[EAI Public Opinion Briefing No. 47-3] Security Threats and Response Directions After North Korea's Nuclear Test as Seen Through Public Opinion

[EAIㆍMaeil Business Newspaper] Public Opinion Briefing No. 47

1. Unstable Political Situation, Public Interest Shifts from "Economy" to "National Integration"

2. Political Turmoil After President Roh's Funeral

3. North Korea's Second Nuclear Test and Koreans' Security Perceptions

1. Growing Security Concerns

- June Survey: Stable 16.9%, Normal 34.4%, Unstable 48.4%

- Security Unstable: March 29.5% → April 32.8% (After North Korea's Rocket Launch) → June 48.4% (After North Korea's Nuclear Test)

Following the second North Korean nuclear test, the South Korean government's announcement of its participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the international community's moves toward sanctions against North Korea have led to a sharp increase in Koreans' security concerns. In this survey, responses indicating that the overall security situation is stable were 16.9% (Very Stable 1.2%, Generally Stable 15.7%), normal was 34.4%, and unstable was the highest at 48.4% (Generally Unstable 36.8%, Very Unstable 11.6%).

[Figure 1] Current Overall Security Situation

[Table 1] Assessment of Korean Peninsula Security Situation (%)

The trend shows a gradual increase in public security concerns, with a significant rise after the recent nuclear test. In the March survey, when North Korea's Taepodong-2 missile launch was anticipated, only 29.5% of respondents felt the overall security situation in Korea was unstable; this slightly increased to 32.8% after North Korea's rocket launch. However, in the survey conducted after North Korea's second nuclear test during the mourning period for former President Roh Moo-hyun, 48.4% expressed anxiety about the overall security situation.

[Figure 2] Changes in Korea's Security Concerns (March-June): "Security Situation Unstable" (%)

Heightened Security Concerns: What is the Desired Direction for ROK-US Relations?

- Moderate (40.9%) and Strengthening ROK-US Alliance (39.7%) Prevail, while Independent Diplomacy (18.9%) Declines

- Support for Independent Diplomacy Declines from 29.9% in February to 18.9% in June (11.0%p▼)

- Even Among Democratic Party Supporters, Strengthening the ROK-US Alliance is Preferred Over Independent Diplomacy

Amidst growing security concerns, an examination of public perception regarding the ROK-US alliance, understood as a lever for Korean Peninsula security, reveals that moderate stances and the strengthening of the ROK-US alliance are dominant, while support for an independent foreign policy, free from US interference, has sharply declined.

Compared to the February survey, the gap between public support for strengthening the ROK-US alliance and support for an independent foreign policy has widened. In the February survey, when the long-range rocket launch was anticipated, 43.7% favored strengthening the ROK-US alliance, while 29.9% advocated for an independent foreign policy. In the current survey, 39.7% of respondents preferred strengthening the ROK-US alliance, whereas only 18.9% favored an independent foreign policy distinct from the US. Consequently, while the stance of strengthening the ROK-US alliance was 13.8 percentage points higher than that of independent diplomacy in the February survey, it was more than 20.8 percentage points higher in the current survey.

The widening gap compared to February is primarily attributed to the significant decrease in support for the independent diplomacy line, which fell by 11.0 percentage points (from 29.9% to 18.9%). In contrast, the proportion favoring the strengthening of the ROK-US alliance decreased by only about 4 percentage points, from 43.7% in the February survey. Meanwhile, the proportion advocating for a moderate stance, which was only 25.9% in the February survey, significantly increased to 40.9% in the current survey.

[Figure 3] Changes in Preference for ROK-US Relations (February-June) (%)

By party support, among supporters of the Grand National Party, the proportion favoring the strengthening of the ROK-US alliance was high at 58.2%, with only 6.0% supporting independent diplomacy. Conversely, among supporters of the Democratic Party, the proportion favoring the strengthening of the ROK-US alliance was 33.8%, showing a difference in perception compared to Grand National Party supporters. However, it is noteworthy that even among Democratic Party supporters, the proportion favoring the ROK-US alliance is nearly twice that of those favoring independent diplomacy (17.6%). This indicates that the perception of the ROK-US alliance as a key lever for Korea's security and diplomacy has significantly spread, albeit with varying degrees of intensity.

[Figure 4] Preference for ROK-US Relations by Party Support (%)

After North Korea's Nuclear Test, Is the Sunshine Policy Being Re-evaluated?

- Sunshine Policy Maintenance/Expansion 73.1%, Reduction/Abolition 26.2%

- Strong Support for Maintenance/Expansion Even Among MB Supporters 64.7%

Despite the positive intent of the engagement policy towards North Korea, commonly known as the Sunshine Policy, which aims to foster North Korea's openness through active support and cooperation rather than pressure, it has been embroiled in controversy over its effectiveness due to continuous nuclear/military threats from 'North Korea.' Concerns have been raised that the engagement policy towards North Korea, pursued without changes in North Korea's attitude, could end up as 'one-sided handouts' or even be exploited for North Korea's nuclear development or military buildup.

Now that North Korea has conducted a nuclear test, what is the public's assessment of the Sunshine Policy? Survey results indicate that the public views the engagement policy towards North Korea as still valid or needing expansion, even amidst the current heightened security concerns. Despite North Korea's second nuclear test and the resulting security anxieties, the Sunshine Policy is understood as a policy that should be expanded (34.6%) or maintained (38.5%). Those advocating for its reduction accounted for 20.7%, and for its discontinuation, 5.5%.

Notably, even among President Lee Myung-bak's supporters, there was overwhelming support for the continuation or expansion of the Sunshine Policy. 64.7% of those with positive approval responded that the engagement policy towards North Korea should be expanded or maintained, while 34.7% favored its reduction or abolition. Among those who disapproved of President Lee Myung-bak's administration, support for the Sunshine Policy was even higher at 77.4%. Within this group, 22.2% favored its reduction or abolition. These results suggest that the public does not view North Korea's nuclear test or military threats as a failure of the Sunshine Policy, but rather as a situation where inter-Korean exchange and cooperation are emphasized even more during times of crisis. This implies that the government could face significant political burdens if inter-Korean exchanges, including the Kaesong Industrial Complex, become strained.

[Figure 5] Preference for the Sunshine Policy (%)

[Figure 6] Preference for the Sunshine Policy by Approval of President Lee's Administration (%)