[Public Opinion Briefing 2-2] The World as Seen by Korea ②

[Public Opinion Briefing 2] The World as Seen by Koreans

[1] How the Survey Was Conducted - EAI Public Opinion Analysis Center

[2] Koreans' Views on the International Order - Lee Sook-jong

[3] Perceived International Threats by Koreans - Min Byung-wook

[4] Koreans' Perceptions of Foreign Countries in the Era of Globalization - Lee Nae-young

[5] North Korean Nuclear Fatigue Evident, Public Opinion for Physical Preparedness Strengthens - Kim Tae-hyun

[6] The ROK-US Alliance and US Forces Korea - Namgung Gon

[7] Koreans' Views on India - Jeong Han-wool & Jeong Won-chil

4. Koreans' Perceptions of Foreign Countries in the Era of Globalization:

Koreans' Economic Primacy Evident, Fatigue Regarding Security Issues

Lee Nae-young (Director, EAI Public Opinion Analysis Center, Korea University)

□ Dual Attitude Towards Globalization: Globalization is positive, but its negative consequences are considerable.

□ Unfairness in Trade with Korea: USA 75%, Japan 71%, China 53%, European Union 49%, Australia 38%

□ "Oppose allowing" foreign companies to purchase stocks of Korean companies.

Opposition to purchase by Japanese companies 74%, by Chinese companies 68%, by US companies 68%,

by European companies 64%, by Indian companies 65%

□ 52% believe that Korea should not comply with WTO dispute resolution results if they are unfavorable to Korea.

Koreans fundamentally support actively participating in the trend of globalization and expanding Korea's role in the international community. First, 86% of the public assesses that the globalization of the economy has a positive impact on Korea. This indicates a spread of positive perceptions of globalization compared to the 81% who positively assessed globalization in the 2004 survey. Furthermore, a majority of Koreans view international trade as having a positive impact on Korea's economy, businesses, consumers, and job creation. While the overall proportion of those in favor of FTAs with other countries was higher than those opposed, the approval rates varied by FTA partner country. FTAs with China and India received approval rates of 65.7% and 64.9% respectively, while only 54.4% and 49.6% approved of FTAs with the US and Japan, respectively. However, despite the general support for globalization, Koreans exhibit considerable vigilance regarding its negative consequences and the potential for sovereignty infringement. While acknowledging the positive impact of international trade on the Korean economy, they perceive its impact on the environment and job security for workers as negative or not significantly positive.

[Figure 4] Assessment of Globalization's Impact

[Figure 5] Priority Order of Countries for Korea to Pursue FTAs

[Figure 6] Areas Where Globalization is Beneficial

Furthermore, a very high proportion of Koreans perceive major trading partners as unfair in their trade with Korea, and it is noteworthy that negative assessments increased in the 2006 survey compared to 2004. Specifically, the proportion of Koreans who believe Japan and the United States are unfair in trade with Korea was 70.6% and 74.8%, respectively. These results represent a strengthening of negative perceptions compared to 67% and 72% in the 2004 survey.

Most importantly, Koreans express significant concern that economic opening could lead to a loss of economic sovereignty. Only around 30% of the public responded that foreign companies should be allowed to acquire stocks of Korean companies to the extent that they can exercise management control, while an average of about 67% opposed such allowances. Opposition to the acquisition of stocks in domestic companies by Japanese firms was particularly high. Additionally, the fact that 63% agreed with the statement that the domestic rice market must be protected regardless of the cost, and 62% agreed that large foreign companies are harming the Korean economy, indicates that a majority of Koreans still hold strong nationalistic economic sentiments.

Furthermore, regarding whether Korea should comply with WTO dispute resolution results unfavorable to Korea, only 36.6% of Koreans responded that they should comply, while 52% responded that they do not need to comply. Compared to the 2004 survey, where 48% answered that Korea should comply with WTO decisions, the 2006 survey indicates a further decline in Koreans' trust in the fairness of the WTO.

In summary, the survey results show that while a majority of Koreans support globalization in principle, they still hold strong, closed, nationalistic attitudes on specific issues such as rice market liberalization and allowing foreign investment and stock ownership. They also lack the willingness to accept new international norms and regulations in the era of globalization.

[Figure 7] Complying with WTO Decisions Unfavorable to Korea

5. North Korean Nuclear Fatigue Evident, Public Opinion for Physical Preparedness Strengthens

Kim Tae-hyun (Director, EAI Center for Diplomacy and Security, Chung-Ang University)

□ North Korean Nuclear Fatigue Evident: 81% believe North Korea possesses nuclear weapons, but only 30% consider North Korean nuclear possession a "very serious threat."

□ 84% support US participation in UN-led counter-operations if North Korea attacks South Korea.

□ Responses to North Korean Nuclear Weapons: A mix of soft and hardline approaches, with public opinion strengthening towards physical responses.

"Through diplomatic efforts such as the Six-Party Talks" 73%

44% support, 55% oppose "US use of military force to prevent North Korea from possessing nuclear weapons."

"Korea should also possess nuclear weapons" 64%: The more North Korea is believed to possess nuclear weapons, the more strongly Koreans believe Korea should also possess nuclear weapons.

North Korea, which launched missiles including the Taepodong-2 long-range missile in early July, has finally announced its intention to conduct a nuclear test. Although there may still be room for negotiation, experts generally believe that negotiations will fail, leading to a deepening crisis on the Korean Peninsula. The public's view of this North Korean nuclear crisis is marked by evident fatigue. In this survey, 81% of respondents believed that North Korea possesses nuclear weapons. 79% of all respondents felt threatened by North Korea's possession of nuclear weapons. However, less than half of them considered the threat serious. Over 20% of respondents stated they felt no threat at all. While there were slight differences in the perceived level of threat based on belief in North Korea's nuclear possession, the differences were not significant.

When asked about the possibility of North Korea's nuclear possession becoming a serious threat to Korea's national interests within the next 10 years, 50% responded "very serious threat" and 40% responded "a threat, but not serious." These figures are comparable to international terrorism (49%; 42%) and China's development (49%; 42%), and higher than Japan's militarization (45%; 43%), but significantly lower than global warming (67%; 29%), the outbreak of infectious diseases (59%; 36%), and disruptions in energy supply (64%; 31%).

[Figure 8] North Korea's Nuclear Possession: "Possesses"

When asked about potential serious threats to South Korea's national interests within the next decade, 50% responded that North Korea's nuclear armament is a very serious threat, and 40% stated it is a threat but not a serious one. These figures are comparable to those for international terrorism (49%; 42%) and China's development (49%; 42%), and higher than for Japan's militarization (45%; 43%), but significantly lower than for global warming (67%; 29%), the outbreak of infectious diseases (59%; 36%), and disruptions to energy supply (64%; 31%).

[Figure 9] Perceived Threat Level of North Korean Nuclear Possession

[Figure 10] Proportion Favoring US Participation in UN-Led Counter-Operations in Case of North Korean Invasion

Regarding the issue of the US using military force to prevent North Korea from possessing nuclear weapons, a majority (55%) opposed it, but a significant 44% also supported it. This support rate is surprisingly higher than that for the use of military force to prevent Iran from possessing nuclear weapons (59% opposed; 39% supported). This suggests an underlying sentiment that the North Korean nuclear issue should be resolved, even through the use of force, despite the general tendency to oppose the use of force for diplomatic purposes.

A majority (55%) opposed the use of military force by the United States to prevent North Korea from possessing nuclear weapons, yet 44% were in favor. It is surprising that the approval rate for using force to prevent North Korea's nuclear armament is higher than that for Iran's nuclear armament (opposition 59%; approval 39%). This indicates that despite a general tendency to oppose the use of force for diplomatic purposes, there is an underlying desire to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue, even if it requires the use of force.

Furthermore, 64% of all respondents strongly agreed (26%) or generally agreed (38%) with the statement that "Korea should also possess nuclear weapons." Among those who believe North Korea possesses nuclear weapons, 66% supported nuclear armament for Korea, while 33% opposed it. Conversely, among those who do not believe North Korea possesses nuclear weapons, 52% supported nuclear armament for Korea and 47.5% opposed it. This indicates that the belief in the necessity of indigenous nuclear armament is partly driven by the perception that it is a necessary response to North Korea's nuclear capabilities.

Overall, the public appears to have low expectations for diplomatic solutions to the North Korean nuclear issue. This survey was conducted prior to North Korea's announced nuclear test. If North Korea proceeds with the test, such sentiments are likely to be further reinforced. The participatory government, which came to power amidst the second North Korean nuclear crisis in October 2002, pledged to pursue the so-called three principles for North Korea: no nuclear weapons, peaceful resolution, and a leading role in resolution. The public no longer believes in these pledges. It is time for the government, responsible for national security, to move beyond adherence to these pledges.

[Figure 11] "Support" for Korea Possessing Nuclear Weapons

6. The ROK-US Alliance and US Forces Korea:

The ROK-US Alliance is Necessary for Korean Security; Adjustments in Accordance with the Security Environment are Inevitable

Namgung Gon (Department of Political Science and International Relations, Ewha Womans University)

□ Positive assessment of the role of US Forces Korea in stabilizing East Asia and the Korean Peninsula.

Positive role in Korean security: USA 77%, China 45%, Russia 30%, Japan 25%, North Korea 21%

□ Role of US Forces Korea: Deterrence against North Korea (39%) vs. Regional Stabilizer (59%)

□ Convergence of Views on the ROK-US Alliance by Ideology: Increased perception of the necessity of the ROK-US alliance compared to 2004.

The issue of the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) is currently under discussion. As the threat of North Korean nuclear weapons increases, conflicts surrounding the OPCON transfer are expected to intensify. However, the OPCON transfer issue is one aspect of the ROK-US alliance adapting to a new security environment.

It is important to note that the survey results indicate that most Koreans understand the changes in the ROK-US alliance as an inevitable process required by the accelerating changes in the global security environment. The public's perception of the ROK-US alliance is also being appropriately adjusted in response to the evolving security landscape. Korean citizens are assessing the necessity of the ROK-US alliance not from a perspective of unilateral security dependence on the US, but from a realistic viewpoint of securing national interests and pursuing future-oriented values.

The survey results show that the majority of Korean citizens maintain a level of national favorability towards the US comparable to other traditional allies, and acknowledge the positive influence of the US on maintaining the East Asian order and ensuring Korean security. However, they feel the need to adjust the alliance relationship to suit the new security environment, moving away from the unilateral security dependence of the Cold War era.

[Figure 12] Proportion Favoring US Use of Military Force by Issue

The public's attitude recognizing the need for the continuous maintenance and timely adjustment of the ROK-US alliance is also reflected in their views on the necessity of US Forces Korea (USFK), which has served as a means of maintaining the alliance. In this survey, 82% supported US military intervention if North Korea attacks South Korea. This figure is significantly higher than the 47% support for US military intervention if China attacks Taiwan. Furthermore, only 3% of Koreans believe that USFK should be immediately withdrawn. However, the proportion advocating for a phased reduction increased slightly from 43% in 2004 to 49%. Regarding the size of USFK, 54% believe it is appropriate, a significantly higher proportion than the 36% who believe it should be reduced and the 8% who believe it is too small. Ultimately, the majority of the public believes that USFK should remain stationed for a considerable period as needed, and its size should be gradually reduced according to circumstances.

The public is generally accepting of the U.S. plan to redeploy its forces abroad based on strategic flexibility. Regarding the role of the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK), a higher percentage of Koreans expect it to contribute to regional stability in the Korean Peninsula (59%) than to deter North Korean attacks (39%). The necessity of USFK's presence is acknowledged, but the proportion acknowledging the inevitability of its role change remains nearly the same as in the survey conducted two years ago. This trend is also expected to continue.

[Figure 13] Influence of Neighboring Countries on South Korea's Security ("Positive" (%))

Sum of "Very Positive" and "Somewhat Positive" responses.

A notable point in this survey is the narrowing of differences among various social strata regarding the role, size, and withdrawal of USFK. In relation to the ROK-U.S. alliance and USFK issues, there are no significant differences or the differences are narrowing based on gender, region, generation, occupation, and ideology of the public. The majority of the public acknowledges the need to maintain a healthy ROK-U.S. alliance for national interests and to adjust it appropriately according to changing times.

The conflicts surrounding the ROK-US alliance are largely attributable to the power struggles of political factions employing a dichotomous black-and-white logic of ROK-US cooperation versus national cooperation, and to the policy failures of decision-makers who failed to maintain the alliance's credibility. Similarly, the issue of wartime operational control (OPCON) transfer should not be mobilized for the sake of power logic or treated as an absolution for policy failures. The public views the OPCON transfer issue as a process of alliance readjustment following changes in US strategy. Rather than focusing on who will transfer OPCON and when, the public is concerned about whether ROK-US cooperation can continuously maintain deterrence against North Korea, regardless of the transfer.

[Figure 14] Changes in Attitudes Toward the ROK-U.S. Alliance by Ideology: Convergence Phenomenon

(0 for independent diplomacy, 5 for moderate, 10 for strengthening the ROK-U.S. alliance)

[Figure 15] Mission of USFK: Deterrence on the Korean Peninsula vs. Regional Stability

7. Koreans' View of "Pro-India": Coexistence of Economic Expectations and Concerns about Hegemony

Jeong Han-wool (EAI) · Jeong Won-chil (EAI)

□ Koreans Show a Noticeably Favorable Attitude Towards "Pro-India"

- Relatively High Favorability Towards China and India

- High Perception of Improving Relations with China and India

□ Koreans Feel Superiority Over China and India in Terms of Technological and Product Competitiveness

□ Economic Growth of China and India is Beneficial to South Korea's National Interests, but Concerns Exist Regarding Their Military Buildup

- 61% Believe China's Economy Will Catch Up to the U.S. Economy

□ Koreans Do Not Wish for the Collapse of the U.S.-led Order

- 59% Believe U.S. Forces Stationed in East Asia Contribute to Regional Stability

- 65% Have a "Negative" View of the U.S. Becoming Militarily Weaker Than Currently

- 67% Have a "Negative" View of the U.S. Becoming Economically Weaker Than Currently

The international community is focusing its attention on the "rise of Pro-India (China and India)." The rise of China and India, which are experiencing high-speed growth based on their vast markets provided by their large populations and territories, is a matter of interest for South Korea as well.

As foreign trade and various economic exchanges with China constitute the largest portion of the South Korean economy, Koreans' perception of China is generally favorable. Based on an average favorability score out of a maximum of 100 points, China (58 points) ranked second after the UK (61 points) as a country Koreans liked in the 2004 survey. Although it has slipped to sixth place (57 points) in the current survey, following Australia (65 points), the UK (63 points), Germany (61 points), France (60 points), and the U.S. (58 points), considering the various negative factors such as the Northeast Asian Project since the 2004 survey, China's favorability can be considered relatively high. Recently, as Korean companies' expansion into India increases and the importance of the Indian market is highlighted, favorability towards India is rapidly rising. In the 2004 survey, the average favorability score for India was 46 points, but it has risen by a significant 10 points to 56 points in just two years.

South Koreans also perceive that diplomatic relations with China and India are relatively improving. While a majority of respondents assess the current situation as being maintained, opinions that relations with both China and India are improving significantly outweigh those that they are deteriorating. This contrasts sharply with the ROK-U.S. relationship, where only 10% of Koreans believe it is improving, while 34% believe it is deteriorating.

This favorable attitude appears to be underpinned by a sense of superiority, as the economic levels of China and India have not yet reached those of South Korea. Based on the average score for product and technological development capabilities, Koreans rank South Korea and Germany (6.7 points) alongside the U.S. (7.3 points) and Japan (7.0 points), recognizing South Korea's technological level as being on par with developed nations. In contrast, they are less generous in evaluating the competitiveness of China (5.1 points) and India (4.9 points), assessing a considerable gap with South Korea.

However, concerns are high regarding the growth potential of China and India. Particularly in the case of China, it is perceived not only as soon surpassing South Korea but also as a potential contender for hegemony with the United States in the future. 61% of South Koreans predict that China's economy will catch up to the U.S. economy. While the expansion of the Chinese and Indian markets plays a positive role for the South Korean economy, 59% and 53% respectively evaluate the growth of these countries into economic powers positively.

The issue lies in the situation where these countries are becoming militarily stronger. 68% of South Koreans expressed concern about China's military strengthening, and 71% were critical of India becoming a militarily powerful nation. This appears to be a result of concerns about the instability caused by the emergence of regional hegemonic powers, lurking behind the expectations of opportunities arising from the economic rise of China and India, the two major powers in Asia. Given South Korea's historical experiences of hardship amidst the power struggles of great powers, it is inevitable that concerns about changing power balances are high.

South Koreans are calling for the U.S. to play a role in deterring potential destabilizing factors in the Asian region. Despite considerable concerns about anti-American sentiment among Koreans, 59% of South Koreans believe that U.S. forces stationed in Asia contribute to regional stability. This is precisely why 67% believe that the U.S. becoming militarily weaker than currently is a negative development.

[Figure 16] Average Favorability Scores of Koreans Towards Various Countries (100 points for very favorable ~ 0 points for very unfavorable)

[Figure 17] Perceived Technological and Product Competitiveness of Major Countries by Koreans

(0 points for not leading at all ~ 10 points for leading significantly)

[Figure 18] Assessment of Improvement in Relations Between South Korea and Neighboring Countries ("Improving" (%))

* The remainder are "Maintaining Status Quo" and others.

[Table 1] Evaluation of Changes in Military and Economic Power of the U.S., China, and India (%)

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