[Public Opinion Briefing No. 78] The Sinking of the Cheonan and Public Opinion: An Assessment of Four Major Crisis Response Vulnerabilities

A Joint Project by EAI, JoongAng Sunday, and Korea Research

The Most Serious Security Crisis Since 2000: Widespread Security Anxiety

Most Serious Security Anxiety Since 2000: 66.8% Feel "Korean Security is Unstable"

[Figure 1] Changes in Perceived Security: "Korean Security is Unstable" (%)

* Data for 2000-2004 from the National Defense University's Security Consciousness Survey; data for 2006-2010 from EAI's Security Perception Survey.

** Sum of responses for "Very Unstable" and "Somewhat Unstable" out of five options: "Very Unstable," "Somewhat Unstable," "Neutral," "Somewhat Stable," and "Very Stable."

A security consciousness survey conducted approximately one month after the sinking of the Cheonan on March 26 revealed significant security anxiety among the South Korean public. When asked to rate the overall security situation in Korea on a five-point scale from "Very Unstable" to "Very Stable," nearly seven out of ten South Koreans (66.8%) responded that it was unstable (16.5% "Very Unstable," 50.2% "Somewhat Unstable").

This figure is the highest since 2000, based on comparative results from surveys using the same question conducted by institutions such as the National Defense University and EAI. In the 2000 survey, conducted shortly after the first inter-Korean summit, only 18.9% expressed instability. This anxiety later escalated due to the North Korean nuclear issue following the advent of the Bush administration, reaching 54.8% by January 2003, triggered by North Korea's withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Security anxiety, which had eased to 43.0% by 2004 through two rounds of Six-Party Talks, surged to 63.8% in 2006 due to the shock of North Korea's nuclear test, but then dropped to 31.9% following the second inter-Korean summit in 2007.

Following the inauguration of the Lee Myung-bak administration and a cooling of inter-Korean relations, security anxiety saw a slight increase, reaching over half the public (48.4%) expressing concern by April 2009, coinciding with North Korea's second nuclear test. The current survey indicates that a significant 66.8% perceive current South Korean security as unstable, surpassing the anxiety levels recorded during the first North Korean nuclear test in 2006. Considering the high probability of North Korean involvement and the subjective sense of security among the public, it is not an exaggeration to define the current situation as a security crisis.

[Figure 2] Security Anxiety by Generation, Ideology, and Party Affiliation: "Unstable" (%)

* Sum of responses for "Very Unstable" and "Somewhat Unstable" out of five options: "Very Unstable," "Somewhat Unstable," "Neutral," "Somewhat Stable," and "Very Stable."

While the intensity varied across demographic groups, there was a general consensus in viewing the current situation with concern. Despite concerns about security apathy among younger generations, the highest proportion of respondents indicating instability was among those in their 20s (72.0%). This was followed by those aged 50 and above (71.4%), while those in their 30s and 40s reported relatively lower levels of anxiety at 61.8% and 59.4%, respectively. The older demographic (50+) often shares historical experiences from the Korean War era and has historically been sensitive to inter-Korean tensions. The 20s demographic, potentially facing the most direct consequences in case of conflict, is also considered among the most unstable groups alongside the elderly. Conversely, the relatively lower sensitivity to external threats among those in their 30s and 40s may be attributed to a greater rejection of Cold War-era anti-communist sentiments and a comparatively higher sense of social stability.

In South Korea, security issues are often perceived differently based on political stances, such as between ruling and opposition parties or progressives and conservatives (Lee Nae-young and Jeong Han-wool, 2005). However, regarding the perceived level of security, the gap between supporters of the Democratic Party and the Grand National Party, or between progressives and conservatives, was not significant. Among supporters of the Grand National Party, 69.2% felt security was unstable, while 69.4% of Democratic Party supporters expressed the same sentiment, showing little difference. Among those with no party affiliation, the figure was 67.4%, also indicating no substantial variation. Comparing the proportion of individuals experiencing security anxiety based on ideological orientation, 61.9% of progressives, 69.2% of moderates, and 69.5% of conservatives reported anxiety. While progressives appeared slightly less anxious than conservatives, the difference was not substantial. Despite variations in intensity across demographic groups, security anxiety was commonly observed across most segments of the population.

Review of South Korea's Crisis Response System Through Public Opinion on the Cheonan Incident

Four Major Vulnerabilities: National Division, Crisis Communication System, Security Apathy, and ROK-US Alliance System

The sinking of a warship, a symbol of South Korean defense, within territorial waters not only exposed flaws in the nation's defense system but also raised serious questions about the societal response mechanisms when national crises arise. Despite widespread security anxiety, public opinion is divided regarding the cause of the Cheonan sinking, the handling of the incident thus far, and subsequent measures, casting significant doubt on the effective functioning of crisis management governance.

(1) National Division: Divergent Perceptions of the Cheonan Incident's Cause

North Korean attack theory 55.8%, internal cause theory within our military 14.8%, fatigue fracture theory 6.5%, internal explosion theory 5.6%, unknown 6.0%

[Figure 3] What is the most convincing explanation for the cause of the Cheonan incident? (%)

The survey results indicate that 55.8% of the public believes the incident was caused by a North Korean attack. However, a considerable number of respondents held views that suggested conspiracy theories, which had been raised since the early stages of the incident. Those who found the theory of an accidental friendly fire during joint ROK-US military exercises to be plausible, pointing to internal military causes, accounted for 14.8%. Respondents who believed in the fatigue fracture theory or internal explosion theory, possibilities that have largely diminished by the time of the investigation, were 6.5% and 5.6%, respectively. Including other theories, this amounts to 11.3%. Although a final conclusion may take time, considering that the survey was conducted after the government and the joint civilian-military investigation committee had leaned towards the theory of North Korean involvement, a significant portion of the public pointed to factors other than North Korea as potential causes.

Serious Politicization of Security Perceptions: Difficulty in Achieving Bipartisan Cooperation on External Threats

Acceptance of North Korean Attack Theory: 30s 39.7% vs. 50s and Above 72.2%

Progressives 44.5% vs. Conservatives 62.8%

Grand National Party Supporters 73.1% vs. Democratic Party Supporters 46.5%

Unlike the relatively small differences in perceived security levels across demographic groups, there were significant discrepancies in understanding the cause of the Cheonan incident. A tendency was observed where individuals with progressive leanings and supporters of the Democratic Party were more likely to accept explanations other than a North Korean attack, while those with conservative leanings and supporters of the Grand National Party were more inclined to agree with the North Korean attack theory.

[Figure 4] Proportion of Support for the North Korean Attack Theory by Demographic Group (%)

By generation, only 45.6% of those in their 20s and 39.7% of those in their 30s accepted the North Korean attack theory. In contrast, 53.8% of those in their 40s and a striking 72.2% of those aged 50 and above understood it as a North Korean act. Distinct differences were also found based on political orientation. Among ideological progressives, only 44.5% accepted the North Korean attack theory, with the remainder emphasizing other interpretations. Moderates showed 58.5% agreement, and conservatives showed 62.8% agreement, placing more weight on North Korea's attack.

By party affiliation, 73.1% of Grand National Party supporters backed the North Korean attack theory. In contrast, only 46.5% of Democratic Party supporters accepted this theory, with 25.1% attributing the incident to internal causes, such as mistakes by the South Korean military. While 52.1% of unaffiliated voters believed it was a result of North Korean attack, the remaining half found other explanations, such as internal military error, internal explosion, or fatigue fracture, to be plausible.

This clearly indicates that perceptions of security issues are heavily influenced by political positions and partisanship. Bipartisan cooperation and objective perceptions, crucial for a society's response system during a crisis, are impossible without a consensus on the cause of the problem. It is difficult to achieve agreement on response measures without a unified understanding of the problem's origin. Therefore, addressing the politicization of security perceptions is a key challenge in upgrading South Korea's crisis response system.

(2) Effective Communication System During Crises

Did the information dissemination function regarding the Cheonan incident operate effectively? - Truth of the Cheonan Incident: Whom to Believe?

Experts 28.7% > None 17.9% > Government 17.5% > Civic Groups 14.2% > Media 12.2%, Political Parties Last

[Figure 5] Whose explanation do you trust most regarding the Cheonan incident? (%)

A society's crisis response capability can be assessed by how well its existing institutions function during a crisis, the extent to which its members trust public institutions, and the degree to which they refrain from deviant behavior. One of the most crucial functions during a crisis is to suppress distrust and anxiety by promptly and accurately disseminating correct information to the public. At least in societies that are not nascent developing nations lacking comprehensive institutional frameworks, the paralysis of information dissemination is not due to a lack of technical or professional capacity to produce accurate information or weak media channels for distribution. Ultimately, the core issue lies in the distrust of the political leadership of public institutions such as the government, political parties, and the media. Deepening distrust in these institutions can lead to the proliferation of rumors and conspiracy theories (DiFonzo and Bordia 2006), and in severe cases, can incite deviant behavior such as riots.

While the Cheonan sinking incident did not escalate to such deviant behavior, it revealed the prevalence of rumors and conspiracy theories during the information dissemination process, which continue to have a significant impact. This underscores the urgent need to examine the credibility of public institutions leading South Korean society, including the government, political parties, and the media. Indeed, in the current survey, when asked, "Whose explanation do you trust most among the various interpretations and analyses of the Cheonan incident?" experts were trusted the most, with 28.7% of respondents choosing them. Trust in the government, responsible for the overall crisis response, was only 17.5%. Trust in the media, responsible for information dissemination, was 12.2%, falling below the response for civic groups (14.2%). Most alarmingly, only 2.7% of respondents selected political parties, which share a crucial role in political leadership alongside the government.

With the deepening of the knowledge-based economy, it is natural to trust experts in areas requiring military and technical expertise, such as the Cheonan incident. However, the information provided by experts is often unfamiliar and difficult for the general public to understand. While experts play a role in enhancing the accuracy and explanatory power of information, it is ultimately public institutions such as the government, political parties, and the media that must reconstruct this information into language understandable to the public, build trust, and foster belief in the stable functioning of existing institutions and order even in the face of unexpected events. The survey results highlight the need to examine the basis of public trust in organizations responsible for political leadership and information dissemination during sudden crises.

(3) Concerns about Security Apathy are Exaggerated; the Majority of the Public Seems to Prefer a "Calm and Prudent Approach"

Following the sinking of the Cheonan, the government's response principles can be summarized by President Lee Myung-bak's statement: "The investigation process will take time but must be accurate, and after determining the facts, measures will be taken decisively." In fact, the government adopted a cautious stance regarding North Korean involvement from the early stages of the incident. While there were some partisan disputes in the political sphere, the process has generally followed the sequence of: recovery of the hull and rescue of personnel → fact-finding → development of countermeasures. Regarding suspicions of North Korean involvement, the government has maintained a cautious attitude pending a final conclusion. This has led to strong criticisms from some quarters, accusing the government of lacking a firm security stance and expressing concerns about public security apathy, as well as the effectiveness of ROK-US cooperation.

President Lee on North Korea's stance regarding the Cheonan: Appropriate Response 35.5%, Appeasing North Korea 33.1%, Shifting Blame 26.0%

Little concern about artificial use of the "North Wind" for local elections

However, the public's diagnosis differs. When asked to evaluate the President and the government's stance towards North Korea concerning the Cheonan incident, 35.5% considered it appropriate, the highest response. Concerns about excessively appeasing North Korea were also voiced by 33.1%, while 26.0% believed the government was excessively blaming North Korea. This suggests that neither the opposition's argument of exploiting the "North Wind" for political gain nor the perception of the government's passive stance towards North Korea is likely to gain significant traction.

[Figure 6] Evaluation of the President and Government's Stance on the Cheonan Incident Towards North Korea (%)

Assessment of Security Apathy by Major Institutions

"Public Opinion: General Public and Government Response are Appropriate": General Public Response Appropriate 57.6%, Government Response 50.2%

"Media Response is Excessive" 48.3%

When the public was asked to assess the level of response by South Koreans to the Cheonan incident, 57.6% responded that the response was "appropriate." Only 20.7% believed it was "excessively overreactive," and 16.2% felt it was "excessively indifferent." The remaining 5.5% were undecided or did not respond. For the government, 50.2% deemed the response "appropriate," while 19.5% considered it "excessively overreactive," and 26.5% felt it was "excessively indifferent." Although some concerns about government security apathy were present, the majority viewed the response as appropriate. This indicates considerable public support for the government's phased and cautious approach.

In contrast, only 39.1% found the media's response appropriate, while 48.3% believed it was "excessively overreactive." The proportion of those who found it indifferent was low at 7.8%, with 4.9% undecided. The extensive news coverage of the Cheonan sinking, the unfiltered reporting of various rumors, and the prolonged suspension of some entertainment programs appear to have been perceived negatively and excessively by the public.

Meanwhile, for the ruling party and the main opposition parties, the Grand National Party and the Democratic Party, positive evaluations of appropriateness slightly outnumbered other responses, with similar levels of "overreactive" and "indifferent" responses. Considering only the "excessive" responses, the Grand National Party received 26.9% and the Democratic Party 24.1%, which were lower than the media's 48.3% but higher than the general public's 20.7% and the government's 19.5%. However, the proportion of undecided responses was notable: 13.8% for the Grand National Party and 17.3% for the Democratic Party, suggesting that these parties were not at the forefront of the Cheonan political discourse.

This suggests that concerns about public security apathy may be somewhat exaggerated, given the highest levels of security anxiety in a decade. The public largely supported the government's cautious and phased approach to the Cheonan incident. In contrast, the media and political parties were perceived as having responded excessively. Public opinion indicates that the core issue is not security apathy but rather concerns about the functioning of political leadership based on trust during a crisis.

[Figure 7] How do you think each of the following groups responded to the Cheonan incident? (%)

(4) Is the South Korean Security System Reliable? "The United States is Excessively Indifferent" 38.5%

Concerns about "Abandonment" in the ROK-US Alliance Heighten, Replacing Concerns about "Entrapment"

Regarding the United States, which has provided indirect support through the dispatch of technicians and experts to the fact-finding process, only 6.5% believed its response was excessive, indicating that significant backlash against excessive US intervention is not a major concern. While 42.8% considered the response appropriate, a substantial 38.5% found it "excessively indifferent." During the Roh Moo-hyun administration, concerns in South Korean society were high regarding the potential for entanglement in US overseas operations, leading to unwanted wars (edited by Ha Young-sun, 2006). However, the public opinion revealed in this incident suggests a growing concern about "abandonment" by the US in the context of Korean Peninsula security crises, rather than concerns about entanglement in US intentions.

In summary, an examination of public opinion reveals serious politicization of security perceptions and distrust in leadership, leading to national division and distorted communication systems. Concerns about the US potentially disengaging from the ROK-US alliance are also growing. However, the notion of public security apathy appears to be distant from reality. The public seems to possess sufficient anxiety and vigilance regarding security issues. It appears, however, that they prefer a phased and prudent approach over a purely emotional or impulsive response.

Response Measures for the Cheonan Incident: Wartime Operational Control and Contingency Plans in Case of North Korean Involvement

Sharp Increase in Public Opinion for Postponing/Canceling the Transfer of Wartime Operational Control

37.5% (June 2009) → 42.7% (October 2009) → 53.0% (April 2010)

Since the June 2009 survey, public opinion has moved beyond merely advocating for renegotiation or cancellation. In the June 2009 survey, 55.3% supported proceeding with the transfer as agreed, while 37.5% favored delaying or canceling the transfer, with 7.2% undecided or not responding. By the October survey, support for proceeding as agreed had decreased to 49.3% (a 6.0 percentage point drop), while opinions favoring renegotiation to delay the transfer were 36.6%, and cancellation of the agreement was 6.1%. The combined proportion favoring delay or cancellation increased to 42.7%, up from the June survey. In the current survey, when asked about the transfer of wartime operational control to the South Korean military in 2012, 40.1% supported proceeding as agreed, 47.6% favored renegotiation to delay the transfer, and 5.4% advocated for canceling the agreement. Those favoring postponement or cancellation reached 53.0%, surpassing half the respondents for the first time. Support for proceeding as agreed decreased by 9.2 percentage points compared to October last year, while the proportion favoring postponement or cancellation increased by 10.3 percentage points. This result supports the aforementioned observation of growing public concern about a potential reduction in the US role within the ROK-US alliance relationship.

[Figure 8] Change in Stance on the Transfer of Wartime Operational Control in 2012 (%)

* The June 2009 survey offered a choice between 'proceed as agreed' and 'postpone or cancel,' while the October 2009 and April 2010 surveys offered choices among 'proceed as agreed,' 'postpone through renegotiation,' and 'cancel.'

Desirable Response Measures if North Korean Involvement is Confirmed

Referral to UN Security Council (75.0%) → Economic Sanctions (58.5%) → Suspension of Inter-Korean Exchange (45.2%) → Limited Military Retaliation (28.2%)

We asked the public about their assessment of various measures the government should take if North Korea's involvement in this incident is confirmed as fact. Seventy-five percent (75.0%) responded that measures such as referral to the UN Security Council to impose sanctions on North Korea through international cooperation are desirable, making it the most preferred option. The response that economic sanctions against North Korea are desirable was 58.5%. On the other hand, regarding measures to suspend inter-Korean exchanges and tourism, opinions were divided, with 45.2% finding it desirable and 50.6% finding it undesirable. This indicates that nearly half of public opinion does not favor a drastic severance of inter-Korean relations. For measures of limited military retaliation, 28.2% found them desirable, while 64.7% found them undesirable, showing an overwhelming opposition.

Ultimately, if North Korea's involvement is confirmed, it can be said that the public favors actively pursuing international pressure and sanctions while being hesitant to freeze inter-Korean relations or take military actions with a high possibility of war.

[Figure 9] Desirable Response Measures if North Korean Involvement is Confirmed: "Desirable" (%)

* Represents the percentage who answered 'desirable' among the choices of 'desirable' and 'undesirable' for each measure.