Public Opinion Briefing Vol. 40, No. 4: Security Threats the MB Administration Must Address

Public Opinion Briefing Vol. 41: Challenges and Public Opinion for the MB Administration in its Second Year

[1] The Dual Challenges Facing the MB Administration in its Second Year

[2] How to Resolve Economic Issues? "Resolve Economic Polarization While Pursuing Economic Growth"

[3] For the Lee Myung-bak Administration to Succeed in Revitalizing the Economy...

[4] Security Threats the MB Administration Must Address

Security Threats the MB Administration Must Address

The New ROK-US Alliance Under Test, North Korea's Hardline Drive - Public Anxiety is Growing

Throughout the participatory government, ideological mismatches between the conservative Bush administration and the progressive Roh Moo-hyun administration were cited as factors destabilizing the ROK-US alliance. Similarly, as attention focuses on what kind of ROK-US cooperation model the liberal Obama administration and the conservative Lee Myung-bak administration will forge, North Korea's hardline policies have put the ROK-US alliance, which has yet to solidify its framework, to the test. Recently, as movements related to North Korea's launch of the Taepodong-2 missile have been detected, and North Korea continues to intensify its criticism and rhetoric towards the South Korean government daily, tensions are escalating on the Korean Peninsula. The pressure from North Korea is intensifying further with the visit of Hillary Clinton, who will oversee the Obama administration's foreign policy, to Asia.

Growing Security Anxiety, Rising Support for the ROK-US Alliance

- "South Korean Security is Unstable" 51.9%, "High Likelihood of War or Military Conflict with North Korea" 38.4%

Amidst this chaotic period of tension, South Koreans' security anxiety is increasing. In this survey, when asked about the "current overall security situation," a majority of the public, 51.9%, responded that it is "unstable," while 30.2% said "normal," and only 17.5% responded that it is "stable." Furthermore, when asked, "Do you believe there is a high possibility of war or military action by North Korea, as they have been threatening recently?", 3.9% responded "very high" and 34.6% responded "somewhat high." Those who thought the possibility was "not very high" accounted for 52.5%, and "not at all" accounted for 8.4%. Nearly four out of ten people believe there is a possibility of North Korea initiating military conflict.

Tracking the perceptions of South Koreans towards foreign affairs over the past several years reveals a pattern: as North Korea's nuclear threat increases, support for the ROK-US alliance rises, and when inter-Korean relations enter a phase of reconciliation, support for the ROK-US alliance weakens. In 2000, the year of the first inter-Korean summit, only 18.9% of respondents felt that South Korean security was unstable. Starting with the second North Korean nuclear crisis in 2002, South Koreans' security anxiety increased from 34.8% in 2002 to 43% in 2004, and after North Korea's nuclear test in 2006, it soared to a staggering 63.8%. This security anxiety dropped to 31.9% following the abrupt resumption of the second inter-Korean summit just before the presidential election, and has risen again to 51.9% this year as North Korea escalates military tensions.

It is also a significant characteristic that the more unstable South Korea's overall security situation becomes, the higher the support for the ROK-US alliance. As the North Korean nuclear crisis intensifies, the proportion emphasizing the ROK-US alliance increases, and conversely, when inter-Korean relations enter a phase of reconciliation, support for the ROK-US alliance tends to decline. From 2002, following the So-eun and Mi-sun incident, to 2006, when the North Korean nuclear crisis was escalating, public support for the ROK-US alliance rose from 32.0% to 36.9% and then to 48.8%. However, it fell to 34.9% after the inter-Korean summit the following year. Under the current tense circumstances, support for the ROK-US alliance is confirmed to be rising to 43.7%. [Figure 1]

[Figure 1] Changes in Perceptions of Inter-Korean Relations, Security, and the ROK-US Alliance Since the 2000s (%)

Sharp Decline in Favorable Views of North Korea, Simultaneously Calls for Flexible Response

While the South Korean public understands the ROK-US alliance as a factor deterring tension on the Korean Peninsula, it is also noteworthy that attitudes toward the ROK-US alliance are significantly influenced by attitudes toward inter-Korean relations and North Korea. Within political circles and among experts, there still exists a tendency to view security issues as a dichotomy of 'pro-US vs. anti-North Korea' or 'pro-North Korea vs. anti-US,' although this has somewhat softened compared to the past.

However, public perception has long since moved beyond this dichotomous framework. As North Korea has created crises for the Korean Peninsula and regional order, such as naval clashes in the West Sea and its nuclear development, even after the Cold War, favorable perceptions of North Korea among the general public have steadily declined. This is clearly confirmed in the results of EAI's annual surveys on the international roles of neighboring countries since 2005. In the 2006 survey, 24.3% of South Koreans held a favorable view of North Korea; this figure has dropped to 9.1% in the current survey. [Figure 2]

Crucially, the increase in negative perceptions of North Korea does not translate into support for hardline policies toward North Korea. Particularly when compared to the Roh Moo-hyun administration, public attitudes toward aid to North Korea have changed significantly. In a 2004 survey, one year into the Roh Moo-hyun administration, only 8.4% advocated for increasing aid to North Korea, and 19.8% favored maintaining the current level. In contrast, a combined 69.8% favored reducing (47.6%) or halting (22.2%) aid. This suggests that a check mechanism was in operation, reflecting concerns about "giving away too much" to North Korea, a sentiment that began during the Kim Dae-jung administration and continued through the Roh Moo-hyun administration, often referred to as the Sunshine Policy. Conversely, at the current juncture, one year into the Lee Myung-bak administration, the proportion advocating for increased aid to North Korea has risen to 14.1%, and those favoring maintaining the current level have increased to 48.5%. Only 28.5% favored reducing aid, and 8.1% favored halting it, indicating that a majority public opinion favors maintaining or increasing aid. This can be interpreted as a check on the administration's overly principled approach at the beginning of its term, which failed to achieve a breakthrough in inter-Korean relations, and a demand for a more flexible approach toward North Korea. [Figure 3]

Despite nearly 90% of South Koreans holding negative perceptions of North Korea, a majority oppose economic sanctions against North Korea and the use of military force by the United States. They consistently support projects like the Geumgangsan tours and aid to North Korea. This suggests that the public opinion landscape has somewhat embraced an engagement strategy, aiming to manage North Korea through cooperation and support rather than outright containment.

[Figure 2] Changes in Perceptions of North Korea, China, and the US by South Koreans: "Positive" Response Rate (%)

[Figure 3] Changes in Perceptions of Aid Policy Toward North Korea (%)

Note 1. Don't know/No response are not included.

Desirable Solution to the North Korean Nuclear Issue: Dialogue First

- Growing Acceptance of North Korea's Nuclear Status Among the Public is Concerning

- Inter-Korean Summit/Special Envoy Visit 85.7%, Six-Party Talks 85.2% > North Korea-US Dialogue 55.6% > PSI 49.2% > US Military Action 31% > Kaesong Industrial Complex Suspension 21.1%

This attitude is also evident in perceptions of desirable solutions to the North Korean nuclear issue. Examining public evaluations of various proposed solutions to the North Korean nuclear problem, 85.7% found the option of "inter-Korean summit or dispatching a special envoy" desirable, and 85.2% positively evaluated the format of "Six-Party Talks." However, "direct negotiations between North Korea and the US," excluding South Korea, is supported by 55.6%. Regarding options that could provoke North Korea, such as "international sanctions" or "PSI, including maritime blockade," opinions are evenly divided, with 49.4% and 49.2% respectively supporting them. In contrast, options involving strong pressure on North Korea, such as "US military action" and "suspension of Kaesong Industrial Complex/Geumgangsan tourism," received support rates of only 31% and 21.1%, respectively, with overwhelming opposition.

However, a concerning trend is the increasing expectation among South Koreans that the North Korean nuclear issue will be resolved through compromise, accepting North Korea's possession of nuclear weapons, compared to before 2006 when North Korea's nuclear capability was uncertain, and after its nuclear test when its capabilities were proven. In 2004, when North Korea's nuclear possession was uncertain, optimistic forecasts prevailed: 4.5% believed North Korea would abandon its nuclear weapons soon, and 54.9% believed it would eventually abandon them. In contrast, in the current survey, only 3% believe it will be abandoned soon, and 45% believe it will be abandoned in the long term, a decrease of about 10 percentage points. Conversely, the expectation that "it will be resolved with North Korea possessing nuclear weapons" has significantly increased from 15.7% in 2004 to 36.6%.

This appears to be a result of nuclear fatigue stemming from the prolonged North Korean nuclear standoff. While high-ranking officials in the Obama administration are drawing attention with remarks that seem to shift from a policy of denuclearization to one of managing North Korea's nuclear status, the increasing expectation among South Koreans that North Korea's nuclear weapons will ultimately be accepted is concerning. This is because the possibility of improving inter-Korean relations and establishing a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula will recede further without the principle of denuclearization, which is a prerequisite for peace on the peninsula and a key agreement between the two Koreas.

[Figure 4] Desirable Solution to the North Korean Nuclear Issue: "Desirable" (%)

[Figure 5] Comparison of Prospects for Resolving the North Korean Nuclear Issue Before and After the Nuclear Test (%)