[Public Opinion Briefing Vol. 47-3] Security Threats and Response Directions After North Korea's Nuclear Test as Seen Through Public Opinion

[EAIㆍMaeil Business Newspaper] Public Opinion Briefing No. 47

1. Unstable Political Climate: Public Interest Shifts from Economy to National Unity

2. Political Turmoil Following President Roh's Funeral

3. North Korea's Second Nuclear Test and Koreans' Security Perceptions

1. Growing Security Concerns

- June Survey: Stable 16.9%, Normal 34.4%, Unstable 48.4%

- Security Unstable: March 29.5% → April 32.8% (After North Korea's Rocket Launch) → June 48.4% (After North Korea's Nuclear Test)

Following the second North Korean nuclear test, the South Korean government's announcement of its participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the international community's moves toward sanctions against North Korea have led to a sharp increase in Koreans' security concerns. In this survey, 16.9% responded that the overall security situation was stable (Very Stable 1.2%, Generally Stable 15.7%), 34.4% responded that it was normal, and 48.4% responded that it was unstable (Generally Unstable 36.8%, Very Unstable 11.6%), with the latter being the largest group.

[Figure 1] Current Overall Security Situation

[Table 1] Assessment of Korean Peninsula Security Situation (%)

The trend shows a gradual increase in public security concerns, with a significant rise after the recent nuclear test. In the March survey, when North Korea's Taepodong-2 missile launch was anticipated, only 29.5% of respondents felt the overall security situation in Korea was unstable. This figure slightly increased to 32.8% in the survey conducted after North Korea's rocket launch. However, in the current survey, conducted after North Korea's second nuclear test during the mourning period for former President Roh Moo-hyun, 48.4% expressed anxiety about the overall security situation.

[Figure 2] Changes in South Korea's Security Concerns (March-June): "Security Situation Unstable" (%)

Heightened Security Concerns: What is the Desired Direction for South Korea-U.S. Relations?

- Moderate (40.9%) and Strengthening the ROK-U.S. Alliance (39.7%) Prevail, While the Independent Diplomacy Stance (18.9%) Declines

- Support for Independent Diplomacy Decreases from 29.9% in February to 18.9% in June (11.0%p▼)

- Even Among Democratic Party Supporters, Strengthening the ROK-U.S. Alliance is Preferred Over Independent Diplomacy

Amidst escalating security concerns, public perception of the ROK-U.S. alliance, understood as a lever for Korean Peninsula security, reveals a prevailing moderate stance and a preference for strengthening the alliance. Concurrently, support for an independent diplomatic approach, free from U.S. interference, has sharply declined.

Compared to the February survey, the gap between public support for strengthening the ROK-U.S. alliance and support for an independent diplomatic stance has widened. In the February survey, when the long-range rocket launch was anticipated, 43.7% favored strengthening the ROK-U.S. alliance, while 29.9% advocated for an independent diplomatic approach. In the current survey, 39.7% preferred strengthening the ROK-U.S. alliance, whereas only 18.9% supported maintaining an independent diplomatic stance free from U.S. influence. Consequently, while the gap between strengthening the alliance and pursuing independent diplomacy was 13.8 percentage points in February, it exceeded 20.8 percentage points in the current survey.

The widening gap compared to February is primarily attributed to a significant drop of 11.0 percentage points (from 29.9% to 18.9%) in support for the independent diplomacy stance. In contrast, the proportion favoring the strengthening of the ROK-U.S. alliance decreased by only about 4 percentage points from 43.7% in the February survey. Meanwhile, the proportion advocating for a moderate stance increased substantially from 25.9% in the February survey to 40.9% in the current survey.

[Figure 3] Changes in Preference for ROK-U.S. Relations (February-June) (%)

By party support, among supporters of the Grand National Party, 58.2% favored strengthening the ROK-U.S. alliance, with only 6.0% supporting independent diplomacy. In contrast, among supporters of the Democratic Party, only 33.8% favored strengthening the ROK-U.S. alliance, showing a difference in perception compared to Grand National Party supporters. However, it is noteworthy that even among Democratic Party supporters, those favoring the ROK-U.S. alliance (nearly double) outnumbered those preferring independent diplomacy (17.6%). This indicates a widespread perception, albeit with varying degrees of emphasis, that the ROK-U.S. alliance is a key lever for South Korea's security and diplomacy.

[Figure 4] Preference for ROK-U.S. Relations by Party Support (%)

After North Korea's Nuclear Test: Is the Sunshine Policy Being Re-evaluated?

- Maintaining/Expanding Sunshine Policy: 73.1%, Reducing/Abolishing: 26.2%

- Strong Support for Maintaining/Expanding Among MB Supporters: 64.7%

Despite its positive intent to foster North Korea's openness through active support and cooperation rather than pressure, the engagement policy towards North Korea, commonly known as the Sunshine Policy, has been embroiled in controversy over its effectiveness due to persistent nuclear and military threats from North Korea. Concerns have been raised that the engagement policy, pursued without changes in North Korea's behavior, could result in unilateral handouts or even be exploited for North Korea's nuclear development and military buildup.

Now that North Korea has conducted a nuclear test, what is the public's assessment of the Sunshine Policy? Survey results indicate that the public views the engagement policy as still valid or even needing expansion in the current climate of heightened security concerns. Despite North Korea's second nuclear test and the resulting security anxieties, the Sunshine Policy is understood as a policy that should be expanded (34.6%) or maintained (38.5%). Those advocating for its reduction accounted for 20.7%, and those for its discontinuation were 5.5%.

Notably, even among supporters of President Lee Myung-bak, there was overwhelming support for maintaining or expanding the Sunshine Policy. Among those with positive approval, 64.7% responded that the engagement policy should be expanded or maintained, while 34.7% favored its reduction or abolition. Among those who disapproved of President Lee Myung-bak's administration, support for the Sunshine Policy was even higher at 77.4%. Within this group, 22.2% favored its reduction or abolition. These results suggest that the public does not view North Korea's nuclear test or military threats as a failure of the Sunshine Policy, but rather as a situation where inter-Korean exchange and cooperation are emphasized even more during times of crisis. This implies that the government could face significant political burdens if inter-Korean exchanges, including the Kaesong Industrial Complex, are further strained.

[Figure 5] Preference for the Sunshine Policy (%)

[Figure 6] Preference for the Sunshine Policy by Approval of President Lee's Administration (%)