[Public Opinion Briefing Vol. 62-1] Is the Efficacy of Pragmatic Centrism Ending? Support Rate Among Centrist Voters Declines by 7.7%p

[Public Opinion Briefing Vol. 62] October Regular Public Opinion Barometer Survey

1. Is the Efficacy of Pragmatic Centrism Ending? Support Rate Among Centrist Voters Declines by 7.7%

2. Public Opinion on Security Issues

1. Analysis of Presidential Approval Ratings: MB's Approval Rate Stalls at 41.8%

Is the Efficacy of Pragmatic Centrism Ending? Support Rate Among Centrist Voters Declines by 7.7%p

Presidential Approval Ratings Fail to Achieve Further Gains

President Lee Myung-bak's approval ratings, which had surged since July, have halted their upward trend. After falling to 30.5% in the July survey due to the withdrawal of Cheon Seong-kwan's nomination for Prosecutor General and the media bill controversy, approval rose by 6.8%p to 37.3% in the August survey, and further increased by 7.2%p from the previous month to 44.5% in the September survey. However, in the survey conducted on October 24th, the rate declined by 2.7%p to 41.8%, halting the upward momentum. Negative evaluations also increased from 52.4% in the September survey to 56.3% in this survey, a rise of 3.9 percentage points. These are the results of the October regular public opinion barometer survey conducted by the East Asia Institute (EAI) and Korea Research on October 24th.

Despite favorable factors that could have driven an increase in approval ratings, such as the renewed drive for pragmatic centrism since July, President Lee Myung-bak's active diplomatic efforts at the G-20 Summit, and diplomatic achievements like Seoul hosting the next G-20 Summit, the approval ratings failed to achieve further gains.

[Figure 1] Changes in President Lee Myung-bak's National Approval Ratings (%)

Why Did the Upward Trend Halt?

Examining the factors that led to the halt in the upward trend and the stagnation of approval ratings, it is evident that non-economic factors, such as political distrust and dissatisfaction with the governing style, have played a significant role, rather than economic factors like the economic crisis. In the April regular survey, when respondents critical of the President's state administration were asked for their reasons in a free-response format, a substantial 35.1% cited the economic crisis and the President's leadership in addressing it. Distrust in the ability to handle the economic crisis was the primary reason for the decline in approval ratings as a single factor. Responses citing autocratic governance or lack of communication accounted for 15.2%, and issues related to policy and ideological orientation accounted for 13.6%. Additionally, 10.9% pointed to the government's bias in representing the interests of specific groups, and 6.2% cited issues with policy execution.

However, six months later, the proportion of respondents citing distrust in the ability to handle the economic crisis has decreased to 25.4%, while the proportion citing autocratic governance has increased to 21.0%. Issues related to government policy and ideological orientation accounted for 16.1%, and representing the interests of specific groups accounted for 12.6%. Political criticism regarding the bias and ideological nature of President Lee Myung-bak's state administration is intensifying.

[Figure 2] Reasons for Negative Evaluation of President Lee Myung-bak's State Administration (%) - Free Response

Note) Responses from 502 respondents in the April survey and 451 respondents in the October survey.

This phenomenon can be attributed to the fact that trade and domestic economic indicators have steadily improved since the economic crisis, leading to a relatively favorable evaluation of the South Korean government's crisis management both domestically and internationally, thereby reducing the impact of economic factors on declining approval ratings. While economic factors may have diminished, they remain a significant factor eroding national approval ratings. A considerable number of citizens are experiencing economic hardship due to the economic downturn, and recently, there have been domestic and international discussions about the possibility of a double-dip recession as the economic recovery falters. Considering that, even if an exit strategy is not immediately implemented, it is difficult to pursue fiscal expansion policies indefinitely for economic stimulus. If the economy cools down further and citizens feel the impact, concerns about the government's leadership during the economic crisis may grow, potentially leading to a significant erosion of approval ratings.

Conversely, it is necessary to pay attention to factors eroding approval ratings in non-economic areas, particularly in the political sphere. There have been numerous negative events that have undermined the government's pragmatic centrism, pro-commoner initiatives, and efforts to strengthen politics of integration and communication, which had previously driven the rise in approval ratings.

First, there are the controversies surrounding the alleged illegal and unconventional practices of newly appointed Prime Minister Chung Un-chan and other cabinet nominees, which were ambitiously prepared. The process of pushing for their confirmation to prevent a weakening of state leadership significantly eroded the image of pro-commoner communication that had been carefully cultivated over several months. Although their confirmations were successful, this has likely reinforced concerns about the President and the government's bias, reminiscent of the 'rich-and-powerful cabinet' image from the early days of the administration, and consequently diluted the President's pro-commoner initiatives.

Second, issues that carry a high potential for conflict and clash of interests between groups, such as the Four Major Rivers Project, the Sejong City issue, and the media bill, have recently come to the forefront of political discourse, overshadowing issues with high levels of public consensus like overcoming the economic crisis. This makes it difficult to achieve further increases in approval ratings (EAI Public Opinion Briefing 61-September 2009). The prominence of conflict-ridden issues is likely to strengthen public concerns about the government's autocratic operation to protect specific vested interests.

Meanwhile, incidents such as infighting among presidential staff and a sexual assault case involving a presidential office employee have raised concerns about discipline within the Blue House. Furthermore, recent conflicts arising from the departure of critical journalists and entertainers from broadcasts, and the governance changes in major broadcasting stations and media organizations, appear to have negatively impacted the government's image of communication and integration. These incidents, perceived as media control or political retaliation, seem to be fueling concerns that the government may be reverting to unilateral and autocratic state administration.

The President's approval ratings had reached unprecedented heights over the past three months, with some survey agencies and even internal Blue House surveys reporting figures exceeding 50%. However, within less than a month, there is concern that the ratings may revert to the 30% range. The President and the ruling party need to assess whether the surge in approval ratings over the past three months has led to a waning of their commitment to reform. It must be emphasized anew that public support can fluctuate at any time if they deviate from the public's message to pursue politics of pragmatic centrism, integration, and communication, rather than representing specific ideologies or vested interests.

Efficacy of Pragmatic Centrism Ending? Centrist MB Support Rate Falls from 47.0% to 39.3%

Changes in Presidential Support Base: Signs of Contraction in Expanded Reach; Support Weakens Among 20s-40s, Highly Educated, TK & Honam, and Centrist/Unaffiliated Voters

The initial surge in presidential approval ratings since July can be attributed primarily to the consolidation of support from traditional conservative bases and the Grand National Party's supporters. In August and September, the support base expanded to include centrist voters and even some opposition party supporters, who shifted their allegiance to the government under the drive for pragmatic centrism. However, in the current survey, stagnation in approval ratings is particularly evident among centrist and reform-minded voters who contributed to broadening the government's support base in August-September.

Until June, around the time the national mourning period for former President Roh Moo-hyun concluded, approval ratings showed significant ideological disparities, with 21.8% support from progressives, 31.2% from centrists, and 49.2% from conservatives. However, during July-August, as pragmatic centrism was actively pursued, presidential approval ratings increased across all ideological groups—progressive, centrist, and conservative—with support from centrists nearly matching that from conservatives.

Centrist support stood at 41.5% in the August survey and 47.0% in the September survey, approaching the conservative support rates of 43.2% in August and 51.4% in September. However, in the October survey, centrist support dropped to 39.3%. In contrast, conservative support actually rose to 56.1% in October, widening the perception gap between the two groups. Centrist support shows signs of reverting to levels seen among progressives (23.7%). Ideological polarization in the perception of the Lee Myung-bak administration is intensifying.

[Figure 3] Changes in National Approval Ratings by Ideological Inclination: June-October (%)

Let us now examine changes in the presidential support base by demographic group. Regarding support by age, individuals aged 50 and above showed the highest support at 64.4%, consistently maintaining high support in the 60% range over the past three months. However, support among younger generations (20s and 30s) and middle-aged individuals (40s), which had increased by approximately 9-10 percentage points in August-September, has declined again. In the 20s, support dropped from 33.7% to 25.9% within a month, a decrease of 7.8 percentage points. In the 30s, it fell from 27.6% to 25.6%, a decrease of 2.0 percentage points. In the 40s, it decreased by about 3.6 percentage points, from 41.1% to 37.5%. A similar pattern is observed by educational attainment. The group with junior high school education or less, which recorded 61.9% support in the August survey, maintained high support at 62.5% in the September survey. The high school graduate group, which saw an 8.1 percentage point increase in support between August and September, showed stagnant support at 49.7% to 46.9%. Among those with college degrees or higher, the September support rate of 36.1% slightly decreased to 34.3% in the October survey.

By region of residence, support rates were relatively high in Daegu-Gyeongbuk (48.6%), Seoul (47.1%), Busan-Gyeongnam (44.1%), Chungcheong (42.8%), and Gyeonggi/Incheon (41.9%). Only the Honam region remained at 24.3%, indicating the persistence of anti-Lee Myung-bak sentiment. However, support in the Daegu-Gyeongbuk region, the traditional base of the Grand National Party and particularly former representative Park Geun-hye, which had risen to 65.0% in the September survey following a meeting between the President and former representative Park, dropped significantly to 48.6% in the current survey, a decrease of 16.4 percentage points from the previous month.

By party support, between July and August, support for the President among Grand National Party supporters increased by 9.6 percentage points to 79.0%. In the September survey, it was 80.3%, and in the October survey, a substantial 82.7% expressed support for the President. Among unaffiliated voters, who experienced a 6.2 percentage point increase in support between August and September, the rate slightly decreased from 35.0% to 33.7% between September and October, showing stagnant support.

2. Analysis of Party Support Ratings: Simultaneous Decline in Support for Both Ruling and Opposition Parties, Increase in Unaffiliated Voters

Grand National Party sees decline in support from core and fluid supporters

Democratic Party sees withdrawal of support from core supporters

Potential variable for political change, such as a new pro-Roh party

Simultaneous Decline in Support for Both Parties

Grand National Party 31.9%→27.6%, Democratic Party 20.7%→16.5%, Unaffiliated Voters 24.4%→ 38.3%

The regular party support rating survey conducted by the East Asia Institute (EAI) and Korea Research on October 24th showed a trend of declining support for both the Grand National Party and the Democratic Party, accompanied by an increase in unaffiliated voters.

The Grand National Party's approval rating fell from 31.9% in September to 27.6% in October. The Grand National Party had initially entered the 30% range in the September survey, following the death of former President Roh Moo-hyun, but it has fallen back into the 20% range within a month.

The Democratic Party's approval rating, which had recovered to the 20% range for the first time since the current administration's inception, reaching 21.8% on May 23rd, the day of former President Roh's death, barely maintained 20.7% in the September survey. In the October survey, it dropped to 16.5%, falling into the 10% range for the first time in five months since the May survey.

[Figure 4] Party Support Ratings September-October (%)

[Figure 5] Trend of Party Support Ratings (%)

Changes in Grand National Party Support Base: Significant Decline Among 20s, 50s and Above / Honam, TK / Progressives, Centrists

Examining the Grand National Party's support base by age, support rates were above the average among those in their 40s (29.6%) and those aged 50 and above (41.4%), while falling below 20% among those in their 20s (12.1%) and 30s (18.4%). By region, the highest proportion of Grand National Party supporters were found in TK (40.8%), followed by PK (36.1%) and Seoul (35.5%). By educational attainment, support was relatively high among those with junior high school education or less (39.3%) and high school graduates (32.6%), but only 23.3% among college graduates.

Compared to the previous month's results, the decline in support was relatively larger among those in their 20s and 50s and above. By region, the decline was significant among respondents from Honam, TK, and Gyeonggi-Incheon. By ideological orientation, the decline was pronounced among progressives and centrists. This suggests that respondents from the 20s, Honam, and progressive groups, who had recently shown favor towards pragmatic centrism or leadership promoting communication and integration, are withdrawing their support.

Weakening of Democratic Party Support Base: Will it Lead to Support for a Pro-Roh New Party?

Democratic Party Support Declines Among 30s / Seoul Metropolitan Area, PK / Progressives / Anti-MB, Anti-Grand National Party Voters

Looking at the Democratic Party's support base by age, they received relatively high support from those in their 20s (18.6%) and 30s (28.7%). Support was lower among those in their 40s (16.9%) and those aged 50 and above (9.9%). By region, while not a majority, they received 42.9% support in the Honam region, but only around 10% support in most other regions. Notably, voters in the Chungcheong region, who showed 14.0% support in the previous survey and 15.7% in the current survey, did not exhibit significant changes despite expectations that support for the Grand National Party would decline and support for the Democratic Party would rise in the Chungcheong region following Prime Minister Chung Un-chan's suggestion of revising the Sejong City plan.

Furthermore, compared to the previous month, the decline in support was larger among those in their 30s by age group, in the Seoul metropolitan area and PK region by geographical area, among those with college degrees or higher by educational attainment. Notably, only 24.4% of those who responded negatively to President Lee Myung-bak's state administration supported the Democratic Party. Support for the Democratic Party among progressives, in particular, decreased significantly by 13.2 percentage points (from 28.3% to 15.1%). This indicates that the Democratic Party is failing to establish itself as the opposition party representing progressive and reform-minded voters who hold anti-MB and anti-Grand National Party sentiments, and its standing is weakening.

As the Democratic Party fails to serve as a focal point for the expanding anti-Grand National Party and anti-MB voter base amidst the weakening support for President Lee Myung-bak and the Grand National Party, it is anticipated that competition, rather than integration, will intensify among opposition political forces.