[Public Opinion Brief No. 84] 60th Anniversary of the Korean War: Changing Perceptions of North Korea and Unification among the Korean Public

Joint Project by EAI and Korea Research

Perceptions of North Korea and Unification Further Apart Compared to Five Years Ago

1. Complex Perceptions of North Korea: A Mix of Perceptions as 'Brothers,' 'Neighbors,' 'Us,' and 'Enemy/The Other Side'

- The proportion of respondents viewing North Korea as an 'enemy' increased by 25 percentage points (p) compared to 2005.

In 2010, the 60th anniversary of the Korean War, amidst a strong chill in inter-Korean government relations following the Cheonan incident, a survey was conducted to gauge the South Korean public's perception of North Korea. Considering that perceptions of North Korea can be complex, the survey allowed respondents to select their first and second most prominent perceptions. The results showed that 'brothers' was the most frequent response, accounting for 42.7% (20.1% first choice + 22.5% second choice). 'Neighbors' followed with 41.7% (19.0% first choice + 22.7% second choice). The response 'us' also appeared with 33.4% (21.6% first choice + 11.8% second choice), indicating that the perception of North Koreans as fellow countrymen, part of the same Korean nation, remains significant in the public consciousness.

However, alongside the perception of North Koreans as fellow countrymen, 40.3% (23.8% first choice + 16.5% second choice) also considered North Korea an 'enemy.' These results suggest that the South Korean public's perception of North Korea is a mixture of viewing it as brothers and neighbors, with the perception of it as an enemy present at a similar level. Even if not an 'enemy,' the response 'the other side,' implying no relation to us, accounted for 32.6% (12.4% first choice + 20.2% second choice), a proportion similar to the response 'us.'

[Figure 1] Survey Results on Perceptions of North Korea (First + Second Choice Total %)

To examine the changes in the South Korean public's perception of North Korea, a comparison was made with the results of the "Korean Identity Survey" conducted by the East Asia Institute in collaboration with the JoongAng Ilbo in September 2005, five years prior. Considering the sum of first and second choice responses, the most significant changes were observed in the perceptions of North Korea as an 'enemy' and as 'us.' The perception of North Korea as an 'enemy' increased by 25.0 percentage points (p) compared to the 2005 survey results, based on the total response rate of 200% for first and second choices. Conversely, the perception of North Korea as 'us' decreased by 12.0 percentage points (p). Additionally, the proportion of responses identifying North Korea as 'brothers' decreased by 9.4 percentage points (p) from 52.1% to 42.7%, and as 'neighbors' decreased by 7 percentage points (p) from 48.7% to 41.7%. In contrast, the proportion of responses identifying North Korea as 'the other side' increased from 18.4% to 32.6%, a rise of 14.2 percentage points (p). These results indicate a deterioration in the South Korean public's perception of North Korea compared to five years ago.

[Table 1] Comparison of Perceptions of North Korea: 2005 vs. 2010 (%)

2. North Korea is an Independent, Separate State: 69.7%

- Compared to the 2005 survey, the proportion of strong agreement increased by 20.6 percentage points (p).

- This trend was not limited to specific age groups.

When asked whether South and North Korea are realistically separate, independent states, 38.7% responded 'strongly agree,' and 31.0% responded 'somewhat agree.' The proportions of 'somewhat disagree' and 'strongly disagree' were 17.4% and 10.0%, respectively. Consequently, the proportion of respondents who view South and North Korea as separate states reached 69.6% (strongly agree + somewhat agree), surpassing the proportion of those who do not view them as separate states (27.4% = strongly disagree 10.0% + somewhat disagree 17.4%) by 42.2 percentage points (p).

[Figure 2] Proportion of Responses to 'North Korea is an Independent, Separate State' (%)

To examine changes over the past five years, this question was also compared with the results of the "Korean Identity Survey." The comparison revealed that the proportion of respondents viewing North Korea as a separate state was 77.7% (18.1% strongly agree + 59.6% somewhat agree) in the 2005 survey, but decreased to 69.6% (38.7% strongly agree + 31.0% somewhat agree) in the current survey, a drop of 8.1 percentage points (p). A more significant difference was found in the 'strongly agree' responses. In the 2005 survey, this proportion was 18.1%, but it more than doubled to 38.7% in the current survey. Overall, while the proportion of respondents viewing North Korea as a separate state slightly decreased compared to five years ago, the proportion strongly advocating for this view increased.

The respondents who strongly agreed that North Korea should be viewed as a separate state (i.e., answered 'strongly agree') were analyzed by age group. Among those aged 19 to 29, the proportion increased from 14.2% in 2005 to 30.6% in 2010, more than doubling. For those in their 30s, the proportion rose from 20.4% to 39.7%, and for those in their 40s, it increased from 22.9% to 41.8%, both nearly doubling. The change was most pronounced among those aged 50 and above, where the proportion increased from 15.5% in 2005 to 40.6% in 2010. While the strong stance of viewing North Korea as a separate state saw a sharp increase among those aged 50 and above compared to 2005, other age groups showed similar results, differing only in the magnitude of the increase.

[Figure 3] Age-Specific 'Strongly Agree' Response Rates for 'North Korea is a Separate State': 2005 vs. 2010 (%)

3. The Territory of the Republic of Korea: 'The Entire Korean Peninsula' 45.6%, 'South Korean Region' 29.0%

- Among respondents in their 20s, 'South Korean Region' was the most frequent response at 40.4%.

Respondents were asked about their perception of the territorial scope of the Republic of Korea. The highest proportion of responses, 45.6%, indicated 'the entire Korean Peninsula, including the current South and North Korean regions.' 'The current South Korean region' was the second most frequent response at 29.0%, followed by 'the Korean Peninsula and Manchuria' at 21.9%. Excluding 'don't know/no answer' (3.5%), these results show that more than two-thirds of respondents consider the entire Korean Peninsula to be within the territorial scope of the Republic of Korea.

[Figure 4] Survey Results on Territorial Perception (%)

Analyzing territorial perceptions by age group, the view that the territory is 'the current South Korean region' saw a slight increase of approximately 2-5% across all age groups compared to 2005. The view of 'the entire Korean Peninsula' showed a slight increase among those in their 30s, but a notable decrease among those aged 50 and above, dropping by 9.3 percentage points (p) from 56.6% to 47.3%. Responses of 'the Korean Peninsula and Manchuria' remained similar or slightly decreased compared to 2005.

A noteworthy finding is the difference in territorial perception by age group. Among those under 29, the response indicating 'the current South Korean region' as the territory was the highest at 40.4%. For those in their 30s, 'the entire Korean Peninsula' was the most frequent response at 45.2%. Those in their 40s and 50s also most frequently chose 'the entire Korean Peninsula,' with response rates of 49.9% and 47.3%, respectively. This indicates a generational difference in territorial perception, with a particularly high proportion among those under 29 viewing only the South Korean region as national territory, unlike other age groups.

[Table 2] Territorial Perception by Age Group (%)

4. Unification with Caution: The Persistent Call for Pace Adjustment

- 59.0% believe unification should proceed at a controlled pace based on circumstances; 16.9% believe there is no need to rush unification.

- Only 13.5% believe unification should be expedited.

The proportion of respondents advocating for 'expedited unification' with North Korea was only 13.5%. The stance that 'unification should proceed at a controlled pace based on circumstances' remained high at 59.0%. Furthermore, 16.9% believed there was 'no need to rush unification,' and 9.8% responded that there was 'no need for unification.' These results suggest that the general public's stance on unification is cautious, even if not outright opposed to the idea itself.

[Figure 5] Survey Results on Perceptions of Unification (%)

The public's cautious approach to unification was already evident in the 2005 survey. In that survey, only 17.4% advocated for expedited unification, while 54.6% favored a controlled pace based on circumstances. The current survey shows a slightly wider gap between these two proportions, indicating that proactive attitudes toward unification remain a minority view, while the call for pace adjustment and the view that unification is unnecessary continue to represent the majority.

[Table 3] Comparison of Perceptions of Unification: 2005 vs. 2010 (%)

Analyzing unification perceptions by age group, the proportion advocating for expedited unification was 10.8% among those in their 20s and 40s. For those in their 40s, it was 14.4%, and for those aged 50 and above, it was 16.1%. While the proportion advocating for expedited unification was higher among those in their 40s and 50s compared to those in their 20s and 30s, it was not substantial enough to alter the overall trend. Conversely, the stance that 'unification should proceed at a controlled pace based on circumstances' was consistently above 50% across all age groups. Among these, respondents in their 30s showed the highest proportion at 63.1%, while those aged 50 and above had the lowest at 57.0%. Regarding 'no need to rush unification,' respondents aged 29 and under, in their 40s, and 50 and above showed proportions between 17% and 18%, while those in their 30s had a relatively lower proportion at 10.8%. For 'no need for unification,' only those aged 29 and under and in their 30s exceeded 10%, while those in their 40s and 50s and above remained at low levels of 8.0% and 7.5%, respectively. This indicates that opposition to unification itself remains a minority view among the South Korean public.

Many believe that the ideological divide between progressives and conservatives in South Korean society can also be identified through differences in perceptions of unification. Progressives have emphasized swift unification, while conservatives have stressed cautious unification. The results of this survey suggest that this approach of using unification perceptions as a criterion for distinguishing between progressives and conservatives may not always be valid. For 'expedited unification,' progressives showed a response rate of 16.4%, while conservatives showed 11.3%. For the 'controlled pace' approach, progressives responded at 62.7%, and conservatives at 57.6%. Regarding 'no need to rush unification,' progressives showed 10.6%, while conservatives showed 20.7%. For 'no need for unification,' both progressives and conservatives showed response rates of around 10%. While progressives are indeed relatively more proactive towards unification compared to conservatives, the difference is not distinct. This is why unification perception is difficult to use as a sole indicator for ideological division.

[Table 4] Perceptions of Unification by Age and Ideology (%)

5. Responsibility for the Korean War: North Korea > Soviet Union > United States > China

- Compared to 2005, China's responsibility increased by 14.3 percentage points (p), while the United States' decreased by 6.9 percentage points (p).

Respondents were also asked about the countries responsible for the outbreak of the Korean War. Considering that the Korean War was an international conflict difficult to attribute to a single nation, the survey allowed for first and second choice responses, and rankings were determined by summing these. The sum of first and second choice responses represents a total of 200%. Analysis revealed that 51.7% identified the North Korean government as the primary responsible party, and the combined first and second choice responses reached 65.2%. Based on first choice alone, the United States government was second with 19.2%, and the Soviet government was third with 8.7%. When summing first and second choices, the Soviet government ranked second, and the United States government ranked third. In contrast, the proportion identifying the South Korean government as primarily responsible was 7.1%, and the combined first and second choice responses were 15.6%.

[Figure 6] Responsibility for the Outbreak of the Korean War (%)

A comparison with the 2005 survey results indicates a shift in perceptions regarding responsibility for the Korean War. The most notable change concerns the Chinese government. The proportion of South Koreans who believe that China bears responsibility for the Korean War, in addition to North Korea, the Soviet Union, and the United States, has been rapidly increasing. In the current survey, the combined first and second choice responses for the Chinese government reached 22.7%. This represents an increase of 14.3 percentage points (p) compared to the 2005 result of 8.4%. North Korea also saw an increase of 4.1 percentage points (p) compared to the 2005 survey. Conversely, the response rates for the Soviet and United States governments decreased by 10.6 percentage points (p) and 6.9 percentage points (p), respectively.

[Figure 7] Comparison of Survey Results on Responsibility for the Korean War: 2005 vs. 2010 (%)

[Table 5] Comparison of Survey Results on Responsibility for the Korean War: 2005 vs. 2010 (%)

Perceptions of responsibility for the Korean War were also examined by age and ideology. In terms of age, there was no significant change in the general tendency to assign responsibility in the order of North Korea, the Soviet Union, and the United States. However, a closer look reveals differences in the combined first and second choice results by age group. Among those aged 20 to 40, the proportion identifying the United States government was higher than that for the Soviet government. Those aged 50 and above showed higher response rates for North Korea, the Soviet Union, China, the United States, and then South Korea and Japan. While the designation of North Korea as responsible for the Korean War remained consistent, the 40s and younger generations tended to place more blame on the United States, whereas those aged 50 and above tended to hold the Soviet Union more accountable.

An examination by ideology also reveals no significant change in the overall trend. Regardless of whether respondents identified as progressive or conservative, there was no discernible difference in the perception of responsibility attributed to North Korea, the Soviet Union, the United States, and China. However, progressives identified North Korea as responsible at a rate of 54.3%, while conservatives did so at 74.3%. A difference was also observed regarding the United States: progressives identified the U.S. as responsible at 49.2%, whereas conservatives did so at a lower rate of 26.6%. In contrast, the differences in responses concerning South Korea, the Soviet Union, Japan, and China were only around 1-4 percentage points.

[Table 6] Comparison of Survey Results on Responsibility for the Korean War by Age and Ideology (%)

* Excludes 'don't know/no answer'

6. Country Hindering Unification: 1st North Korea, 2nd China

- Over 30% of respondents aged 30 and above identified China as the primary obstacle.

When asked which country poses the greatest obstacle to inter-Korean unification, North Korea was identified by 39.0% of respondents, making it the highest response. An interesting finding was that China was cited by 30.4% of respondents, indicating a negative perception of China's role in unification among the South Korean public. The United States was third with 16.5%, and South Korea itself was cited by only 3.4%. A comparison with the 2005 survey results highlights significant shifts in perceptions of China and the United States. The proportion of respondents identifying China as an obstacle increased by 21.7 percentage points (p) compared to 2005. Conversely, the proportion identifying the United States as an obstacle decreased by 27.1 percentage points (p) in the current survey compared to 2005.

[Figure 8] Survey Results on Countries Hindering Unification: 2005 vs. 2010 (%)

[Figure 9] Difference in Response Rates for Countries Hindering Unification: 2005 vs. 2010 (%)

Interesting findings also emerge when analyzing perceptions of countries hindering unification by age and ideology. Examining the results by age group, among those aged 29 and under, North Korea was identified as the primary obstacle by 42.7% of respondents. The United States and China were cited at 23.4% and 22.2%, respectively. In their 30s, North Korea (37.6%) and China (31.4%) were frequently cited, with the United States mentioned by 18.4%. Similar response patterns were observed among those in their 40s: North Korea at 32.5%, China at 30.1%, and the United States at 21.2%. Those aged 50 and above showed a distinct difference from the younger age groups. While North Korea was cited by 41.8% and China by 34.6%—both high proportions compared to other age groups—the response rate for the United States dropped sharply to 8.7%. These results indicate a difference in how those aged 50 and above perceive the United States as an obstacle to unification compared to those aged 40 and under.

The difference was clear when compared to 2005. The proportion of respondents identifying North Korea and the United States increased, while the proportion identifying the United States decreased. First, among those under 29, the proportion of respondents selecting North Korea increased by 20.7 percentage points (p) from 22.0% in 2005 to 42.7% this time. For China, it increased from 5.9% to 22.2%, a rise of approximately fourfold in proportion. In contrast, the proportion for the United States more than halved, decreasing from 52.0% to 23.5%. A similar situation was observed for those in their 30s and 40s. In all these age groups, the proportion selecting North Korea increased, and the proportion for China showed an increase of approximately threefold. The proportion selecting the United States decreased, reducing their response rate to about half. The changes were also distinct for those aged 50 and above. First, the proportion of respondents selecting North Korea increased from 35.1% to 41.8%. For China, the response rate increased by 23.6 percentage points (p) from 11.0% to 34.6%. In contrast, the United States showed a significant decrease in response rate, falling from 32.0% to 8.7%. For countries hindering unification, the order among those under 29 was North Korea, the United States, and China. However, for all age groups 30 and above, the order of response rates was North Korea, China, and the United States.

[Table 7] Survey Results on Countries Hindering Unification by Age: 2005 vs. 2010 (%)

Changes are also evident when comparing by ideological orientation. Among progressives, the proportion identifying North Korea as an obstacle increased from 24.5% in 2005 to 53.5% in 2010, a rise of 19 percentage points (p). The proportion identifying the United States decreased from 53.5% to 27.0%, a drop of 26.5 percentage points (p). The response rate for China increased from 6.4% to 24.6%. Among conservatives, the proportion identifying North Korea increased from 31.3% to 40.6%, while the proportion identifying the United States decreased by approximately threefold, from 39.1% to 13.4%. For China, the rate increased by about threefold, from 11.7% to 34.9%. Although the magnitude differs, it is evident that compared to 2005, the proportion of respondents identifying both North Korea and China as obstacles to unification has increased, while the proportion identifying the United States has decreased, for both progressives and conservatives.

[Table 8] Survey Results on Countries Hindering Unification by Ideology: 2005 vs. 2010 (%)

7. Negative Perceptions of North Korea and Economic Aid to North Korea

- 51.2% believe aid should be reduced or suspended; 44.8% believe it should be maintained at current levels or increased.

As negative perceptions of North Korea, which is seen as a threat to Korean Peninsula security, grow, so too does opposition to economic aid to North Korea. Responses indicating a need to reduce economic aid to North Korea accounted for 27.5%, while those advocating for complete cessation of aid were 23.7%. The proportion supporting increased aid was 17.0%, and those favoring maintaining current levels was 27.8%. Consequently, 51.2% favored reducing or suspending aid, while 44.8% favored maintaining current levels or increasing aid, indicating a predominantly negative stance towards economic assistance to North Korea. Compared to the 2005 survey results, the proportion supporting aid at current levels decreased from 44.2% to 27.8%, a drop of 16.4 percentage points (p). The 'never provide aid' category increased from 7.9% to 23.7%, an increase of 15.8 percentage points (p). 'Increase aid' showed a similar result at 17.0% (up from 15.4%), and 'reduce aid' was 27.5% (up from 27.0%). These results can be interpreted as a decrease in support for maintaining current aid levels and an increase in support for suspending aid.

[Figure 10] Survey Results on Economic Aid to North Korea: 2005 vs. 2010 (%)

However, regarding how to provide economic assistance to North Korea, it can be understood that there is a potential for social conflict due to differing perceptions among groups. First, examining by generation, those under 30 showed a tendency to emphasize 'support' in economic assistance compared to other age groups. Those aged 40 and above appeared to hold passive or negative stances towards support. Looking at the evaluation of state affairs, respondents in the positive evaluation group called for reducing or halting economic assistance, while those in the negative evaluation group showed high response rates for maintaining or expanding the current level. In terms of ideological orientation, progressives leaned towards support, while conservatives leaned towards reduction/halt. Furthermore, a difference in stance was revealed between supporters of the Democratic Party and supporters of the Grand National Party. Democratic Party supporters tended towards support, while Grand National Party supporters were relatively more numerous in opting for reduction/halt.

[Table 9] Survey Results on Perceptions of Economic Assistance to North Korea in 2005 and 2010 by Variable (%)