[Public Opinion Briefing 7-2] Chindia and Korea as Seen by the World ②

[Public Opinion Briefing 7] Chindia and Korea as Seen by the World

[1] How This Survey Was Conducted - EAI Public Opinion Analysis Center

[2] Americans' Views on Terrorism, the Iraq War, and Bush's Diplomacy - Namgung Gon

[3] The World's View of the United States - Min Byung-un

[4] Americans' Views on China - Christopher Whitney & Jeong Han-ul

[5] How Chindia Views the World: How Do China and India See Themselves and the World? - Lee Tae-hwan

[6] Perceptions of an East Asian Community Among the Peoples of Korea, China, and Japan - Lee Nae-young

[7] The World's View of Korea - Lee Sook-jong

[8] North Korea as the 'World's Problem Child' and Korea's Collateral Damage - Kim Tae-hyun

[9] The Views of Korea and the International Community on the UN - Lee Nae-young

5. How Chindia Views the World (Excerpt from an article published in Monthly Next, November 2007)

- How Do China and India See Themselves and the World?

Lee Tae-hwan (Sejong Institute)

□ China's Sense of Competition with the U.S. is Stronger than India's: China perceives itself as having influence comparable to the U.S., and its perception of U.S. troops stationed in Asia is more negative than India's.

□ Both China and India are positive about military sanctions on nuclear-armed states or nuclear facilities.

□ China is actively engaged in globalization, while India is lukewarm.

As the influence of 'Chindia' (China and India) in the global economy continues to grow, interest in Chindia is intensifying. According to one analysis, China's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is projected to surpass Japan's around 2020 and the United States' by 2040, while India's economic scale is also expected to begin surpassing Japan's around 2030. As the economic power of these two nations increases, their weight in the international order will likewise grow. Therefore, it is crucial to understand how the elites and citizens of China and India perceive themselves and the world.

First, there is the mutual perception of self and other. Regarding the assessment of each country's influence, China perceives its influence in Asia as equal to that of the United States and globally as second only to the United States. This perception is expected to remain similar in ten years. China's desired order of influence ranks China highest (8.9), followed by the EU (7.2), the United States (7.1), India (6.5), and Japan (5.6), indicating a desire for the influence of the United States and Japan to diminish. Meanwhile, India views its influence, both in Asia and globally, as second only to the United States. India perceives itself as having more influence than China in Asia and globally, and sees Japan and China as having similar influence, with Japan slightly ahead. This pattern is expected to continue in ten years. In terms of India's preferred order of influence, India ranks first (7.0), followed by the United States (6.7), Japan (6.2), China (6.2), and the EU (5.7), suggesting a desire for the influence of the U.S. and Japan to grow relative to China and Russia. From the perspective of mutual perception between China and India, China still views India as the least influential country (6.3), whereas India ranks China jointly third with Japan (6.2). The prevailing view regarding the China-India relationship is that of a partnership for both countries.

Second, concerning the perceptions of Chindia nations toward the world, particularly the United States, India's favorability rating towards the U.S. (56.9 degrees) is higher than China's (51 degrees). However, regardless of favorability, both countries view the U.S. as an important actor. In terms of relations with the U.S., China's dominant view is that of competition (52%) rather than partnership (39%). In contrast, India holds similar views on partnership (43%) and competition (42%) in its relationship with the U.S. Interestingly, regarding the spread of American culture, India has more negative views (48%) than positive views (39%), while China generally perceives the spread of American culture positively (59%).

Third, regarding whether the UN Security Council should have the right to use military force to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the production of nuclear fuel, a majority in both China (47%) and India (53%) believe it should have this right, outweighing those who believe it should not. For military action against Iran's nuclear facilities, both China and India showed more support than opposition, whether through a coalition under UN authorization or unilateral U.S. action. India's support rate (57%) was slightly higher than China's (51%). Concerning the regional stability effect of U.S. troops stationed in East Asia, an overwhelming majority in China believes that U.S. troops reduce regional stability (56%) rather than increase it (18%). In contrast, India's views were split, with similar proportions believing it reduces stability (33%) and increases it (31%), revealing a difference in perception between China and India regarding the U.S. military presence. Regarding the long-term stationing of U.S. military bases in South Korea, a majority in both China and India holds a negative view.

Fourth, regarding globalization, an overwhelming majority in China views globalization positively (87%). In contrast, while a majority in India also views it positively (54%), there is a mixed sentiment with a significant portion viewing it negatively (30%). Both countries maintain a positive stance towards Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). China prefers the United States, South Korea, India, and Japan as FTA partners, in that order, while India prefers the United States, Japan, China, and South Korea.

Fifth, both countries perceive non-traditional threats such as AIDS and terrorism as the greatest security threats. In terms of major foreign policy objectives, they prioritize economic issues such as economic growth, domestic job protection, and energy. Regarding potential sources of conflict in Asia, China identifies competition for energy resources (84%), economic competition among Asian countries (78%), and the China-Taiwan relationship (74%) as priorities. India prioritizes energy competition (79%), economic competition (78%), nuclear proliferation in Asia (76%), and the India-Pakistan relationship (76%). Both countries view the situation on the Korean Peninsula as a less significant factor (65% for China, 62% for India).

In summary, China perceives its influence as comparable to or likely to become comparable to that of the United States, suggesting a stronger sense of competition with the U.S. than with India. The foreign policies of both China and India can be characterized as realist balancing diplomacy, focused on economic growth through stabilizing relations with the United States.

[Figure 1-1] Global Influence Perception of China and India

(0-10 scale: 0 points means no influence at all, 10 points means very influential)

[Figure 1-2] Desired Global Influence of China and India

[Figure 1-3] Perceived Global Influence of China and India in 10 Years

[Figure 2] Perception of Asian Influence of Major Countries by Chinese and Indian Citizens

(0-10 scale: 0 points means no influence at all, 10 points means very influential)

[Figure 3] Perceptions of the Triangular Relationship Between the US, China, and India by Chinese and Indian Citizens

[Figure 4] Proportion of Support for the Legitimacy of UN Security Council Military Intervention by Issue

[Figure 5] Perceptions of Globalization by Chinese, Indian, and Korean Citizens

[Figure 6] Factors Perceived as Highly Threatening by Chinese Citizens

[Figure 7] Factors Perceived as Highly Threatening by Indian Citizens

6. Korean Perceptions of an East Asian CommunityㆍChinaㆍJapan

Lee Su-jong, Director of the EAI Public Opinion Research Center (Korea University, Political Science)

□ Korean, Chinese, and Japanese citizens hold positive views on an East Asian Free Trade Area

□ Mutual trust and favorability among citizens of the three countries are low

As the experience of European integration demonstrates, for countries in a specific region to dismantle borders and create a regional community, not only must there be a functional necessity for regional integration, but also mutual trust among the citizens of the regional countries must increase, and a regional identity must be formed. While economic interdependence among East Asian countries has significantly increased, the political environment for building an East Asian community has not been established due to persistent differences in positions on historical issues and acute political-military conflicts among governments. Therefore, what are the thoughts of the citizens of South Korea, China, and Japan regarding an East Asian community? Is the level of trust and favorability among the citizens of these three countries sufficient to pursue an East Asian community?

First, regarding a "East Asian Free Trade Area" encompassing China, Japan, and South Korea, citizens of South Korea, China, and Japan generally hold positive views. Eighty percent of Koreans, 69% of Chinese, and 67% of Japanese agree on the necessity of an East Asian Free Trade Area. However, when asked whether the three countries should move beyond this to pursue the establishment of a borderless regional community akin to the European Union, distinct differences in opinion emerged among the countries. While 67% of Koreans supported this and 30% opposed it, opinions were divided among Chinese, with 45% in favor and 38% against. Only 35% of Japanese supported it, while 64% opposed it. A considerable number of Japanese appear concerned about the potential influx of foreign laborers and the equalization of welfare benefits downwards, as seen in the European experience, should regional integration occur.

Factors contributing to a pessimistic outlook on the establishment of an East Asian community include not only the ongoing conflicts rather than cooperation at the governmental level among East Asian countries, but also the very low levels of trust and favorability among ordinary citizens towards each other. Firstly, in terms of perceptions of responsible behavior in international relations, East Asian countries exhibit very low levels of mutual trust. Regarding China, 38% of Koreans perceived that China would act responsibly, whereas only 16% of Japanese evaluated China positively, indicating a deep distrust among the Japanese. Conversely, only 14% of Chinese perceived that Japan would act responsibly, and 19% of Koreans expressed trust in Japan. It is noteworthy that Koreans exhibit a deeper distrust towards Japan than towards China; this result can be inferred as a reflection of the current cooling of South Korea-Japan relations under the recent Koizumi administration due to issues such as Dokdo and visits to Yasukuni Shrine, as well as Korean concerns about Japan's increasing right-wing tendencies.

Furthermore, survey results showing that 86% of Japanese view China and Japan as competitors, with only 14% seeing them as partners, and 65% of Chinese view China and Japan as competitors, with only 18% perceiving them as partners, clearly illustrate the deep distrust and concerns that Chinese and Japanese citizens have towards each other.

In terms of favorability towards neighboring countries and their citizens, East Asian nations exhibit more negative sentiments compared to other countries. The average favorability ratings of Chinese and Koreans towards Japan are 36° and 39°, respectively. When compared to the favorability ratings of citizens from the United States, India, and Australia towards Japan, which are 58°, 54°, and 64°, respectively, it is evident that unfavorable sentiments are prevalent. The favorability of Japanese citizens towards China is the lowest at 30°, whereas Koreans have relatively favorable sentiments towards China, with a rating of 57°. Towards South Korea, Japanese citizens have a favorability rating of 41° and Chinese citizens have a rating of 73°, indicating that South Korea receives relatively more favorable evaluations among the three countries.

To summarize the survey findings, it is clearly indicated that in order to pursue the vision of an East Asian community, South Korea, China, and Japan must not only engage in cooperation and dialogue at the governmental level but also undertake the challenging task of increasing mutual trust and fostering positive sentiments among their citizens. Considering the current reality of East Asian international relations, marked by ongoing diplomatic conflicts over historical issues and territorial disputes, a realistic assessment suggests that the realization of an East Asian community remains a distant dream.

7. How the World Views Korea: Notably Favorable Sentiment from China, Somewhat Indifferent from the US

Lee Suk-jong, Head of the EAI International Public Opinion Research Team (Sungkyunkwan University, Public Administration)

□ Favorability towards South Korea: Citizens of China and Australia are favorable, while citizens of the US, India, and Indonesia are somewhat indifferent.

□ Relations with South Korea: 15% of Americans believe "Korea-US relations are improving," while 56% of Chinese believe "Korea-China relations are improving."

□ Technological Competitiveness: "Korea is falling behind China and India" - Countries, except China, evaluate that South Korea's technological development has been overtaken by China and India.

□ Neighboring countries do not view Korean Peninsula issues as a source of Asian conflict; 41% of Americans and 23% of Chinese agree.

□ Opposition to Korea-US FTA: Opposition is stronger in the US than in South Korea; China supports a "Korea-China FTA."

Among the surveyed countries, sentiments towards South Korea were most favorable in the order of China, Australia, India, the US, and Indonesia. In terms of perceived temperature on a 0-100 degree scale, China's favorability towards South Korea is distinct. The perceived temperature of Chinese citizens towards South Korea is 73 degrees, significantly more favorable than towards the US (51 degrees), Japan (36 degrees), and India (62 degrees). Following China, Australia (56 degrees) and India (48 degrees) also showed high favorability towards South Korea, but all these ratings were lower than the favorability these countries' citizens felt towards the US, China, and Japan. The perceived temperature of American citizens towards South Korea is 44 degrees, slightly more favorable than towards China (40 degrees), but less favorable than towards Japan (58 degrees).

Reflecting these perceived temperatures, the view that relations with South Korea are deteriorating was relatively more prevalent in the US, while the view that relations are improving was more common in China. Fifty-three percent of Americans responded that relations with South Korea are similar to before, but the proportion stating that relations are deteriorating (25%) was higher than those who said they are improving (15%). In contrast, 56% of Chinese respondents stated that relations with South Korea are improving, with only 5% indicating that they are deteriorating.

The world anticipates that South Korea's product and technological development capabilities will improve further in the future. On a 0-10 scale for recognizing South Korea as a leader in developing new products and technologies, Americans, who are technologically advanced, gave relatively low scores of 3.8 and 3.7, respectively. In contrast, Indians gave a generous score of 5.5, and Chinese gave 7.1. Regarding South Korea's new product and technology development capabilities in 10 years, all these countries expect them to increase from current levels, with Americans giving 4.5 points, Indians 5.8 points, and Chinese 7.4 points.

There were significant differences among countries regarding South Korea's trade practices. US public opinion is divided between viewing Korean trade practices as fair and unfair (similar percentages at 44% and 43%). Americans generally perceive the European Union, Australia, Canada, and Japan as engaging in fair trade, while they view China and India as engaging in unfair trade. Therefore, their perception of South Korea falls somewhere in the middle. Forty percent of Indians responded that South Korea engages in fair trade, which is higher than the 17% who believe it engages in unfair trade. Chinese citizens perceive South Korea's trade practices favorably, with 64% answering that South Korea engages in fair trade, while only 17% believe it engages in unfair trade. Chinese citizens perceive Japan and the US, with whom they have high trade volumes, as engaging in unfair trade.

China was positive about concluding a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with South Korea. 66% of Chinese people supported the conclusion of an FTA with South Korea. In contrast, 50% of Americans opposed an FTA with South Korea, with only 39% in favor, revealing that opposition to the ongoing Korea-US FTA negotiations was greater within the United States than within South Korea.

Approximately 60% to 90% of the populations surveyed believe that the situation on the Korean Peninsula has a high potential to become a source of conflict among major Asian countries. Looking at the proportions of more definitive answers, 'very likely' and 'not likely,' excluding 'somewhat likely,' reveals significant differences between countries. The view that the situation on the Korean Peninsula will clearly cause conflict is strong in the United States (41%), significantly higher than the view that it will not (5%). In contrast, only 23% of Chinese people believe it is 'very likely,' and 19% respond 'not likely.' This indicates a more optimistic outlook on the Korean Peninsula situation than the 30% of Koreans who answered 'very likely' and 12% who answered 'not likely.'

In evaluating South Korea's role in resolving Asian issues, China and India hold more positive views than the United States. The ratio of positive to negative responses is 51% to 40% in the US, 59% to 20% in China, and 50% to 13% in India, with China showing the highest net positive ratio (positive minus negative). This suggests an expectation in China for South Korea to voice opinions distinct from those of Japan and the US.

[Figure 1] Perceptions of South Korea by National Populations

[Figure 2] Perceptions of South Korea's Product and Technological Competitiveness (Current and 10 Years Hence)

(Average score of responses on a scale from 0, not at all leading, to 10, very leading)

[Figure 3] Perceptions of Neighboring Countries Regarding the Necessity of an FTA with South Korea

8. 'World's Problem Child' North Korea and South Korea's Collateral Damage

Kim Tae-hyun, Director of the EAI Center for Diplomacy and Security (Professor, Chung-Ang University)

□ US and Australian Publics: Favorability towards Iran and North Korea Influence Each Other

□ Australian and Indonesian Publics: Unable to Distinguish North Korea from South Korea, Significant Collateral Damage for South Korea

□ US and Chinese Publics: Able to Distinguish North Korea from South Korea, Minimal Collateral Damage

Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon is virtually certain to become the next Secretary-General of the United Nations. This achievement, comparable to reaching the semi-finals of the World Cup, is evaluated as a result of South Korea's significantly enhanced international standing, driven by the major trends of economic growth and democratization, and tangible achievements such as the 1988 Seoul Olympics, the 2002 World Cup, and the Korean Wave that swept across Asia.

How is Korea perceived in the minds of people around the world? This international perception survey conducted a survey on favorability towards major countries worldwide. On a favorability scale of 100 points, the average score for Korea among respondents was in the 40s in the United States and Indonesia, the 50s in Australia, and the 70s in China. However, excluding China, the average score was below the overall average. Korea ranked 8th out of 15 countries in the United States, tied for 8th in Indonesia, and 9th in Australia. Only in China did Korea exceptionally rank first. These are disappointing results.

What about North Korea? For North Korea, which President Bush once referred to as part of the 'axis of evil' along with Iran and Iraq, US respondents seem to evaluate it alongside Iran and Iraq. It ranked second to last, following Iran (21.1). Let's examine this through the correlation coefficient between the favorability ratings of these two countries. (A correlation coefficient absolute value close to 1 means that the favorability of one country significantly impacts the favorability of another, while a value close to 0 means the favorability towards the two countries does not influence each other.) For US citizens, perceptions of Iran and North Korea moved together (r=0.65). That is, people who showed low favorability towards Iran also showed low favorability towards North Korea. In Australia, North Korea ranked last, below Iran. Australian respondents appear to perceive and evaluate North Korea in the same context as Iran (r=0.70), Iraq (r=0.62), and Indonesia (r=0.62).

In Indonesia, where Israel received the lowest favorability rating, consistent with its identity as an Islamic country, North Korea avoided last place. Indonesian people hold negative views not only towards Israel but also towards smaller neighboring countries such as East Timor, Papua New Guinea, and Australia. However, even among Islamic countries, Iran and Iraq are not viewed favorably, while Malaysia and Singapore, despite being neighbors, are viewed favorably. Both South Korea and North Korea are evaluated in the same category as Australia, Iran, and Iraq.

If North Korea is evaluated as one of the world's problematic states, South Korea appears to be suffering from collateral damage. Indonesian respondents seem to barely distinguish between North and South Korea (r=0.82). In Australia, collateral damage is also evident (r=0.58). Is it possible that North Korea avoided last place in Indonesia due to the simultaneous effect with South Korea?

Fortunately, such collateral damage is not significant in the United States (r=0.23). Americans seem to distinguish between North and South Korea reasonably well. China's case is unique. While ranking Korea as the most favorably viewed country, North Korea follows closely behind. Some degree of collateral effect is also observed (r=0.44), but it is unclear whether North Korea benefited from Korea or vice versa.

In reality, North Korea is not well-regarded even in its sibling nation, South Korea. It ranks 4th from last, following Japan, Iraq, and Iran. North Korea is such a prominent entity for us that no other country's favorability moves in tandem with it. However, when examining correlations with favorability towards other countries, North Korea showed the highest correlation coefficients with Iran (r=0.29) and Iraq (r=0.29). This indicates that South Koreans tend to perceive North Korea as a 'problematic country,' similar to Iran and Iraq, albeit not strongly. The path to unification is thus long. And it only grows longer with the persistence of the North Korean nuclear issue and any impulsive actions by North Korea.

<Table 1> Average Favorability Ratings of Major Countries in Each Country's Survey

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* Correlation coefficient between favorability toward North Korea and favorability toward the respective country.

9. Perspectives of South Korea and the International Community on the UN

Lee Nae-young (Professor, Korea University) ․ Jeong Han-wool (EAI)

□ South Korean Attitudes Toward the UN: Highly Favorable, High Support for Various Reform Proposals

□ If South Korean interests conflict, decisions should be made within the UN framework: 44% (US: 60%, China: 78%)

□ Candidates for New UN Security Council Permanent Member States: Support ranked in order of Germany (54%), India (46%), Brazil (41%), South Africa (38%), Japan (18%)

With the election of Minister Ban Ki-moon as UN Under-Secretary-General considered highly likely, South Koreans are showing high interest in the UN. Taking this as an opportunity, we will examine the basic attitudes of South Koreans and the international public toward the UN and the issues surrounding major agenda items.

□ Favorability

In a question asking about favorability toward various international organizations on a scale of 0 to 100, the UN (70 points) ranked as the most highly regarded international organization, along with the World Health Organization (74 points), among the 12 organizations surveyed. Compared to citizens of other countries, South Koreans also show a high level of affinity for the UN, second only to China (75 points), and significantly higher than India (63 points) and the United States (55 points). It is also true that perceptions are rapidly shifting away from past victimhood consciousness and protectionism, with a growing emphasis on strengthening contributions to the international community.

□ Support for UN Reform Proposals

The Korean public's awareness of participation in the international community and high expectations for international organizations translate into strong support for various reform proposals aimed at strengthening the UN. Support among Koreans is very high for proposals such as 'authority to investigate human rights violations (77%)', 'authority to regulate international arms trade (75%)', 'possession of UN peacekeeping forces (68%)', 'introduction of an international police system (77%)', and 'imposition of international transaction taxes (53%)', which are currently being presented as measures to strengthen the UN.

□ Respect for UN Decisions

The issue is that while the Korean public largely favors various UN reform proposals, the prevailing sentiment is that there is no need to adhere to the UN framework if South Korea's position conflicts with that of the UN. While public opinion supporting joint decisions with the UN, even if they conflict with the UN's stance, reached a high of 78% in China and 60% in the United States, it fell short of a majority in South Korea at only 48%. Maintaining such a double standard will make it difficult for South Korea to be recognized as a leading actor on the international stage of the UN.

□ Legitimacy of UN Military Action

Meanwhile, as UN efforts to address issues such as the North Korean nuclear program and the Iranian nuclear program become more visible, discussions regarding the scope of UN activities and accountability are also gaining prominence. In particular, opinions varied significantly by country regarding the legitimacy of the UN Security Council's use of military force and the candidate countries seeking permanent membership on the Security Council. Korean citizens consider human rights violations (74%) and the prevention of support for terrorist groups (61%) as legitimate grounds for UN Security Council military action. However, they do not recognize the legitimacy of actions such as restricting nuclear weapons possession (44%), prohibiting nuclear fuel production (42%), or restoring overthrown democratic governments (32%). In contrast, the United States seeks to legitimize the use of military force in matters aligned with its national interests, such as nuclear non-proliferation (62%), eradication of human rights abuses (83%), prevention of support for terrorism (76%), and the establishment of overthrown democratic governments (83%).

□ Expansion of UN Permanent Membership

Furthermore, the UN is currently facing tests in various areas. Internally, it must forge international consensus on UN reform plans, including the expansion of permanent Security Council seats, which is currently a pressing issue. Externally, it needs to enhance its coordination capabilities to address various current international security issues, such as the North Korean and Iranian nuclear programs. However, even the issue of expanding permanent Security Council seats appears difficult to reconcile due to conflicting interests. Japan, which has actively pursued permanent membership, receives strong support from the American public (66%) but is largely shunned by neighboring China (10%) and South Korea (18%). Germany, while receiving relatively lower support from the American public (62%), benefits from broad support from other countries. 54% of the Korean public supports Germany's bid for permanent membership, with 41% of Chinese and 40% of Indian citizens also supporting Germany. India, Brazil, and South Africa, despite lower international support, are seeking permanent Security Council seats on the grounds of representing developing nations.

[Figure 1] Korean Favorability Toward International Organizations (0-100 points)

[Figure 2] Legitimacy of UN Security Council Military Action

[Figure 3] Korean Support for UN Security Council Permanent Membership Candidates