[Public Opinion Briefing 79-1] Characteristics of Public Opinion in the June 2 Local Elections as Seen Through Panel Surveys

[Public Opinion Briefing No. 79] EAI · JoongAng Ilbo · SBS · Korea Research 2010 Local Elections Panel Survey

National Trends and Characteristics of the 2010 Local Elections: "Will the Wind of a Midterm Judgment Blow in the Local Elections?"

1. Characteristics of Public Opinion in the June 2 Local Elections as Seen Through Panel Surveys

2. Detailed Analysis of the First National Panel Survey

June 2 Local Elections: Will the Wind of Judgment Against the MB Administration Blow?

Attention Should Be Paid to Balancing Voting Rather Than Punishment Voting

Lee Nae-young (Director, Public Opinion Analysis Center, East Asia Institute; Korea University)

Past local elections have generally served as a midterm assessment of the incumbent administration. In the case of the 2006 local elections, the then-opposition Grand National Party's argument for judging the Roh administration was effective, leading to victories in 12 out of 16 metropolitan areas and securing 55.2% of the national vote share, significantly overwhelming the then-ruling Uri Party's 27.1%. In the upcoming June 2 local elections, the opposition is appealing for support to check the ruling party's dominance and to judge the current administration. Therefore, the key point to watch in the June 2 local elections is the extent to which the judgment against the MB administration will influence voters' choices.

On the surface, the survey results suggest this is highly possible. Nearly half, 49.9%, agree with the statement, "We must vote for the opposition to judge the Lee Myung-bak administration and prevent the ruling party's unchecked power." Conversely, 49.5% of the public disagrees with this statement. This is similar to the 2006 panel survey, where 49.8% agreed with the judgment against the Roh administration and 47.2% disagreed. In other words, the conditions are in place for the administration's judgment to translate into voter choices.

However, even if the administration's judgment argument is activated, the likelihood of a vote concentration towards the opposition, as seen in the 2006 local elections, is slim. This is because there are several factors that offset the opposition's argument for judging the MB administration. Firstly, nearly half of the public, 47.8%, has shown support for President Lee Myung-bak's state management, a figure close to 50%. In contrast, former President Roh Moo-hyun's approval rating during the 2006 local elections was 35.1%, significantly lower than President Lee Myung-bak's current approval rating. Furthermore, the ruling Grand National Party's party support rate is more than 10 percentage points ahead of the Democratic Party, a stark contrast to the situation in 2006.

The party support rates in this survey were: Grand National Party 34.5%, Democratic Party 20.9%, Liberty Forward Party 2.0%, and Democratic Labor Party 4.6%. This compares to the JoongAng Ilbo survey conducted in May 2006, which showed the ruling Uri Party's support rate at 22.4%, lagging far behind the opposition Grand National Party's 39.2%. This indicates that the current election is being held with the ruling Grand National Party in a dominant position.

Given the high presidential approval ratings and the Grand National Party's favorable position, the impact of the opposition's argument for judging the administration on voter choices in the local elections appears to be limited. Indeed, the current survey results also predict the Grand National Party's advantage in the June 2 local elections. Support for Grand National Party candidates was 34.8%, while support for Democratic Party candidates was only 19.6%. Even combining the support for all minor party candidates does not exceed 10%. However, the variable remains the 31.6% of undecided voters who have not yet decided on a candidate.

Another factor preventing the opposition's argument for judging the administration from gaining traction is the heightened sense of security crisis due to the Cheonan incident and Kim Jong-il's visit to China. While the media's focus over the past month has been on the handling and investigation of the Cheonan incident, overshadowing issues like the Sejong City and the Four Major Rivers projects, which is disadvantageous for the opposition, the ongoing election competition amidst persistent public anxiety about national security is a burden for the opposition, particularly the Democratic Party.

Furthermore, despite having only about 20 days left until election day, the election atmosphere is unusually subdued, and the public is indifferent to the election, which also hinders the spread of the administration's judgment argument. In this survey, the combined percentage of respondents who expressed 'strong interest' or 'general interest' in the local elections was only 63%. This is a significant decrease compared to the 70.7% who expressed interest in the 2006 local elections. The high probability that this low interest will lead to a decline in voter turnout is a concern for the opposition. It is clear that a low turnout would benefit the Grand National Party, which has high turnout and a solid support base, while disadvantaging the Democratic Party, which has lower turnout and a less loyal support base.

Nevertheless, it remains uncertain whether the current favorable situation for the Grand National Party will persist until the end of the election campaign. We must consider that in past general and local elections held mid-term, voters' desire for checks and balances has often led to difficulties for the incumbent administration. Moreover, as seen in the past general elections and subsequent by-elections, the voters' desire to check the ruling party's dominance has been significant. In particular, if the Democratic Party and the People's Participation Party succeed in changing the election atmosphere and mobilizing their supporters through the memorial events for former President Roh Moo-hyun scheduled throughout May, the possibility of a reversal of the Grand National Party's favorable position cannot be ruled out.

[Figure 1] Support for the Roh Moo-hyun Administration's Judgment in 2006 and the Lee Myung-bak Administration's Judgment in 2010

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[Figure 2] Who Will You Vote For in the June 2 Metropolitan Mayoral Elections?

*: Don't know/No answer (1.0%) not shown (n=1,200)

** Survey conducted with leading candidates in each metropolitan area, compiled by party

[Figure 3] Factors Suppressing the MB Administration's Judgment Argument

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The Biggest Issue in the June 2 Local Elections: A Tenuous Balance

Will Differentiated Issue Strategies Break the Balance?

Lee Hyun-woo (Department of Political Science and International Relations, Sogang University)

It is a well-known fact that local elections are significantly influenced by central politics. Regarding the extent to which political issues affect the metropolitan mayoral elections, which have the strongest political orientation, three out of four respondents (74.8%) stated they would consider the candidates' and parties' stances on free school meals when deciding their vote. This was followed by the Four Major Rivers Development (63.3%), Sejong City relocation (57.6%), disclosure of teachers' names from the Korean Teachers and Education Workers Union (53.9%), the Cheonan incident (48.1%), and the first anniversary of former President Roh's death (40.3%).

The reason why free school meals are the issue of greatest interest to voters is that the core of the debate is easy to understand, and the policy outcomes directly affect them. It is an issue where the benefits or drawbacks of implementing and expanding free school meals can be felt personally. In contrast, issues like the Four Major Rivers or Sejong City, while important, are difficult to grasp in terms of their gains and losses and are perceived as long-term projects. Meanwhile, the disclosure of teachers' names from the Korean Teachers and Education Workers Union is a matter of political ideology, and the first anniversary of former President Roh's death is a scheduled political event, considered an issue whose impact cannot yet be clearly assessed.

Interestingly, the degree to which supporters and opponents consider an issue varies depending on the nature of the issue. In particular, there is a significant difference in the proportion of voters who consider the issue when deciding their vote for metropolitan mayor, depending on whether they support or oppose the free school meal policy. While 57.8% of voters who support universal free school meals consider it a major factor in their voting decision, the degree to which voters who believe it should be limited to low-income students (17.5%) or who are entirely opposed to free school meals (10.3%) consider this issue in the election is considerably lower. Therefore, the free school meal issue demonstrates its effectiveness for the opposition, which actively promotes it, in expanding its support base.

On the other hand, regarding the Four Major Rivers project, the proportion of voters who support the current administration's approach and those who oppose the project itself consider it a significant factor in the election to a similar extent, 42.3% and 43.7% respectively. Thus, the Four Major Rivers issue can be utilized as a policy issue that allows each party to strengthen its supporter base or attract potential supporters to the polls.

Of the six issues presented in this survey, respondents indicated they would consider four of them when deciding their vote. Furthermore, given the potential for the remaining two issues to gain influence depending on how parties frame them, policy issues could be important in this election. It would be efficient for parties to identify which issues undecided voters are most interested in and conduct differentiated policy campaigns. Tailored policy campaigns targeting both supporter groups and undecided voters can be an important election strategy.

[Figure 1] Consideration of Current Issues in Local Election Voting

[Appendix] Voter Attitudes on Each Issue

[Figure 2] Voter Attitudes on Each Issue

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Sejong City

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Government Response to the Cheonan Incident

Regarding free school meals, the response that they should be provided to all students and the response that they should be limited to low-income students were neck and neck, with 47.7% and 45.1% respectively.

Regarding the Four Major Rivers project, negative or cautious opinions were high. Only 23.4% responded that it should proceed as planned, while 37.1% responded that it should not proceed, and 29.4% responded that the scale should be reduced or the timing delayed, showing relatively high opposition.

Support for the revision of the Sejong City plan is gradually decreasing, and support for the original plan is increasing. Regarding the Sejong City project, support for the revised plan was 5.2 percentage points higher than support for the original plan. Support for the original plan was 37.4%, support for the revision was 42.6%, and those who were unsure accounted for 20.0%.

Regarding the disclosure of teachers' names itself, support and opposition were evenly divided at 40.3% and 41.6% respectively, with 18.2% unsure. However, regarding the Grand National Party's push for disclosure despite the court's injunction to halt it, 49.3% responded that it was wrong, compared to 36.3% who responded it was right. Those unsure accounted for 14.4%.

The Cheonan War Incident: A 'Northern Wind'?

The Bidirectional Effect of the 'Northern Wind': Not Just an Issue Favoring the Ruling Party

Kang Won-taek (Department of Political Science and International Relations, Soongsil University)

With the sinking of the ROKS Cheonan dominating media headlines daily ahead of the local elections, speculation is rife that the so-called 'northern wind,' a North Korea variable, is influencing the elections in favor of the ruling party. This survey confirms that the Cheonan incident indeed had a significant impact on voters' choices, but interestingly, its effect was not one-sided, favoring a particular political faction, but rather bidirectional.

When asked, 'Did the sinking of the Cheonan cause a change in your party support between the ruling and opposition parties?', 18% of respondents answered that they 'previously supported the opposition party but now support the ruling party (4.3%)' or 'support the ruling party more than before (13.7%)'. However, 15.0% of respondents stated that after the Cheonan incident, they shifted from supporting the ruling party to the opposition party (4.8%) or strengthened their support for the opposition party (10.2%). While the shift towards supporting the ruling party was slightly higher, considering the margin of error, the proportion of changes in party support between the ruling and opposition parties is virtually the same. Furthermore, among respondents who actually changed their party affiliation, the number who shifted from supporting the opposition to the ruling party was 4.3%, and the number who shifted from supporting the ruling to the opposition party was 4.8%, with virtually no difference between the two.

Given that 33% of respondents were affected by the Cheonan incident, it is evident that this event had a considerable impact on the elections. However, contrary to expectations, it is difficult to conclude that it unilaterally benefited the ruling party. The Cheonan incident had the effect of mobilizing both ruling and opposition party supporters. By party support, 38.4% of Grand National Party supporters (6.2% shifted from opposition to ruling party support, 32.2% strengthened ruling party support) and 38.7% of Democratic Party supporters (11.5% shifted from ruling to opposition party support, 27.2% strengthened opposition party support) responded that they were influenced in a direction favorable to their respective parties. The Cheonan incident created a mutually offsetting effect for both the ruling and opposition parties.

The age groups most affected by the Cheonan incident were those in their 50s and 60s, where the strengthening of support for the ruling party was higher. The shift in support towards the opposition party was highest among those in their 20s, 40s, and 50s. Regionally, the response that support for the ruling party increased was high in the Gyeongbuk region, while the response that support for the opposition party increased was relatively high in the Honam and Chungcheong regions. By education level, the proportion of respondents who indicated increased support for the opposition party was higher among those with higher education, including those currently enrolled in university.

[Figure 1] Impact of the Cheonan Sinking Incident on Party Support

How Did Voter Preferences Change?

Attitudinal Changes of Participants in the 2007 Presidential Election Panel Survey (625 individuals) and the 2008 General Election Panel Survey (555 individuals)

Lee Nae-young · Jeong Han-wool (EAI Public Opinion Analysis Center)

75.6% of MB's Presidential Election Voters Consolidated into MB's Support Base, Absorbing 47.1% of Lee Hoi-chang's Supporters

6.2 Local Elections: "Roh Moo-hyun Wave" Unclear, Only 29.4% of Former President Roh's Supporters in 2007 Supported the Democratic Party

The panel survey method is evaluated as a scientific methodology that allows for the direct identification of attitudinal changes over time by repeatedly surveying the same respondents. EAI, SBS, JoongAng Ilbo, and Korea Research conducted panel surveys for the 2006 local elections, 2007 presidential election, and 2008 general election, and will also conduct a panel survey for the upcoming 5th National Local Elections.

A total of 1,200 individuals, recruited in proportion to the national population, will be surveyed twice, before and after the election, to assess attitudinal changes on a national level. In addition, panel surveys will be conducted three times each in Seoul, Gyeonggi, Gyeongnam, Jeonbuk, and Chungnam provinces, with 600 individuals in each region, considering regional representativeness and election competitiveness. This will allow for tracking changes in voter preferences nationwide and in five key regions. The survey results will be reported through JoongAng Ilbo and SBS.

This survey presents the results of the first panel survey of the 1,200-person national panel, examining the impact of national issues on voter preferences and the national landscape of the local elections. Of the 1,200 respondents in the panel, 625 participated in the 2007 presidential election panel survey, and among them, 555 had participated in both the presidential and 2008 general election panel surveys. The survey results for these individuals not only show attitudinal changes within the upcoming June 2nd local elections but also, by comparing them with attitudes during the previous presidential and general elections, directly reveal attitudinal changes between elections. By applying the panel survey method across elections, it becomes possible to empirically track the reasons behind President Lee Myung-bak's soaring approval ratings and the widening gap in support between the Grand National Party and the Democratic Party.

75.6% of Lee Myung-bak's 2007 Presidential Election Voters Consolidated into Current MB Support Base, Absorbing 47.1% of Lee Hoi-chang's Supporters

Of the 625 individuals who participated in the presidential election panel survey conducted on December 20-21, 2007, 311 (49.7%) supported candidate Lee Myung-bak at the time. This figure is very close to Lee Myung-bak's actual vote share of 48.7%, demonstrating the accuracy and reliability of this panel survey. A remarkable 75.6% of these individuals, totaling 235, remain within President Lee Myung-bak's support base two years later. In contrast, only 74 (23.8%) of the 311 who voted for candidate Lee Myung-bak have become critical of President Lee Myung-bak's governance.

Instead, nearly half of the 68 individuals who voted for candidate Lee Hoi-chang at the time, 47.1% (32 individuals), have been absorbed into President Lee Myung-bak's current support base, while the remaining 52.9% maintain a critical stance towards the president. Of the 138 individuals (22.1% of the total 625 respondents, actual vote share 26.1%) who supported candidate Chung Dong-young in the 2007 presidential election, 79.7% (110 individuals) remain critical of President Lee, with only 19.6% absorbed into the president's support base. Ultimately, the secret to President Lee Myung-bak's current soaring approval ratings lies in the consolidation of supporters who constituted nearly half of the vote in 2007 and the absorption of a majority of conservative voters who supported Lee Hoi-chang.

[Figure 1] Change in 17th Presidential Election Voters' Evaluation of MB's Governance in 2010

The Gap in Support Between the Grand National Party and the Democratic Party Stems from Differences in Support Base Consolidation

64.6% of Grand National Party Voters in the 2008 General Election Remained Loyal to the Grand National Party

Only 47.4% of United Democratic Party Supporters Currently Support the Democratic Party; Over Half Have Defected

Furthermore, an analysis of the 555 individuals who participated in the general election panel survey separately shows the changes in party support between the 2008 general election voting tendencies and current party support. Of the 555 individuals, 240 (43.2%, actual vote share 37.5%) supported Grand National Party candidates in the last general election, and 64.6% of these, totaling 155, stated they currently support the Grand National Party. In contrast, of the 135 individuals (24.3% of 555, actual vote share 25.2%) who supported United Democratic Party candidates at the time, less than half, 47.4% (64 individuals), stated they currently support the Democratic Party.

Additionally, 14.1% of respondents who voted for United Democratic Party candidates in the 18th general election have now shifted their support to the Grand National Party, while only 7.5% of those who voted for Grand National Party candidates at the time have defected to support the Democratic Party. This indicates that the Grand National Party's support base has shown higher consolidation, with more than six out of ten still remaining as supporters two years later, and the scale of defection to the opposing party was also larger among the Democratic Party's supporters.

[Figure 2] Shift in Party Support of 18th General Election Voters in 2010

The 'Roh Wave' in the June 2nd Local Elections: The Effect of Returning Defectors Was Greater Than Support Base Consolidation

Only 29.4% (45 individuals) of Former President Roh's 2007 Supporters Now Support the Democratic Party

Of the 472 individuals who were negative towards former President Roh in 2007, 15.7% (74 individuals) returned to supporting the Democratic Party.

The strategy of the Democratic Party and the People's Participation Party, which aimed to connect the sentiment of mourning for former President Roh, sparked by the first anniversary of his death on May 23rd, to voter sentiment in the local elections, appears unlikely to materialize. This is because even among the core supporters who responded positively to former President Roh's governance in the presidential panel survey, there is currently little expectation for the Democratic Party and the People's Participation Party. Of the 625 individuals who participated in the presidential panel survey and are also participating in this survey, 153 (24.5%) were core supporters who expressed support for former President Roh despite the spread of the 'judgment on the Roh Moo-hyun administration' narrative.

Among these, only 45 individuals (29.4%) stated they currently support the Democratic Party in this survey. Only 9.2% expressed support for the People's Participation Party, which advocates for being a pro-Roh party, falling short of the 13.7% of former pro-Roh supporters who have now shifted to supporting the Grand National Party. The largest group, 35.3%, identified as undecided voters who have not yet decided on their party affiliation.

Conversely, of the 472 individuals who were critical of former President Roh's governance at the time, nearly half, 47.9% (226 individuals), continue to support the Grand National Party. The proportion returning to support the Democratic Party was 15.7% (74 individuals). Support for the People's Participation Party was 1.3% (6 individuals), and for other parties was 8.7% (41 individuals). The second largest group, 26.5%, moved to the undecided voter category.

Notably, in absolute numbers, the group that returned to the Democratic Party from among those critical of former President Roh (74 individuals) is larger than the group that consolidated into the current Democratic Party from among former President Roh's core supporters (45 individuals). While the current expectations of the core supporters of former President Roh are not high for the current Democratic Party or the People's Participation Party, and their support is dispersing, there is a tendency for those who were critical at the time to return to the Democratic Party.

However, overall, the low proportion of consolidation or return to the Democratic Party makes it uncertain whether the 'Roh wave' will translate into voter sentiment in the local elections.

[Figure 3] Shift in Party Support of 18th General Election Voters in 2010