[Public Opinion Brief No. 5] The Changing Ideological Landscape of Koreans

[Public Opinion Brief No. 5] The Changing Ideological Landscape of Korean Society

[1] The Changing Ideological Landscape of Korean Society - Nae-young Lee

[2] The Changing Perceptions of Koreans toward the U.S. - Jeong Han-wool

1. The Changing Ideological Landscape of Korean Society

Nae-young Lee (Director, EAI Public Opinion Analysis Center; Professor, Korea University)

Ideology refers to a comprehensive value orientation and belief system that continuously influences political attitudes and behaviors. The ideological landscape of a society reflects the distribution of its citizens' ideological orientations and is shaped by the historical experiences and conflicts of that society. Therefore, changes in a society's ideological landscape significantly impact its goals, policy directions, and even party competition. This public opinion survey measured citizens' ideological orientations using the same questionnaire as the first survey conducted in May 2002, allowing us to track changes in South Korea's ideological landscape over the past four years.

First, examining the changes in subjective ideological orientations, as self-assessed by respondents, reveals a distinct decrease in the proportion of progressives from 24.9% in 2002 to 18.6% in 2006, while the proportion of centrists increased from 38.6% to 45.1%. The proportion of conservatives saw a slight increase from 34.7% to 36.3%. This trend of decreasing progressives in South Korea's ideological landscape appears to be a result of the public's deep disappointment and negative evaluation of the current government and ruling party, which have positioned themselves as progressive reformers, as evidenced by the ruling party's crushing defeat in the recent local elections. Particularly concerning for the government and the progressive reformist camp is the trend of conservatism among the younger generation, who were the core supporters of President Roh and the Uri Party in the 2002 presidential and 2004 general elections. In the 2002 survey, among respondents in their 20s, progressives accounted for 34.2%, centrists 39%, and conservatives 26.3%, with progressives outnumbering conservatives. However, in the current survey, progressives among those in their 20s only accounted for 25.0%, while centrists were 45.9% and conservatives 29.2%, with conservatives now outnumbering progressives. For the ruling party, how to regain the support base of the younger generation appears to be a critical task for the upcoming presidential election and the party's future direction.

The declining trend of progressive ideology in South Korean society can also be confirmed through changes in public attitudes toward specific policy issues. In the 2002 survey, 70% of respondents believed that distribution was more important than economic growth, but in the 2006 survey, 53.5% stated that economic growth was more important than distribution. This result indicates that the public, suffering from a prolonged economic downturn, prioritizes economic growth over distribution. Furthermore, in the context of increasing security threats due to North Korea's nuclear development, public attitudes toward foreign policy and security issues show a decrease in support for progressive policies and an increase in preference for cautious and realistic policies.

Compared to 2002, support for independent diplomacy has decreased, while support for strengthening the ROK-U.S. alliance has increased. Critical evaluations of the engagement policy toward North Korea are also on the rise. For example, regarding economic aid to North Korea, the proportion of respondents who believed aid should be provided at the current level was 23% in the 2002 survey and 16.6% for increased aid, whereas in the current survey, these figures decreased to 18.6% and 5.8%, respectively.

However, what warrants our attention is that despite distrust in and defection from progressive reformist forces and their ideologies, there has not been a significant increase in the shift towards conservative ideology. While the survey shows a shift from progressive to centrist orientations among the majority of the public, it is difficult to conclude that the entire population is becoming more conservative.

This suggests, on one hand, that distrust in South Korea's conservative forces and their ideologies remains strong among many Koreans. On the other hand, it implies that there is still room for progressive reformist forces, currently facing difficulties due to the defection of their supporters, to recover their support base.

2. Changing Perceptions of Koreans toward the U.S.

We must focus on ambivalence rather than dichotomy.

Jeong Han-wool (EAI Public Opinion Analysis Center)

1. ROK-U.S. Alliance and the Transformation of U.S. Forces in Korea: The Framework of Perceiving the ROK-U.S. Alliance through U.S. Forces in Korea is Shattered

It is important to note that, unlike in the past, the public no longer judges the health of the ROK-U.S. alliance based on the size of the U.S. Forces in Korea (USFK) or their role as a "tripwire." As North Korea has actively pursued nuclear development, the stance favoring the strengthening of the ROK-U.S. alliance has intensified. In the past, a stance strengthening the ROK-U.S. alliance would have led to a weakening of the position for USFK withdrawal or reduction, and there would have been unease regarding the ongoing relocation of forces south of the Han River.

A Desirable ROK-U.S. Alliance

The candlelight vigils triggered by the death of two middle school girls in 2002 mobilized hundreds of thousands of participants and garnered domestic and international attention regarding anti-U.S. sentiment in South Korean society. However, with the outbreak of the Iraq War and the North Korean nuclear issue in 2003, public opinion favoring the withdrawal or reduction of USFK significantly declined to 36.9% in 2004. At the time, as negotiations for the relocation and reduction of USFK were underway between South Korea and the U.S., the argument that the U.S. reduction and relocation of USFK south of the Han River reflected a crisis in the ROK-U.S. alliance, which would lead to a security vacuum on the Korean Peninsula, gained traction.

"Despite North Korea's Nuclear Test, Public Opinion Favoring USFK Reduction/Withdrawal Rises"

As observed earlier, the Six-Party Talks have been stalled this year, and North Korea is escalating its threats through missile development and nuclear tests. Under these circumstances, many citizens are increasingly relying on the deterrence of the ROK-U.S. alliance. This environment, which in the past would have significantly weakened public opinion favoring USFK reduction, has been created. However, since 2004, the way Koreans perceive USFK has been changing significantly. Amidst the heightened North Korean nuclear crisis and the growing recognition of the importance of the ROK-U.S. alliance, public opinion favoring USFK withdrawal/reduction has risen to the level seen during the 2002 candlelight vigils.

Attitudes toward U.S. Forces in Korea

"Tripwire Role of USFK Unnecessary. Relocation South of Han River Has No Major Negative Impact"

Regarding the ongoing relocation of USFK south of the Han River, compared to the 2004 survey results, the perception of it being a threat has not significantly increased, while the perception that it will have no impact has greatly increased from 42.7% to 55.7%. Although the perception that it will contribute to security due to North Korea's nuclear test has decreased by more than 10 percentage points, the increase in the perception of no significant impact means that only a minority views it as a threat overall.

Attitudes toward the Relocation of U.S. Forces in Korea South of the Han River

2. "Escalation of Anti-Americanism? Or an Expression of Ambivalence?"

However, caution is needed when directly linking these phenomena to South Koreans' security complacency or the escalation of anti-Americanism.

"U.S.-Led USFK Reduction," 64% of Conservatives Do Not See It as a Security Threat, 43% Believe USFK Should Be Reduced

First, it is necessary to consider that the United States is currently leading the process of USFK reduction and relocation. While acknowledging that some anti-American sentiment in South Korean society may have influenced the USFK reduction process, the fundamental point is that the U.S. is pursuing a global realignment of its overseas military posture (GPR) following the 9/11 attacks, and the reduction or relocation of USFK is part of this initiative. Therefore, with the U.S. itself advocating for the transformation of USFK into a rapid deployment force based on the concept of "strategic flexibility," the reduction or relocation of USFK is inevitable to some extent. Even from a perspective that emphasizes the ROK-U.S. alliance, if one accepts the changing global strategy of the U.S., there is no reason to oppose the reduction or relocation of USFK. In fact, 64% of the ideological conservatives did not view the relocation of U.S. forces south of the Han River as a major security threat (18% saw it as helpful to security, 46% as having no impact, and 35.2% as a threat), and 43% also favored the reduction or withdrawal of USFK (2.1% for withdrawal, 40.8% for gradual reduction).

Evaluation of USFK Relocation by Ideological Orientation

Coexistence of Ambivalent Attitudes: Concerns about North Korean Threats and Concerns about U.S. Preemptive Strikes

A dichotomous approach cannot explain the public's attitude of being concerned about North Korea's threats and believing the ROK-U.S. alliance is important, while simultaneously supporting the reduction of USFK (50.9%) and accepting the relocation of USFK or the transfer of wartime operational control. The emergence of such dual attitudes signifies that the public no longer views the U.S. or North Korea as solely a threat or solely a partner for cooperation. A notable factor driving this change is the theory of U.S. preemptive strikes, indicating that the U.S. has also begun to be perceived as a source of anxiety regarding South Korea's security. 77.9% of respondents opposed preemptive strikes by the U.S., and even among conservatives who emphasize the ROK-U.S. alliance, this figure reached 73.7%. In fact, 49% of respondents believed it was highly likely that the U.S. would attack North Korea.

Concerns about preemptive strikes against North Korea are leading to public opinion favoring USFK reduction. While only 40.5% of respondents who viewed U.S. military action favorably desired the withdrawal of USFK, among those who viewed it unfavorably, the desire for USFK withdrawal significantly increased to 58.8%. Even among conservatives, those who opposed U.S. military action were more than 10 percentage points more likely to respond positively to USFK withdrawal than those who supported it, indicating that this is a factor contributing to the duality in perceptions of the U.S.

Perceptions of USFK by Attitudes toward U.S. Military Action against North Korea

Perceptions of USFK by Attitudes toward U.S. Military Action against North Korea, by Ideological Orientation

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"Internationally, anti-American sentiment in Korea is not strong"

According to the results of international public opinion surveys conducted by the East Asia Institute (EAI) since 2004, Koreans' critical view of the United States can be considered relatively high compared to other countries. While it is true that discord between Korea and the U.S. has been publicly revealed more than in the past, and voices demanding a horizontal alliance relationship have increased in Korean society, it is necessary to emphasize that this does not mean denying the necessity of the Korea-U.S. alliance itself or demanding a severance of Korea-U.S. relations.

Evaluation of the U.S.'s Global Role: Positive vs. Negative

GlocScan · EAI · Maeil Business Newspaper (2005)