[EAI Briefing 48-1] Changes in Public Security Awareness Following North Korea's Nuclear Test

[EAI·Korea Research] June Barometer - Security Awareness/Government Reform Measures

1. Changes in Public Security Awareness Following North Korea's Nuclear Test, p. 2

2. Direction of Government Reform by the Lee Myung-bak Administration/Grand National Party, p. 9

3. Changes in Approval Ratings for Government and Political Parties, p. 12

Increased Security Anxiety

- June 20 Survey: Stable 12.3%, So-so 27.8%, Unstable 59.2%

- Security Unstable: 29.5% (3/21) → 32.8% (4/19, after North Korea's rocket launch) → 48.4% (6/5, after North Korea's nuclear test) → 59.2% (6/20)

Following the second North Korean nuclear test on May 25, South Koreans' security anxiety has sharply increased. As the South Korean government announced its participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and pursued five-party talks, and as international sanctions against North Korea began to materialize, public anxiety has continued to grow compared to early June (June 5 survey). In this survey, responses indicating the overall security situation as 'stable' were 12.3% (very stable 2.7%, somewhat stable 9.6%), 'so-so' were 27.8%, and 'unstable' were 59.2% (somewhat unstable 36.8%, very unstable 11.6%), with the latter being the largest proportion.

[Figure 1] Current Overall Security Situation

June 20 Security Perception

The trend shows that as international voices calling for sanctions grew after the nuclear test, and North Korea responded with a hardline stance, public anxiety further intensified. In the March survey, when North Korea's Taepodong-2 missile launch was anticipated, only 29.5% responded that the overall security situation was unstable. However, after the rocket launch on April 5, the survey results showed 32.8%, a slight increase. Following North Korea's second nuclear test on May 25, the survey conducted in early June indicated that 48.4% found the security situation unstable, and this figure has now risen to 59.2% in the current survey.

[Figure 2] Changes in South Korea's Security Anxiety (March-June): "Unstable Security Situation" (%)

* The June 5 survey was part of an urgent joint survey on political issues by EAI and Maeil Business Newspaper (600 respondents), not a regular survey.

[Table 1] Assessment of Overall Security Situation (%)

* Don't know/No response not shown

Hardline Stance Towards North Korea Increased Compared to February, but Opposition to Exclusion or Severance of Inter-Korean Relations

- Preference for Dialogue Including North Korea Over Hardline Policies Excluding North Korea

Desirable North Korean Nuclear Solution: "Six-Party Talks" 77.2%, "Five-Party Talks Excluding North Korea" Desirable 42.5%

- Expectations for Six-Party Talks Decreased Compared to February, and Opinion to Suspend Kaesong Industrial Complex Increased

Amidst growing security concerns, the Six-Party Talks, involving North Korea and major surrounding powers such as South Korea, the United States, China, Japan, and Russia, were the most anticipated solution for the North Korean nuclear issue among the public. A significant 77.2% responded that the Six-Party Talks are desirable for resolving the North Korean nuclear problem. However, there were considerable concerns regarding the proposed Five-Party Talks, excluding North Korea, recently raised by President Lee Myung-bak. Only 42.5% found the Five-Party Talks desirable, compared to 51.9% who found them undesirable. 5.6% responded that they were unsure. In contrast, only 29.4% found measures such as suspending inter-Korean economic cooperation projects like the Kaesong Industrial Complex or Kumgangsan tourism desirable, with 65.2% responding negatively.

While it is true that opinions favoring dialogue and exchange with North Korea remain high, recent events such as North Korea's second nuclear test and belligerent statements have led to increased calls for a hardline policy towards North Korea. Firstly, expectations for the Six-Party Talks have weakened compared to the February survey. In the February survey, 85.2% supported the Six-Party Talks as a desirable solution to the North Korean nuclear issue, but this figure has decreased to 77.2% in the current survey. Conversely, support for participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which involves searching vessels suspected of carrying weapons of mass destruction and maritime interdiction, has increased from 49.2% to 54.2%. Calls to suspend inter-Korean exchanges and aid, such as halting operations at the Kaesong Industrial Complex or Kumgangsan tourism, have also risen from 21.1% to 29.4%. This indicates an increase in the proportion advocating for a hardline response.

[Figure 1] Desirable Solution for the North Korean Nuclear Issue (June 20) (%)

* Results for PSI participation are from an additional survey conducted on June 24.

[Figure 2] Changes in Preference for Key North Korean Nuclear Solutions (February-June)

"South Korea should possess nuclear weapons" 60.5%, "Wartime operational control to be transferred as scheduled" 55.3%, "Will participate (support) in case of war" 63.0%

Perception of Nuclear Possession: Stance in Favor of Possession Rises 9.8%p Compared to 5 Years Ago

Support for Nuclear Sovereignty Higher Among Older Demographics, Lower Education Levels, and Supporters of the Liberty Forward Party/Grand National Party

As North Korea's nuclear possession becomes increasingly visible, public opinion in South Korea advocating for the country to also possess nuclear weapons is strengthening. Six out of ten people stated that they 'strongly agree' (28.8%) or 'generally agree' (31.7%) with the assertion that South Korea should possess nuclear weapons. 'Slightly disagree' responses accounted for 25.2%, while 'strongly disagree' claims were only 12.0%. A comparison with the public opinion poll conducted by EAI and the JoongAng Ilbo five years prior reveals an increase of approximately 10 percentage points in the public's support for nuclear sovereignty.

[Figure 1] Evaluation of the Statement "South Korea Should Also Possess Nuclear Weapons" (%)

While support for nuclear sovereignty, the idea that South Korea should possess nuclear weapons, is low among younger generations, highly educated individuals, and supporters of progressive political parties, it is notably high among older demographics, those with lower educational attainment, and supporters of conservative parties. By age group, 47.5% of those in their 20s and 48.0% in their 30s held negative views on nuclear sovereignty, in stark contrast to 69.2% of those in their 40s and 70.6% of those aged 50 and above who responded positively. Educational attainment also showed a similar trend: 76.7% of those with a junior high school education or less agreed with the argument for South Korea's nuclear possession. This figure decreased to 68.0% for high school graduates and 52.2% for those with a college degree or higher, indicating that higher education levels correlate with lower positive responses regarding nuclear sovereignty. By political party affiliation, 70.7% of Liberty Forward Party supporters and 68.1% of Grand National Party supporters favored South Korea possessing nuclear weapons. In contrast, 62.8% of Democratic Party supporters, 57.4% of the Democratic Labor Party supporters, and 42.0% of the Creative Korea Party supporters held this view. This suggests that conservatives prioritize a balance of power, while progressives are more critical of a nuclear arms race on the Korean Peninsula.

[Figure 2] Nuclear Sovereignty Opinion by Demographic Group (%)

55.3% Support for 'Transfer of Wartime Operational Control in 2012', 37.5% for 'Delay or Cancellation'

63.0% 'Will Participate in War if Conflict Erupts on the Korean Peninsula', 33.3% 'Do Not Wish to Participate'

Despite escalating tensions in inter-Korean relations, including North Korea's nuclear tests, public opinion shows strong support for the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) in 2012, as agreed upon by South Korea and the United States. Fifty-five point three percent (55.3%) favor the transfer 'as scheduled,' while only 37.5% believe it should be 'delayed or canceled.' Furthermore, when asked if they would participate in a war on the Korean Peninsula (with women and older individuals potentially participating in rear support roles), 63.0% of respondents indicated a willingness to participate (28.5% 'definitely would participate,' 34.5% 'would rather participate'). Conversely, 33.3% were opposed to participation (24.6% 'would prefer not to participate if possible,' 8.7% 'would absolutely not participate').

[Figure 3] Transfer of Wartime Operational Control in 2012 (%)

[Figure 4] Intention to Participate in Case of War (%)

- Younger individuals and those with higher education levels show greater support for the transfer of wartime operational control and weaker willingness to participate in conflict.

- Older individuals and those with lower education levels are more opposed to the transfer of wartime operational control and show stronger willingness to participate in conflict.

As anticipated, differences in attitudes towards the transfer of wartime operational control and the responsibility to participate in a conflict were observed across socio-economic strata and ideological stances. Younger generations and individuals with higher educational attainment were relatively more supportive of the transfer of wartime operational control, while their willingness to participate in the event of a war was weaker. Among those in their 20s, 58.5% responded positively to the 2012 transfer of wartime operational control, and 69.7% of those in their 30s did so. This figure was only 40.2% for those aged 50 and above. By educational level, 59.3% of college graduates and above supported the scheduled transfer of wartime operational control, while this figure stood at 54.4% for high school graduates and 43.8% for those with a junior high school education or less.

Meanwhile, regarding the willingness to participate in a conflict on the Korean Peninsula, only half of those in their 20s (51.5%) responded positively, and this figure was 54.8% for those in their 30s. However, in their 40s, 69.5% expressed a willingness to participate through rear support, and this figure was 70.9% for those aged 50 and above. Educational attainment also showed a similar pattern: those with college degrees or higher showed relatively weaker willingness to participate (59.8%), while those with high school diplomas (64.5%) and junior high school education or less (72.8%) reported a greater willingness to participate. Considering that younger generations and those with higher education in South Korean society tend to have stronger progressive leanings, while older generations and those with lower education tend to have more conservative leanings, this implies that attitudes towards the transfer of wartime operational control and participation in conflicts are ultimately determined by respondents' ideological orientations. Indeed, supporters of conservative parties such as the Grand National Party and the Liberty Forward Party are generally opposed to the return of wartime operational control from the United States and express a strong willingness to participate in the event of a conflict on the Korean Peninsula. In contrast, supporters of relatively progressive parties like the Democratic Party and the Democratic Labor Party are more receptive to the transfer of wartime operational control and negative towards participating in war.

[Figure 5] Support for 2012 Transfer of Wartime Operational Control by Demographic Group (%)

[Figure 6] Proportion of Intention to Participate in War by Demographic Group (%)