[Public Opinion Brief No. 91] The Impact of North Korea's Yeonpyeong Island Shelling on Public Opinion

[Public Opinion Brief No. 91] EAI · Korea Research Joint Project: November Regular Public Opinion Barometer Survey

The Impact of North Korea's Yeonpyeong Island Shelling on Public Opinion

[Analysis 1] Impact on Security Sentiment: 81.5% Feel Insecure, 26.8% Perceive Possibility of Full-Scale War

[Analysis 2] Evaluation of Government Response to Yeonpyeong Island Shelling: 24.7% Responded Well, 72.0% Responded Poorly

[Analysis 3] Impact on Perceptions of North Korea and Preferred Policy Towards North Korea

[Analysis 4] Impact of Yeonpyeong Island Shelling on Domestic Political Perceptions

[Related Report] EAI Public Opinion Brief No. 92: "A Mix of Hardline and Conciliatory Approaches: Keywords for Understanding Changes in Perceptions of North Korea"

[The Peterson Institute for International Economics] North Korea: Witness to Transformation View Citation

[Analysis 1] Changes in Security Anxiety Since 2000: Security Anxiety Reaches Peak at 81.5%

The Greatest Security Crisis of the 2000s: A Crossroads of Reconciliation and Crisis

Kim Dae-jung to Roh Moo-hyun Administrations: 2002-3 Naval Clash/North Korean Nuclear Development 54.8% → 2006 North Korean Nuclear Test 63.8% → 2007 Summit 31.9%

On November 23, North Korea's shelling of Yeonpyeong Island resulted in flames engulfing the island and casualties among soldiers and civilians. While there have been three naval clashes in the West Sea and the sinking of the Cheonan since the Armistice Agreement on July 27, 1953, this marks the first military attack targeting civilians, creating considerable shock and tension.

According to the November Public Opinion Barometer survey conducted by the East Asia Institute (EAI) and Korea Research immediately following North Korea's attack on Yeonpyeong Island, a staggering 81.5% (34.9% very insecure + 46.6% somewhat insecure) responded that the current security situation in South Korea is 'insecure.' This is the highest level of anxiety recorded since the survey began in November 2000.

Following the first inter-Korean summit in 2000, the response indicating insecurity was only 18.9%. However, with the advent of the Bush administration and the North Korean nuclear issue, anxiety rose to 54.8% following North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) in January 2003. Security anxiety, which had eased to 43.0% through two rounds of Six-Party Talks in 2004, surged to 63.8% following North Korea's first nuclear test in 2006, but then dropped to 31.9% with the second inter-Korean summit in 2007.

[Figure 1] Changes in Security Anxiety Since 2000: Percentage of Responses Indicating Insecurity (Very + Somewhat)

Lee Myung-bak Administration: Security Anxiety Reaches All-Time High Due to Yeonpyeong Island Shelling

Second North Korean Nuclear Test (June 2009) 59.2% → Cheonan Announcement (May 2010) 75.4% → Yeonpyeong Island Shelling (November 2010) 81.5%

In the early part of the current administration, there were no significant crisis factors, and the response indicating security anxiety was as low as 29.5% in the March 2009 survey. However, as North Korea's hardline policies towards South Korea and the United States intensified, starting with the long-range rocket launch test on April 5, 2009, and escalating to the second North Korean nuclear test on May 25, security anxiety rose from 32.8% to 48.4%. As international sanctions against North Korea, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), began to take effect, the figure increased to 59.2% in the June survey.

In August 2009, there was a temporary thaw in inter-Korean relations, with North Korea releasing two detained South Korean journalists and Hyundai Group Chairwoman Hyun Jeong-eun visiting North Korea to resolve the Geumgangsan issue. This led to a sharp decrease in security anxiety.

In 2010, immediately after the sinking of the Cheonan on March 26, anxiety rose to 66.8%, comparable to the level during the first North Korean nuclear test in 2006. A month later, following the government's official announcement attributing the incident to North Korea, it surged to 75.4%. While security anxiety seemed to subside to 59.6% in July due to heightened ROK-US cooperation, including joint military exercises, the recent shelling of Yeonpyeong Island has caused it to spike to 81.5%.

The significant increase in security anxiety following the Yeonpyeong Island shelling appears to be primarily due to the fact that, for the first time since the Armistice Agreement, North Korea directly targeted South Korean territory and civilians with a medium-to-high intensity military action using howitzers. The attack violated the 'principle of distinction' under international law, which prohibits attacks on civilians and civilian objects, a principle that had been maintained during previous inter-Korean military confrontations. This violation has led to widespread public anger and concern.

[Figure 2] Changes in Security Anxiety During the Lee Myung-bak Administration (2009-2010): Percentage of Responses Indicating Insecurity (Very + Somewhat)

Low concern over full-scale war: 26.8% believe war is likely, 71.4% believe war is unlikely

Women (35.4%), younger demographics (20s: 35.7%, 30s: 32.5%), and critics of the MB administration (30.9%) express greater concern about full-scale war.

● This sense of insecurity did not extend to concerns about escalation into a full-scale war. In this survey, when asked, "Do you feel anxious that a war might break out, or not?", only 26.8% of all respondents answered that they felt anxious about a war breaking out, while 71.4% responded that a war was unlikely to break out.

● However, significant differences in sentiment were observed across gender and age groups. While only 18.0% of men responded that a war was likely, 35.4% of women respondents indicated feeling anxious about a potential war. Younger age groups expressed greater concern about war compared to older generations. Specifically, 35.7% of those in their 20s and 32.5% of those in their 30s responded that a war was likely, exceeding the average. In contrast, only 25.1% of those in their 40s and 19.6% of those aged 50 and above believed a war was likely. A slight difference in perception was also noted based on approval of the President's job performance. While 22.2% of those who approve of the President's job performance expressed concern about the possibility of war, 30.9% of those critical of the administration's performance responded that war was possible. No significant differences were found based on education level, occupation, or region.

[Figure 3] Assessment of War Likelihood by Gender, Age, and Presidential Approval: "War is likely to break out" (%)

[Analysis 2]. Assessment of the Government's Response to the Yeonpyeong Shelling

Government Response Assessment: Well-handled 24.7%, Poorly handled 72.0%; Both progressives and conservatives are critical.

Backlash against the Yeonpyeong response led to a decline in presidential approval ratings, from 51.0% in October to 44.2% in November, a drop of 6.8 percentage points.

● As reflected in [Figure 4], the public's assessment of the government's response was critical, seemingly mirroring the anger and shock. Responses indicating the response was handled well accounted for 24.7% (1.9% very well handled, 22.8% somewhat well handled), whereas responses indicating it was handled poorly reached 72.0% (46.0% somewhat poorly handled, 26.0% very poorly handled).

● Notably, negative assessments were prevalent not only among the opposition Democratic Party supporters and progressives but also among the government and ruling party's own supporters. Among supporters of the Grand National Party, 63.4% responded poorly, and among conservatives, 72.8% stated the government handled the response poorly, indicating a lack of approval even from its base. Even among those who approved of the President's overall job performance, 58.8% responded that the government handled the response poorly.

● Reflecting this critical public opinion, the Blue House and the government are facing various criticisms from the political sphere, media, and civil society. Some criticize that the military retaliation was insufficient, even at the risk of escalation, while others argue that the government's hardline North Korea policy is problematic. Meanwhile, there are also strong voices pointing out confusion in the government's response direction and failure in managing public messaging during the initial response phase. Furthermore, criticisms are pouring in from various perspectives regarding issues such as outdated military facilities and problems with managing the local community in Yeonpyeong. A thorough and systematic analysis of public opinion expressed during crises is necessary to serve as an opportunity to advance the government's response system to crisis situations involving the safety and lives of its citizens.

[Figure 4] Assessment of Government's Response to Yeonpyeong Shelling by Presidential Approval, Ideological Tendency, and Party Affiliation: "Poorly handled" (%)

Inadequate government response amplified security concerns.

Security concerns among the "positively evaluating" group for government response were 71.6%, while among the "negatively evaluating" group, security concerns were 85.6%, a 15 percentage point difference.

● The negative perception of the government's response, above all, appears to have amplified public anxiety regarding security. While 71.6% of those who believed the government handled the Yeonpyeong shelling response well reported feeling insecure about security, this figure rose to 85.6% among those who believed the government handled it poorly.

● It is true that the Yeonpyeong shelling, being the first moderate attack on South Korean territory and civilian areas since the Armistice Agreement, heightened security concerns regardless of the government's response. However, the fact that the percentage of those reporting insecurity was 15 percentage points higher among those who viewed the government's response negatively compared to those who viewed it positively suggests that the government's response amplified these concerns.

● Furthermore, the intensity of the anxiety shows a greater difference. Among those who felt the government responded well to the Yeonpyeong attack, 18.2% described the overall security situation as "very anxious" and 53.5% as "somewhat anxious," indicating a relatively mild level of anxiety. In contrast, among those who believed the government responded poorly to the Yeonpyeong shelling, 41.3% reported feeling "very anxious," and 44.3% reported feeling "somewhat anxious." The proportion of "very anxious" responses was approximately 33.1 percentage points higher among the negatively evaluating group compared to the positively evaluating group.

[Figure 5] Security Anxiety by Assessment of Government's Response to Yeonpyeong Shelling (%)

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Detailed Evaluation of Government Response Through Public Opinion: Achievements and Failures

Good Response: "None" 26.1% > "Preventing Escalation" 21.8% > "ROK-US Alliance" 16.5% > Suppressing Anxiety 9.4% > "Economic Management" 6.4%

Poor Response: "Crisis Management System" 36.5% > "Military Retaliation" 23.8% > "Confused Response Direction" 13.1% > "Confused Government Announcements" 11.4%

● Although public opinion's overall evaluation of the government's response is very harsh, a more detailed and objective examination can provide important implications for building the government's crisis response system in the future. To this end, we asked about the positive and negative aspects of the government's response to North Korea's armed attack on Yeonpyeong Island.

● Reflecting the prevailing critical public sentiment, the most frequent positive evaluation of the government's response was the cynical assessment that "there were no good points," accounting for 26.1%. However, "preventing escalation," which had sparked controversy regarding the appropriateness of the President's initial response message, was cited as a positive factor by 21.8% of respondents, making it the second most frequent answer. "Maintaining a firm ROK-US alliance" was cited by 16.5%. Only 9.5% responded that "military retaliation" was well handled. "Suppressing the spread of public anxiety" was cited by 9.4%, and "economic risk management" by 6.4%, followed by "other" at 5.4%.

● Regarding criticisms of failures, the highest response rate, 36.5%, pointed to the "lack of an overall crisis management system." This was followed by "lukewarm military retaliation" cited by 23.8%. "Confused response direction towards North Korea" was cited by 13.1%, "confused government announcements" by 11.4%, and "lack of diplomatic capability towards China" by 6.9%. "Other" accounted for 3.3%, and only 1.4% responded that "nothing was done wrong."

● More voices pointed to the lack of an overall crisis management system and the confusion in response strategies, indicating a lack of systematic approach and coherence in the government's response, rather than the inadequate military retaliation which has been the main point of controversy. This suggests that, in addition to determining the level of North Korea's attack and the appropriate military response, priority should be given to diagnosing the problems in the government's response strategies and public messaging, and to developing system improvements that enhance policy consistency and certainty during crises.

[Figure 6] Detailed Evaluation of Government Response to Yeonpyeong Shelling: Achievements and Failures (%)

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Both Progressives and Conservatives are Critical, but Reasons for Criticism Differ

Progressives and moderates cited "confusion in the crisis management system," while conservatives cited "lukewarm military response."

● As examined above, neither progressives nor conservatives viewed the government's response to North Korea's shelling of Yeonpyeong Island favorably. However, significant differences in perspective were identified when examining the reasons for criticism from progressives and conservatives.

● As shown in [Figure 7], among progressives and moderates, the most frequent response (42.3% and 41.5%, respectively) pointed to the "lack of an overall crisis management system" that failed to function properly during the crisis. This was followed by responses citing inconsistencies in policy direction and public messaging, such as "confusion in the direction of response towards North Korea" or "confusion in government announcements," with 23.9% and 25.0% respectively. Responses citing the "lukewarm military response towards North Korea," which has been a frequent point of contention recently, were at the level of 20.9% and 19.7% respectively.

● Meanwhile, among conservatives, the most frequent response (32.2%) cited the "lukewarm military response towards North Korea." Responses pointing to the "lack of an overall crisis management system" accounted for 27.8%, and those citing "confusion in the direction of response towards North Korea/confusion in government announcements" combined for 25.7%.

● Although criticized for prioritizing de-escalation and domestic management over a response to North Korea in its initial response, this public sentiment appears to be primarily spreading among conservative segments. Among liberal and conservative voters, there were many responses pointing to the absence of a crisis response system and policy confusion. Although not well-discussed within the political sphere, media, and civil society, it is necessary to pay attention to aspects of the government's response that are evaluated positively.

[Figure 7] Most Negative Evaluation Factors for the Yeonpyeong Artillery Barrage by Ideological Tendency (%)

[Analysis 3]. Changes in Perceptions of and Preferred Policies Toward North Korea: A Comparison of Public Opinion on the Cheonan Incident and the Yeonpyeong Artillery Barrage

Comparison of Incident Overviews

● The most significant difference between the Cheonan incident and the Yeonpyeong artillery barrage is that, according to the government's official announcement, the Cheonan incident involved a North Korean submarine infiltrating South Korean territory and firing a torpedo at a South Korean warship, an act of military action within the framework of international law prohibiting attacks on civilians and civilian facilities. In contrast, the Yeonpyeong artillery barrage included civilians and civilian facilities as targets.

● In the case of the Cheonan incident, it took approximately two months for the government to conclude, based on North Korea's denial of the attack, that it was North Korea's act. In contrast, for the Yeonpyeong artillery barrage, North Korea officially announced within three days that it had carried out a precision strike, indicating a difference in the certainty of responsibility.

● Regarding the response of neighboring countries, the Cheonan incident saw South Korea, the United States, and Japan on one side, and China, Russia, and North Korea on the other, showing differences in perception and response regarding the truth of the incident. China and Russia did not accept the content of the truth of the Cheonan incident announced by the South Korean government. In the case of the Yeonpyeong artillery barrage, Russia immediately clarified that North Korea was responsible, while the Chinese government initially took a neutral stance, noting that the incident occurred immediately after South Korea's artillery drills near North Korea. However, a change in attitude is emerging with the commencement of joint South Korea-U.S. military exercises in the West Sea, involving a U.S. aircraft carrier, starting on November 28. Through meetings with the North Korean ambassador in Beijing and messages indicating tolerance for joint South Korea-U.S. military exercises within South Korea's exclusive economic zone, there is a visible effort to deter miscalculated further provocations by North Korea.

● The government's response showed similar initial confusion. In the case of the Cheonan incident, immediately after the incident, the Blue House stated, "It is presumed not to be North Korea's act." The process followed was: handling of victims and funeral arrangements → investigation of facts → response. However, with the salvage of the Cheonan accelerating the investigation, the Joint Investigation Committee officially confirmed it as a North Korean torpedo attack on May 20. President Lee Myung-bak, in a national address at the War Memorial on May 24, presented a series of principles for responding to North Korea, declaring military retaliation in case of further North Korean provocations and proposing sanctions including severance of inter-Korean relations and referral to the UN Security Council. The transition from an initial cautious approach to a swift response in the latter half occurred just before the local elections. Public opinion accepted the theory of North Korean responsibility, but a May 30 survey revealed that 67.2% of respondents expressed concern that the ruling party might be using the Cheonan incident for political gain.

● In the Yeonpyeong artillery barrage incident, after media reports indicated the President's initial message was focused on "managing de-escalation," the Blue House later clarified that this was a distorted report and the message was one of "strong retaliation." This clarification conflicted with the National Defense Minister's testimony in the National Assembly, amplifying suspicions. Furthermore, criticisms poured in regarding the inadequate response to the shelling of territory that included civilians, and the failure to take precautionary measures for Yeonpyeong residents despite detecting signs of North Korean activity. Ultimately, the situation has led to the acceptance of Defense Minister Kim Tae-young's resignation to resolve the political crisis.

[Table 1] Overview of the Cheonan Incident and the Yeonpyeong Incident

Comparison of Public Opinion on the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Incidents

Cheonan response well handled 41.2% (4.24) → 57.6% (5.28), Yeonpyeong response well handled 24.7%

Cheonan evaluation: tendency for partisan interpretation (conservative-positive, liberal-negative), Yeonpyeong: critical from both conservatives and liberals

● Above all, the evaluation of the government's response to the Yeonpyeong artillery barrage is significantly more negative compared to the evaluation of the response to the Cheonan incident. In a survey conducted on April 24, before the official announcement of responsibility for the Cheonan incident, 41.2% responded that the government's response was well handled, falling short of a majority. However, on May 28, immediately after the President's national address on May 24, 57.6% responded that it was well handled. Based on this effect during this period, the approval rating for national administration exceeded 50% on May 28 (see EAI Public Opinion Briefing No. 82). In contrast, the current approval rating for the government's response to the Yeonpyeong artillery barrage is only 24.7%, although there is potential for change later as the incident is still recent.

● As confirmed in [Table 2], the evaluation of the government's response to the Cheonan incident showed a thoroughly polarized perception, with liberal, Democratic Party supporters, and those critical of the administration showing positive attitudes, while conservatives, Grand National Party supporters, and those supportive of the administration showed negative attitudes, influenced by partisan perspectives. In contrast, the Yeonpyeong artillery barrage is characterized by a predominantly non-partisan evaluation. This is because, as examined above, critical public opinion regarding the government's response (especially its lukewarm response to North Korea) is prevalent not only among the government's opponents but also among conservatives, Grand National Party supporters, and those supportive of the administration.

Perceptions of the Use of Military Retaliation Measures Have Significantly Changed

"Limited Military Retaliation is Desirable" Immediately after Cheonan Incident 28.2% → Immediately after Yeonpyeong Incident 68.6%

● In the past, when public opinion on the government's response direction was surveyed during serious security threat situations such as the North Korean nuclear crisis, missile crisis, and Cheonan crisis, international cooperation or economic sanctions against North Korea were generally preferred, and opinions were divided on severing inter-Korean relations, while there was significant resistance to the use of military means, even to a limited extent.

● In the survey conducted immediately after the Cheonan incident regarding desirable crisis resolution measures, the order was: 'Referral to the UN Security Council' 75.0% > 'Economic sanctions against North Korea' 58.5% > 'Severance of inter-Korean relations' 45.2% > 'Limited military retaliation' 28.2%. However, in the survey conducted immediately after the Yeonpyeong artillery barrage, while perceptions of other measures remained largely unchanged, the perception that limited military retaliation measures are desirable increased to 68.6%.

● This is the result of the perception that appropriate military retaliation for North Korea's clear 'provocation' has spread not only among conservatives but also among moderates and progressives. This is interpreted as having been significantly influenced by the fact that it was a direct attack on South Korean territory and that civilian casualties, a taboo, occurred, impacting public sentiment and judgment.

Deepening Ambivalence in Perceptions of North Korea: Acceptance of Military Measures as a Turning Point in Perceptions of North Korea

Ambivalence Likely to Deepen: Acceptance of Military Measures (68.6%) Coexisting with Preference for Conciliatory North Korea Policy (55.2%)

● In the past, a majority of public opinion in South Korean society showed strong resistance to military action against North Korea, but this taboo has been broken with the Yeonpyeong artillery barrage. This implies that military action, as a last resort in dealing with North Korea, may now be given significant priority as a preferred policy option by the public, depending on North Korea's attitude. It has a high potential to be a turning point in the change of perceptions toward North Korea.

● However, this change does not appear to signify a complete shift in the center of gravity towards a preference for hardline policies. Firstly, in terms of preferred North Korea policies, 42.5% view complete severance of inter-Korean relations, including economic exchange and tourism, as desirable, but public opinion that views this as undesirable is higher at 53.9% [Table 2].

● In [Figure 8], regarding the direction of North Korea policy that the government should pursue, only 42.7% responded "should pursue a hardline approach," while 55.2% responded "should pursue reconciliation and cooperation," forming a majority. Although the proportion of those advocating a hardline approach increased slightly compared to the June 5 survey, where 37.1% favored a hardline approach and 61.5% favored reconciliation and cooperation, the majority still prefers a flexible policy.

● Nevertheless, the fear of full-scale war remains deeply ingrained in public opinion, and the growing acceptance of limited military measures against North Korea is possible primarily under the premise that the possibility of full-scale war is not considered high. Furthermore, it can be seen as a result of mixed emotional responses to the immediate deaths of civilians and casualties among our military. In this context, urging a shift towards a conciliatory policy in the government's North Korea policy can be viewed as a typical example of ambivalent attitudes where conflicting values coexist within an individual.

The Lever of South Korean Security: The ROK-U.S. Alliance

Security Crisis Escalates, Support for ROK-U.S. Alliance Rises: January 34.7% → July 43.2% → 48.6%

● During the Roh Moo-hyun administration, following the incident involving the death of a middle school student, there was a public movement to improve the asymmetric relationship between South Korea and the U.S. and to move away from security policies prioritizing the ROK-U.S. alliance. However, through North Korea's nuclear development, long-range missiles, the Cheonan incident, and now the Yeonpyeong incident, support for the ROK-U.S. alliance has significantly strengthened.

● As recently as January of this year, when asked about desirable ROK-U.S. relations, 30.8% supported independent diplomacy away from the U.S., 33.6% held a neutral stance of maintaining the status quo, and 34.7% supported strengthening the ROK-U.S. alliance, indicating a kind of political balance. However, in a July survey conducted after the outbreak of the Cheonan incident, support for independent diplomacy away from the U.S. decreased to 23.7%, the status quo remained at 30.4%, and support for strengthening the ROK-U.S. alliance increased to 43.2%, an increase of 8.5 percentage points.

● Four months later, in the November survey following the Yeonpyeong incident, this trend has further strengthened. Support for independent diplomacy away from the U.S. decreased to 18.1%, a drop of 12.7 percentage points compared to January of this year. The status quo remained unchanged at 30.5%, but support for strengthening the ROK-U.S. alliance rose to 48.6%. This represents an increase of 13.9 percentage points compared to January. Despite the deepening military conflict with North Korea, expectations and trust in the ROK-U.S. alliance are increasing in a situation where confidence in the government's response to North Korea is not solid.

[Figure 8] Direction of Future Government Policy Toward North Korea and Desirable ROK-U.S. Relations (%)

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[Table 2] Comparison of Public Opinion on the Cheonan Incident and the Yeonpyeong Artillery Barrage

[Analysis 4]. Impact of the Yeonpyeong Incident on Domestic Politics

MB's Approval Rating Declines 51.0%→44.2%, G20 Effect Reverts to Original State

No Change in Party Support Ratings, Grand National Party 35.2%, Democratic Party 23.5%

Next Presidential Election: Park Geun-hye 30.8% > Yoo Si-min 8.5% > Sohn Hak-kyu 5.8% > Lee Hoi-chang 5.3%

● The negative evaluation of the government's response to the Yeonpyeong artillery barrage has led to an overall decline in the President's approval rating for national administration. While the approval rating exceeded a majority at 51.0% in the October survey and reportedly reached the 60% range in some surveys immediately after the G20 Summit, it has now fallen to 44.2%. As can be seen in [Figure 9] and [Figure 10], the recent increase in approval ratings was primarily due to an increase among moderates and conservatives. However, in this survey, support from conservatives decreased by -8.5%p (66.1%→57.6%) and from moderates by -6.2%p (47.0%→39.8%) compared to the previous month, exceeding the decrease among progressives of -5.1%p (36.8%→31.7%).

● There was no significant change in party evaluations. The Grand National Party's support rating was 37.3% in October and 35.2% in November, while the Democratic Party's rating was 23.5% in October and 22.9% in November, appearing to be stagnant. This is likely because urgent security issues and matters involving military responses are primarily considered within the President's and the government's inherent domain of governance.

[Figure 9] Changes in Approval Ratings for National Administration/Party Support: "Doing Well (Very Well + Somewhat Well)" (%)

[Figure 10] Changes in Approval Ratings for National Administration by Ideological Tendency: "Doing Well (Very Well + Somewhat Well)" (%)

Next Presidential Election: Park Geun-hye 30.8% > Yoo Si-min 8.5% > Sohn Hak-kyu 5.8% > Lee Hoi-chang 5.3%

The Biggest Beneficiary of the Security Crisis is Lee Hoi-chang

● Representative Park Geun-hye has maintained the lead since re-entering the 30% range in October following her reconciliation with the President in August-September, and her support stood at 30.8% in the November survey. Former Minister Yoo Si-min ranked second with 8.5%, Representative Sohn Hak-kyu third with 5.8%, Representative Lee Hoi-chang fourth with 5.3%, and Governor Kim Moon-soo fifth with 4.4%. Former Prime Minister Han Myeong-sook, who maintained a leading position until the beginning of the year, appears to have fallen to the lower ranks as she shows no intention of pursuing a presidential bid. In the context of the security crisis atmosphere, Representative Lee Hoi-chang ranked fourth with 5.3%, the first time he has achieved this position since surveys in 2010.

[Table ] Next Presidential Candidate Approval Ratings (%)

* The May survey was not conducted due to local elections and public opinion surveys on security awareness.

** Minister of Special Affairs Lee Jae-oh has been included in the survey since September.