[Public Opinion Briefing Vol. 32-2] Korea as Seen from Abroad: An Analysis of South Korea's Soft Power

[Issue Briefing Vol. 32] Soft Power in East Asia

[1] Comparison of Soft Power in the U.S., China, Japan, and South Korea

[2] Korea as Seen from Abroad: An Analysis of South Korea's Soft Power

2. Korea as Seen from Abroad: An Analysis of South Korea's Soft Power

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1. Politics and Diplomacy

• The area with the largest perception gap between internal and external views; strong self-deprecation in Korea.

• Foreign assessments of politics are relatively favorable, while Koreans' self-assessments are harsh.

Objective indicators show that external evaluations of Korean politics are relatively positive (61 points), whereas Koreans' self-evaluations are highly cynical, revealing the largest gap between internal and external perspectives. Despite numerous positive assessments of Korea's political system and human rights record, showing a significant gap even with China, only 10% of Koreans feel pride in their country's politics. This implies that although objective conditions exist to enhance Korea's soft power in the political sphere, a lack of perception to market the achievements and recognition of Korean democracy externally, due to excessive domestic political criticism, is evident. Despite increasing instances of Southeast Asian nations and other developing countries benchmarking the dynamism of Korean democracy, there is a lack of proactive response. This result indicates the need to systematically publicize the achievements made in Korea's political system and human rights advancements both domestically and internationally.

[Figure 1] Evaluation Scores (Points) of Human Rights Respect and Political System Effectiveness by Country

Note 1. Scores range from 0 (not at all) to 10 (very much), converted from the average responses of respondents from the other four countries (including Indonesia) excluding the country in question, scaled to 100.

• Diplomacy: Allies are indifferent; China/Southeast Asia are favorable. "Positive assessment of Korea's role in resolving North Korean nuclear issue." U.S. 41%, Japan 35%.

• Strengths of Korean diplomacy: "Respect for sovereignty"; Weaknesses: "Following international trends."

In diplomacy, while Korea receives relatively indifferent responses from its traditional allies and friends, the U.S. and Japan, it receives more favorable evaluations from China and Southeast Asia. Specifically, only 41.4% of Americans and 35.1% of Japanese respondents had a positive view of Korea's role in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue. In contrast, 58.5% of Chinese respondents and 56.6% of Korean respondents held a positive view. Meanwhile, regarding Korea itself, there were high positive evaluations for its respect for the sovereignty of other nations and its cooperative attitude. Indonesians gave a relatively high score of 6.8, Chinese 6.3, and Americans 5.7. Japanese respondents gave the lowest score of 5.2. Conversely, Americans and Japanese respondents felt that Korea contributes little to humanitarian aid in Asia (U.S. 4.6, Japan 4.9) and does not demonstrate leadership or fulfill its responsibilities in international organizations like the WTO and UN. Americans and Japanese gave Korea 4.5 points for its role, while Chinese respondents gave a relatively generous score of 5.9.

[Figure 2] Assessment of Korea's Effective Role in Resolving the North Korean Nuclear Issue

Note. 1. Very effective, 2. Somewhat effective, 3. Not very effective, 4. Not effective at all. The sum of responses for 1 and 2.

[Figure 3] Evaluation of Korea's Role in Respecting Sovereignty and Leadership in International Organizations (Points)

Note 1. Scores range from 0 (not at all) to 10 (very much), converted from the average responses of respondents from the other four countries (including Indonesia) excluding the country in question, scaled to 100.

2. Economy: South Korea's Soft Power Lags

• The brand value of Korean products falls short of expectations.

- Korean product brands: Americans perceive them as "cheap," Japanese as "mid-range," Chinese/Southeast Asians as "mid-to-high-end," and Koreans as "high-end."

• While attractive as an FTA partner, the impact of economic relations with Korea on partner economies is perceived as low.

When the brand evaluations of products from the four East Asian countries by citizens of six countries are converted to a 100-point scale, the U.S. ranks highest with 69 points, followed by Japan with 67.5 points. The score for Korean products falls short of these at 61 points. However, when broken down by country, except for the U.S. (41 points), the other countries (Japan 55 points, China 61 points, Indonesia 62 points, Vietnam 67 points) indicated that Korean products possess a certain brand power that enhances purchase intent. Furthermore, Koreans themselves gave Korean product brand power a score of 80, demonstrating affection and confidence in Korean brands. Consequently, overcoming the image of low-quality products in the U.S. and Japan emerges as a significant challenge [Figure 4].

[Figure 4] Average Purchase Power Evaluation Scores (%) of Products from Korea, U.S., China, and Japan by Citizens of Six Countries

Note 1. Scores range from 0 (decreases purchase intent) to 10 (increases purchase intent), with no change at 5. Converted from the average responses of respondents from six countries to a scale of 100.

Note 2. The box contains the evaluation scores of Korean product brands by citizens of six countries.

Meanwhile, Korean citizens prefer the U.S. (75.6%) > Japan (73.6%) > China (66.7%) as FTA partners. The fact that Koreans, who emphasize trade with China, prefer the U.S. and Japan more than China suggests concerns about increased imports of Chinese agricultural products and a perception that the Chinese economy is not yet highly advanced. Conversely, from the perspective of Japanese and Chinese citizens, Korea can be considered an attractive preferred partner for FTA negotiations. Chinese citizens are the most enthusiastic about FTAs. They agreed to an FTA with the U.S. (84.4%), a Korea-China FTA (82.1%), and a China-Japan FTA (78.9%). Japan's agreement rate for a Japan-Korea FTA (63.4%) and a Japan-U.S. FTA (63.2%) was about 10% higher than the rate for desiring an FTA with China. The U.S. was the least enthusiastic about FTAs. U.S. citizens showed a majority agreement only for a U.S.-Japan FTA (59.0%), while the approval rate for a U.S.-Korea FTA (48.6%) and a U.S.-China FTA (41%) fell short of a majority.

It is noteworthy to examine the disparity in the intensity with which citizens of FTA negotiation parties prefer their counterparts. Overall, the smallest disparity was observed in the U.S.-Japan FTA, with a difference of only 4.2 percentage points. In contrast, the largest disparity occurred in the Korea-China FTA, where Chinese citizens' preference for the U.S. as an FTA partner was 84.4%, while U.S. citizens' preference for China was only 41.0%, resulting in a significant gap of 43.2 percentage points. The smaller the gap, the more likely the FTA is approached from the perspective of mutual benefit between the two countries, signifying a broad social support base for the FTA. However, if asymmetry arises where one party prefers the other more than the other party prefers them, it is highly probable that they will be in a disadvantageous position during negotiations. The reverse is also likely to hold true. In such cases, public opinion vetoing an FTA by one party could pose a significant obstacle to its conclusion. For Korea, it can be assessed that it holds a relatively disadvantageous position in U.S.-Korea and Japan-Korea FTAs, while it is in a relatively advantageous position in the Korea-China FTA. Although 75.6% of Korean citizens preferred the U.S. as an FTA partner, only 48.6% of U.S. citizens preferred Korea as a partner, showing a gap of (-27%p). For the Japan-Korea FTA, the gap was -10.2%p, indicating that Korean citizens are more enthusiastic about a Japan-Korea FTA than Japanese citizens. Conversely, the proportion of Koreans preferring China as an FTA partner was 66.7%, but the proportion of Chinese preferring Korea was 82.1%, showing a gap of 15.4%p.

[Figure 5] Asymmetry in Preference for FTA Negotiation Partners among Four East Asian Countries

Note 1. The proportion of respondents who answered "should" to the question "Should our country sign an FTA with the following country?" (as opposed to "should not").

Neighboring countries are less sensitive to the impact of the Korean economy on their own economies.

If the impact of economic relations with a specific country on one's own economy is perceived as significant, sensitivity to changes in bilateral relations inevitably increases, which can act as a disadvantage in economic negotiations between the two countries. Conversely, it is possible to assume that lower sensitivity allows for a relatively advantageous position in economic negotiations.

One of the weaknesses in exercising South Korea's economic soft power is the perception gap: Koreans believe that economic relations with neighboring countries significantly impact the Korean economy, while citizens of those countries perceive the impact of economic relations between their country and Korea on their own economy as relatively minor. Koreans are more sensitive to the economic relationship with the U.S., China, and Japan compared to the citizens of those countries. Specifically, 85% of Koreans believe that the U.S.-Korea economic relationship is important, but only 51% of Americans perceive the U.S.-Korea relationship as important to the U.S. economy. This indicates that Korea is inevitably more sensitive to the U.S.-Korea economic relationship. In contrast, regarding the Korea-China relationship, 83% of Koreans responded that it is important, while 68% of Chinese respondents stated it is important, reducing the gap to -15%p. The smallest gap was observed in the Korea-Japan economic relationship, with 78% of Koreans and 66% of Japanese evaluating the bilateral economic relationship as important to their respective economies.

[Figure 6] Perception Gap (Points) between Koreans and U.S., Chinese, and Japanese Citizens Regarding the Importance of Bilateral Economic Relations

Note 1. Scores range from 0 (not important at all) to 10 (very important). Converted from the average responses of Korean and counterpart country citizens to a scale of 100.

3. Culture: The Power of "Hallyu" Primarily Manifests in China and Vietnam; Fails to Impress Americans

Riding the wave of Hallyu, the influence of Korean culture is spreading across Asia, but its appeal in the U.S. does not appear to have expanded significantly yet. Regarding the attractiveness of Korean popular culture, it receives positive evaluations averaging 61.6 points from five countries excluding Korea. However, it still lags far behind American, Japanese, and Chinese culture. It received high ratings in China (69 points) and Vietnam (75 points). Even Japanese respondents, who were indifferent to Korea in other areas, gave a somewhat positive evaluation (61 points). In Southeast Asia, Indonesia scored 58 points, and notably, Americans were indifferent to Korean popular culture (45 points).

Meanwhile, Korea's appeal as a tourist destination presents challenges that require further development. Americans ranked Japan (78 points) and China (66 points) as desirable travel destinations, while Korea received only 50 points. For Japanese respondents, the preferred travel destinations were the U.S. (68 points), China (58 points), and Korea (56 points). Chinese respondents ranked the U.S. first (76 points), followed by Japan and Korea (68 points) in second place.

[Figure 7] Evaluation of Popular Culture Attractiveness among Four East Asian Countries by Five Countries (Points)

Note 1. Scores are converted from the average responses to a scale of 100, where 0 means "not at all" and 10 means "very much." Responses from citizens of their own country were excluded when evaluating the attractiveness of Korean culture.

[Table 2] Mutual Evaluation of Four East Asian Countries as Attractive International Tourist Destinations (Points)

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Note 1. Scores are based on the average response from 0 (not at all) to 10 (very much), converted to a 100-point scale. Responses from respondents within their own country were excluded when evaluating the attractiveness of Korean culture for each country.

4. Human Resources/Technology/Knowledge Base

Korean Language Important for Children's Success: Average of 5 Countries 11.2%, English Important: 87.1%

Evaluation of Korean workforce is high, while evaluation of Korean science and technology fields is low.

Preferred study abroad destinations for children of Koreans: USA 43.7%, EU 40.7%, Japan 5.8%, China 5.3%

Respondents who would send their children to study in Korea: 0.6% of Americans, 2% of Japanese, 9.5% of Chinese, 1.8% of Indonesians, 4.7% of Vietnamese.

The area where U.S. superiority is most evident, more so than in any other domain, is human resources/knowledge-based industries. In assessments of the possession of high-quality universities, the U.S. significantly outperforms Japan, China, and Korea. This is the area where Korea and China lag considerably behind the U.S. and Japan. However, in the fields of science and technology and highly educated labor, the U.S. and Japan achieve nearly equivalent levels. It is assessed that Korea and China, among others, still fall short of the U.S. and Japanese levels even in this domain. Within Korea, regarding the fields of science and technology and the possession of high-level human resources, Korea itself assigned scores of 77 and 82, respectively, indicating considerable confidence, but the assessments from neighboring countries have been comparatively less generous.

[Figure 8] Evaluation of Universities' Quality/Science & Technology/Highly Educated Personnel in Four East Asian Countries (Points)

Note 1. Scores are based on the average response from 0 (not at all) to 10 (very much), converted to a 100-point scale. Responses from respondents within their own country were excluded. For the quality of universities, it is the average response from 3 countries excluding self-evaluation among Korea, the U.S., and China. For the fields of science and technology and highly educated personnel, responses from Indonesia and Vietnam were included, excluding self-evaluation.

Furthermore, when asked about the importance of acquiring each language for their children's success, an average of 87.1% across five countries answered English, demonstrating an overwhelming preference. In contrast, only 26.7% considered Chinese to be a very important language, while 19.9% cited Japanese. Only 11.2% responded that Korean was important.

Additionally, preferred study abroad destinations were generally concentrated in developed countries such as the United States and Europe. 43.9% of Chinese respondents chose the U.S., and 23.3% chose EU countries. 43.7% of Koreans chose the U.S., and 40.7% chose EU countries. Among foreigners, respondents who would prioritize sending their children to study in Korea were found in small numbers, with 9.5% from China and 4.7% from Vietnam. This figure was only 2.0% for Japanese and 1.8% for Indonesians. Only 0.6% of Americans indicated they would send their children to study in Korea.

[Figure 9] Languages Necessary for Children's Success (%)

Note 1. Percentage of respondents who answered 'very important' excluding their own country for each category.

[Figure 10] Preferred Study Abroad Destinations for Children

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