Analysis of Influence and Trust by Ideological Tendency of Institutions

Public Opinion Briefing No. 50: Five-Year Comprehensive Evaluation of Trust and Influence Among 25 Korean Power Institutions

1. Changes in Trust and Influence of Key Power Institutions Over Five Years

2. Analysis of Influence and Trust by Ideological Tendency of Institutions

3. Basic Analysis Results for 2009

Neither Progressive nor Conservative Institutions Can Be Trusted: Trust Declines for Both Progressive and Conservative Groups

Conservative Institutions Maintain Influence, but Trust Declines; Progressive Institutions Experience Simultaneous Decline in Influence and Trust
A concurrent crisis for progressive and conservative forces is becoming a reality. This is not limited to the political sphere but is also evident among civic and interest groups. The political sphere and civil society, which should represent the interests of citizens, are facing indifferent evaluations from the public, regardless of whether they are progressive or conservative. However, major political parties, civic groups, and interest groups representing the public's interests are experiencing a simultaneous decline in trust, irrespective of their progressive or conservative stance. The situation is evolving from a crisis of the progressive side to a crisis of the conservative side, and further to a concurrent crisis for both progressive and conservative forces.

In terms of influence, conservative political parties and civic groups consistently maintain their influence, receiving evaluations of 5 points or higher since 2005. Progressive political parties and civic groups such as the Democratic Party, People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD), Citizens' Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ), Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU), and Federation of Korean Industries (FKI) were evaluated as exerting influence similar to conservative groups (4.99) until 2005. They experienced a sharp decline in influence during the latter half of the Roh Moo-hyun administration (4.49 in 2006, 4.41 in 2007). With the launch of the Lee Myung-bak administration, the influence of progressive forces began to rise through the movement against the import of U.S. beef and candlelight protests (4.66), but this year's survey shows a renewed decline in the influence of progressive institutions (4.49). The conservative side maintains an advantage in terms of influence.

[Figure 1] Trend of Influence Changes for Progressive and Conservative Organizations

*Progressive Organizations (CCEJ/Minbyun/KCTU/Democratic Party/Korean Teachers and Educational Workers Union/PSPD), Conservative Organizations (New Right/FKI/Korean Teachers Union/Grand National Party - 4 institutions)

No group, whether progressive or conservative, is exempt from the contraction of trust. When the Grand National Party's approval rating approached 50% and Lee Myung-bak was elected president at the end of the Roh Moo-hyun administration, most experts and civil society accepted the 'resurgence of conservatism and crisis of progressivism' as a foregone conclusion. Just one year later, amidst the beef import controversy and candlelight protests, trust in the government and ruling party weakened. Trust in conservative institutions, including the Grand National Party, continues on a downward trajectory. Although President Lee's approval rating, which had fallen to the 20% range during the period following the former president's passing, shows signs of reversal, it is important to note that the public still harbors strong distrust towards them. Pushing forward with state affairs unilaterally, instead of cooperating with the opposition/dissenting factions, could intensify public distrust and criticism, ultimately making it more difficult to exercise leadership in state affairs.

What is noteworthy is that the decline in trust towards the Grand National Party and conservative organizations is not translating into increased trust in the progressive camp, but rather a concurrent stagnation. The current government and conservative camp are failing to absorb critical public opinion following the passing of former President Roh Moo-hyun. While trust in some progressive organizations, such as Minbyun and the Korean Teachers and Educational Workers Union, has somewhat recovered compared to the previous administration, they have not sustained last year's recovery momentum. The Democratic Party has been in a state of stagnation since recently entering the 20% approval rating range. The attempts by progressive organizations to lead the political agenda through attacks on the government are not garnering significant support, which can be attributed to a weak foundation of trust. Engaging solely in street protests without offering alternative solutions fails to build trust as a viable alternative force.

Both progressive and conservative forces are currently being shunned by the public. This suggests an assessment that neither ideology nor any political or social force is adequately representing the interests of the people. Nevertheless, the progressive and conservative camps are engaging in political disputes, interpreting recent conflicting poll results in a self-serving manner, claiming 'public opinion is on my side.' This will further strengthen distrust in the major political forces. If trust is not established, political cynicism and apathy will prevail among the majority of the public, leading to rampant political extremism. Before celebrating a slight recovery in approval ratings, efforts to self-reflect on the underlying public distrust must precede.

[Figure 2] Trend of Trust Changes for Progressive and Conservative Organizations

*Progressive Organizations (CCEJ/Minbyun/KCTU/Democratic Party/Korean Teachers and Educational Workers Union/PSPD), Conservative Organizations (New Right/FKI/Korean Teachers Union/Grand National Party - 4 institutions)