[Briefing on Public Opinion No. 5] The Changing Ideological Landscape of Koreans

[Briefing on Public Opinion No. 5] The Changing Ideological Landscape of Korean Society

[1] The Changing Ideological Landscape of Korean Society - Lee Na-young

[2] Changing Perceptions of the U.S. by Koreans - Jeong Han-wool

1. The Changing Ideological Landscape of Korean Society

Lee Na-young (Director, EAI Center for Public Opinion Analysis, Professor, Korea University)

Ideology refers to a comprehensive orientation and belief system that continuously influences political attitudes and behaviors. The ideological landscape of a society signifies the distribution of people's ideological orientations and invariably reflects the historical experiences and conflicts of that society. Therefore, a change in a society's ideological landscape significantly impacts the goals and policy directions it pursues, as well as party competition. This public opinion survey measured people's ideological orientations using the same questionnaire as the first survey conducted in May 2002, allowing us to track how the ideological landscape of Korean society has changed over the past four years.

First, looking at the changes in subjective ideological orientations, where respondents themselves assessed their ideological leanings, the proportion of progressives clearly decreased from 24.9% in 2002 to 18.6% in 2006, while the proportion of centrists increased from 38.6% to 45.1%. The proportion of conservatives increased slightly from 34.7% to 36.3%. This trend of decreasing proportion of progressives in the ideological landscape of Korean society appears to be the result of deep disappointment and negative evaluation of the current government and ruling party's state administration, as evidenced by the ruling party's crushing defeat in the last local elections. Particularly concerning for the government and the progressive reformist forces is the trend of conservative shift in the ideological orientations of the younger generation, who were the core supporters of President Roh and the Uri Party in the 2002 presidential election and the 2004 general election. In the 2002 survey, among respondents in their 20s, progressives accounted for 34.2%, centrists 39%, and conservatives 26.3%, with progressives outnumbering conservatives. However, in this year's survey, progressives among those in their 20s only accounted for 25.0%, while centrists were 45.9% and conservatives 29.2%, with conservatives outnumbering progressives. For the ruling party, how to regain the support base of the younger generation appears to be a key task for the next presidential election as well as for the party's future direction.

The declining trend of progressive ideology in Korean society can also be confirmed by changes in public attitudes toward specific policy issues. In the 2002 survey, 70% of respondents believed that distribution was more important than economic growth, but in the 2006 survey, 53.5% believed that economic growth was more important than distribution. This result shows that the public, suffering from a prolonged economic downturn, prioritizes economic growth over distribution. Furthermore, in the context of increasing security threats due to North Korea's nuclear development, public attitudes toward foreign policy and security issues also show a trend of decreasing support for progressive policies and increasing preference for cautious and realistic policies.

Compared to 2002, this year's survey shows a decrease in support for independent diplomacy and an increase in support for strengthening the ROK-U.S. alliance, along with an increasing trend of critical evaluation of the engagement policy toward North Korea. For example, regarding economic aid to North Korea, in the 2002 survey, 23% responded 'should provide at the current level' and 16.6% responded 'should expand further,' but in this year's survey, these proportions decreased to 18.6% and 5.8%, respectively.

However, what we should pay attention to is that despite the distrust in progressive reformist forces and ideology, and the resulting departure of support, the shift towards conservative ideology has not significantly increased. While this survey shows a shift in the ideological orientation of the majority of the public from progressive to centrist, it is difficult to conclude that the ideological orientation of the entire public is becoming conservative.

This point, on the one hand, indicates that distrust in Korea's conservative forces and their ideology still remains strong among many Koreans, and on the other hand, suggests that there is still room for progressive reformist forces, currently in difficulty due to the departure of their supporters, to regain their support base.

2. Changing Perceptions of the U.S. by Koreans

We need to focus on ambivalence rather than dichotomy.

Jeong Han-wool (EAI Center for Public Opinion Analysis)

1. ROK-U.S. Alliance Transformation and the ROK-U.S. Alliance: The Perception Framework of the ROK-U.S. Alliance as the Presence of U.S. Forces in Korea is Being Broken

It is important to note that the public, unlike in the past, does not judge the health of the ROK-U.S. alliance based on the size of the U.S. Forces in Korea (USFK) or their role as an 'tripwire.' As North Korea has actively pursued nuclear development, the stance advocating for strengthening the ROK-U.S. alliance has been reinforced. In the past, a stance strengthening the ROK-U.S. alliance would have led to a weakening of the position for the withdrawal or reduction of USFK, and there would have been unease regarding the ongoing relocation of units south of the Han River.

A Desirable ROK-U.S. Alliance

The candlelight protests triggered by the death of a middle school student in 2002 mobilized hundreds of thousands of people and drew domestic and international attention to anti-U.S. sentiment in Korean society. However, as the Iraq War and North Korea's nuclear development issues emerged in 2003, the public opinion favoring the withdrawal or reduction of USFK significantly declined to 36.9% in 2004. At that time, the theory of a crisis in the ROK-U.S. alliance, which argued that the ongoing negotiations between Korea and the U.S. regarding the relocation and reduction of USFK reflected a crisis in the alliance and would lead to a security vacuum on the Korean Peninsula, gained traction.

"Despite North Korea's Nuclear Test, Opinion for USFK Reduction/Withdrawal Remains High"

As observed earlier, the Six-Party Talks have been stalled this year, and North Korea is intensifying its threats through missile development and nuclear tests. In this context, many Koreans are increasingly relying on the deterrence of the ROK-U.S. alliance. In the past, this situation would have significantly weakened public opinion for USFK reduction. However, since 2004, the way Koreans perceive USFK has been changing significantly. Amidst the escalating North Korean nuclear crisis and the growing recognition of the importance of the ROK-U.S. alliance, public opinion for USFK withdrawal/reduction has risen to the level seen during the candlelight protests in 2002.

Attitudes toward U.S. Forces in Korea

"Tripwire Role of USFK Unnecessary. Relocation South of Han River Has No Major Negative Impact"

Regarding the ongoing relocation of USFK south of the Han River, compared to the 2004 survey results, the perception that it will be a threat has not significantly increased, while the perception that it will have no impact has greatly increased from 42.7% to 55.7%. Although the perception that it will be helpful for security due to North Korea's nuclear test, etc., has decreased by more than 10 percentage points, the increase in the perception of 'no significant impact' means that the tendency to view it as a threat remains in the minority.

Attitudes toward the Relocation of U.S. Forces in Korea South of the Han River

2. "Escalation of Anti-Americanism? Or Expression of Ambivalence?"

However, caution is needed when directly linking these phenomena to a lack of security awareness or an escalation of anti-Americanism among Koreans.

"USFK Reduction Led by the U.S., 64% of Conservatives Do Not See It as a Security Threat, 43% Believe USFK Should Be Reduced"

First, we must consider that the United States is leading the current process of USFK reduction and relocation. While acknowledging that some anti-American sentiment in Korean society may have influenced the USFK reduction process, the fundamental point is that the U.S. has been pursuing a global reorganization of its overseas military posture (GPR) since the 9/11 attacks, and the reduction or relocation of USFK is part of this effort. Therefore, with the U.S. itself advocating for the transformation of USFK into a rapid deployment force based on the concept of 'strategic flexibility,' there are unavoidable aspects to the reduction or relocation of USFK. Even from the perspective of emphasizing the ROK-U.S. alliance, if one accepts the changing global strategy of the U.S., there is no reason to oppose the reduction or relocation of USFK. In fact, 64% of conservatives did not view the relocation of U.S. forces south of the Han River as a major security threat (18% saw it as helpful for security, 46% as having no impact, and 35.2% as a threat), and the opinion that USFK should be reduced or withdrawn also reached 43% (2.1% for withdrawal, 40.8% for gradual reduction).

Evaluation of USFK Relocation by Ideological Orientation

Coexistence of Ambivalent Attitudes: The North Korean Threat Theory and the Threat of U.S. Preemptive Strike Theory

A dichotomous approach cannot explain the attitude of being concerned about the North Korean threat and believing the ROK-U.S. alliance is important, while simultaneously supporting the reduction of USFK (50.9%) and accepting the relocation of USFK or the transfer of wartime operational control. The emergence of such dual attitudes signifies that the public no longer views the U.S. or North Korea as solely a threat or solely a partner for cooperation. A notable factor bringing about this change is the theory of U.S. preemptive strike, which has positioned the U.S. as a source of anxiety for South Korea's security as well. 77.9% of respondents opposed a U.S. preemptive strike, and even among conservatives who emphasize the ROK-U.S. alliance, this figure reached 73.7%. In fact, 49% of respondents believed it was highly likely that the U.S. would attack North Korea.

Concerns about a preemptive strike against North Korea are leading to public opinion for USFK reduction. While only 40.5% of respondents who viewed U.S. military action as desirable desired the withdrawal of USFK, among those who viewed it as undesirable, the proportion desiring the withdrawal of USFK significantly increased to 58.8%. Even among conservatives, the proportion of those opposing U.S. military action responded more positively to USFK withdrawal by more than 10 percentage points compared to those who supported it, indicating that this is acting as a cause for the duality in perceptions of the U.S.

Perceptions of USFK by Attitudes Toward U.S. Military Action Against North Korea

Perceptions of USFK by Attitudes Toward U.S. Military Action Against North Korea, by Ideological Orientation

f2e34dd1a320d063

f2e34dd1a320d063

f2e34dd1a320d063

« L'anti-américanisme en Corée n'est pas fort à l'échelle internationale »

Selon les résultats des enquêtes d'opinion internationales menées par l'Institut d'études de l'Asie de l'Est (EAI) depuis 2004, la critique des Sud-Coréens à l'égard des États-Unis peut être considérée comme relativement élevée par rapport à d'autres pays. Bien qu'il soit vrai que les dissonances entre la Corée et les États-Unis soient apparues plus ouvertement qu'auparavant et que les voix exigeant une relation d'alliance horizontale au sein de la société coréenne se soient multipliées, il est nécessaire de souligner que cela ne signifie pas un rejet de la nécessité de l'alliance Corée-États-Unis elle-même, ni une demande de rupture des relations Corée-États-Unis.

Évaluation du rôle mondial des États-Unis : positif contre négatif

Glocal Scan ․ EAI ․ Maeil Business Newspaper (2005)