, particularly after DP Chairman Sohn Hak-kyu's emphasis on the role of the middle class. Therefore, it was urgent for the DP to solidify support from these centrist/middle-class voters by strengthening its centrist policies and developing a strategy that could encompass both its progressive base and centrist supporters.

● The stalling of the DP's upward momentum can be attributed to its failure to develop agendas and policies, and to implement party reforms that would solidify centrist/middle-class support after the election (EAI <Public Opinion Briefing> No. 97). Figure 3(1) shows that the DP, which lagged behind the GNP among centrists before the April 27 by-elections, had overtaken the GNP in the centrist demographic following the by-elections. However, one month later, in the May survey, the DP has fallen behind again. Among centrists, the GNP garnered 34.9% and the DP 32.9%, indicating that the DP failed to maintain its advantage over the GNP (34.1%) among centrists recorded in the April survey (38.0%).

● Although Chairman Sohn recently expressed a centrist stance, stating he would "confront outdated progressivism," the DP's ideological positioning remains ambiguous, as evidenced by its reversal of the agreement between the ruling and opposition parties on the ratification of the Korea-EU FTA. Figure 3(2) shows that while there was no change in DP support among progressives and conservatives in the May survey, support among centrists dropped by 6.1 percentage points from 38.0% in April to 32.9% in the current survey. This suggests that the DP's decline in support is primarily driven by the departure of centrist/middle-class voters.

[Figure 3] Changes in Party Approval Ratings Among Centrists and Changes in DP Approval Ratings by Ideological Inclination (%)

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(3) The Dilemma of Reforms by Ruling and Opposition Parties

Overwhelming Pressure for the Grand National Party to Lean Left; Coexisting Pressures for the Democratic Party to Lean Left and Right-Center

● Currently, voters are pressuring both the GNP and the DP to adopt progressive and centrist policies rather than conservative ones. For the GNP, 39.7% of public opinion favors strengthening centrist policies, and 36.5% favor implementing progressive policies, while only 11.2% advocate for conservative policies. Those who were undecided or did not respond accounted for 12.7%. Combining the preferences for centrist and progressive policies yields 76.2%, indicating a strong public desire for a leftward shift in the party's ideology and policies. Even among GNP supporters, 41.5% prefer centrist policies, 35.1% prefer progressive policies, and 14.5% prefer conservative policies, suggesting that meeting expectations for a significant ideological shift in party policy will be challenging.

● For the DP, the opinions were closely divided: 39.8% favored strengthening progressive policies, and 35.8% favored strengthening centrist policies, while only 10.7% advocated for strengthening conservative policies. Undecided/no response accounted for 13.9%. Given the DP's consistent emphasis on a progressive line and its leftward movement, the fact that a majority favors centrist or conservative policies presents a burden. As mentioned earlier, following the April 27 by-elections, Chairman Sohn began to actively pursue a centrist path, but faces considerable opposition within the party and from progressive parties seeking alliances.

● For the GNP, being currently in a conservative position, whether the preference is strongly for progressive or centrist policies, it is difficult to disagree that a leftward shift is necessary for party reform. However, the DP faces a situation where it must decide between a centrist and a progressive path. Pursuing a progressive path requires a leftward shift, while pursuing a centrist path requires a rightward shift. This inherent conflict makes resistance to ideological shifts within the party potentially greater than in the GNP. This explains why Chairman Sohn and the DP face a challenging path.

[Figure 5] Preferred Policy Ideologies for the Grand National Party and the Democratic Party Going Forward (%)

[Figure 6] Attitude Towards a United Opposition Front Against the Grand National Party (%)

The Relationship Between the DP's Ideological Positioning and Opposition Alliance

● The DP's ideological positioning is further complicated by its impact on the upcoming major presidential election strategy, particularly the formation of a unified democratic front. Given that the potential allies, such as the Democratic Labor Party, the Progressive Party, and the Participation Party, are predominantly progressive, it would theoretically be advantageous for the DP to move further left ideologically to facilitate an alliance. However, this could lead to a decline in overall support due to backlash from the centrist demographic. Conversely, a clear shift towards the center could alienate progressive supporters and make alliances with progressive parties more difficult.

● Indeed, in this survey, where the DP's ideological direction remains unclarified, the negative response to the question of whether the opposition parties should unite to prevent a GNP victory has significantly increased over the past month. In the previous survey, a substantial 57.2% agreed with the idea of opposition unity, but this figure dropped to 51.9% in the current survey. Specifically, 63.8% of progressives agreed with unity, while only 49.6% of centrists and 47.0% of conservatives agreed. Notably, among undecided voters, the proportion who disagreed with unity surged from 39.3% in April to 51.8% in May. This indicates that since the April 27 by-elections, the expectations of the centrist and undecided demographics towards the DP and the opposition have waned.

【Next Presidential Election Landscape and Candidate Approval Ratings】 Solidifying Support? An Alternative to Moon Jae-in... Maybe Not...

(1) Next Presidential Election Support: Park Geun-hye, Sohn Hak-kyu Approval Ratings Stagnant, Moon Jae-in at 2.6%

- May Simple Approval Ratings: Park 35.3% > Sohn 12.0% > Han 5.1% > Oh 4.7% > Yoo 4.6%

[Table 1] Changes in Support for Next Presidential Candidates (%)

** Kim Doo-kwan, Governor of Gyeongnam Province, included in the survey from January 2011. Lee Hae-chan, Chairman of the Democratic Party, added from May 2011.

*** The January survey was conducted by Korea Research independently, not as part of the EAI･Korea Research regular survey.

**** Landline RDD survey method used from the March 2011 survey onwards.

● There have been no significant changes in the approval ratings of potential presidential candidates following the April 27 by-elections. In the May survey, based on simple approval ratings, former Representative Park Geun-hye remained in first place with 35.3%. Representative Sohn Hak-kyu, who received 11.5% in the April survey and 12.0% in the current survey, was in second place. Representative Yoo Si-min, who was in the 2-3% range before the April 27 by-elections, dropped to fifth place with 4.7%. Former Prime Minister Han Myeong-sook took third place with 5.1%, Mayor Oh Se-hoon of Seoul was fourth with 4.7%, and Governor Kim Moon-soo of Gyeonggi Province was sixth with 4.1%.

● Moon Jae-in, former Chief of Staff, who is emerging as a potential alternative within the pro-Roh faction following Yoo Si-min's decline, was included in this survey for the first time. In terms of simple approval ratings, he ranked eighth with 2.6%, alongside former Liberty Forward Party Chairman Lee Hoi-chang, trailing behind former Minister Chung Dong-young (3.0%). However, it is noteworthy that in his first survey, prior to his official announcement, he surpassed the approval ratings of figures such as former GNP Chairman Chung Mong-joon, current Governor Kim Doo-kwan of Gyeongnam Province, Minister Lee Jae-oh, and former Representative Chung Sye-kyun. Nevertheless, it is evident that the notion of Moon Jae-in as an alternative candidate cannot yet be considered a concept based on a substantial political foundation in public opinion.

(2) Candidate Suitability by Faction

- Suitability as Grand National Party Candidate: Park Geun-hye 53.5% > Kim Moon-soo 10.5% > Oh Se-hoon 9.0% > Chung Mong-joon 4.7%

- Suitability as Unified Opposition Candidate: Sohn Hak-kyu 36.1% > Yoo Si-min 8.4% > Chung Dong-young 8.2% > Han Myeong-sook 7.9%

● When asked about suitability as a GNP candidate, the results show little change from the previous month. Former Representative Park Geun-hye maintained over half of the support with 53.5%. Governor Kim Moon-soo garnered 10.5%, and Mayor Oh Se-hoon received 9.0%, vying for second place within the margin of error. Former Representative Chung Mong-joon, who has been attempting a comeback by raising the issue of Park's "shadow," received only 4.7%, failing to demonstrate significant presence as a potential GNP presidential contender.

● Among Grand National Party supporters, former representative Park leads with 64.7%, followed by Mayor Oh Se-hoon at 11.3%, Governor Kim Moon-soo at 7.9%, and representative Chung Mong-joon at 5.9%, maintaining a strong lead. Among undecided voters, former representative Park garnered 46.6%, Governor Kim Moon-soo 9.4%, and Mayor Oh Se-hoon 4.4%, with 31.8% undecided. While former representative Park did not secure a majority among undecided voters, he is significantly ahead.

[Figure 7] Grand National Party Candidate Suitability (%)

The dispersion of support among pro-Roh figures may become a variable in opposition party consolidation.

● Meanwhile, when asked about suitability as a unified opposition candidate, Representative Sohn ranked first with 36.1%, slightly down from last month. Representative Yoo Si-min dropped to a single digit at 8.4%, and former Minister Chung Dong-young ranked third at 8.2%. They were followed by former Prime Minister Han Myeong-sook at 7.9%, Governor Kim Doo-kwan at 3.8%, and Chairman Moon Jae-in at 3.7%. One variable is that the combined support for pro-Roh figures such as Yoo Si-min, Han Myeong-sook, Kim Doo-kwan, and Moon Jae-in amounts to approximately 24%. Therefore, the nomination of a post-Yoo Si-min pro-Roh candidate could become a key variable in the opposition's competition. The idea of Moon Jae-in as an alternative also seems to stem from this point.

● Among Democratic Party supporters, 44.9% supported Representative Sohn Hak-kyu, followed by former Prime Minister Han Myeong-sook at 13.1%, former Minister Chung Dong-young at 11.7%, Representative Yoo Si-min at 9.0%, Governor Kim Doo-kwan at 6.0%, and Chairman Moon Jae-in at 2.9%. However, among undecided voters, Representative Sohn's support rate was 26.3%, Yoo Si-min's 7.6%, Chung Dong-young's 5.4%, and Han Myeong-sook's 3.1%, with 45.5% undecided. This means that the opposition party's weakness lies in the lack of a candidate capable of swaying undecided voters.

[Figure 8] Unified Opposition Candidate Suitability (%)

(3) Park Geun-hye vs. Sohn Hak-kyu: The gap in a hypothetical two-way race narrows from 51.7% vs. 37.1% (19.2%p difference) to 14.6%p.

- Sohn leads among those in their 40s; a close race within the margin of error for those in their 20s and 30s and in the Gyeonggi region. Park leads among moderates.

● In a hypothetical one-on-one match between the leading candidates of the ruling and opposition parties, former representative Park Geun-hye garnered 51.7% and Representative Sohn Hak-kyu received 37.1%, a difference of 14.6 percentage points. This is a slight decrease compared to last month's survey, where former representative Park led with 52.3% and Representative Sohn Hak-kyu had 33.1%, a difference of 19.2 percentage points. While it is difficult to assign absolute significance within the margin of error, at least former representative Park's approval rating has remained static, and Representative Sohn, who emerged as the leading opposition candidate in the April 27 by-elections, is maintaining a追击 (chasing) momentum.

● Representative Sohn led in the Honam region, among Democratic Party supporters, and among progressives. By age group, for the first time in this survey, Representative Sohn (45.4%) led former representative Park (44.7%) within the margin of error among those in their 40s. In the Gyeonggi region and among those in their 20s and 30s, the support gap narrowed to within a single digit, indicating these are competitive regions and demographics.

● However, ideologically, Representative Sohn led among progressives with 48.6% compared to former representative Park's 40.7%. Among moderates, former representative Park led with 50.4% compared to Representative Sohn's 36.2%. Among conservatives, former representative Park held a significant lead with 63.4% compared to Representative Sohn's 31.9%.

[Table 2] Candidate Preference in One-on-One Presidential Scenarios by Demographic Group (%)

【Current Issues Analysis】 Half-Price Tuition / Seoul City Referendum / KORUS FTA / U.S. Forces Korea Agent Orange Incident

(1) Half-Price Tuition - Cautious implementation considering fiscal impact (58.4%), government support should be differentiated (69.2%)

Attitude towards half-price tuition has no direct impact on national approval ratings.

● Following the April 27 by-elections, the government and ruling party are attempting to revive the political momentum by pursuing the half-price tuition pledge from the last presidential election. Naturally, opinions are divided within both the ruling and opposition parties regarding concerns about fiscal burden, populism, or sincerity.

● In response, voters are taking a largely realistic approach. Only 19.9% of the general public believe it should be actively pursued even if it incurs a fiscal deficit, while 18.4% believe it should not be pursued as it is a populist policy. A significant majority of 58.4% believe it should be implemented restrictively, considering the fiscal burden. However, even among those in their 20s who directly experience the burden of university tuition, while realism prevails, the opinion that half-price tuition should be implemented immediately, even at the cost of a fiscal deficit, is relatively high at 30.2%.

● Regarding the method of government support for reducing university tuition, only 26.3% believe the government should set the reduction rate and provide uniform support. A substantial 69.2% believe that support should be differentiated based on various criteria such as university level, financial status, student performance, and income level. This appears to be a result of growing criticism towards uniform financial support, given the increasing perception of serious issues with some underperforming universities.

[Figure 9] Stance on Half-Price Tuition (%)

● Meanwhile, some within the government and ruling party are raising the issue of half-price tuition as a means to prevent a lame-duck situation after the April 27 by-elections and to strengthen their weakened political base. However, it is unlikely that the attitude towards half-price tuition will directly contribute to an increase in national approval ratings. There was no significant difference in the President's approval rating: 33.3% among those who advocate for actively pursuing half-price tuition, and 36.6% among those who believe it should be pursued cautiously considering fiscal matters. While the approval rating was slightly lower at 29.9% among those who oppose it as a populist measure, the differences were within the margin of error overall.

[Figure 10] Attitude towards Half-Price Tuition and Presidential Approval (%)

(2) The Dilemma of the Seoul City Referendum: Results may vary depending on the framing of the referendum.

In the frame of selecting the method (scope) of free school meals, support for selective free school meals is high, but

In the yes/no vote frame, 58.1% oppose the Seoul City's proposal to suspend free school meals.

● With the signature drive to oppose free school meals in Seoul exceeding the minimum requirement, the issue is poised to become a flashpoint in the political landscape. As previously indicated by our research team's surveys [Figure 11-(1)], public opinion has favored the Grand National Party's proposal for selective free school meals (differentiated by income level) over the opposition's proposal for universal free school meals (benefiting all students) when it comes to the target recipients and scope of free school meals (EAI Public Opinion Briefing No. 94). Considering this public sentiment, we pointed out that a referendum, if held, could be disadvantageous to the opposition party, which advocates for universal free school meals.

● However, several additional considerations are necessary to predict the actual outcome of the referendum. In particular, the framing of the referendum question is crucial. Public opinion on specific issues is not one-dimensional; different results can emerge depending on the dimension, context, and even the wording of the question. As the saying goes, 'Ah' and 'Uh' are different. Therefore, in social surveys (including referendums and opinion polls), the standard practice is to ask respondents' opinions on a single dimension using the simplest and most neutral terms to minimize ambiguity and wording effects.

● As the signature drive for the referendum is nearing completion, making the conditions for its initiation ripe, attention should be paid to the content and framing of the referendum question. Our research team hypothesized that while public opinion favors the selective free meal approach emphasized by the Grand National Party on the issue of 'application targets and methods' of free school meals, which is a point of contention between the ruling and opposition parties, the direction of public opinion could significantly change if the question is framed around the necessity of free school meals itself or whether to continue the current free school meal program.

● This is because, in general, few people oppose free school meals themselves, making it highly probable that a majority would favor free school meals in a yes/no framing. It is particularly important to consider that referendums cannot easily present various methods of providing free school meals and ask for a choice among them. Therefore, we need to verify the hypothesis that the Grand National Party might have an advantage in the framing of free meal methodologies, while the opposition might have an advantage in the framing of the yes/no debate on current free school meals.

● Based on this, in our May survey, we asked the question, 'Do you agree or disagree with the Seoul City's proposal to suspend free school meals?' in a yes/no frame. As expected, a majority of 58.1% agreed with the Seoul City's proposal, while 38.6% opposed it. Among Seoul citizens alone, the gap narrowed, with 42.8% agreeing and 54.2% opposing, but the opposition still held a majority. This confirms that different results can be obtained depending on the question framing.

● In practice, most referendums and national referendums are conducted in the simplest, most concise format, thus posing a yes/no question on a specific proposal. For example, 'Do you support or oppose the hosting of nuclear power plants?', 'Will constitutional amendments be made or not?', or while a yes/no vote on a specific amendment is appropriate, a referendum or national referendum that requires choosing from multiple amendment proposals seems inappropriate (further legal review and in-depth examination of actual cases are needed regarding the question format for citizen-initiated referendums).

● The issue of free school meals is not only a matter where the welfare policies and methodological differences between the ruling and opposition parties clash fiercely, but it is also a crucial area of contention in the competition for issues in the upcoming presidential election. This survey revealed that public opinion is multi-dimensional and influenced by question framing. Therefore, if an actual referendum is held, a fierce battle over framing between the ruling and opposition parties, and between the Seoul City government and the city's education office/council, is inevitable, and the outcome of this battle will significantly influence the actual referendum results.

[Figure 11] Attitude towards the Scope of Free School Meals and Preference for Seoul City's Proposal to Suspend Free School Meals (%)

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(3) KORUS FTA: "Ratify promptly" 57.8%, among supporters, "Must process within this year" 51.8%

● Regarding the ratification of the KORUS FTA, which EAI has been tracking since last year, public opinion continues to favor prompt ratification. 57.8% of respondents agreed with the proposition to ratify the KORUS FTA promptly, while 32.7% opposed it, and 9.5% were unsure/did not respond.

● When asked about the timing for those who support ratification, 23.9% suggested processing it within the June parliamentary session, and 27.9% believed it should be done by the second half of 2011. Combining these two, 51.8% believe it should be processed within this year. In contrast, 34.5% believe it should be done within the current administration's term, and 8.8% believe it should be done by the next administration. While public opinion favors prompt ratification of the KORUS FTA, there is a close contest between those who want it done within the current government's term and those who believe it can be postponed further.

● However, this level of support is slightly lower than the 63.8% recorded in the October 2010 survey and 65.8% in the February 2011 survey. The recent decrease in support for KORUS FTA ratification appears to reflect the weakened political influence of the government and ruling party following the April 27 by-elections and the increased influence of the opposition, particularly the Democratic Party. It also seems to be influenced by the heightened distrust among the Korean public towards the United States due to the recent Agent Orange burial incident.

● In fact, in this survey, among those who believe the U.S. Forces Korea is making efforts to investigate the Agent Orange burial incident, 71.1% supported prompt ratification of the KORUS FTA. However, among those who believe the efforts of the U.S. Forces Korea are insufficient, the support for KORUS FTA ratification dropped to 51.9%.

[Figure 12] Changes in Public Opinion on Prompt KORUS FTA Ratification and KORUS FTA Stance by Attitude towards Agent Orange Incident (%)

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(4) U.S. Forces Korea's efforts to investigate Agent Orange are insufficient (67.1%), leading to a decline in support for the ROK-U.S. alliance.

● Meanwhile, recent revelations that U.S. Forces Korea secretly buried toxic substances, including Agent Orange, at domestic sites in the 1970s have heightened distrust towards the United States and critical attitudes towards U.S. Forces Korea among the Korean public. When asked, 'Do you believe U.S. Forces Korea is making efforts to investigate the Agent Orange burial incident or not?', a majority expressed that the efforts of U.S. Forces Korea are insufficient. Only 30.2% responded positively, stating that efforts are being made for truth clarification, while a significant 67.1% responded that U.S. Forces Korea is 'making little or no effort.'

● This distrust appears to be weakening public support for the ROK-U.S. alliance as a whole. As shown in the results of the question regarding the desirable direction for ROK-U.S. relations [Figure 13-(2)], following the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong incidents in 2010, anti-U.S. independence sentiment decreased, and public opinion favoring the strengthening of the ROK-U.S. alliance steadily increased, reaching nearly half (48.6%) in the November survey. However, in the May survey, those advocating for anti-U.S. independence and maintaining the status quo increased to 23.8% and 36.0% respectively compared to November 2011, while support for strengthening the ROK-U.S. alliance sharply declined from 48.6% to 33.0%.

● While this change can also be seen as a phenomenon resulting from a slight easing of the North Korean threat [Figure 13-(1)], it is evident that public perception of the recent Agent Orange burial incident is significantly influencing perceptions of desirable ROK-U.S. relations [Figure 14]. Among those who positively assessed the efforts of U.S. Forces Korea to clarify the truth, anti-U.S. independence diplomacy stood at 11.1%, maintaining the status quo at 34.2%, and strengthening the alliance at 42.8%. However, among those who viewed the efforts of U.S. Forces Korea as insufficient, independent diplomacy was 30.0%, maintaining the status quo was 37.1%, and strengthening the alliance was 28.5%.

[Figure 13] Changes in Security Anxiety and Direction for Desirable ROK-U.S. Relations (%)

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[Figure 14] Evaluation of U.S. Forces Korea's Efforts to Clarify Truth on Agent Orange Incident and Attitude towards ROK-U.S. Alliance (%)