[Public Opinion Briefing No. 14-1] 1st Analysis Results of Presidential Panel Survey ①, [Public Opinion Briefing No. 14-1] 1st Analysis Results of Presidential Panel Survey ①

[Public Opinion Briefing No. 14] 1st Analysis Results of Presidential Panel Survey

[1] Why a Panel Survey? "This is How We Surveyed" - Kim Byong-kook, EAI President

[2] Can a Grand Coalition of Pro-Government Parties Against the Grand National Party Be Realized? - Lee Nae-young, Chairperson

[3] Analysis of Factors Affecting Defections and Re-aggregation within the Pro-Government Camp - Kwon Hyuk-yong, Chairperson

[4] Lee and Park Supporters' Vote Shifts if Their Preferred Candidate is Eliminated - Jung Han-wool, Chairperson

[5] South Korean Women Declare Political Independence - Kim Min-jeon, Chairperson

[6] The 386 Generation at 40: The "386 = Anti-Grand National Party" Equation is Broken - Lim Sung-hak, Chairperson

[7] Competition Between the Grand National Party's Big Two and New Regional Divides: The Emergence of North-South Divides - Kim Jang-soo, Chairperson

1. Why a Panel Survey? "This is How We Surveyed."

Beware of Self-Serving Interpretations of Public Opinion; Show the True Nature of Public Sentiment

Kim Byong-kook (EAI President, Korea University)

For politicians who have fully entered the presidential race or for mere spectators, the change in approval ratings is likely the primary concern. Currently, various media outlets are competitively reporting survey results that show the trend of presidential candidates' approval ratings. These surveys invariably follow a one-time (ad hoc) method, recruiting separate respondents for each survey at specific points in time. When conducted sequentially, one-time surveys make it easy to grasp the overall trend of changes in candidates' approval ratings.

However, in a presidential election that determines the future of the nation, it is more important to understand the reasons and motivations behind voters changing or maintaining their support preferences than to accurately track the trend of approval rating changes. The biggest drawback of one-time surveys is that because the respondents in earlier surveys differ from those in later surveys, they can only offer conjecture, not direct evidence, about who changed and why. This leaves room for politicians to interpret the survey results arbitrarily.

For example, if voters elect a candidate based on choosing the lesser of two evils rather than the best option, it would be crucial for the elected official to understand the true nature of public sentiment that did not perceive them as the best choice as a starting point for governing. However, we have repeatedly experienced politicians, once elected, forgetting this complex public sentiment and engaging in self-righteous politics as if they were the best choice. Repeating such experiences would be unfortunate not only for the candidates themselves but also for all voters.

To contribute to preventing such malpractices, the JoongAng Ilbo, SBS, the East Asia Institute (EAI), and Korea Research are conducting a panel survey for the 17th presidential election and will publicize the results. A panel survey is a method of repeatedly asking the same questions to the same respondents over time, allowing us to distinguish between those who maintain their support for a particular candidate, those who change their opinion, and those who remain undecided, not supporting any candidate. Furthermore, the panel survey method allows direct questioning of those who changed their evaluation of a candidate or their voting preference, thereby revealing the reasons and motivations behind changes in public sentiment without filtering. This is expected to significantly contribute to reducing the possibility of self-righteous politics based on self-serving interpretations.

The reason four institutions jointly conducted the survey is to address the difficulties and costs of management through cooperation and to effectively carry out the panel survey, which is being conducted for the first time in the history of Korean election reporting. This is the second time the four institutions have jointly conducted a panel survey, following the 2006 local election panel survey. A large panel of approximately 3,500 individuals, recruited in proportion to the national population by gender, age, and region, will be surveyed a total of six times over eight months until the presidential election concludes in December. The margin of error for this telephone interview survey is ±1.7% at a 95% confidence level. The survey results announced today are from the first survey conducted from April 26th to 29th.

Predicting Changes in Voter Support Tendencies After Candidate Selection¹.

2. Can a Grand Coalition of Pro-Government Parties Against the Grand National Party Be Realized?

Grand Coalition of Pro-Government Parties Unlikely to Materialize; High Likelihood of Internal Strife After Grand National Party's Nomination Process

Lee Nae-young (Director, EAI Public Opinion Analysis Center, Korea University)

Despite the favorable approval ratings of the leading candidates from the Grand National Party, no one can easily predict the outcome of the presidential election. This is because the possibility of a grand coalition of pro-government parties against the Grand National Party and internal conflicts within the Grand National Party remain latent variables. The results of the first panel survey, jointly conducted by the JoongAng Ilbo, SBS, the East Asia Institute, and Korea Research, offer important implications regarding the feasibility of the grand coalition against the Grand National Party being pursued by the ruling camp.

■ A majority of non-Grand National Party supporters and unaffiliated voters dislike the Grand National Party more than the Uri Party

First, let us examine the possibility of a grand coalition against the Grand National Party. Comparing the results of asking voters about their preferred and disliked parties, slightly less than half of the Grand National Party supporters, who constitute 42.2% of all respondents, cite the Uri Party as a disliked party. In contrast, 56.8% of Uri Party supporters, 45.1% of Democratic Party supporters, 57.9% of Democratic Labor Party supporters, and 40% of United Liberal Democrats supporters cite the Grand National Party as their most disliked party. This suggests that there is ample room for a grand coalition against the Grand National Party to gain public support. [Table 1]

■ Conditions Under Which a Grand Coalition Against the Grand National Party is Difficult to Realize Immediately

However, despite the anti-Grand National Party sentiment among supporters of parties other than the Grand National Party and among unaffiliated voters, it is difficult for a grand coalition against the Grand National Party to materialize immediately.

First, the lack of a central force to drive the anti-Grand National Party coalition is a problem. Looking at the approval ratings of parties that could participate in an anti-Grand National coalition, the Uri Party has 11.8% and the Democratic Party has 5.1%, with negligible support for the United New Party Movement and others. Furthermore, among the unaffiliated voters, who constitute a quarter of the total population and do not have a preferred party, nearly half (45.3%) stated they do not have a disliked party, indicating that anti-Grand National Party sentiment is not strong.

Second, a scenario of a candidate-centered anti-Grand National coalition also appears unlikely to garner broad public support at present. Primarily, the approval ratings of pro-government candidates are very weak compared to the strength of the Grand National Party's presidential candidates, leaving little room for an anti-Grand National coalition to form around a specific candidate.

Third, when asked who they would support if their current preferred candidate does not run for president, even supporters of Sohn Hak-kyu and Chung Dong-young, who are mentioned as potential centers of a candidate-centered coalition, indicate that if these candidates do not run, they would largely choose a Grand National Party candidate. Among current Sohn Hak-kyu supporters, 32.5% stated they would support Lee Myung-bak if Sohn does not run, followed by 13.5% who would support Chung Dong-young, and 11% who would support Park Geun-hye. Among Chung Dong-young supporters, 25.6% would switch their support to Lee Myung-bak and 18.3% to Park Geun-hye if Chung does not run. Among those who supported Chung Un-chan in this survey (1.3%, 44 individuals), although he has since withdrawn, 22.2% responded they would support Sohn Hak-kyu, followed by Lee Myung-bak (17.8%) and Chung Dong-young (13.3%).

These results indicate that supporters of pro-government candidates do not have a strong inclination to choose among the entire pool of pro-government candidates. Based on current public opinion, if the pro-government camp were to unite, a significant portion would likely defect to support a Grand National Party candidate during the nomination process, considerably weakening the cohesive effect of a pro-government coalition. This is a perplexing outcome for the current ruling party leadership, which is pinning its hopes on a pro-government coalition.

[Table 1: Presidential Panel Survey 1st Round] Comparison of Most Preferred Party and Most Disliked Party

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[Table 2: Presidential Panel 1st Round] Candidate to Support if Current Preferred Candidate Does Not Run

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Analysis of the Possibility of Re-aggregation of the Pro-Government Camp2.

3. Analysis of Factors Influencing the Defection and Re-aggregation of the Pro-Government Camp

Kwon Hyuk-yong (Korea University)

“65% of Roh Moo-hyun supporters in the 16th presidential election did not support any pro-government candidate”

“77% of those who supported the Grand National Party candidate in the local elections still support the Grand National Party”

■ Estimated Scale of Pro-Government Camp Supporter Defection

By tracking and analyzing the political choices of the pro-government camp's supporters, we can gauge the possibility of their re-aggregation. The results of this first panel survey indicate that the core supporters who backed Roh Moo-hyun in the last presidential election are less likely to switch their support. The bad news for the pro-government camp is that approximately 65% of these core supporters have shown an intention to defect.

We compared and analyzed voting choices in the 2006 local elections with current party support. Those who did not vote in the local elections or did not respond were excluded. Among those who voted for the Grand National Party in the 2006 local elections, 77% currently support the Grand National Party. In contrast, the corresponding figure for the Uri Party was only 30.4%. Of the Uri Party supporters in the last local elections, 19.1% have switched their support to the Grand National Party, and 23.8% have become undecided (no party support). Even if we consider the United New Party (7.0%), the Democratic Party (5.1%), and the People's Unity Party (0.9%) as the pro-government camp, the fixed pro-government support base is 43.4%.

Looking at the current support for presidential candidates, only 35% (fixed pro-government supporters) of those who supported the Uri Party candidate in the 2006 local elections responded that they support one of the pro-government presidential candidates. This indicates that 65% (defectors from the pro-government camp) of the Uri Party supporters from the last local elections are intending to switch their support to candidates from the Grand National Party or the Democratic Labor Party in this presidential election, or have not yet decided on a candidate.

<Table 1> Fixed Pro-Government Support and Defection Rates

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■ Examination of Factors for Pro-Government Camp Defection and Regathering

• Factors for Defection: Defection from the Seoul Metropolitan Area, Yeongnam, and Chungcheong regions / Ideological shift towards the center or conservatism / Sensitivity to economic issues / Decline in President Roh Moo-hyun's approval rating

• Factors for Regathering: Mediation of core support base among progressive, Honam region, and men in their 30s and 40s

Recovery of President Roh Moo-hyun's approval rating / Economic improvement

What are the characteristics of the defecting pro-government camp voters, and what factors are associated with their defection?

Compared to the stable pro-government camp supporters, the defecting pro-government camp voters are more likely to be female and are more concentrated in the Seoul Metropolitan Area, Yeongnam, and Chungcheong regions. Their subjective ideological orientation is closer to the center than that of the stable supporters. Regarding policy issues and evaluations, the defecting pro-government camp voters are more sensitive to economic issues such as economic growth and polarization compared to the stable supporters, and they hold a much more negative view of President Roh Moo-hyun's performance. Furthermore, the more they perceive their household economy to have worsened compared to five years ago, the more likely they are to withdraw their support from the pro-government camp.

Ideologically progressive individuals, those from the Honam region, men in their 30s and 40s, can be considered to have a relatively lower likelihood of defecting from the pro-government camp. This implies that for the pro-government camp to regroup, the choices of these groups (with lower defection likelihood) must become the center of the pro-government support base consolidation. However, the problem is that the baseline defection probability for these groups exceeds 60%.

From the perspective of the pro-government forces, there are two strategic options. They must choose between focusing on securing (regathering) the support of groups with relatively low defection likelihood, or striving to reduce the defection likelihood of groups with higher defection potential.

A strategy for the pro-government camp to achieve regathering of its support base can be derived by considering that one of the characteristics of democratic elections is that voters make choices as a judgment or reward for the incumbent government's policies. It is necessary to expand positive evaluations of the President's performance and to ensure that the household or national economy is perceived as having improved, or at least not having worsened. Under these conditions, regathering of the pro-government support base may become possible, and furthermore, the possibility of 'reconversion' (return of support) among the pro-government defectors who have shifted their support to the Grand National Party candidate may be discovered.

◎ Comparison of Pro-Government Camp Defector Size by Key Variables

-Mitigation of Economic Polarization: Not important → Important: Defector group increases by 2.0%p

-Economic Growth: Not important → Important: Defector group increases by 8.7%p

-Seoul Metropolitan Area (Hometown): Non-Seoul Metropolitan Area → Seoul Metropolitan Area: Defector group increases by 6.4%p

-Yeongnam (Hometown): Non-Yeongnam → Yeongnam: Defector group increases by 5.2%p

-Honam (Hometown): Non-Honam → Honam: Defector group decreases by 15.7%p

-Chungcheong (Hometown): Non-Chungcheong → Chungcheong: Defector group increases by 2.8%p

-Presidential Performance Evaluation: Positive evaluation → Negative evaluation: Defector group increases by 12.3%p

-Household Economy: Improvement/Status quo → Worsening: Defector group increases by 8.4%p

-Gender: Male → Female: Defector group increases by 5.8%p

-Subjective Ideology: Progressive → Centrist: Defector group increases by 11.2%p

-Subjective Ideology: Centrist → Conservative: Defector group increases by 7.5%p

-Age: 30s/40s → 20s/60+ years old: Defector group increases by 10.0%p

**Note: This table compares the size of the pro-government camp defectors between two groups (e.g., people whose hometown is the Seoul Metropolitan Area versus those who are not). It is not appropriate to compare the influence of variables on defection probability. That is, based on this table, one cannot say that the age effect is more influential than the economic growth issue effect.