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[Public Opinion Briefing No. 92] Ambivalence: Keywords for Understanding Changes in Perceptions of North Korea

Category
Commentary and Issue Briefing
Published
November 29, 2010
Related Projects
Conditions for Presidential Success

[Public Opinion Briefing No. 92] Joint Project of EAI and Korea Research

Public Opinion on North Korea Transcends the 'Sunshine vs. Hardline' Framework

Series 2: Impact of North Korea's Yeonpyeong Island Shelling on Public Opinion

[Issue Analysis] Ambivalence: Keywords for Understanding Changes in Perceptions of North Korea

(1) Cause and Responsibility: Agreement on North Korea's Perpetration, Disagreement on Government Responsibility

(2) Evaluation of Government Response

(3) Level of Military Response: "Restraint on Fighter Jet Bombing was Appropriate" 56.6%

(4) Future North Korea Policy Stance

[Related Report] EAI Public Opinion Briefing No. 91, "Impact of North Korea's Yeonpyeong Island Shelling on Public Opinion"


Introduction

● As the shock from the Yeonpyeong Island shelling gradually subsides, the focus of political circles, media, and public opinion is shifting. Immediately following the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island on November 23, which targeted Korean territory and civilian areas after the Armistice Agreement, public opinion was a mixture of anxiety about security, dissatisfaction with the government's confused response, and anger towards North Korea.

● Following the President's address to the nation on November 29 and the ROK-US joint military exercises in the West Sea, the sense is that while lingering anxiety and tension have not entirely dissipated, a gradual return to normalcy and composure is evident. As public opinion transitions from initial confusion to a calmer phase, the focus of political circles, media, and public opinion is rapidly shifting to policy-related issues concerning the attribution of responsibility for this incident and future response directions.

● The East Asia Institute (EAI) and Korea Research conducted a regular survey on November 27, four days after the incident, targeting 800 individuals nationwide to investigate the overall impact of the Yeonpyeong incident on public opinion. While EAI Public Opinion Briefing No. 91, "Impact of North Korea's Yeonpyeong Island Shelling on Public Opinion," published on November 28, provided a general overview of public opinion immediately after the incident, this Public Opinion Briefing No. 92 aims to analyze and explain the confused perceptions and issues surrounding current public opinion.

● While the current frames used by political circles and major media to analyze the situation are primarily based on a dichotomy of 'war vs. peace,' public opinion can be characterized by an ambivalent attitude, coexisting with dual perspectives rather than choosing one of the extreme viewpoints.

● Public opinion opposes extreme pacifism that prohibits military action against North Korea's military actions and prefers military retaliation. Simultaneously, there are divided opinions on high-intensity retaliation that could lead to full-scale escalation, and on postponing inter-Korean relations improvement until the immediate issue is resolved. While the majority opinion favors a shift towards dialogue and cooperation in the long term, the stance advocating for maintaining a hardline policy toward North Korea is strengthening.

Issues and Public Opinion Surrounding the Yeonpyeong Incident

● Following the Yeonpyeong Island shelling incident, various debates are ongoing within political circles and civil society regarding the causes of the problem, the evaluation of the government's response, and future response directions, with various public opinion survey results being introduced. The issues, divided by party lines and ideological stances, largely reflect differences in opinion on (1) the cause and responsibility for the incident, (2) the evaluation of the government's response, (3) the level of future military response, and (4) the stance on future North Korea policy.

[Table 1] Issues Related to Yeonpyeong Island and Public Opinion

(1) Cause and Responsibility: Agreement on North Korea's Perpetration, Disagreement on Government Responsibility

"Yeonpyeong Incident" is the responsibility of the MB Administration; "North Korean Nuclear Issue" is the responsibility of the DJ/Participatory Governments

● In the case of the Cheonan incident, North Korea did not admit responsibility for its occurrence. However, in the Yeonpyeong Island shelling incident, North Korea officially admitted its involvement, leaving little room for disagreement on the direct cause of the incident. Nevertheless, there are significantly divided views on whether the responsibility for the government's failure to prevent and respond adequately to the incident lies with the current administration or the previous one. Synthesizing the currently released public opinion survey results, the majority of public opinion attributes responsibility for the Yeonpyeong Island shelling incident to the current government, while a majority also attributes the worsening of the North Korean nuclear issue to the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun administrations.

● According to the EAI · Korea Research survey conducted on November 27, 39.4% of respondents attributed the background of the Yeonpyeong incident to the previous government's Sunshine Policy, while 51.3% attributed it to the current government's hardline policy toward North Korea. The undecided group (don't know/no response) accounted for 9.3%. Public opinion attributing responsibility to the current government was higher among younger individuals, those with higher education, and those with progressive political leanings, while attributing responsibility to the previous government was more common among older individuals, those with lower incomes, and conservatives [See Appendix Cross-Tabulation Table].

● Meanwhile, a survey conducted on the same day by the Asan Institute for Policy Studies · Research & Research showed contrasting perceptions regarding responsibility for the North Korean nuclear issue. 43.3% of respondents believed that North Korea's nuclear weapons development was due to the engagement policies of the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun administrations, while 35.4% attributed it to the current administration's hardline policy toward North Korea (Yonhap News, 2010.11.29).

● The differing perceptions of responsibility for nuclear development and the Yeonpyeong shelling are likely due, in part, to the fact that the North Korean nuclear development occurred during previous administrations, while the Yeonpyeong shelling incident occurred during the current administration. More fundamentally, this reflects a critical perception that the Sunshine Policy over ten years failed to fundamentally prevent security threats from North Korea and its nuclear weapons development, coupled with dissatisfaction over the strained inter-Korean relations due to reluctance towards active engagement on North Korean issues.

[Figure 1] Policy Responsibility for Yeonpyeong Shelling and North Korean Nuclear Development

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Policy Responsibility for the Yeonpyeong Shelling Incident

Source: East Asia Institute · Korea Research (11/27)
Policy Responsibility for North Korean Nuclear Development

Source: Asan Institute for Policy Studies · Research & Research (11/27)

(2) Evaluation of Government Response

Progressives/Moderates Point to "Crisis Management," Conservatives to "Lukewarm Military Retaliation"

● The evaluations of the government's response reported in the media largely confirm a high level of distrust towards the government. As presented in EAI Public Opinion Briefing No. 91, the EAI · Korea Research survey results indicated that 24.7% of respondents believed the government responded well to the Yeonpyeong Island shelling, while 72.0% believed it responded poorly. In the survey by the Asan Institute for Policy Studies · Research & Research, 25.9% responded that the government acted well, while 65.7% believed it acted poorly.

● However, regarding the reasons for the poor response in the EAI · Korea Research survey, the current government and ruling party, along with the Liberty Forward Party and conservatives, primarily criticized the insufficient retaliation relative to the scale of the North Korean attack and our casualties. Opposition parties, progressive political parties, and moderate to progressive segments of the public pointed to the government's crisis management system, which failed to function effectively during the crisis.

● Overall, the most frequently cited reason was "lack of a comprehensive crisis management system" (36.5%), followed by "lukewarm military retaliation" (23.8%). "Confusion in the government's response direction toward North Korea" was cited by 13.1%, "confusion in government announcements" by 11.4%, and "lack of diplomatic capacity toward China" by 6.9%. "Other" accounted for 3.3%, and "no wrongdoing" was 1.4%. (EAI Public Opinion Briefing No. 91, "Impact of Yeonpyeong Island Shelling on Public Opinion," p. 7-8).

[Figure 2] Most Negative Evaluation Factors of Yeonpyeong Shelling by Ideological Tendency (%)

Source: East Asia Institute · Korea Research (11/27)

(3) Level of Military Response: "Restraint on Fighter Jet Bombing was Appropriate" 56.6%

80.3% Believed a Stronger Response Was Necessary

● The most significant change in public perception of North Korea resulting from the Yeonpyeong Island shelling is the beginning of recognition of "military options" as a viable means of North Korea policy. 68.6% of respondents answered that the government's response to the Yeonpyeong Island shelling was "desirable," while only 23.9% answered it was "undesirable." This is more than double the 28.2% who responded that limited military action was desirable in a survey conducted immediately after the Cheonan incident (EAI Public Opinion Briefing No. 91, p. 11).

● Furthermore, there is a general consensus in public opinion following the Yeonpyeong Island shelling that the government's military response was insufficient. According to data from the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, 80.3% of all respondents agreed with the statement that "our military should have taken a stronger military response during the Yeonpyeong incident" (Yonhap News, 2010.11.29).

● However, the EAI · Korea Research survey results indicated that the public was hesitant about the level of response involving fighter jets, which carries a high risk of escalation. When asked, "Do you think North Korea's coastal artillery bases should have been bombed by fighter jets, risking escalation, or was it appropriate to refrain from fighter jet bombing to prevent escalation?", 39.3% responded that "fighter jets should have been used for bombing," while 56.6% responded that "it was appropriate to refrain from fighter jet bombing."

● While it is true that hardline public opinion toward North Korea has strengthened in South Korean society following the Yeonpyeong Island shelling, this finding reveals that the majority opposes full-scale escalation into war with North Korea.

[Figure 3] Support for and Opposition to Fighter Jet Bombing of North Korean Coastal Artillery Bases After Yeonpyeong Shelling (%)

Source: East Asia Institute · Korea Research (11/27)

(4) Future North Korea Policy Stance

Reduction/Abolition of North Korean Aid: 31.6% (Jan) → 51.2% (May) → 56.9% (Nov)

● The call for reducing aid to North Korea is growing louder regarding the future North Korea policy stance the government should pursue. According to EAI survey results, as recently as January 2010, 67.6% of respondents favored expanding or maintaining the current level of aid to North Korea, while only 31.6% favored reducing or ceasing aid. However, this trend reversed following the Cheonan incident. In the May survey, the proportion favoring expansion or maintenance dropped to 41.8%, and in the November survey, immediately after the Yeonpyeong incident, it further decreased to 40.5%, a significant drop from January. Conversely, the proportion favoring reduction or abolition rose to 51.2% in the May survey and exceeded the majority at 56.9% in the November survey.

● However, while public opinion has soured towards aid to North Korea due to North Korea's military provocations in the short term, long-term support for reconciliation and cooperation with North Korea still outweighs support for a sustained hardline policy. In the May survey, 37.1% favored a North Korea policy of "long-term hardline response," but this increased slightly to 42.7% following the recent shelling. Conversely, the proportion favoring "long-term strengthening of reconciliation and cooperation" decreased from 61.5% in the May survey to 55.2% in November, a drop of 6.3 percentage points. Nevertheless, support for the necessity of transitioning to conciliatory measures still remains higher than maintaining a hardline stance in the long term.

[Figure 4] Stance on Aid to North Korea and Direction of Long-Term North Korea Policy (%)

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Changes in Stance on Aid to North Korea

Source: East Asia Institute · Korea Research (11/27)
Direction of Long-Term North Korea Policy

Source: EAI May Panel Survey,
November Regular Survey

Conclusion

● Synthesizing the results of this survey and other public opinion polls reported in the media, a fundamental shift in public perception regarding North Korea policy is evident following the successive incidents of the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Island shellings. These events have fractured the social consensus supporting the reconciliation and cooperation policy, which was largely based on aid to North Korea. Public opinion now realistically considers military options, which were previously taboo. The public, which prioritized patience for peace, now widely embraces the concept of military reciprocity, demanding retaliation in kind at a minimum. Indeed, perceptions have shifted to hold previous administrations, which adopted engagement as their primary policy, more responsible for the North Korean nuclear development than the current government.

● However, this does not signify a unilateral abandonment of previous policy frameworks or an outright victory for a hardline approach toward North Korea. Public opinion also reveals deep concerns about the potential for a hardline stance to escalate into full-scale war. Expectations for reconciliation and cooperation in inter-Korean relations still remain. In essence, while the focus has shifted from a conciliatory to a hardline perception of North Korea, the overall situation is best understood as a coexistence of ambivalent attitudes.

● This suggests that for the government's future North Korea policy to garner public support, flexibility in policy implementation that transcends ideological boundaries will be a crucial virtue, rather than a rigid, either/or approach between the Sunshine Policy and a hardline policy.

[Appendix] includes cross-tabulation tables for survey questions newly added to EAI Public Opinion Brief No. 92.

*This text is an AI translation of an original written in Korean. Some translations or nuances may be inaccurate.

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