[Public Opinion Briefing 50-3] 2009 Basic Analysis Results

[Public Opinion Briefing 50] Comprehensive 5-Year Evaluation of Trust and Influence of 25 Korean Power Institutions

1. Changes in Trust and Influence of Key Power Institutions Over 5 Years

2. Analysis of Influence and Trust by Institutional Ideological Orientation

3. 2009 Basic Analysis Results

2009 Survey Results on Trust and Influence of 25 Power Institutions

In Korean society, large corporations and judicial institutions such as the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court exert strong influence while receiving significant public trust. Power institutions like the Blue House saw increased influence but relatively lower trust. Political parties, civic groups, and interest groups, which represent public interests and mediate between citizens and state power, had low influence and trust. These findings are from the '2009 Survey of Influence and Trust of 25 Power Institutions,' conducted annually since 2005 by the East Asia Institute (Director: Lee Sook-jong, Sungkyunkwan University) and the JoongAng Ilbo.

Major conglomerates such as Samsung, Hyundai Motor, SK, and LG were evaluated as top-tier in both influence and trust, as in previous years. In terms of influence, Samsung ranked first (7.00 points), followed by Hyundai Motor (6.91 points) in second place, and SK (6.70 points) in third. As power and judicial institutions like the prosecution, Constitutional Court, and Blue House significantly increased their influence, LG dropped to seventh place with 6.21 points. In terms of trust, these conglomerates occupied the top four positions: Hyundai Motor (6.58 points), SK (6.41 points), Samsung (6.09 points), and LG (5.84 points). Despite events like the 'Chief Justice Shin Young-chul controversy,' judicial institutions such as the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court maintained high influence and trust, securing top positions.

The most prominent characteristic this year is that state power institutions, including the Blue House, prosecution, police, National Tax Service, Board of Audit and Inspection, and National Intelligence Service, saw increased influence compared to last year, but their public trust further declined. The prosecution, which demonstrated strong influence in the series of events from the Park Yeon-cha lobby scandal to the death of former President Roh Moo-hyun, rose from sixth place last year (6.19 points) to fourth place this year (6.68 points). The Blue House jumped from ninth place in influence last year (5.96 points) to sixth place this year (6.22 points). However, the trust levels for these institutions remained in the lower-middle range, with the prosecution at 12th place (4.48 points) and the Blue House at 17th place (4.19 points). Concerns are growing over power that is not trusted.

Meanwhile, civic and interest groups, which represent public interests and mediate between the public and the state, are experiencing a decline in both influence and trust, regardless of their progressive or conservative orientation. In the 2008 survey, the aftermath of the candlelight protests led to an increase in the influence and trust of progressive civic and interest groups, while conservative groups saw a decline. The Federation of Korean Industries (FKI) ranked 12th in influence with 5.74 points, and organizations such as the Korean Teachers and Education Workers Union (KTU), Korean Federation of Teachers' Associations (KFTA), Korean Public Interest Lawyers Group (Minbyun), Citizens' Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ), People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD), and New Right were ranked between 15th and 20th in influence. In terms of trust, the FKI received a relatively high score, ranking 8th (4.79 points), while other organizations scored in the low 4-point range, ranking between 13th and 21st. Major labor organizations, including the Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU) and the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU), had influence scores of 4.25 points (21st) and 4.24 points (22nd) respectively. In terms of trust, both labor federations jointly ranked 22nd among the 25 institutions with a score of 3.67.

Trust in major political parties continued to remain at the lowest levels. The Grand National Party (GNP) ranked in the middle tier for influence with 5.35 points, but fell to the bottom among the 25 institutions in trust with 3.62 points. The Democratic Party (DP), despite experiencing a rise in approval ratings following the candlelight protests last year and the subsequent national mourning for former President Roh Moo-hyun, was unable to sufficiently recover public trust. Its influence ranked 21st with 4.25 points, and its trust ranked 24th with 3.65 points. The fact that the ruling party and the main opposition party in Korea are at the bottom in terms of influence and trust signifies the absence of the party's function to represent public will and mediate conflicting interests. This highlights the void in politics.



Changes in Trust and Influence by Institutional Characteristics

Examining influence and trust by institutional characteristics, large corporations (Samsung, Hyundai Motor, SK, LG) and judicial bodies such as the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court are groups that exert social influence and receive high public trust. Power institutions like the Blue House, prosecution, National Intelligence Service, Board of Audit and Inspection, and National Intelligence Service have increased influence but are simultaneously classified as groups facing significant public distrust. The order of trust is also conglomerates, judicial bodies, and power institutions. Political parties received the lowest evaluation in trust as well. The gap between influence and trust was significant for major power institutions and the judiciary. Averaging the evaluations for the GNP, DP, Democratic Labor Party, and Liberty Forward Party yields an influence score of 4.36 and a trust score of 3.74, receiving the most negative evaluations compared to other institutions. For power institutions, the difference was 1.51 points (6.06 - 4.55), and for the judiciary, it was 0.98 points (6.42 - 5.44). Conglomerates had the smallest difference at 0.11 points (6.71 - 6.60).

[Figure 1] Comparison of Trust-Influence Results by Target Group in 2009 (Unit: Points)

Looking at the changes over the past five years, several characteristics are apparent. Conglomerates, commensurate with their high social influence, enjoy relatively high public trust. Over the last five years, the influence of conglomerates has remained relatively stable. While trust had been declining until last year, it successfully rebounded in this year's survey. The gap between influence and trust has also narrowed.

Judicial bodies are also classified as institutions with relatively high influence and public trust. However, while their influence continues to grow, their trust is showing a declining trend. As more issues that should be resolved politically are being settled through judicial decisions, a decline in judicial trust is concerning, as it could weaken the rule of law across society and lead to disputes over legitimacy and fairness.

Key power institutions such as the Blue House, prosecution, police, and National Intelligence Service have seen their influence continuously increase since the Lee Myung-bak administration, but their trust continues to decline. The gap between influence and trust is widening. The increase in the influence of state power institutions, in contrast to the previous administration which advocated for de-authoritarianization of political power, is a result of the Lee Myung-bak administration's emphasis on the efficiency and achievements of state power institutions. However, distrust in the government has been growing since the early days of its term, stemming from its perceived representation of only the interests of established groups and its unilateral policy implementation approach, rather than conflict resolution and compromise.

In recent years, both the influence and trust of civic organizations, which serve to check state power and provide spaces for individual citizen participation, have been declining. The results for interest groups such as the KCTU, FKTU, and FKI are similar. Both influence and trust are decreasing. This is a result of excessive politicization of these organizations, practices where the positions of some executives take precedence over individual citizen participation, and recent corruption scandals. However, civic and interest groups are important channels for citizens to represent their interests and participate in policy-making processes. They also play a crucial role in checking government overreach. The deterioration of influence and trust in these organizations is concerning, as it signifies the weakening of platforms for voluntary representation of public interests and participation.

However, the most serious issue is undoubtedly the political sphere. In modern democracy, the fundamental role of representing and mediating diverse interests lies with the political sphere. If party politics fails to function properly, representative democracy faces a crisis, and various social conflicts are directly projected onto state power. This is the main reason for the serious expression of political and social conflicts following last year's candlelight protests. Minor parties such as the Democratic Labor Party and the Liberty Forward Party, as well as the majority GNP and the main opposition DP, have seen their trust base continuously weaken. While it is true that the GNP and DP have somewhat recovered their influence under the Lee Myung-bak administration, and the DP's trust level has recently improved, overall, political parties are considered the most distrusted group by the public.

In summary, only conglomerates consistently receive public trust commensurate with their significant influence. They are performing well in the context of economic crisis. In other areas, power institutions representing government, political parties, the judiciary, and civil society are generally facing a crisis of trust. When institutional confidence—trust in the fundamental elements of democracy and their core institutions—declines, the function of representative democracy weakens. In such cases, citizens may tend to engage directly in politics rather than seeking institutional solutions, or it may lead to political cynicism and apathy, thereby weakening political participation.

[Table 1] Trust-Influence Results by Target Group Over 5 Years (Unit: Points)

[Figure 2] Changes in Trust-Influence Results by Individual Target Group Over 5 Years (Unit: Points)

Scatter Plot Analysis of Trust and Influence for 25 Institutions

Analysis by Type

The influence and trust scores assigned to each surveyed institution are represented in a scatter plot. The surveyed institutions are divided into four types based on their high or low levels of trust and influence.

First, there is the type with high influence and high public trust. This category includes conglomerates and judicial institutions such as the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court. These institutions have maintained relatively strong influence and high trust over the past five years. The increasing societal expectations of corporations and the growing tendency to rely on judicial decisions rather than political resolutions for various social conflicts reflect these changes.

Conversely, civic groups like CCEJ, PSPD, and New Right, and interest groups such as KFTA, FKTU, and KCTU, fall into the category of low influence and low trust. In 2008, conservative groups experienced a significant decline in influence and trust, while progressive groups showed signs of recovery. In 2009, regardless of conservative or progressive orientation, major political parties including the main opposition DP, the Democratic Labor Party, and the Liberty Forward Party, along with major civic and interest groups, are positioned in this category.

Key power institutions such as the Blue House, prosecution, police, and National Tax Service are evaluated as having high influence but relatively insufficient trust. This year, as the evaluation of these institutions' influence increased while their trust decreased, this category has become more prominent. The ruling Grand National Party (GNP), which shares responsibility for government and national affairs, is also included in this category.

However, among the major institutions in Korean society, it was difficult to find institutions with low influence but high trust.

Comparison of Results from 2005-2009

Comparing the scatter plots of survey results from 2005 to 2009 with the 2009 survey results reveals clearer differences. Firstly, in 2005, institutions with high influence but low trust were concentrated around the midpoint of 5 points. In the area of both low influence and low trust, the surveyed institutions were also clustered around 5 points. This implies that, excluding conglomerates and judicial institutions with both high influence and high trust, the differences among the surveyed power institutions in terms of influence and trust were relatively small.

The 2006 survey shows a significant divergence in the evaluation results of trust and influence for institutions compared to the 2005 survey. The substantial decline in trust and influence of political parties such as Uri Party, DP, and DLP, and labor organizations like KCTU and FKTU, widened the variance in institutional influence and trust levels. This trend intensified in 2007. The ruling party at the time, the Blue House, and progressive organizations moved towards lower levels of trust and influence, more clearly demonstrating the differences in influence and trust based on ideological orientation and institution. It was during this period that the assessment of a 'crisis of progressivism' began to emerge.

In 2008, the first year of the Lee Myung-bak administration, conglomerates and judicial institutions continued to exert significant influence and receive high trust. A notable characteristic was the decline in trust for Samsung, whose image had been damaged by incidents such as the slush fund revelations. Following the advent of the Lee Myung-bak administration, there were shifts in the center of political power and significant changes in the political trust base. From the beginning of the administration, the influence of state power institutions such as the Blue House, prosecution, and National Tax Service increased, and the influence of the former opposition GNP and New Right rapidly expanded. However, facing public criticism regarding the personnel screening committee activities and cabinet appointments, and crucially, the controversy over the US beef import negotiations and subsequent candlelight protests, the trust in the government and the ruling party significantly decreased. As distrust in the Lee Myung-bak administration spread, the trust levels of conservative parties and civic groups also declined concurrently. In contrast, progressive organizations showed signs of recovery from the 'crisis of progressivism'.

[Figure 1] Scatter Plot of Trust and Influence for 25 Institutions

[Figure 2] Characteristics of Scatter Plots of Trust and Influence for 25 Institutions from 2005-2008