[Public Opinion Brief No. 97] April 27 By-election and Future Political Landscape Outlook

[Public Opinion Brief No. 97] Joint Project of EAI, YTN, JoongAng Ilbo, and Korea Research: April Regular Public Opinion Barometer Survey

1. Evaluation of the April 27 By-elections and Political Landscape Changes: A Mid-term Evaluation of the MB Administration 65.3%

2. Next Presidential Election Landscape and Candidate Support Ratings: Park Still Leading, Sohn Hak-kyu Lays Groundwork for Pursuit

3. Issue: Why does former representative Park maintain an advantage despite a high level of calls for a change in government?

【Evaluation of the April 27 By-elections and Political Landscape Changes】A Mid-term Evaluation of the MB Administration 65.3%

(1) Evaluation of the April 27 By-elections

Meaning of the April 27 By-elections: "Mid-term Evaluation of the Lee Myung-bak Administration" 65.3% vs. "Election to Choose Local Representatives" 26.6%

July 28, 2010 Election Won by the Grand National Party: "Mid-term Evaluation" 44.8% vs. "Election to Choose Local Representatives" 51.2%

● The April 27 by-elections, serving as a prelude to the 2012 general and presidential elections, have concluded. Prior to the by-elections, the Grand National Party was expected to have an advantage as the opposition parties had failed to produce significant figures or issues. However, with the candidacy of Representative Sohn Hak-kyu in Bundang, the election rapidly began to be perceived as a mid-term evaluation of the current administration and a prelude to the next presidential election. The candidacy of Lee Bong-soo, supported by Representative Yoo Si-min, in Gimhae-eul, as the unified opposition candidate, not only created a platform for comparison among opposition candidates but also generated nationwide interest from the political community and the general public, as the election outcome had the potential to significantly alter the landscape of the next presidential race.

[Figure 1] Evaluation (%) of the Nature of the July 28, 2010 By-election and the April 27, 2011 By-election

*Source: EAI, JoongAng Ilbo, YTN, Korea Research (April 2011); EAI, Korea Research (July 2010)

● Furthermore, the fact that voters viewed the recent by-elections not as local elections to choose representatives but as a mid-term evaluation of the current government led to an all-out battle between the ruling and opposition parties. However, according to the public opinion barometer survey conducted by the East Asia Institute (EAI), YTN, JoongAng Ilbo, and Korea Research immediately after the election on April 30 using a landline RDD method, 65.3% of respondents answered that it was "a mid-term evaluation of the Lee Myung-bak administration," while only 26.6% considered it "an election to choose local representatives." Compared to the July 28 by-elections, this indicates that conditions were in place for the opposition's narrative of government judgment to gain traction.

● The pattern of how voters assign meaning to various elections under the current administration shows a clear difference from the participatory government era. While mid-term evaluation and government judgment narratives consistently influenced local and by-elections during the mid-to-late stages of the Roh Moo-hyun administration, the current administration has seen a more pronounced tendency towards balancing votes, where neither the opposition's mid-term evaluation narrative nor the ruling party's "local representative" narrative gains a decisive edge.

● In fact, although the mid-term evaluation narrative gained momentum in the run-up to the June 2, 2010 local elections, leading to a crushing defeat for the ruling party, the July 28 by-elections held just a month later saw voters favor the "local representative" argument emphasized by the ruling party over the presidential mid-term evaluation, resulting in a victory for the Grand National Party. At that time, a regular survey by the East Asia Institute and Korea Research in July 2010 found that only 44.8% of respondents viewed the July 28 by-elections as a "mid-term evaluation of the Lee Myung-bak administration," while 51.2% considered it an election to choose "local representatives." The outcomes of various elections, including the 2008 general elections, the 2010 June 2 local elections, the July 28 by-elections, and the April 27, 2011 by-elections, suggest that public opinion operates in a manner that balances power rather than leading to unilateral victories for a specific camp.

● Ultimately, in these elections where the mid-term evaluation narrative prevailed, the Democratic Party achieved optimal results by winning in Bundang, a key area for gauging public opinion among the metropolitan middle class, and in the Gangwon gubernatorial race, which garnered attention due to the contest between two former MBC presidents. In Gimhae-eul, despite internal disputes during the unified candidate selection process, the Democratic Party's candidate Lee Bong-soo, who was nominated as the unified opposition candidate, secured victory, paving the way for the political comeback of Kim Tae-ho, who had resigned as Prime Minister the previous year. In Honam, Kim Sun-dong of the Democratic Labor Party, running as the unified opposition candidate, defeated independent candidates from the Democratic Party to win.

● Bundang, where Representative Sohn Hak-kyu emerged as a victor, was a stronghold of the Grand National Party in the Seoul metropolitan area, having overwhelmingly supported Grand National Party candidate Im Tae-hee with 71% of the vote in the 2008 general elections and showing over 50% party support. The election of President Lee Myung-bak and the Grand National Party's overwhelming majority in the 18th general elections, despite facing a crisis due to impeachment, were largely attributed to their success in absorbing support from the 30s and 40s age groups and the middle class in the Seoul metropolitan area; Bundang was considered representative of this trend. Therefore, Representative Sohn Hak-kyu's victory served as an opportunity to showcase his and the Democratic Party's potential to attract votes from the middle and centrist classes. Given that the 2012 general and presidential elections are imminent, the shock the Grand National Party will experience from its defeat in Bundang is considerable. In contrast, the Democratic Party's candidate Choi Moon-soon, who was considered to be at a relative disadvantage, also pursued a close race against the Grand National Party's candidate Uhm Ki-young, who had a significant advantage in name recognition, ultimately securing victory.

Concerns over overheated election campaigns: 67.5% prefer 'solo campaigning'

● Unlike the July 28 by-elections, the April 27 by-elections were strongly characterized as a mid-term evaluation of the current administration. It is worth noting that public opinion was not favorable towards the all-out campaign efforts undertaken by the leadership of both ruling and opposition parties, except for certain factions. While party leaders and lawmakers were mobilized in most areas, candidates Sohn Hak-kyu in Bundang, a Grand National Party stronghold, and Kim Tae-ho in Gimhae-eul, where support for former President Roh Moo-hyun was strong, primarily engaged in solo campaigning, and they ultimately won, surpassing the intensive efforts of their opponents.

● These results suggest that voters favored a more subdued, solo campaigning style over the method of party leaders mobilizing for campaign rallies. In this survey, only 25.8% of respondents preferred "the method of party leaders providing campaign support," while 67.5% expressed a preference for "the solo campaigning method where the candidate campaigns alone." This finding, consistent across different age groups, regions, and political stances, indicates that voters harbor significant concerns about the overheating of elections due to vote-mobilizing campaign tactics. This is a point that campaign teams preparing for future elections should carefully consider.

[Figure 2] Preferred Campaigning Methods (%) in the April 27, 2011 By-election

*Source: EAI, JoongAng Ilbo, YTN, Korea Research Survey (April 2011)

(2) Post-April 27 Political Landscape Changes 1: National Approval Ratings and Party Support

President's approval rating plummets, supporters rapidly defecting, increasing likelihood of lame duck status.

Down 9.5%p from the previous month, 44.6% (March) → 35.1% (April)

● The implications of these election results for the Lee Myung-bak administration's strategy in the latter half of its term and for the positions of each party and presidential candidate in the lead-up to the next presidential election are of paramount interest. Notably, there has been a significant shift in President Lee Myung-bak's approval rating for his administration's performance. Given that a majority of voters viewed these elections as a mid-term evaluation of the current government, the ruling party's defeat has directly led to a decline in the President's approval rating.

● Following a 49.8% approval rating in January of this year, the rating had been on a slight downward trend, standing at 44.6% in the March survey. After the April 27 by-elections, it dropped to 35.1%, a decrease of 9.5 percentage points from the previous month. This result is lower than the Grand National Party's support rating of 37.5%, marking the first time since the survey began in 2009 that the President's approval rating has fallen below the ruling party's support rating. This suggests that responsibility for the election outcome is being placed more on the President and the government than on the ruling party.

[Figure 3] Changes in Presidential Approval Rating and Party Support (%)

*Source: EAI, JoongAng Ilbo, YTN, Korea Research Survey. Landline (RDD method) surveys since March 2011.

Supporters rapidly defecting, increasing likelihood of lame duck status; 4 out of 10 voters for MB in 2007 have defected.

Positive evaluations do not exceed a majority in Yeongnam, among those in their 50s, and among conservatives.

● The reason for focusing on this sharp decline in the national approval rating is primarily the potential for lame duck status to become a reality in the fourth year of the administration if the approval ratings, which the Lee Myung-bak administration has managed through issues such as the "pragmatic middle-ground" approach and the "fair society" initiative, were to plummet. Beyond the election results themselves, it is crucial to note the significant departure of core supporters from the government.

[Figure 4] National Approval Ratings (%) by Social Strata and Political Stance

*Source: EAI, JoongAng Ilbo, YTN, Korea Research Survey

● Regionally, approval ratings fell below 40% in the Seoul metropolitan area, including Seoul and Gyeonggi Province, in addition to the historically low support in Honam and Chungcheong regions. Even in the Yeongnam region, which has shown relatively high support, the rating did not exceed a majority. In the Busan/Ulsan/Gyeongnam region, it was below 40% at 36.9%. Notably, even in the TK region, which had recorded high national support rates in the 60% range, the approval rating in this survey was 49.3%, failing to reach a majority. By age group, while 58.6% of those aged 60 and above still positively evaluated the Lee Myung-bak administration's governance, the approval rating among those in their 50s, which was 52.3% in the March survey, dropped to 40.2% in this survey.

● Among voters who supported Lee Myung-bak in the 17th presidential election, only a little over half, 55.4%, still supported the President's governance; the rest expressed negative views or withheld their response, indicating that more than four out of ten have defected from the presidential support base. Ideologically, support was 28.2% among progressives and 31.8% among centrists. Even among conservatives, only 43.3%, far from a majority, responded favorably to the President's governance evaluation. The support base for the President's governance has narrowed to that of the Grand National Party supporters, with 64.4% of them expressing positive evaluations. The recent election results and the recent conflicts with large corporations have led to a noticeable departure even from the conservative base.

(3) Party Support Ratings Narrowing to a Close Race: GNP 38.4% vs. DP 22.2% (March) → GNP 37.5% vs. DP 32.1% (April)

Son Hak-kyu effect, rapid rise in Democratic Party support among moderates: 21.9% (March) → 38.0%, an increase of 16.1 percentage points.

● Another shockwave from the April 27 by-elections that will impact the future political landscape is the significant reduction in the gap between the ruling and opposition party support ratings. In the March survey, the Grand National Party's support rating was 38.4% and the Democratic Party's was 22.2%. However, in the April survey, the Grand National Party's support rating remained stagnant at 37.5%, while the Democratic Party's support rating surged to 32.1%, bringing them within the margin of error.

● During this by-election process, the Democratic Party demonstrated political resolve by having its leader challenge in the Bundang election, a Grand National Party stronghold, and by keeping its promise of not nominating a candidate in Suncheon to facilitate opposition candidate unification. Notably, in the Gimhae-eul candidate unification process, despite conflicts with the People's Participation Party, the Democratic Party's candidate Kwak Jin-up ultimately yielded, showcasing a departure from past electoral behaviors of shifting alliances or prioritizing partisan interests. This appears to have contributed to the election victory and improved the party's image.

● In contrast to the Democratic Party's rapid shift towards a progressive stance since the election of its leadership last year, the party's emphasis on the "role of the middle class" during the Bundang election appears to have been effective in attracting support from the middle and centrist classes. In fact, the ideological distribution of the Democratic Party's support showed a decline among centrist voters, who are a key support base, following the party's sharp leftward shift in policy and direction after the national convention last October. This led to an widening gap in support ratings with the Grand National Party, which has emphasized a pragmatic middle-ground approach (EAI Public Opinion Brief No. 96).

● However, the Democratic Party's support among conservatives remained largely unchanged, at 19.2% in the March survey and 20.4% in the April survey. The surge in support following the election victory is particularly noticeable among progressives and centrists. The increase in support among centrists is especially striking. Among progressives, the support rating increased by 9.7 percentage points from 29.7% in the March survey to 39.4% in the April survey. In contrast, the Democratic Party's support among centrists, which was close to the support among conservatives at 21.9% in the March survey, surged by a remarkable 16.1 percentage points to 38.0% in the April survey, approaching the level of support among progressives. This can be inferred as a result of consistently emphasizing the "role of the middle class" in the Bundang election.

● Moving forward, the sustainability of the Democratic Party's rising support ratings will likely depend on whether the Sohn Hak-kyu leadership, characterized by its emphasis on the "role of the middle class" and a strong centrist identity, can successfully integrate a centrist approach with the party's recent leftward trajectory.

[Figure 5] Changes in Democratic Party Support Ratings (%) by Ideological Stance Compared to the Previous Month

*Source: EAI, JoongAng Ilbo, YTN, Korea Research Survey. Landline (RDD method) surveys since March 2011.

【Composition of the Next Presidential Election and Support Ratings for Presidential Candidates】

(1) Next Presidential Election Landscape: Commonalities and Differences Between the 17th and 18th Presidential Election Landscapes

Commonality: Strong sentiment for change in government; agreement on 'punishment/government change theory' 58.4% in the 17th presidential election, 61.9% in the 18th presidential election.

Difference: Rapid increase in agreement on anti-Grand National Party alliance 40.2% → 57.2%; strong showing by opposition candidates in the 17th election, strong showing by Park Geun-hye in the 18th election.

● The April 27 by-elections provide an opportunity to compare public opinion regarding the "change of government" and "unified opposition alliance" narratives, which will shape the landscape of the 18th presidential election, with public opinion during the 17th presidential election. According to the joint 2nd Presidential Panel Survey by EAI, SBS, JoongAng Ilbo, and Korea Research in August 2007, 58.4% agreed with the statement "We must judge the failures of the Roh Moo-hyun administration and bring about a change in government," while only 32.1% disagreed. In the current survey, with a modified question, "We must judge the failures of the Lee Myung-bak administration and bring about a change in government," 61.9% agreed, exceeding the demand for a change in government during the previous presidential election.

● In contrast, during the 17th presidential election, only 40.2% agreed with the statement "The pro-government parties must unite to prevent the Grand National Party from taking power," indicating low expectations. However, in the current survey, a significant 57.2% agreed with the statement "The opposition parties must unite to prevent the Grand National Party from taking power." While the pro-government parties were divided and repeatedly formed alliances during the 17th presidential election, the current situation shows a growing possibility of a unified opposition alliance, with discussions on progressive party unification underway and the opposition parties, centered around the Democratic Party, successfully selecting unified candidates in electoral contests since the 2010 local elections.

[Figure 6] Consensus (%) on Change of Government and Opposition Alliance Narratives in the 17th and 18th Presidential Elections

*Source: EAI, JoongAng Ilbo, YTN, Korea Research Survey (April 2011); EAI, JoongAng Ilbo, SBS, Korea Research Presidential Panel 2nd Survey (August 2007)

(2) Simple support for the next presidential election: Park 35.8% > Son 11.5% > Yoo 7.1% > Oh 5.1%

- Likelihood of winning: Park 48.9% → 48.5%, Son 4.1% → 12.5%, Oh Se-hoon 7.5% → 5.3%

● Despite the growing momentum for a change in government and increased expectations for opposition unity, the most significant difference between the 18th presidential election landscape and the 17th presidential election landscape lies in the competitiveness of opposition candidates. In the 17th presidential election, the sentiment for judging the Roh Moo-hyun administration was expressed through the strong candidacies of Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye as alternatives. However, in the current 18th presidential election, while the sentiment for judging the current administration is high and there is considerable expectation and consensus for opposition unity, former representative Park Geun-hye maintains an overwhelming lead despite the recent by-election victory.

[Table 1] Support Ratings and Likelihood of Winning for Next Presidential Candidates (%)

Note: Figures in parentheses for April represent the likelihood of winning.

* Special Minister Lee Jae-oh has been included in the survey since September 2010.

** Gyeongnam Governor Kim Doo-kwan has been included in the survey since January 2011.

*** The January survey is based on Korea Research's own survey results, not the regular EAI/Korea Research survey.

**** Starting with the March 2011 survey, landline RDD method was used.

● In this survey, among various candidates, Park remains in the undisputed first place with 35.8% in the simple support question asking, "If the presidential election were tomorrow, who would you vote for?". Although this is a 1.1 percentage point decrease from 36.9% in last month's survey, it is not statistically significant. This result shows that the responsibility for the defeat in the April 27 by-election is not a major issue in public opinion. In the assessment of electability, the number of respondents who believe Park has a chance to be elected next president is close to half, with no significant change from 48.9% last month to 48.5% this month.

● On the other hand, the progress of Representative Sohn Hak-kyu is remarkable. In last month's survey, conducted before the decision to participate in the April 27 by-election, Sohn received only 3.6% support. In this survey, he recorded 11.5%, re-entering the double-digit range and ranking second, a position he last held shortly after becoming party leader last year. His electability also jumped from 4.1% last month to 12.5% in this month's survey.

● In contrast, former Representative Yoo Si-min, who recorded 10.6% in last month's survey, dropped to 7.1% in this survey. Mayor Oh Se-hoon received 5.1%, former Representative Chung Mong-joon 3.7%, former Prime Minister Han Myeong-sook 3.6%, and Governor Kim Moon-soo and Representative Lee Hoi-chang each received 3.2%. Following them were Governor Kim Doo-kwan of Gyeongnam (1.8%), former Minister Chung Dong-young (1.7%), Minister Lee Jae-oh (0.4%), and former Representative Chung Sye-kyun (0.1%).

(3) Candidate Suitability by Political Camp

- Grand National Party Candidate Suitability: Park Geun-hye 57.0% > Oh Se-hoon 10.0% > Kim Moon-soo 9.2% > Chung Mong-joon 5.0%

● When asked about suitability as a Grand National Party candidate, selecting only from GNP candidates, former Representative Park Geun-hye was overwhelmingly favored with 57.0%. Mayor Oh Se-hoon followed with 10.0%, Governor Kim Moon-soo with 9.2%, and former Representative Chung Mong-joon with 5.0%. Among GNP supporters, the gap widened further, with 63.5% choosing former Representative Park, 13.4% choosing Mayor Oh Se-hoon, 8.2% choosing Governor Kim Moon-soo, and 6.4% choosing former Representative Chung Mong-joon. Looking at the trend, support has concentrated on former Representative Park since March, with a significant decrease in undecided respondents.

[Figure 7] Grand National Party Candidate Suitability (%)

*Source: EAI, JoongAng Ilbo, YTN, Korea Research Survey. Landline telephone (RDD method) survey starting March 2011.

[Table 2] Suitability Preference for Grand National Party Presidential Candidates by Demographic Group (%)

*Source: EAI, JoongAng Ilbo, YTN, Korea Research Survey. Landline telephone (RDD method) survey starting March 2011.

- Opposition Unity Candidate Suitability: Sohn Hak-kyu 41.4% > Yoo Si-min 10.4% > Han Myeong-sook 8.4%

● Meanwhile, when asked about suitability as a unified opposition candidate, selecting only from opposition candidates, Representative Sohn Hak-kyu, who won the by-election, appears to have an overwhelming advantage with 41.4%. Representative Yoo Si-min, who was within the margin of error of Representative Sohn last month, dropped to 10.4%. Former Prime Minister Han Myeong-sook received 8.4%, Supreme Council member Chung Dong-young 6.5%, Governor Kim Doo-kwan 1.4%, former Assemblyman Noh Hoe-chan 1.4%, former Representative Chung Sye-kyun 1.2%, and Representative Lee Jung-hee 0.3%. Those who responded 'none' or 'don't know' accounted for 26.1%. This result shows that Sohn has firmly established himself as the leading opposition candidate following this election.

● Looking at the trend from January to March, Sohn was slightly ahead of Yoo. However, Sohn's strong performance in the April 27 by-election and the defeat of Lee Bong-soo, who was supported by Yoo Si-min, have significantly strengthened Sohn's position as the unified opposition candidate.

[Figure 8] Unified Opposition Candidate Suitability (%)

*Source: EAI, JoongAng Ilbo, YTN, Korea Research Survey. Landline telephone (RDD method) survey starting March 2011.

Gap widens among Democratic Party supporters; in Honam, Sohn 40.5%, Yoo 8.1%

● The gap between the two candidates remained consistent across all demographic groups. In terms of region, even in the Honam region, which has strong anti-Grand National Party sentiment, 40.5% chose Representative Sohn and 8.1% chose Representative Yoo, indicating a firm shift in support towards Sohn. Analysis by age and occupation showed that in the 20s and among students, the two candidates were still at similar levels, indicating that Yoo Si-min's support remains strong among young students, and his potential primarily stems from this demographic.

● Among Democratic Party supporters, the gap widened further: Representative Sohn received 48.0%, former Representative Yoo Si-min 11.2%, and former Prime Minister Han Myeong-sook 9.8%. Other candidates received less than 2% support. Among supporters of minor parties and unaffiliated voters, excluding GNP and DP supporters, the gap between Representative Sohn and Representative Yoo narrowed. Among minor party supporters, 38.7% chose Representative Sohn as the unified candidate, 20.1% chose Representative Yoo, 14.9% chose former Prime Minister Han Myeong-sook, 5.4% chose Supreme Council member Chung Dong-young, and 4.2% chose Governor Kim Doo-kwan, and 4.0% chose former Assemblyman Noh Hoe-chan. While the proportion of votes for Representative Yoo among minor party supporters, especially those with progressive leanings, was higher than among Democratic Party supporters, the gap with Representative Sohn was still considerable. Among unaffiliated voters, Representative Sohn received 33.1%, Representative Yoo 10.7%, Supreme Council member Chung Dong-young 4.7%, and former Prime Minister Han Myeong-sook 4.0%, with 40.3% undecided.

[Table 3] Preference for Unified Opposition Candidate by Demographic Group (%)

*Source: EAI, JoongAng Ilbo, YTN, Korea Research Survey. Landline telephone (RDD method) survey starting March 2011.

(4) Hypothetical Two-Way Matchup: Park Geun-hye vs. Sohn Hak-kyu: Park Geun-hye 52.3% vs. Sohn Hak-kyu 33.1%

Park leads among moderates, Park 51.7%, Sohn 33.8%.

● In a hypothetical matchup between former Representative Park Geun-hye and Representative Sohn Hak-kyu, Park received 52.3% and Sohn received 33.1%. Those who responded 'none' or 'don't know' accounted for 14.6%. Overall, Park maintained an advantage across most demographic groups, with Sohn performing better in the Honam region, among Democratic Party supporters, and among those with progressive political leanings. Notably, the gap between Park's support (54.2%) and Sohn's support (34.7%) was considerable even among voters in their 20s, who are known to lean towards the opposition.

● In a head-to-head matchup, Sohn's support increased more than Park's compared to simple support ratings, suggesting an advantage for Sohn. However, it is noteworthy that Park also garners significant support from opposition voters, including Democratic Party supporters and progressives, even though she trails Sohn in these groups. Meanwhile, Park also held an advantage among moderates, with 51.7% supporting her compared to 33.8% for Sohn. Reducing the gap with Park in these segments is the biggest challenge for Sohn's campaign going forward.

[Table 4] Candidate Preference in 1:1 Presidential Matchups by Demographic Group (%)

*Source: EAI, JoongAng Ilbo, YTN, Korea Research Survey. Landline telephone (RDD method) survey starting March 2011.

【Discussion Point】Why does Park maintain an advantage despite strong consensus for a unified opposition candidate?

- Presidential elections are heavily influenced by candidate factors, with a stronger tendency towards prospective voting than retrospective voting.

- Even among supporters of government judgment/opposition unity, 55.4% stated, "I will decide based on the candidate."

● If so, why does Park continue to dominate candidate support ratings, despite the strong consensus for government judgment and opposition unity discussed above?

● Recent theoretical discussions on economic voting theory may provide a theoretical basis for explaining why Park maintains an overwhelming lead in the race for the next presidency, despite the heightened sentiment for government judgment. In Western academia, there is ongoing debate as to whether voters decide based on a retrospective evaluation of the incumbent government's performance or a prospective evaluation of each candidate's economic policies and their ability to implement them (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000).

● However, in Korea, general elections, local elections, and by-elections held during a presidential term often serve as mid-term evaluations of the incumbent government, and voting is frequently based on retrospective evaluations of government performance (Kang, Won-taek 2010). Nevertheless, it has been generally accepted that the prospective voting theory has strong explanatory power in presidential elections, with the exception of the 15th presidential election held during the IMF economic crisis (Park, Kyung-san 1992; Lee, Hyun-woo 1998; Jhee and Shin 2007). However, an analysis of the 2007 presidential election experience confirmed a tendency towards retrospective voting in Korea, resulting in the defeat of the ruling party's candidate as a punitive vote for the participatory government's economic failures.

● If this logic holds, it is difficult to explain why the ruling party's candidate receives high support in voting behavior, despite the widespread sentiment for judging the current government and ruling party. Recently, rather than viewing these two positions as opposing, the argument that retrospective voting is possible in Korean elections, under the condition that there is a clear perception of who is best suited to improve the economy in the future, i.e., when there is a clear alternative for prospective voting, is gaining traction (Sanders and Carey 2002; Jeong, Han-wool and Kwon, Hyuk-yong 2009).

● The premise that retrospective judgment voting is linked to an assessment of future policy capabilities implies that the sentiment for judgment can only translate into actual voting behavior when it is connected with expectations for future alternative forces. Indeed, when asked who is perceived as most capable of managing national agendas such as future economic growth, resolving polarization, and improving quality of life among the major potential presidential candidates, public opinion strongly favored Park Geun-hye over opposition candidates. This means that instead of choosing an opposition candidate as an alternative to the current government's failures, Park Geun-hye is chosen. This suggests a reason why, despite strong public sentiment for judging and punishing the current government, the actual candidate chosen is not an opposition candidate but the ruling party candidate (Park Geun-hye) (EAI Public Opinion Brief No. 93, 2010. 12).

[Figure 9] Voting Preference in a Unified Opposition Candidate Scenario (%)

*Source: EAI, JoongAng Ilbo, YTN, Korea Research Survey. Landline telephone (RDD method) survey starting March 2011.

● Furthermore, in Korean elections, candidate factors have traditionally played a strong role, comparable to party or structural factors. In fact, this survey shows that despite strong support for government judgment and opposition unity, this does not directly translate into support for a unified opposition candidate. When asked, "If a unified opposition candidate is selected in the next presidential election, who would you vote for?", a majority of 59.7% responded that they would decide based on the candidate. Only 14.5% said they would vote for the ruling party candidate, and 22.4% said they would vote for the unified opposition candidate.

● Even among those who agree with the need for opposition unity to prevent the Grand National Party from taking power (458 people), only 33.8% stated they would support the current unified opposition candidate. Those who said they would decide based on the candidate accounted for 54.4%, indicating a majority who would decide based on the candidate's individual merits. Among these, only 9.2% said they would vote for the ruling party candidate. Conversely, among those who oppose opposition unity, the tendency to vote based on the candidate was even stronger, reaching 66.8%. Among these, 23.4% said they would support the ruling party candidate, and 7.8% said they would support the unified candidate.

● This suggests that the selection of a unified opposition candidate does not directly lead to support from those who agree with government judgment and the alliance of progressive forces. This also sheds light on why the opposition candidate lost in the recent by-election in Gimhae-eul, a district with strong anti-government sentiment, despite the selection of a unified candidate, likely due to the candidate's lack of capability. It indicates that focusing solely on candidate unification without considering individual candidate competitiveness and vision/policy content can diminish its impact, and that candidate unification, while a necessary condition for opposition victory, may not be a sufficient condition.

[Figure 10] Voting Candidate by Agreement on Opposition Unity for Regime Change (%)

*Source: EAI, JoongAng Ilbo, YTN, Korea Research Survey. Landline telephone (RDD method) survey starting March 2011.