Public Opinion Briefing No. 83-2: Preliminary Analysis of the 2nd 5-Region/3rd National Panel

Public Opinion Briefing No. 83: EAI · JoongAng Ilbo · SBS · Korea Research 2010 Local Election Panel Survey

June 2nd Local Election Results and Future National Governance Direction

1. EAI Expert Opinion Brief: Significance and Tasks of the June 2nd Local Election Results

2. Preliminary Analysis of the 2nd 5-Region/3rd National Panel

Characteristics of the 3rd 5-Region Panel Survey

1. Approval Rating Changes Over One Month

Approval Gap in Metropolitan Areas Dramatically Narrowed Within a Week of the Election; Gyeonggi Approached a 7.8%P Gap on D-7. The most dramatic change was observed in the metropolitan areas. Comparing the results of the first survey (May 10-13), the second survey (May 24-26), and the post-election third survey (June 3-5), it was found that in the first and second surveys, Grand National Party candidates Oh Se-hoon and Kim Moon-soo led their opponents Han Myeong-sook and Yoo Si-min by approximately 12.0%P and 7.8%P respectively in the metropolitan areas, but this gap rapidly narrowed in the survey conducted around the election date. The rapid narrowing of the approval gap is judged to have occurred within the week prior to the election day.

[Figure 1] Changes in Approval Ratings for Metropolitan Area Mayoral Candidates

Opposition Candidates Maintained an Advantage in Chungnam/Gyeongnam; Grand National Party Candidate Showed Significant Performance in Jeonbuk

Meanwhile, candidates Ahn Hee-jung and Kim Du-gwan are judged to have maintained a slight advantage over their opponents from the first survey to the final survey. In the Gyeongnam region survey, the approval rating for candidate Kim Du-gwan was overrepresented compared to the actual voting results, widening the gap significantly. This is considered an over-reporting effect, where the winning candidate's approval rating is overrepresented in post-election surveys.

In the Jeonbuk region survey, Democratic Party candidate Kim Wan-ju showed a large approval gap from the first and second surveys. However, a more noteworthy characteristic is that Grand National Party candidate Jeong Woon-cheon's approval rating steadily increased over time. This is interpreted as a significant achievement for Grand National Party candidates running in the Honam region, exceeding 10%.

[Figure 2] Changes in Approval Ratings for Chungnam, Gyeongnam, and Jeonbuk Mayoral Candidates

2. Movement of Votes in Metropolitan Areas: What Happened During the Week Leading Up to the Election?

The strong performance of opposition candidates resulted from the mobilization of their support bases and the absorption of undecided voters from previous surveys during the election period. While this trend was already evident in the second survey for Chungnam and Gyeongnam, no such trend was observed in the metropolitan areas, leading to unexpected election results. This analysis compares the response results from the second survey with those from the third survey, utilizing the characteristic of panel surveys to observe changes in voters over time.

Seoul

Second Survey: 86.3% of Oh Se-hoon Supporters Maintained Support, 93.1% of Han Myeong-sook Supporters Maintained Support; 50.9% of Undecided Voters Voted for Han.

Gyeonggi

Second Survey: 96.0% of Candidate Kim's Supporters and 96.6% of Yoo Si-min's Supporters Maintained Support; 70.5% of Undecided Voters Voted for Yoo.

Chungnam

Second Survey: 40.1% of Park Hae-choon Supporters and 50.5% of Undecided Voters Voted for Park Sang-don; Voted for Ahn.

94.0% of Ahn's Supporters Maintained Support; 68.7% of Park Sang-don's Supporters Maintained Support, While 24.6% Switched to Ahn.

Gyeongnam

Candidate Kim Du-gwan's Support Maintained at 93.2%; Candidate Lee Dal-gon's Support Maintained at 89.7%; 69.3% of Undecided Voters Voted for Candidate Kim.

Jeonbuk

79.3% of Candidate Jeong Woon-cheon's Supporters Voted for Jeong; 87.2% of Candidate Kim Wan-ju's Supporters Maintained Support; 25.9% of Undecided Voters Supported Jeong.

3. The Reversal in Metropolitan Areas from D-7 to D-Day

The Grand National Party Shifted from a Cautious Strategy to an Offensive Strategy, Simultaneously Triggering a Backlash.

1) Rapid Increase in Anti-MB Sentiment

In the second panel survey conducted a week before the election, stability and presidential approval ratings had risen in the metropolitan areas based on the security consolidation effect of the Cheonan sinking incident (EAI Public Opinion Briefing). However, following the joint investigation team's announcement on the 20th, the ruling party shifted to a strategy of solidifying its dominance by emphasizing security issues, the 'judgment of the previous administration,' and the 'judgment of the Korean Teachers and Education Workers Union.' This appears to have been the cause of the backlash. Over the following week, the sentiment for stability rapidly contracted, and presidential approval ratings began to decline again.

Sharp Increase in Checks and Balances Sentiment, Especially a 13.7%P Surge in Seoul Within a Week

Among the 401 Seoul respondents who participated in both the second and third surveys, support for the sentiment that 'the opposition party should be supported to prevent the government and ruling party's monopoly' (checks and balances sentiment) increased from 44.1% to 57.8%, a significant rise of 13.7%P. Conversely, the response supporting 'the ruling party should be supported for the stable governance of the president and government' (stability sentiment) decreased from 41.0% to 33.3%.

In Gyeonggi, among the 400 respondents, stability sentiment increased from 45.3% to 55.2%, a rise of 7.9%P, while the stability sentiment remained at a similar level, decreasing from 38.7% to 35.8%. The reason the gap between the ruling and opposition parties' vote shares narrowed more in Seoul than in Gyeonggi in the actual election results appears to be due to the difference in the speed and magnitude of the increase in checks and balances sentiment.

[Figure 3] Changes in Stability and Checks and Balances Sentiment Ratios Between the 2nd and 3rd Surveys

Weakening of Security Consolidation Effect After the Cheonan Incident: Decline in Presidential Approval Ratings

This indicates a decline in presidential approval ratings around the election period in metropolitan areas where an increase was observed after the Cheonan incident's truth disclosure (on the 20th). In Seoul, presidential approval ratings, which had risen to 52.0%, fell to 42.7% in the post-election survey. In Gyeonggi, presidential approval ratings, which had risen to 53.6%, fell to 39.3% within the week leading up to the election.

Following the truth disclosure, public opinion, which had been quiet, became agitated due to distrust in the disclosure and criticism of the government's response, fueled by the lecture by Do-ol Kim Yong-ok and subsequent doubts raised by domestic and international experts. Furthermore, as confirmed by the results of the second 5-region panel survey, public criticism intensified that the government and ruling party were excessively exploiting the issue for the election, leading to a rapid weakening of the security consolidation effect and a decline in presidential approval ratings.

[Figure 4] Changes in Presidential Approval Ratings Between the 1st and 3rd Surveys

2) The Seoul Upset: Was it Hidden Votes or a Last-Minute Surge?

Support for candidates by timing of voting decision: In the Seoul metropolitan area, support for Democratic/unified candidates surged within 2-3 days of the election.

It appears that voters with opposition-leaning tendencies did not necessarily hide their intentions, but rather critical voters who favored government checks and balances could not find suitable alternatives and remained undecided. However, in response to the ruling party's offensive strategy, they rapidly chose the Democratic Party/unified candidates, leading to a sharp concentration of votes in the Seoul metropolitan area.

[Figure 5] Difference in support rates between ruling and opposition candidates by timing of support decision: Seoul and Gyeonggi

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Comparing the scale of support for candidates by the timing of their decision, voters who chose their candidate more than a month before the election showed overwhelming support for the Grand National Party candidates. However, the undecided voters who began choosing candidates a week before the election showed overwhelming support for the opposition candidates. In particular, as the election approached, their choices were sharply concentrated on opposition candidates.

Interestingly, while candidates Han Myeong-sook and Yoo Si-min showed a steep upward trend in the Seoul metropolitan area, rapidly gaining support as the election neared, candidates Kim Doo-kwan and Ahn Hee-jung, who had maintained a lead within the margin of error, allowed their opponents to catch up a week to 2-3 days before the election. This appears to be the result of the final mobilization of the traditional support base of the opposing candidates in the final stages of the election.

[Figure 6] Difference in support rates between ruling and opposition candidates by timing of support decision: Chungnam, Gyeongnam, Jeonbuk

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Timing of voting decision by age group: 62.5% in Seoul and 60.9% in Gyeonggi were voters in their 30s and 40s.

A week prior, most existing election polls predicted a victory for candidate Kim Moon-soo, but this prediction was inaccurate partly due to the high voter turnout among young people. However, looking at the survey results on when the voters who participated in this election decided on their preferred candidate, in Gyeonggi, the choices of those in their 20s became more visible as the election approached, supporting this interpretation. However, in both Gyeonggi and Seoul, the main drivers of the vote concentration on election day appear to have been voters in their 30s and 40s. It is interpreted not that their opinions were hidden, but that their choices were concentrated just before the election.

[Figure 7] Timing of support decision by age group

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Last-minute mobilization of metropolitan area voters favoring government checks and balances, who could not find an alternative.

[Seoul] 2nd survey: 68.0% of government-checking voters supported Han -> 3rd survey: 73.9% of government-checking voters supported Han.

[Gyeonggi] 73.9% of government-checking voters supported Yoo Si-min -> increased to 83.3% support.

While 91.3% of metropolitan area voters favoring stability supported candidates Oh Se-hoon and Kim Moon-soo, only 68.0% of government-checking voters in Seoul and 70.7% in Gyeonggi supported Yoo Si-min. In contrast, in the Chungcheong region, due to the vote-splitting effect of candidate Park Sang-don, only 46.7% of stability supporters and 49.7% of government-checking supporters backed Park Hae-cheon and Ahn Hee-jung, respectively. In Gyeongnam, 68.3% of stability supporters and 63.9% of government-checking supporters backed candidate Lee Dal-gon and Kim Doo-kwan, respectively, resulting in a close contest.

However, according to the results of this final survey, candidate Han Myeong-sook absorbed 73.9% of the government-checking sentiment and newly attracted 5.3% of respondents who previously supported candidate Oh. Candidate Yoo Si-min in Gyeonggi also showed a remarkable absorption rate of 83.3%, and this absorption appears to have been the driving force behind the rebound in support.

[Table 1] Concentration of support by stance on stability/government checks: Comparison of 2nd and 3rd surveys (%)

2nd National Panel Basic Analysis

1. Why did the Grand National Party lose? Was it the Democratic Party's victory?

Reasons for the Grand National Party's defeat: 50.8% cited "The President and the government performed poorly," and 28.4% cited "The Grand National Party performed poorly."

"The Democratic Party or independent candidates were better" 8.8%, "The Democratic Party performed well" 2.4%

Regarding the factors behind the victory of the opposition Democratic Party in this election, the highest response rate was 50.8%, citing "The President Lee Myung-bak or the government performed poorly," while 28.4% responded that the Grand National Party performed poorly. The proportion citing the personal competitiveness of Democratic Party or independent candidates was 8.8%, and the proportion citing the good performance of the Democratic Party and other opposition parties was 2.4%. In other words, the main reason for the Grand National Party's defeat is judged to be the re-emergence of a mid-term evaluation of the government. However, the opposition's victory was largely due to a backlash effect rather than their own strength.

Among Grand National Party supporters, the proportion citing the "government judgment" was relatively low among older voters, those with lower education levels, and voters in the Yeongnam region. Conversely, a higher proportion of Democratic Party and opposition party supporters responded that President Lee Myung-bak or the government performed poorly. Notably, among those who supported the President's national administration, a significant number cited problems with the Grand National Party, foreshadowing potential conflicts within the ruling party's support base regarding responsibility between the pro-Lee faction and non-pro-Lee faction, and between the government and the ruling party.

However, it is noteworthy that even among Grand National Party supporters and those who support the current administration, a considerable number cited the President or the Grand National Party as the reason for the defeat, indicating a significant degree of self-reflection.

[Table 2] Perceptions of the reasons for the opposition party's victory by social group (%): 2nd National Panel, 904 people

[Table]

Caution against excessive conservatism

Evaluating the ideological stance of political parties and President Lee Myung-bak, it is perceived that the President and the Grand National Party have become significantly more conservative. President Lee Myung-bak, perceived as centrist in 2006, is now evaluated as having shifted to 6.9 on the conservatism scale (out of 10), compared to 5.9 during the general election. The Grand National Party is also evaluated as having become considerably more conservative, moving from 6.0 to 6.4, and now to 7.2.

Considering that the average ideological score of the public is 5.2, this creates a situation where they may be ideologically alienated from the centrist public. Although the President has recently emphasized "pragmatic centrism," in the public's view, he appears to have already moved to a significantly conservative position. The recent shift towards a hardline policy towards North Korea, such as holding a national address at the "War Memorial of Korea," making strong statements like "We have no intention of war, but we are not afraid," imposing sanctions, and resuming broadcasts towards North Korea, likely played a significant role in the short term.

[Figure 8] Ideological evaluation of political parties and MB (0-10 points): 2nd National Panel, 904 people

[Table 2] Changes in ideological evaluation of political parties and MB (0-10 points): 2006-2010

* President Lee Myung-bak was a strong presidential candidate during the 2nd survey in '06.

** 0 points means very progressive, 5 points means centrist, and 10 points means very conservative.

Grand National Party's failed strategy: Judgment of the previous administration

Regarding the judgment of the Lee Myung-bak administration, the response rate was a high 65.6%, while the judgment of the Roh Moo-hyun administration's failures received a response rate of 37.1%, showing a significant difference. As pro-Roh figures were selected as the unified opposition candidate, the Grand National Party's election strategy shifted from a confrontation between "MB vs. Anti-MB" to "MB vs. Pro-Roh." This likely provoked backlash. The proportion agreeing with the judgment of the previous administration's failures was only 37.1%, while the proportion agreeing with the judgment of the Lee Myung-bak administration's failures was 65.6%.

[Figure 9] Comparison of agreement rates on judgment of previous administration vs. Lee Myung-bak administration

Discrepancy between issues desired by the public and election camp strategies

The core issues were free school meals for elementary and middle school students and the Four Major Rivers Project, and this trend was observed in both the 1st and 2nd surveys. While the media and election camps primarily focused on the priming effect between the so-called "North Korea wind vs. Roh Moo-hyun wind" issues, these were low-priority issues for actual voters. Considering that other issues were barely highlighted in the media and public discourse after the announcement of the Cheonan incident's findings, this indicates that the media's agenda-setting and priming effects did not function effectively in this election.

Even when considering the age factor, which is cited as a key driver of last-minute opposition vote mobilization, there was no significant difference. In this election, the free school meals issue and the Four Major Rivers Project were found to be the most concentrated issues. Although the ranking changed in the 2nd survey, and the Sejong City project was ranked second in some instances, free school meals and the Four Major Rivers Project were the core issues identified by voters in this election.

[Figure 10] Voting consideration rate by issue in 1st and 2nd surveys (%)

[Table 3] Ranking of issues considered for voting by age group: 1st and 2nd places

2. Post-election political situation

1) Preference for politicians, decline of ruling party leaders

[Figure 11] Favorability scores of major politicians: 0 (strongly dislike) ~ 10 points (strongly like)

* Displayed as average scores out of a maximum of 10 points.

Compared to the 2008 general election, the favorability ratings for major Grand National Party politicians, including President Lee Myung-bak, former representative Park Geun-hye, and former representative Chung Mong-joon, have significantly decreased. Former representative Park received a score of 6.4 out of 10 immediately after the general election, higher than President Lee Myung-bak's 6.2. Former representative Chung also received a favorable evaluation with 5.4 points at the time. However, incumbent winners Oh Se-hoon and Kim Moon-soo, who barely secured re-election, maintain similar favorability ratings to Han Myeong-sook and Yoo Si-min, who performed well in this election.

2) The Best Way to Stabilize the Nation: Focus on the Economy and National Unity

Elections detached from the economy and people's lives; political issues influenced the election compared to previous ones, 66.2%

When asked about the priority tasks for the next government in the latter half of the term, respondents selected alleviating economic polarization (28.8%), national unity (16.6%), economic growth (15.5%), and improving inter-Korean relations (10.4%) with high response rates. Overall, many respondents chose agendas related to economic issues, but the high number of responses for national unity and improving inter-Korean relations suggests considerable public opinion favoring a relaxation of the government's unilateral approach and inter-Korean confrontation. Improving quality of life (6.5%), political reform (5.8%), and balanced regional development (5.0%) followed.

[Table 4] Top National Governance Tasks the Government Should Pursue After the Election

3) What About Sejong City and the Four Major Rivers Project?

Sejong City and the Four Major Rivers Project, the soil for the 'regime judgment' argument, pushed forward 74.5%

Harmonious President Desired by 67.9% of the Public

When 593 individuals who agreed with the 'MB judgment' argument were asked about the reasons, 74.5% cited the unilateral push for projects like Sejong City and the Four Major Rivers, 10.8% pointed to the Cheonan incident, and 5.9% cited a lack of ability to revitalize the economy.

The defeat of the ruling party in this election has created conditions making it difficult to continuously pursue the Sejong City issue, as evidenced by the declining consensus on the revision of the Sejong City plan. For the Four Major Rivers Project, public opinion is increasingly leaning towards reducing its scale or delaying its implementation, while support for proceeding as planned is decreasing.

This can be seen as a challenge to the unilateral leadership style. In fact, when asked about the type of leadership expected from President Lee Myung-bak going forward, 67.9% desired a harmonious leadership style, 14.2% desired a strong leadership style, and 11.7% desired a practical leadership style. Whether the transition to a harmonious leadership style will be successful, following the processes of Sejong City and the Four Major Rivers Project, remains to be seen.

[Table 5] Direction of the Sejong City Project (%)

[Table 6] Direction of the Four Major Rivers Project (%)