[Public Opinion Brief No. 93] 2010 State Assessment and 2011 Political Outlook

[Public Opinion Brief No. 93] EAI · Hankook Research Joint Project

[Current Issue] Security Concerns Remain, Government's Preparedness for North Korean Provocations Insufficient

[Urgent Issue] Security Concerns Persist Ahead of Yeonpyeong Artillery Drill; Preparedness for North Korean Provocations Unsettling

Security Concerns High at 79.6% (December), Slightly Down from 81.5% (November) Immediately After Yeonpyeong Attack

● Although the shock from the Yeonpyeong shelling appears to be gradually subsiding, security concerns are escalating again as the resumption of the South Korean military's Yeonpyeong artillery drill approaches (December 20-24). North Korea, through a notice from its chief delegate to inter-Korean general-level talks on the 17th, warned against the South's maritime artillery drill. Subsequently, on the 18th, a commentary by 'Uriminzokkiri,' a South Korean propaganda outlet operated by the North's Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland, claimed that 'the South's artillery drill is a military provocation pushing the Korean Peninsula towards war,' thereby increasing its warnings and threats against the South. Notably, it even hinted at the possibility of a nuclear attack, stating, 'If war breaks out on this land, an immense nuclear catastrophe, incomparable to the Korean War (6.25 War), will befall our people,' rapidly escalating tensions between the two Koreas.

● A public opinion poll conducted by EAI and Hankook Research on the 18th reveals that public anxiety regarding security has not diminished since the Yeonpyeong shelling incident on November 23rd. According to the security perception index, tracked with the same question since the early 2000s, 81.5% (34.9% very anxious + 46.6% somewhat anxious) responded they were anxious in the poll conducted on November 27th. Approximately twenty days later, in the poll on December 18th, 79.6% (30.4% very anxious + 49.2% somewhat anxious) reported continued anxiety [Figure 1].

[Figure 1] Changes in Security Anxiety during the Lee Myung-bak Administration (April 2009 - December 2010) (%)

"Government's Preparedness for North Korean Provocations is Poor" - 69.6%; 51.9% of MB Supporters Hold Negative Views

● While the heightened level of North Korea's warnings and threats is likely the primary cause, public distrust in the government's preparedness also appears to be a factor contributing to security concerns. When asked, "How well do you think the government is prepared for potential North Korean provocations such as the Yeonpyeong shelling?", only 27.8% of respondents answered that the government is doing well, while the remaining 69.6% responded that it is doing poorly.

● Even among President Lee Myung-bak's supporters, over half (51.9%) believe the government is not well-prepared for North Korean provocations. Among those critical of the administration, a staggering 88.2% responded that it is doing poorly. Although the military leadership has been reorganized with personnel changes, including the defense minister, following the Yeonpyeong shelling incident to strengthen military preparedness, controversies such as suspicions of real estate speculation among military leaders and regional bias in the new military command appear to have reinforced negative perceptions.

[Figure 2] Assessment of Government's Preparedness for North Korean Provocations (%)

Source: EAI · Hankook Research December Public Opinion Barometer Survey

[Comprehensive Analysis] Factors Influencing Changes in Presidential Approval Ratings in 2010

December Presidential Approval Rating Ends at 48.9%: First Half Saw Conservative Consolidation; Second Half Saw Simultaneous Rise Among Moderates and Progressives

(1) Pattern of Presidential Approval Rating Changes in 2010

● The changes in the President's approval rating in 2010 can be broadly categorized into three periods based on turning points: a period of increase (January-May) amid security concerns following the Cheonan incident; a period of decline (June-August) where checks and balances from the moderate and opposition camps emerged following the June 2nd local elections; and a period of rising approval across all demographics (September-December) driven by the emphasis on a moderate-pragmatic approach and the theory of a fair society, as articulated in the August 15th commemorative speech.

[Figure 3] Pattern of Presidential Approval Rating Changes in 2010 (%)

Source: EAI · Hankook Research January-December Public Opinion Barometer Survey

Period of Increase (January-May): Expectations for the Third Year of Presidency and Security Effect of the Cheonan Incident; Primarily Effect of Conservative Consolidation

● The Lee Myung-bak administration, which experienced stagnant approval ratings early in the year due to the Sejong City conflict, saw an increase in approval ratings starting in February, marking the second anniversary of its inauguration and the third year of its term (44.3% → 49.2%). Although approval briefly faltered due to a decline in trust following the government's response to the Cheonan incident on March 26th, it achieved majority approval for the first time after President Lee's national address on May 24th [Figure 3].

● The characteristic of the approval rating increase in May was, above all, driven by the consolidation of conservative support. [Figure 4] shows that during the initial phase of the Cheonan incident in March-April, conservative support weakened due to the administration's cautious stance, while approval ratings actually increased among progressives and moderates. However, following President Lee Myung-bak's firm national address on May 24th, strong support consolidation was observed primarily among the elderly, low-income individuals, those with lower educational attainment, and the Yeongnam region, which constitute the core conservative base.

Period of Decline (June-August): June 2nd Local Elections; Consolidation of Conservative Support and Checkered Sentiments from Progressive/Moderate Camps

● Triggered by the defeat in the June 2nd local elections, the President's approval rating turned to a downward trend, remaining in the low to mid-40% range until August. The defeat of the ruling party, which had boasted majority approval, in the June 2nd local elections appears to be primarily the result of the checking sentiments of moderate and progressive voters against the consolidation of conservative support. [Figure 4] shows a sharp decline in approval ratings among progressives and moderates, who had supported the President's approval rating during the initial phase of the Cheonan incident, around the time of the June local elections. In particular, as the government and ruling party's strategy shifted towards an offensive approach in the final stages of the election campaign, focusing on (1) judging the previous administration, (2) judging the Korean Teachers and Education Workers Union, and (3) excessive 'North Wind' tactics, it appears to have induced checking sentiments and a judgment of the administration among moderate and progressive voters.

● Following the election defeat, the revised Sejong City plan, which the government had been pursuing since late 2009, was abandoned, and a withdrawal from the offensive strategy became unavoidable. After the election defeat, the party sought a political turnaround by electing a new leadership at the national convention on July 14th. Coupled with the opposition party's inertial response, this led to a political balance with the victory in the July 28th by-elections. Based on this momentum, the approval rating was maintained in the low 40% range.

Period of Resurgence (September-December): "Fair Society" Initiative and Expansion of Support Base; Simultaneous Rise in Support from Progressive and Moderate Camps

● The turning point for resurgence was, once again, the August 15th initiative, which advocated for a "pro-people, moderate-pragmatic approach" and the "realization of a fair society." Although the ambitious plan for Prime Minister Kim Tae-ho, who was in his 40s, failed due to corruption allegations, public support for the August 15th initiative began to rise in September, leading to a turnaround in approval ratings.

● The Democratic Party, which launched the Sohn Hak-kyu leadership system through its national convention on October 3rd, appears to be focusing on a "progressive line" rather than engaging in a "battle for the center" with the Grand National Party to secure moderate support. However, the party has not yet achieved significant success in expanding its support base among either the progressive or moderate camps, and it has been unable to counter the rising trend in the President's approval ratings.

● However, criticism over the government's confused response and inadequate handling of the Yeonpyeong shelling incident led to a drop in approval ratings to 44.2% in the November survey. Nevertheless, the approval rating recovered to 48.9% in the December survey, conducted about twenty days later, concluding the year. [Figure 4] Despite numerous negative factors, such as illegal wiretapping via burner phones, unilateral passage of the budget bill with omissions of 'welfare budget' funds, controversies over the increase of the 'brother-in-law budget,' and biased military appointments, the administration succeeded in increasing its approval ratings. It is noteworthy that the administration is currently consolidating conservative support while also expanding its support base to include progressive and moderate demographics.

[Figure 4] Pattern of Presidential Approval Ratings by Ideological Orientation in 2010 (%)

Source: EAI · Hankook Research January-December Public Opinion Barometer Survey

(2) Reasons for Simultaneous Rise in Approval Ratings in the Second Half of the Year: The Impact of the "Fair Society" Initiative / Cracks in the Progressive Camp After Yeonpyeong / Perceived Economic Improvement

While the rise in presidential approval ratings in the first half of 2010 was primarily due to the consolidation of conservative support, the second half saw a notable simultaneous increase in approval ratings from both conservative and progressive/moderate camps. What are the reasons for this?

The Impact of the "Fair Society" Initiative

● Above all, the government's "pro-people, moderate-pragmatic approach" and "Fair Society initiative" appear to have had policy appeal not only to conservatives but also to moderates and progressives. Positive evaluations (very positive + somewhat positive) of the pro-people, moderate-pragmatic approach increased from 50.8% in the August survey to 58.7% in the September survey. The Fair Society initiative also saw an increase from 55.2% to 63.5% during the same period.

● Indeed, a comparison of support for the pro-people, moderate-pragmatic approach and the Fair Society initiative by ideological orientation in the September survey confirms that they received high support not only from conservatives but also from progressives and moderates. Regarding the evaluation of the moderate-pragmatic approach, 52.3% of progressives and 52.2% of moderates held positive views. Among conservatives, 68.3% held positive views. The Fair Society initiative, in particular, demonstrated even greater impact. 56.6% of progressives, 61.8% of moderates, and 71.6% of conservatives held positive views on the Fair Society initiative.

[Figure 5] Evaluation of Pro-People Moderate-Pragmatic Approach and Fair Society Initiative by Ideological Orientation: "Positive" (%)

Source: EAI · Hankook Research September Public Opinion Barometer Survey

Shift in Preference for Military Response After Yeonpyeong Shelling: Stance on Military Response Causes Division and Departure Among Progressive/Conservative Camps

● The Yeonpyeong shelling incident left a significant impact on South Koreans' perceptions of North Korea. While wariness of full-scale escalation and a desire for long-term inter-Korean relations remain, the social atmosphere that previously considered military action taboo has been completely reversed by the Yeonpyeong shelling incident. Even in a survey on April 24th, after the Cheonan incident, only 28.2% viewed limited military action as a desirable tool for North Korea policy. However, in a survey on November 27th, immediately after the Yeonpyeong shelling, which targeted civilians on South Korean territory, a remarkable 68.6% responded affirmatively.

[Figure 6] Evaluation of Limited Military Action Against North Korea in Response to Yeonpyeong Shelling (%)

Source: EAI · Hankook Research November Public Opinion Barometer Survey

● A majority of progressives, who had been reluctant to take military action against North Korea and showed a strong preference for the Sunshine Policy, have begun to consider military action as a viable option. In the November survey [Figure 6], conducted immediately after the Yeonpyeong shelling, the pattern of conservatives preferring hardline responses and progressives preferring moderate responses was broken. Public opinion acknowledging the necessity of military action against North Korea has emerged across all ideological spectrums. 70.4% of progressives, 68.3% of moderates, and 71.6% of conservatives view limited military action as a desirable response by the government to the Yeonpyeong shelling.

● Notably, support for military action appears to be causing significant cracks in the traditional pattern of presidential approval ratings, where "progressives = anti-MB, conservatives = pro-MB." In the November survey, among progressives, those who view military action as undesirable show only 21.8% approval for the President, while those who favor military action against North Korea show a significantly higher approval rating of 35.1%, a difference of 13.3 percentage points. Conversely, among conservatives, those who favor military action, the traditional hardline conservatives, show a high approval rating of 60.4% for President Lee Myung-bak, but this drops to 46.0% among conservatives who oppose military action.

● While anti-MB sentiment among progressives and pro-MB sentiment among conservatives are still evident, the attitude towards military action appears to be causing considerable changes in attitudes toward the President. Considering that a majority across all ideological spectrums favors military action, the proportion of progressives who have shifted their support to the President due to favoring military action appears to be larger than the proportion of conservatives who have defected from the President's support base due to opposing military action. This shift seems to be underpinning the simultaneous rise in approval ratings among progressives.

[Figure 7] Comparison of Presidential Approval Ratings by Ideological Orientation Based on Preference for Military Action Against North Korea: "Doing Well" (%)

Source: EAI · Hankook Research November Public Opinion Barometer Survey

Perceived Economic Improvement

● Another factor supporting the President's approval ratings is economic performance. [Figure 8] shows that public perception of the national and household economy has been continuously improving since the economic crisis of 2008. Given that those who perceive economic improvement have higher approval ratings for state affairs, and conversely, those who perceive deterioration are critical of state management, the improvement in the perceived economy can be seen as a driving force behind the rise in presidential approval.

● In February 2009, immediately after the economic crisis, only 1.4% perceived that the South Korean economy had improved compared to a year prior. In contrast, a staggering 93.1% perceived that it had deteriorated. However, by the December 2009 survey, the perception of improvement rose to 14.4%, and by the December 2010 survey, it reached 25.8%. The perception of deterioration decreased to 36.2% in the December 2009 survey and 35.9% in the December 2010 survey. This represents a significant improvement compared to the January 2009 survey.

● Meanwhile, perceptions of household economic conditions also show a slow but steady increase in the proportion of those who perceive improvement. In the February 2009 survey, this figure was 5.8%; in the December survey, it was 7.8%; and in the December 2010 survey, it rose to 12.0%. Conversely, the perception of deterioration decreased from 50.9% in February 2009 to 33.1% in December, and further to 26.8% in the December 2010 survey.

● However, the increase in the perception of improvement at the household economic level is still too gradual, and the rate of decrease in negative perceptions has slowed down since 2010. While perceptions of improvement in the national economy are increasing, perceptions of deterioration have not significantly decreased since 2010. This presents a challenging aspect for the government.

[Figure 8] Changes in Perception of National and Household Economic Conditions Compared to One Year Ago (%)

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[Political Forecast] 2011 Agendas and Political Outlook

(1) Top National Agenda for 2011

Weakening of Economic Issues, Strengthening of North-South Security Agenda

Economic Polarization 23.2%, North-South Relations 14.8%, Economic Growth 12.0%, National Unity 11.7%, Security Enhancement 11.1%

● 2011 marks the fourth year of the Lee Myung-bak administration, entering its latter half, and is also the year preceding the presidential and general elections. Not only will the movements of the next presidential contenders from each political party become visible, but preliminary battles over the direction of the next administration will also commence between the ruling and opposition parties. It is anticipated that the Lee Myung-bak administration, as well as each political party and preliminary presidential candidate camps, will fiercely compete to set agendas favorable to themselves. How will the national agendas chosen by the public for 2011 change compared to the beginning of the year?

[Table 1] Changes in Top National Agendas: Comparison of Survey Results from January-December 2010 (%)

Source: EAI · Korea Research January, December Public Opinion Barometer Survey

● Since the 2007 presidential election, mitigating economic polarization and achieving economic growth have been the top national agendas demanded by public opinion. As of the January 2010 survey, 37.2% of respondents selected alleviating economic polarization as the top national task, and 21.0% selected economic growth as the top task. Combined, these two tasks accounted for 58.2%. Following these were national unity (13.5%), improving quality of life (10.0%), political reform (6.1%), and strengthening international competitiveness (5.8%). The demand for improved North-South relations ranked seventh at 3.2%, and national security agenda ranked low in priority at 1.2%.

● However, following the sinking of the ROKS Cheonan in March 2010 and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in November, significant changes are expected in the top national agendas for 2011. Economic agendas are weakening, and North-South security agendas are emerging. In the February survey, when asked about the top national agendas to be addressed in 2011, 'mitigating economic polarization' was still chosen by 23.2% of respondents, maintaining the top position, but this percentage dropped by 14.0 percentage points compared to January. Responses selecting economic growth as a top agenda also significantly decreased from 21.0% in January to 12.0%, falling to third place.

● However, the North-South relations agenda, which ranked seventh at 3.2% in the January survey, saw a 11.6 percentage point increase to 14.8%, rising to become the second-highest national agenda. The national security agenda also rose by 9.9 percentage points to 11.1%, ranking fifth. National unity (11.7%), improving quality of life (8.9%), and political reform (7.4%) showed little change in response percentages compared to January, but their priority ranking has declined.

● Despite the aftermath of the Yeonpyeong incident, the economic polarization agenda received the most responses as the top national agenda, indicating it will remain a major issue in 2011, albeit with reduced intensity. However, there is a clear tendency for the proportion of welfare and economic growth agendas to weaken when foreign policy and security agendas such as North-South relations and national security are highlighted. Ultimately, with economic polarization as the dominant agenda, the North Korean variable is expected to be the agenda that shapes the political landscape in 2011.

(2) Next Presidential Election and Competition for Presidential Contender Agendas

Park Geun-hye's Dominance, Strong Across All Agendas

Maintaining Large Gaps in National Security, National Unity, and Polarization Agendas

● In the December survey, Park Geun-hye, former party leader, continued her dominance in support for preliminary presidential contenders. Yoo Si-min, former minister, garnered 8.7%, Oh Se-hoon, mayor, 6.7%, and Kim Moon-soo, governor, 5.8%. Sohn Hak-kyu, party leader, received 4.9%. Following them were Han Myeong-sook (4.9%), Lee Hoi-chang (3.8%), Chung Mong-joon (3.3%), and Chung Dong-young (2.9%).

[Table 2] Support for Next Presidential Candidates (%)

** Minister Lee Jae-oh was included in the survey from September.

● Among opposition party contenders, Yoo Si-min, former minister, has consistently maintained support around 8-10%. Oh Se-hoon, mayor, and Kim Moon-soo, governor, who gained attention after rising to the 8% range following the local elections, have since fluctuated between 4-6%. Sohn Hak-kyu, leader of the Democratic Party, has not been able to maintain the double-digit support rates he achieved after becoming party leader following the local elections, falling to the 5% range. Han Myeong-sook, former prime minister, who was at the forefront of the opposition along with Yoo Si-min in the first half of the year, is falling behind the leading group as she faces the aftermath of the local election defeat and shows no clear commitment to the next presidential race. Chung Mong-joon, former party leader, Chung Sye-kyun, former leader, and Chung Dong-young, former minister, who have moved away from the center of political affairs after resigning their party leaderships, are also lagging in the lower ranks.

● In this survey, respondents were asked to choose the presidential contender best suited to resolve the top national agenda for 2011. Park Geun-hye shows superiority across all agendas. Specifically, 33.3% responded that she could best resolve national unity, 32.6% for national security, 26.9% for mitigating polarization, and 24.6% for political reform. The gap with the second-place candidate was relatively smaller for North-South relations (21.0%), improving quality of life (20.8%), economic growth (18.8%), educational reform (16.7%), and strengthening international competitiveness (9.7%). It is considered that Park, who has emphasized a welfare platform, has succeeded in preempting the polarization issue by leading Yoo Si-min, a former welfare minister, by over 15 percentage points.

● In terms of second place, Yoo Si-min, former minister, showed strength in polarization (10.8%), North-South relations (13.4%), and political reform (19.7%). His strength lies in securing second place in the emerging key issues of polarization and North-South relations. Oh Se-hoon, mayor, ranked second in national security (14.6%), Kim Moon-soo, governor, in economic growth (9.4%) and international competitiveness (6.5%), Han Myeong-sook, former prime minister, in quality of life agenda (12.5%), and Sohn Hak-kyu, party leader, in national unity issues (9.7%).

[Table 3] Issue Ownership: Preliminary Contenders Best Suited to Resolve Each National Agenda (%)

Source: EAI · Korea Research December Public Opinion Barometer Survey

(3) Challenges Facing the New Leadership of the Ruling and Opposition Parties in 2011

Ruling and Opposition Party Competition in 2010 - Support Gap Widened After June 2nd Local Elections

Support Reversed Among Centrists After August 15th Initiative and Democratic Party's Shift to Progressive Stance

● Examining the changes in support for the ruling and main opposition parties in 2011, the ruling Grand National Party (GNP) has shown a stable support rate in the mid-to-high 30% range, with a gradual increase. The GNP, which started with a 33.9% support rate, concluded the year with 38.4% in the December survey. The high mobilization of conservative voters following incidents like the sinking of the Cheonan and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island this year appears to be the basis for maintaining stable support.

● In contrast, the Democratic Party has experienced considerable fluctuations, and its support rate has stagnated in the latter half of the year, causing the support gap with the GNP to widen again. Following the impact of the Cheonan incident in the first half of the year, support rates fluctuated, but surged around the June 2nd local elections due to public checks and balances. In the July survey, the Democratic Party achieved a support rate in the 30% range for the first time since the current administration took office, narrowing the gap with the GNP to 3.7 percentage points. However, the support gap began to widen after the administration's August 15th initiative, and in the December survey, it stood at 23.6%, a 14.8 percentage point difference from the GNP [Figure 9].

[Figure 9] Changes in Support Rates for the Grand National Party and the Democratic Party (%)

Democratic Party - Support Reversed Among Centrists After Emphasizing Progressive Stance at October National Convention

● It is noteworthy that the widening gap in support between the two parties is primarily due to the ruling party proposing the August 15th initiative and the Democratic Party emphasizing a progressive stance after its national convention in October. While the GNP focused on securing support from the middle ground through its pragmatic centrist line and fair society initiative, the Democratic Party has tended to prioritize consolidating its progressive base by emphasizing a progressive line. This situation is somewhat distant from the pledge made by party leader Sohn Hak-kyu at the national convention to regain the lost 5 million votes by asserting that 'centrists are votes'.

● [Figure 10] shows the trend of support rates for the two parties among ideological centrists since the June 2nd local elections. Accordingly, the Democratic Party, which had shown comparable competition or even led the GNP among centrists before the national convention, began to fall behind the GNP in the October survey. Immediately after the Yeonpyeong incident in November, public distrust and criticism of the government and ruling party's response led to a temporary parity in support rates between the two parties. However, the December survey indicated that the Democratic Party was trailing the GNP in support.

[Figure 10] Changes in Support Rates for the Grand National Party and the Democratic Party Among Centrists Since the June 2nd Local Elections (%)

2011 Challenges: How Will the New Leadership of the Ruling and Opposition Parties Overcome Their Weak Leadership?

54.7% of Ruling Party Supporters, 59.2% of Democratic Party Supporters Say "No Improvement Compared to One Year Ago"

● In 2010, both the ruling and opposition parties underwent leadership changes through their national conventions. As these new leaderships were to guide the political competition leading up to the 2012 general and presidential elections, they garnered considerable interest and expectations from their respective supporter bases. As a result, the Ahn Sang-soo leadership system was established for the GNP, and the Sohn Hak-kyu leadership system for the Democratic Party.

● However, neither the Ahn Sang-soo nor the Sohn Hak-kyu leadership systems appear to have established stable leadership amidst internal strife and inter-party competition. With the 2011 presidential and general elections just a year away, both leaderships will face significant political challenges. Above all, cynicism towards the newly established leadership is evident among party supporters. In this survey, supporters of each party were asked how the activities of their party had changed compared to one year ago (before the new leadership took office).

● In [Figure 11], among GNP supporters, 30.8% responded that the GNP's current activities had improved compared to a year ago, while 54.7% responded that there was not much difference. 11.9% also responded that it had worsened. Among Democratic Party supporters, only 21.5% responded that it had improved, with a cynical 59.2% responding that there was no significant difference, and 12.9% responding that it had worsened.

[Figure 11] Evaluation of Party Activities Compared to One Year Ago: GNP and Democratic Party Supporters (%)

GNP's Conservative Supporters and Democratic Party's Centrist Supporters Dissatisfied with Current Leadership's Stance

● The dilemma, as shown in [Table 4], is that the current ideological shifts within each party are eroding their traditional support bases. In the case of the GNP, as it moved leftward with its pragmatic centrist line and fair society initiative, 36.6% of progressive supporters within the GNP responded that things had improved compared to a year ago, while 28.5% of centrist supporters and 25.6% of conservative supporters responded that things had improved, indicating lower satisfaction among traditional supporters.

● For the Democratic Party, with the emphasis on a progressive stance, 25.9% of supporters with a progressive tendency responded that things had improved, the highest percentage. Among centrist supporters of the Democratic Party, this figure was 19.3%, and among conservative supporters, it was 21.1%, indicating relatively lower satisfaction. In the same vein, among Democratic Party supporters, the proportion of respondents who felt things had worsened was relatively higher among centrist and conservative supporters than among progressive supporters. The dissatisfaction among conservative supporters, who represent the largest proportion, is less burdensome due to their smaller share of the Democratic Party's support base. Instead, attention should be paid to the dissatisfaction among centrist supporters, who constitute the largest segment.

● For the GNP's current leadership in 2011, the challenge is to expand support from the target group of centrist voters while simultaneously addressing the dissatisfaction of its traditional conservative base. In contrast, for the Democratic Party's leadership, the primary challenge is expected to be how to prevent the centrist voters, who form the largest segment of its support base, from being drawn to the GNP's outreach to the center, amidst the emphasis on a progressive stance.

[Table 4] Evaluation of Party Activities Compared to One Year Ago: Comparison by Ideological Tendency of GNP/Democratic Party Supporters (%)

【Key Issues】

(1) Unilateral Passage of Budget Bill: "Unavoidable Choice" 24.2% vs. "Should Have Been Passed by Consensus" 70.5%

Public reaction to the GNP's unilateral passage of the budget bill was cold. 24.2% responded that it was an unavoidable choice, while a significant 70.5% responded that it was wrong because it was not passed by consensus with the opposition parties.

[Figure 12] Attitude Towards the GNP's Unilateral Passage of the Budget Bill (%)

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● When asked about the swift implementation of the KORUS FTA, 59.5% responded in favor (20.8% strongly favor, 38.7% somewhat favor), while 35.8% opposed (23.1% somewhat oppose, 12.7% strongly oppose), and 4.7% were undecided/did not respond. Despite considerable friction during the FTA revision process between South Korea and the US following the Yeonpyeong incident, the high public demand for swift implementation appears to be a result of fatigue with the prolonged KORUS FTA debate, which has been ongoing since the previous administration, and the public opinion emphasizing the ROK-US alliance after the Yeonpyeong incident.

● Meanwhile, a slight majority favors the proposed increase in cigarette prices to 8,000 won. However, the extremely high levels of both strong support and strong opposition indicate that if this policy is pursued, it could lead to significant conflict.