Public Opinion Briefing Vol. 79-2: Detailed Analysis of the 1st National Panel Survey

Public Opinion Briefing Vol. 79: EAI, JoongAng Ilbo, SBS, Korea Research 2010 Local Election Panel Survey

National Trends and Characteristics of the 2010 Local Elections: "Will the Wind of Midterm Referendum Blow in the Local Elections?"

1. Characteristics of Public Opinion in the June 2nd Local Elections as Seen Through Panel Surveys

2. Detailed Analysis of the 1st National Panel Survey

Why is the MB Referendum Not Gaining Traction?

Government Check Sentiment (Referendum) * Focal Point of Anti-Government Sentiment * Clarity of Responsibility for Economic Downturn = Vote Concentration

(1) Political Factors: High approval ratings for state affairs and political parties; lack of a focal point for the MB referendum.

As has been pointed out both within and outside political circles, the reason why the conditions for an MB administration referendum, similar to 2006, are unlikely to translate into voter behavior is, above all, due to the operation of offsetting factors that make it difficult for the referendum sentiment to spread nationwide and across all social strata.

First, despite considerable criticism and sentiment for checks on the MB administration, President Lee Myung-bak currently maintains an approval rating close to 50%. In this survey, he maintained a relatively high approval rating of 47.8%. This is effectively preventing the MB administration referendum sentiment from spreading throughout society. In a panel survey conducted around the same time as the 2006 local elections, former President Roh Moo-hyun's approval rating was 35.1%, a full 12.7 percentage points lower than President Lee Myung-bak's current approval rating. Negative evaluations also stood at 63.0%, indicating that critical perceptions of the government were widespread among a majority of voters.

[Figure 6] Factors Suppressing the MB Administration Referendum Sentiment

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Factors for candidate selection: Party affiliation factor shows an increase

Candidate's qualifications 32.8%, Party affiliation 31.4%, Policies and pledges 23.8%, Likelihood of winning 7.7%

A notable point in this survey is that voters who had already chosen their candidate tended to select based on the candidate's personal qualities rather than party affiliation or policies/pledges. When asked about the factors influencing their choice of candidate, 32.8% of those who had chosen a candidate cited the candidate's personal character as the basis for their decision. 31.4% cited party affiliation, and 23.8% cited policies and pledges. This indicates that 'who is running as a candidate for which party' had a greater influence on the selection than 'what will they do.' Unlike in past elections where the candidate's personal qualities and policies/pledges held overwhelming priority, the consideration of party affiliation as the top priority is strengthening.

[Figure 7] Factors Determining Support for a Candidate

Party support appears to have a significant impact on voting choice.

Grand National Party 34.5%, Democratic Party 20.9%, Unaffiliated 31.0%, precisely matching current voter sentiment.

Difference in party cohesion: Six out of ten supporters of the Uri Party in 2006 defected, while the Grand National Party maintained 64.6% support.

[Figure 8] Party Support

In this survey, the support rates for each party were: Grand National Party 34.5%, Democratic Party 20.9%, Liberty Forward Party 2.0%, and Democratic Labor Party 4.6%. These figures are nearly identical to the responses regarding voting preference in this local election. Despite the similar levels of negative perception of the Grand National Party and the Democratic Party among voters, what accounts for this difference in support rates?

The primary reasons cited are the high cohesion of the Grand National Party's support base and the dispersion of the Democratic Party's former supporters. While only 39.8% of respondents who supported Uri Party candidates in the 2006 election currently support the Democratic Party, with six out of ten having defected, a remarkable 64.6% of voters who supported Grand National Party candidates in the 2006 election still support the Grand National Party. This difference in cohesion can be attributed to the Grand National Party, which has maintained its party structure despite being out of power since the Kim Dae-jung administration, having a stronger sense of unity among its supporters. In contrast, the Democratic Party, through the formation of the Uri Party, subsequent splits, and re-mergers during the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun administrations, has experienced weakened unity and loyalty among its supporters, leading to a relaxation of its support base.

High cohesion of Grand National Party support and dispersion of Democratic Party supporters

[Table 1] Change in Voting Preference for 2010 Local Elections Among Supporters of Ruling and Opposition Parties in the 2006 Local Elections (%)

(2) Economic Factors: The economy is worse than in 2006, but it is difficult to assign blame.

- Duality of attributing improvement to local government and deterioration to central government.

- Coexistence of public sentiment for reward and punishment towards the Grand National Party, which controls both local and central governments.

As confirmed in the previous panel survey, the logic of economic voting, which holds the responsible party accountable for the economic situation, operates in a dual manner. Specifically, those who perceive an improvement in the economic situation tend to attribute credit to local governments or other economic actors rather than the central government. Conversely, those who perceive a deterioration tend to assign a significant portion of the blame to the central government rather than local governments or other actors. Although many respondents currently indicate that the regional and household economies have worsened compared to the past, the duality in voters' economic perceptions, unlike in 2006, results in the blame for economic failures being dispersed rather than concentrated solely on the ruling party.

In 2006, with the Grand National Party holding local power and the Uri Party holding central power, credit for regional economic improvement went to the Grand National Party, while responsibility for regional economic deterioration fell on the Uri Party. This significantly contributed to a concentration of votes for the Grand National Party. However, in the current election, as the Grand National Party holds both central and local power, credit for economic improvement and responsibility for deterioration are both concentrated on the Grand National Party, acting as offsetting forces.

[Figure 9] Changes in Economic Perception between 2006 and 2010

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[Figure 10] Divergent Voting Effects of Dual Economic Responsibility Perception: Differences between the 2006 and 2010 Elections

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Vote Concentration Phenomenon

If improved -> Support for Grand National Party (local government ruling party)

Even if worsened -> Support for Grand National Party (anti-Uri Party)

Vote Dispersion Phenomenon

If improved -> Grand National Party (local government ruling party)

If worsened -> Support for Democratic Party (anti-Grand National Party)

(3) Local Election Variables: Impact of current issues likely to be offset.

Economy and Integration: Grand National Party leads in agenda setting and capability assessment.

When asked about the most important national agenda the government should prioritize, 36.1% of respondents chose "Mitigating economic polarization." "Economic growth" also appeared with 15.9%, confirming that expectations for economic growth remain high. Including "Improving quality of life" and "Political reform" at 9.3% and 8.0% respectively, it can be seen that the majority of the public desires solutions for economic problems and the easing of social conflicts. National security-related agendas, such as strengthening national security or improving inter-Korean relations, were ranked lower in priority, despite the Cheonan incident and tensions in inter-Korean relations.

There were some differences based on party support. Supporters of the Grand National Party showed relatively higher proportions of responses prioritizing economic agendas and strengthening national security. Supporters of the Democratic Party showed relatively higher proportions prioritizing political reform and improving quality of life. Among the unaffiliated (no party support + don't know/no response), who accounted for 32.2%, their response tendencies regarding economic growth were similar to those of Grand National Party supporters, while their tendencies regarding strengthening national security and improving quality of life were similar to those of Democratic Party supporters. However, the overall emphasis on resolving economic polarization, growth, and national integration is commonly observed.

[Figure 11] Top National Agendas

Grand National Party leads in problem-solving capabilities for the top three agendas, as well as diplomacy and national security issues like national security/international competitiveness.

Democratic Party leads in political reform and inter-Korean relations agendas; these are lower in priority.

Comparing the parties that are likely to resolve the national agenda items well, the Grand National Party (GNP) shows a strong performance. The GNP received relatively balanced approval ratings for national integration and strengthening national security. However, the Democratic Party only surpassed the GNP in improving inter-Korean relations and political reform.

Therefore, if agendas such as resolving polarization, economic growth, and national integration, or foreign policy and security issues are highlighted, the election landscape is likely to favor the GNP. Conversely, if political reform and inter-Korean relations agendas are emphasized, the situation would be favorable for the Democratic Party. However, only 13.8% of respondents cited these agendas as their top priority, suggesting the GNP has an advantage in the competition for election agendas.

[Figure 12] Top National Agenda Items

* Includes only parties that received 5% or more of the response rate

Influence of the Six Major Issues in Local Elections

Free School Meals > Four Major Rivers Project > Sejong City Project > Teachers' Union Member List Disclosure > Cheonan War Incident > Former President Roh Moo-hyun's Passing

A survey was conducted on how much each issue was considered in deciding the preferred candidate in the current metropolitan mayoral election. The results showed that the order of consideration was: Free School Meals > Four Major Rivers Project > Sejong City Project > Teachers' Union Member List Disclosure > Cheonan War Incident > Former President Roh Moo-hyun's Passing.

[Figure 13] Consideration of Issues in Voting Choices for Local Elections

Among these, issues such as free school meals and the disclosure of the Teachers' Union member list have sharply divided opinions, with balanced support and opposition. In contrast, the Four Major Rivers Project appears to be an issue favorable to the opposition parties, while the Cheonan War incident seems favorable to the ruling party. For Sejong City, the benefits and drawbacks vary by region.

GNP's 'Affluent Class Free Meals' Argument Seems Effective

Regarding free school meals, the response rates for implementing it for all students and limiting it to low-income students were 47.7% and 45.1%, respectively, showing a close contest. Considering that public opinion initially overwhelmingly favored implementing it for all students based on the concept of universal welfare, the fact that it has become nearly equal to the position of limiting it to low-income students suggests that the GNP's argument has gained considerable traction.

[Figure 14] Attitudes Toward Free School Meals

Four Rivers Project: A Pro-Opposition Issue

Opposition or cautious views were prevalent regarding the Four Major Rivers Project. Only 23.4% of respondents supported proceeding as planned, while 37.1% opposed it, and 29.4% favored reducing the scale or delaying the timeline. Even among GNP supporters, while 41.8% supported proceeding as planned, the proportions supporting a cautious approach or opposition were 31.1% and 15.3%, respectively. Overall, the Four Rivers Project issue appears to favor the opposition parties.

When asked about the actual impact of the Four Major Rivers Project on voters' choices, 59.6% responded that it had not changed their decision, while 10.7% indicated they would support the ruling party more, and 14.7% indicated they would support the opposition party more, suggesting it reinforced existing stances. However, the proportion of those who switched their support from the opposition to the ruling party was 4.5%, and from the ruling party to the opposition was 9.1%. This indicates it is somewhat favorable to the opposition parties. Ultimately, it can be confirmed that it primarily benefits the opposition parties in reinforcing existing stances or changing support.

[Figure 15] Attitudes Toward the Four Major Rivers Project

What About the Sejong City Effect?

Support for the revised plan is decreasing, with strong backlash from the Chungcheong, TK, and Honam regions favoring the Democrats, while it favors the GNP in Seoul and the metropolitan areas.

First, over time, support for the revised Sejong City plan has gradually decreased, while support for the original plan has increased. Regarding the Sejong City project, support for the revised plan was 5.2 percentage points higher than for the original plan. Support for the original plan was 37.4%, for the revised plan 42.6%, and 20.0% were undecided. The benefits and drawbacks between the ruling and opposition parties appear to be somewhat mixed.

Looking at regional differences, 52.1% in the Chungcheong region support the original plan, significantly ahead of the 34.5% support for the revised plan. In Honam, 44.1%, and in the TK region, 41.8% support the original plan, surpassing support for the revised plan. This suggests that opposition to the revised plan has grown in the TK region, where concerns about reverse discrimination were high.

However, in the metropolitan areas, support for the revised plan is more than 10 percentage points higher. In Seoul, support for the revised plan is 46.9%, exceeding the 36.2% support for the original plan. In the Gyeonggi-Incheon region, support for the revised plan is 45.6% and for the original plan is 33.4%, indicating higher support for the revised plan. Despite considerable public support for the 'judgment of the MB administration' in the metropolitan areas recently, the Sejong City issue appears to be influencing the continued support for the GNP and the President.

[Figure 16] Attitudes Toward Sejong City

*Note: Surveys from November to March were conducted by EAI, JoongAng Sunday, and Korea Research (800 respondents)

Balanced Support and Opposition for Teachers' Union Member List Disclosure

Opposition Prevails Regarding Disregard for Court Ruling

Meanwhile, mixed reactions are observed regarding the disclosure of the Teachers' Union member list. Firstly, opinions are evenly divided on the disclosure of the teacher list itself, with 40.3% in favor and 41.6% opposed, and 18.2% undecided. However, regarding the GNP lawmakers' push for disclosure despite the court's injunction, 49.3% responded that it was wrong, compared to 36.3% who thought it was right, with 14.4% undecided. This result suggests that the GNP needs to consider the possibility of facing backlash.

[Figure 17] Attitudes Toward Teachers' Union Member List Disclosure

[Figure 18] Attitudes Toward GNP Lawmakers' Disclosure of Member List After Court Injunction

Government Response to Cheonan Incident: 41.2% "Doing Well," 47.5% "Doing Poorly"

Reasons for Poor Performance: 56.6% "Overly Blaming North Korea" vs. 39.9% "Being Too Cautious"

No Impact on Party Support 65.4%, Equal Benefit/Loss for Ruling and Opposition Parties

Slightly more respondents indicated that the Lee Myung-bak administration's response to the Cheonan incident was not being handled well compared to those who thought it was being handled well. Among the 570 respondents who felt it was being handled poorly, 39.9% cited the reason as the government being too cautious and not taking firm action against North Korea, while 56.6% cited the reason as rushing to blame North Korea before the truth was revealed. This appears to be a result of public distrust surrounding the Cheonan incident and anxiety over the rapid shift from an initial cautious stance to attributing blame to North Korea.

[Figure 19] Evaluation of Government's Response to the Cheonan Incident

Examining the impact of the Cheonan incident on actual voting preferences, 65.4% responded that it had not significantly changed their support for either party. However, 13.7% indicated increased support for the ruling party, and 10.2% indicated increased support for the opposition party, suggesting a slight advantage for the ruling party's mobilization. Nevertheless, the proportion of those who switched their support from the opposition to the ruling party was 4.3%, and from the ruling party to the opposition was 4.8%, with no significant difference. In conclusion, the Cheonan incident did not prove to be a major variable influencing the local elections.

[Figure 19-1] Impact of the Cheonan Sinking Incident on Party Support

(4) Interaction of Central and Local Political Factors: Uncertainty of Spreading a 'Judgment on Local Power' Argument

Local Political Factors Operate as Much as Central Political Factors

Disappointment with Incumbent Mayors Leads to Abstention Rather Than Judgment

How the public perceives the current election is a crucial factor that parties must consider when structuring the election. According to the survey results, the public agrees that this election is a mid-term evaluation of the performance of central and local governments, but they more strongly agree that it is an election to choose capable individuals for the development of their local regions.

When asked about the nature of this election, 61.0% of voters agreed that it was an election to evaluate the performance of the central government, and 61.4% agreed that it was an election to evaluate the performance of the local government. In contrast, 71.8% of voters agreed that it was an election to choose local representatives, about 10% more than the other categories. By party affiliation, 79.4% of GNP supporters more strongly agreed that it was an election to choose local representatives, while Democratic Party supporters placed more emphasis on evaluating the performance of central and local governments than GNP supporters.

Overall, it appears that the public perceives this election as an opportunity to evaluate the performance of central and local governments, as well as to elect capable local representatives who can achieve better results in the future. Notably, attributing a political character to this election as a prelude to the next presidential election does not seem to be widely persuasive, as 41.1% of the total voters disagreed.

[Figure 20] Meaning of the 2010 Local Elections: Central and Local Political Factors

Duality in Voting Behavior Based on Evaluation of Incumbents:

Those with a positive evaluation of incumbent performance go to the polls; those with a negative evaluation choose abstention over judgment.

The approval rating for the operational performance of incumbent metropolitan mayors by all respondents averaged 59.1%, indicating a generally positive evaluation of incumbents. By socioeconomic strata, similar to the presidential approval rating pattern, older individuals and those with lower educational attainment showed higher approval ratings for incumbent mayors. However, unlike presidential approval ratings, no consistent pattern was observed across income levels.

Interestingly, in relation to voting intention, the group of active voters who intend to vote definitely had a higher proportion of positive evaluators, while the group who do not intend to vote had a higher proportion of negative evaluators. These results suggest that positive evaluators of metropolitan mayors are highly likely to reward them through voting, while negative evaluators do not translate their dissatisfaction into punishment, potentially creating a favorable landscape for incumbents in local elections.

Given that most incumbents are from the GNP, the tendency for negative public opinion regarding local government performance to lead to abstention rather than electoral judgment also hinders the translation of 'regime judgment' arguments into voting behavior in local elections.

[Figure 21] Deviation in Voting Intention by Incumbent Evaluation