[Public Opinion Briefing Vol. 66-1] Diagnosis of Social Conflict in Korea Through Public Opinion

[Public Opinion Briefing Vol. 66] Regular Public Opinion Barometer Survey

1. Diagnosis of Social Conflict in Korea Through Public Opinion

2. Case Studies of Conflict: Sejong City and the Four Major Rivers Project

Urgent Need for Social Conflict Management; Political Sector Most Responsible for Failure of Conflict Resolution Function

Compared to Five Years Ago, Political Conflict Between Ruling and Opposition Parties and Ideological Conflict Have Worsened, While Wealth Gap and Yeongnam-Honam Regional Conflict Have Eased

EAI, JoongAng Sunday, and Korea Research are focusing on the reality that various social conflict factors in Korean society are escalating into endless political struggles rather than being resolved through political mediation, judicial rulings, or self-regulation within civil society. We periodically track the structure and intensity of social conflict perceived by the public annually. Through this, we aim to identify conflict factors that require political and social attention for the mitigation of social conflict and the promotion of social integration, and to highlight the importance of developing political and social countermeasures.

Compared to Last Year, When Candlelight Protests Occurred, 56.9% Perceive Social Conflict as Worsened, 28.5% as Similar, and 13.2% as Eased

This is Proof That the Social Conflict Management Function is Not Working

Compared to one year ago, 56.9% of the public (28.8% 'significantly worsened' + 28.2% 'slightly worsened') responded that the level of conflict in our society has worsened. Those who answered it was similar accounted for 28.5%, and only 13.2% (1.5% 'significantly eased' + 11.4% 'slightly eased') of the public responded that it had eased. Undecided/No response was 1.4%. Consequently, it can be interpreted that more than eight out of ten Koreans believe that social conflict has not improved compared to a year ago.

[Figure 1] Perception of Social Conflict in Korea Compared to One Year Ago (%)

The comparison point, one year ago, was a period when social conflict reached its peak, with millions of people taking to the streets until late at night due to the appointment of cabinet members and the US beef controversy immediately after President Lee Myung-bak took office, leading to direct confrontation between the Blue House and civil society. Nevertheless, the fact that public opinion overwhelmingly indicates that social conflict has worsened compared to last year in this survey demonstrates that the conflict management function of Korean society is not operating properly. Notably, even within this year, the division of national opinion concerning the recent Sejong City and Four Major Rivers Project issues, as well as the passing of two former presidents, can be attributed to the failure of the Korean social conflict management system to function effectively.

Critics of the President and Democratic Party Supporters Perceive Greater Conflict

We Must Prevent Anti-Government and Anti-Ruling Party Forces from Becoming Blind Veto Groups; Politics of Unity and Harmony is Desperately Needed

When analyzed by income, age group, and region, it is generally confirmed that there is a consensus that social conflict in Korea has worsened or at least not improved. Generally, respondents in their 30s and 40s, lower-middle income brackets earning less than 3 million won per month, and in the Honam and Chungcheong regions, reported a higher proportion of perceiving conflict as severe than the average. However, the differences with other demographic groups were not significant.

[Figure 2] Proportion of Respondents Perceiving Social Conflict as 'Severe' by Age, Income, and Region (%)

However, a significant difference in the intensity of perceived conflict was observed among supporters of President Lee Myung-bak and the Grand National Party, and among ideological conservatives. Among those who identified as progressive, the proportion responding that social conflict had worsened was 68.9%, while it was 52.7% and 52.6% among conservatives and moderates, respectively. By party affiliation, 36.6% of Grand National Party supporters responded that conflict had worsened, 35.0% said it was similar to last year, and 26.9% said it had eased. In contrast, among Democratic Party supporters, 72.9% responded that social conflict had worsened, 20.2% said it was similar to last year, and only 6.4% said it had eased. Among those who supported President Lee Myung-bak, the proportion responding that conflict had worsened was 34.1%. Among those who did not support him, the proportion was as high as 72.3%.

Ultimately, there is a difference in the intensity of perceived conflict of interest between social groups among supporters of the ruling power and supporters of the opposing camp. Generally, supporters of the ruling power tend to identify with the ruling power, exhibiting a sense of vested interest and a tendency to justify the ruling power's mistakes. Conversely, supporters of the opposition tend to perceive social conflict more severely due to psychological deprivation from their preferred party's failure to gain power and backlash from policies they oppose.

The problem is that if these groups become entrenched as either blind government advocates or anti-government groups that oppose every government policy, it will be difficult to ease social conflict and achieve integration. If the pattern of the Grand National Party supporters remembering the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun administrations as a 'lost decade' during the change of government, and the opposing camp remembering the present with the same sentiment, repeats itself, it will be difficult to expect social integration and the efficient functioning of democracy.

[Figure 3] Proportion Responding 'Severe' to Conflict Perception by Party Support, Presidential Approval, and Ideological Tendency (%)

Responsibility for Worsening Social Conflict

National Assembly and Political Sector 44.4% > Media 16.3% > Citizens 13.8% > President 11.4% > Labor Unions/Civic Groups 8.2%

Regarding the responsibility for the worsening social conflict, 44.1% of the public pointed to political parties and the National Assembly. The media was cited by 16.3%, and citizens themselves were seen as the problem by 13.8%. The President was mentioned by 11.4%. Other responses included labor unions (5.0%), civic groups (3.2%), corporations (1.4%), and the judiciary (1.1%).

The National Assembly and the political sector are not only legislative bodies that lay the foundation for the rule of law but also play a role in political conflict resolution and management by checking the President and the government, and by mediating and reflecting diverse social interests in the government's policy-making and implementation processes. The fact that the public perceives the National Assembly and the political sector not as conflict resolution bodies but as the primary instigators of conflict in Korean society signifies the collapse of expectations and trust in the ability to manage social conflict through politics.

[Figure 4] Who Bears the Greatest Responsibility for Worsening Social Conflict?

Distrust in the conflict management function of the political sector primarily intensifies power struggles and promotes politics of direct action. Consequently, the resolution of various social conflicts in Korean society becomes excessively reliant on the judiciary or tempts individuals to resort to street protests. In other words, as the healthy balance of power is disrupted, a state of instability persists with constant clashes between legislative, executive, and judicial powers. This is clearly illustrated by the recurring pattern observed in major government policies since the Roh Moo-hyun administration, including the impeachment of former President Roh, the relocation of the administrative capital, candlelight protests, and most recently, the media content industry promotion act: conflict is not resolved in the political sphere, leading to prolonged external struggles, referral to the Constitutional Court, rulings by the court, and subsequent politicization of court decisions.

Not only does the political sector fail to fulfill its role as a conflict mediator, but the ruling party, in pursuit of national leadership, and the opposition party, for their future presidential election strategies, exploit the psychological animosity of their supporters towards the opposing camp, thereby extending political power struggles into conflicts within civil society. Historically, ruling parties and governments have tended to ignore or exclude the opinions and stances of opposing factions, rather than embracing them to achieve political integration, thus failing to manage political and ideological conflicts. Similarly, opposition parties have largely utilized the psychological deprivation and resentment of their supporters towards the government for political attacks against the ruling party.

This indicates that the perception is widespread in society that the political sector is not a problem solver that can be relied upon when social conflict arises, but rather a troublemaker that exacerbates conflict. While political reform agendas are being proposed to alleviate regionalism and improve administrative efficiency, it appears that reforms and changes to shed this 'troublemaker' image are the immediate priority.

Changes in the Structure of Social Conflict in Korea: Analysis of Distance Between Conflicting Groups

During the Roh Government Period, Wealth Gap Was Ranked First; During the MB Government, Conflict Between Ruling and Opposition Parties Was Ranked First

Compared to the previous administration, conflict between the ruling and opposition parties and ideological conflict have worsened, while conflicts related to wealth gap, generational differences, and Yeongnam-Honam have eased.

Since democratization, the structure of social conflict in Korea has become increasingly diverse and complex. The priorities of social conflict factors perceived by the public have also changed. According to a joint survey conducted by EAI and JoongAng Ilbo during the Roh Moo-hyun administration in 2005, a significant 89.6% of respondents agreed that the distance between the rich and the poor was large, identifying it as the most significant conflict factor in Korean society. The distance between the Uri Party and the Grand National Party was cited by 86.0%, and the conflict between entrepreneurs and laborers was understood as a significant conflict relationship by 76.0%. Following these were the conflict between the older and younger generations, pointed out by 63.5% of respondents, and ideological conflict between progressives and conservatives, which narrowly trailed at 62.8%.

[Figure 5] Changes in Perceived Distance Between Groups by Social Conflict Factor (2005-2009)

However, four years later, at the current juncture with a change in administration, significant changes are observed. While economic conflict factors such as the wealth gap (81.8%) and labor-management conflict (71.3%) are still identified as significant conflict factors, the highest proportion of respondents (84.2%) cited political conflict between the Grand National Party and the Democratic Party as the primary issue. Although the Grand National Party, then the opposition, has become a major opposition party, and the Uri Party, which held a majority in 2005, has transformed into the Democratic Party with less than 100 seats, the stalemate without resolution in political compromise and mediation has not changed. This appears to reflect the ongoing situation where uncompromising political confrontation is anticipated over issues such as Sejong City and the Four Major Rivers Project.

Meanwhile, regarding the group distance between the older and younger generations, which gained new attention during the Roh Moo-hyun administration, there has been no significant change in the response rate, but its relative ranking has been overtaken by the progressive-conservative ideological divide. In the case of ideological conflict between progressives and conservatives, 74.9% responded that the distance between groups was large, an increase of 11.4 percentage points from 2005, making it the third highest response after ruling-opposition party conflict and wealth gap conflict. This year alone, the political landscape has been significantly affected by events such as the Yongsan tragedy and the passing of two former presidents. Recently, major political issues, such as the publication of dictionaries of pro-Japanese and pro-North Korean figures, have overlapped with confrontations between progressive and conservative factions.

In contrast, the proportion of respondents who cited the Yeongnam-Honam conflict, with six out of ten respondents indicating a large group distance, has fallen to 40.3%. Although political mobilization strategies based on regionalism still emerge during elections and bloc voting by region has not completely disappeared, this phenomenon is likely related to the recent shift in regionalism from conflicts based on regional identity in the authoritarian era to conflicts based on regional interests, particularly concerning development policies in residential areas, rather than solely Yeongnam-Honam identity. It can be inferred that the Yeongnam-Honam regional conflict is perceived as having significantly eased, with the focus shifting to differences in interests between the Seoul metropolitan area and provincial regions, and between the Chungcheong region and non-Chungcheong regions, centered on issues like Sejong City.

The results of this survey confirm that the restoration of the political sector's conflict mediation function, along with sustained and focused measures to address socio-economic polarization issues such as the wealth gap and labor-management conflict, are crucial from the perspective of social integration. Notably, the renowned sociologist DiMaggio from the University of Chicago has emphasized that the negative consequences of social polarization are most severe when various social conflict factors overlap with ideological identity divisions. In the current era where the content and substance of progressive and conservative ideologies are becoming ambiguous, a more thorough analysis and countermeasures are needed to determine whether political and social conflicts are converging into conflicts based on ideological identity.