[民意简报 48-1号] 朝鲜核试验后国民安全意识变化

[EAI·韩国研究] 6月晴雨表-安全意识/施政改革方案

1. 朝鲜核试验后国民安全意识变化, 2页

2. 李明博政府/大国家党施政改革方向, 9页

3. 国政支持率/政党支持率变化, 12页

安全担忧感增加

- 6月20日调查：稳定12.3%，一般27.8%，不安59.2%

- 安全不安：29.5%(3/21)→32.8%(4/19, 朝鲜发射火箭后)→48.4%(6/5, 朝鲜核试验后)→59.2%(6/20)

自5月25日第二次核试验以来，韩国人的安全担忧感急剧上升。随着韩国政府宣布加入PSI（防扩散安全倡议）并推动五方会谈，以及国际社会对朝制裁措施的逐步显现，国民的安全担忧感比6月初（6月5日调查）仍在持续增加。本次调查中，认为整体安全形势“稳定”的受访者占12.3%（非常稳定2.7%，略微稳定9.6%），认为“一般”的占27.8%，而认为“不安”的受访者最多，占59.2%（略微不安36.8%，非常不安11.6%）。

[图1] 当前整体安全状况

6/20 安全感知

从变化趋势来看，核试验后国际社会加强了制裁声音，而朝鲜则表现出强硬的应对态度，这使得国民的担忧感进一步加剧。在原定于3月朝鲜发射大浦洞2号导弹的调查中，认为整体安全形势不稳定的受访者仅占29.5%，但在4月5日火箭发射后的调查结果显示该比例上升至32.8%。然而，在5月25日朝鲜进行第二次核试验后进行的6月初调查中，认为安全形势不稳定的受访者比例为48.4%，而本次调查中已上升至59.2%。

[图2] 韩国安全担忧感变化(3月-6月)：“安全状况不安” (%)

* 6月5日的调查是EAI与《每日经济》联合进行的紧急政治时事调查（600人）结果，并非定期调查。

[表1] 整体安全状况评价(%)

* 模糊/无应答未标示

与2月相比，对朝强硬声音有所提高，但反对排除朝鲜或中断韩朝关系

- 与排除朝鲜的强硬政策相比，更倾向于包含朝鲜的对话

理想的朝核解决方案“六方会谈”占77.2%，“排除朝鲜的五方会谈”占42.5%

- 与2月相比，对六方会谈的期待有所下降，中断开城工业园区的声音有所提高

Amidst growing security anxieties, the Six-Party Talks, involving North Korea, South Korea, the United States, China, Japan, and Russia, were most anticipated as the desirable solution to the North Korean nuclear issue. A significant 77.2% responded that the Six-Party Talks are desirable for resolving the North Korean nuclear problem. However, there were considerable concerns regarding the Five-Party Talks proposed by President Lee Myung-bak, which exclude North Korea. Only 42.5% found the Five-Party Talks desirable, compared to 51.9% who found them undesirable. 5.6% were unsure. Conversely, only 29.4% found the suspension of inter-Korean aid and exchange programs, such as the Kaesong Industrial Complex and Geumgangsan tourism, to be desirable, with 65.2% responding negatively.

While opinions favoring dialogue and exchange with North Korea are indeed prevalent, the second nuclear test and belligerent statements from North Korea have led to increased demands for a hardline policy towards Pyongyang. Firstly, the expectation for the Six-Party Talks has weakened compared to the February survey. In the February survey, 85.2% supported the Six-Party Talks as a desirable solution to the North Korean nuclear issue, but this figure has decreased to 77.2% in the current survey. On the other hand, support for participating in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which involves inspecting vessels suspected of transporting weapons of mass destruction and implementing maritime interdictions, has increased from 49.2% to 54.2%. The demand for suspending inter-Korean exchanges and aid, such as the closure of the Kaesong Industrial Complex or Geumgangsan tourism, has also risen from 21.1% to 29.4%. This indicates an increase in the proportion favoring a hardline response.

[图1] 理想的朝核问题解决方案(6/20) (%)

* 关于参与PSI的结果是6月24日的补充调查结果。

[图2] 主要朝核解决方案的偏好变化(2月-6月)

“韩国也应拥有核武器”占60.5%，“按计划行使战时作战指挥权”占55.3%，“战争爆发时将参战（支援）”占63.0%

与5年前相比，主张拥有核武器的比例上升了9.8个百分点

高年龄层、低学历层、自由先进党/大国家党支持者中，拥有核主权的舆论较高

The increasing visibility of North Korea's nuclear armament is strengthening public opinion in South Korea that the country should also possess nuclear weapons. Regarding the assertion that South Korea should acquire nuclear weapons, six out of ten respondents stated they 'strongly agree' (28.8%) or 'generally agree' (31.7%). The response of 'somewhat disagree' was 25.2%, and 'strongly disagree' was only 12.0%. Comparing this to the results of a public opinion survey conducted five years ago by EAI and JoongAng Ilbo, it can be seen that public opinion regarding nuclear sovereignty has increased by approximately 10 percentage points.

[图1] 对“韩国也应拥有核武器”主张的评价(%)

A notable characteristic is that support for nuclear sovereignty, the idea that South Korea should possess nuclear weapons, is low among younger generations, those with higher education, and supporters of progressive political parties. Conversely, support for South Korea's nuclear sovereignty is high among older generations, those with lower education, and supporters of conservative political parties. By age group, 47.5% of those in their 20s and 48.0% in their 30s were negative towards nuclear sovereignty, while a stark contrast was seen with 69.2% of those in their 40s and 70.6% of those aged 50 and above responding positively. By educational background, 76.7% of those with junior high school education or less agreed with the assertion of South Korea possessing nuclear weapons. This figure was 68.0% for high school graduates and 52.2% for those with a college degree or higher, indicating that as educational attainment increases, positive responses towards nuclear sovereignty decrease. By political party affiliation, supporters of the Liberty Forward Party and the Grand National Party held positions favoring South Korea acquiring nuclear weapons at 70.7% and 68.1% respectively. In contrast, supporters of the Democratic Party were at 62.8%, the Democratic Labor Party at 57.4%, and the Progressive New Party at 42.0%. This suggests that while conservatives prioritize a balance of power, progressives are more critical of a nuclear arms race between the two Koreas.

[图2] 不同阶层核主权舆论 (%)

“2012年移交战时作战指挥权”55.3%赞成，“推迟或取消”37.5%

“朝鲜半岛爆发战争时参战”63.0%，“不愿参战”33.3%

Despite the escalation of inter-Korean relations, including North Korea's nuclear tests, public opinion strongly favored the return of wartime operational control to South Korea in 2012, as agreed upon by South Korea and the United States. 55.3% supported the 'return as scheduled,' while only 37.5% advocated for 'postponing the date or canceling it.' Meanwhile, when asked about participation in the event of a war breaking out on the Korean Peninsula (including rear support for women and the elderly), 63.0% of respondents stated they would participate (28.5% would definitely participate, 34.5% would preferably participate). 33.3% were negative about participation (24.6% would not want to participate if possible, 8.7% would absolutely not participate).

[图3] 2012年战时作战指挥权移交(%)

[图4] 战争爆发时参战意愿(%)

- 年轻层、高学历层越倾向于支持战时作战指挥权移交，参战意愿越弱

- 高龄层、低学历层越倾向于否定战时作战指挥权移交，参战意愿越强

Differences in attitudes towards the return of wartime operational control and the responsibility to participate in wartime were observed according to social class and ideological stance. Younger generations and those with higher education showed relatively higher support for the return of wartime operational control, while their willingness to participate in the event of war was weaker. 58.5% of those in their 20s and 69.7% in their 30s responded positively to the return of wartime operational control in 2012, whereas only 40.2% of those aged 50 and above did. By educational background, 59.3% of those with a college degree or higher supported the return of wartime operational control as scheduled, compared to 54.4% of high school graduates and 43.8% of those with junior high school education or less.

Regarding the intention to participate in the event of a war on the Korean Peninsula, only half of those in their 20s (51.5%) responded positively, and it was only 54.8% for those in their 30s. However, 69.5% of those in their 40s and 70.9% of those aged 50 and above expressed their intention to participate through rear support or other means. By educational background, those with a college degree or higher showed a relatively weaker intention to participate (59.8%), while a higher proportion of high school graduates (64.5%) and those with junior high school education or less (72.8%) responded that they would participate. Considering that younger generations and those with higher education in Korean society tend to have stronger progressive leanings, while older generations and those with lower education tend to have stronger conservative leanings, it implies that attitudes towards the return of wartime operational control or participation in case of contingencies are ultimately determined by the respondents' ideological orientation. In fact, supporters of conservative parties like the Grand National Party and the Liberty Forward Party are negative about the return of wartime operational control from the United States and express a strong will to participate in case of contingencies on the Korean Peninsula. Supporters of relatively progressive parties such as the Democratic Party and the Democratic Labor Party are proactive about the return of wartime operational control and negative about participating in war.

[图5] 不同阶层2012年战时作战指挥权移交赞成(%)

[图6] 不同阶层参战意愿比例(%)