[EAI Public Opinion Brief No. 4] North Korea's Nuclear Crisis and Evolving Perceptions of North Korea

North Korea's Nuclear Test and Evolving Perceptions of North Korea

Diagnosing the North Korean Nuclear Issue Through Public Opinion.

Jeong Han-wool (Senior Researcher, EAI Center for Public Opinion Analysis)

(1) How do the public perceive North Korea's nuclear test?

1. Changes in Threat Perception: Security Complacency or Security Sensitivity?

“The controversy over security complacency is exaggerated”

Following North Korea's missile tests in July, the nuclear test in October rapidly cooled inter-Korean relations. Subsequently, the UN and the international community passed Security Council resolutions imposing sanctions on North Korea, sending a warning message. Meanwhile, mediation efforts by major countries, including China, accelerated, somewhat easing the tense atmosphere and foreshadowing fierce diplomatic battles within the Six-Party Talks.

Domestically, one side (primarily the Grand National Party and conservative newspapers) pointed to the absence of hoarding or panic despite the nuclear test, raising concerns about security anxiety. On the other hand, another side (the Blue House and progressive newspapers) argued that these discussions of security anxiety were exaggerating the security crisis to attack the government, leading to a stalemate.

The results of this public opinion survey indicate that the assertion that South Koreans are insensitive to security crises is somewhat exaggerated. A time-series analysis of public opinion surveys on the overall security situation in Korea since 1998 shows that security anxiety, which fell to 18.9% after the 2000 inter-Korean summit, has increased annually, reaching its highest level since 1998 in the 2006 survey.

Evaluation of the Overall Security Situation

Data from 1998, 2000, 2002, and 2004 are from the National Defense University's Regular Security Survey (options in parentheses are from the National Defense University survey).

Options: “Very Anxious,” “Somewhat Anxious,” Neutral, “Not Anxious (Stable),” “Not Anxious at All (Very Stable)”

2. North Korea's Nuclear Development Intent: For Self-Defense or Offense?

“We do not agree that North Korea's nuclear development is for self-defense”

In response to criticism from opposition parties and conservative media, President Roh Moo-hyun stated at a foreign investment attraction briefing last month that "the balance of power between North and South has not been broken" and that "we must calmly consider why North Korea is developing nuclear weapons and whether it will use them." He reiterated his 2004 argument that "North Korea's missile and nuclear development could be for self-defense." These remarks themselves became a point of contention, cited as a factor causing further security anxiety. However, the public does not agree with the President's assessment of North Korea's nuclear development intentions. Only 37.6% of respondents agreed (Strongly Agree + Agree) with the statement "North Korea's nuclear weapons are for self-defense, not aimed at South Korea," while 62.4% disagreed (Disagree + Strongly Disagree). However, younger demographics (40.2% of those in their 20s, 46.5% in their 30s) and progressives (47.3%, compared to 37.4% for moderates and 28.6% for conservatives) showed a higher tendency to accept the argument that North Korea's nuclear development is for self-defense, indicating an evaluation of North Korea's intentions based on ideological criteria.

Attitude towards the statement: “North Korea's nuclear development is for self-defense, not for invasion”

Also disagrees with the President's assertion that "the military balance between North and South has not been broken."

After North Korea's nuclear test, when comparing the military strength of North and South Korea, excluding US Forces Korea, 49.3% of all respondents indicated that North Korea has the advantage (Slightly + Significantly), while only 30.7% stated South Korea has the advantage. This suggests that more than half of the respondents question the assertion that the military balance between North and South has not been broken.

Public assessment of North-South military balance, excluding US Forces Korea

(2) The Public's Perspective on Security Issues is Changing

1. What Hasn't Changed: The Pattern of "Security Crisis → Strengthening of ROK-US Alliance" in Response to North Korea's Nuclear Test

The debate between ruling and opposition parties, and between progressives and conservatives regarding North Korea's nuclear test, naturally manifests as differences in perceptions of strategies for resolving the North Korean nuclear issue. One perspective attributes the failure to control the North Korean nuclear crisis primarily to the "failure of engagement policy" and the "weakening of the ROK-US alliance as a deterrent." Another perspective holds that the "neoconservatives in the United States, focused solely on pressure," have exacerbated the problem. Furthermore, the Grand National Party advocates for a "fundamental revision of the engagement policy," including "restraint on humanitarian aid" and "participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)," while the government and ruling party argue for "maintaining the engagement policy" and "opposing participation in PSI."

“The North Korean nuclear security crisis has amplified the importance of the ROK-US alliance”

In the first survey in December 2002, the proportion advocating for an independent foreign policy that distanced itself from the US (28%) exceeded that of strengthening the alliance (20.4%). However, over the past four years of repeated North Korean nuclear crises, the emphasis on strengthening the ROK-US alliance has significantly increased. Notably, even among progressives, the proportion advocating for an independent foreign policy (28.2%) has become nearly equal to that of strengthening the alliance (28.7%), indicating that the North Korean nuclear crisis has reinforced the view of the ROK-US alliance as a cornerstone of security realization.

Public Preference for Desired ROK-US Relations (%)

“Increased skepticism towards the engagement policy towards North Korea”

Moreover, while the Kim Dae-jung administration's "Sunshine Policy," which boosted its popularity, has continued under the Roh Moo-hyun administration as the "engagement policy towards North Korea," the current North Korean nuclear crisis has led to an increase in critical perceptions of the existing engagement policy. When asked about perceptions of the engagement policy towards North Korea, only 6.3% advocated for strengthening it, and 34.2% favored maintaining the current level. However, 47.2% suggested reducing it, and 10.2% even called for its abolition.

Public Preference for Engagement Policy towards North Korea (%)

2. However, the Public's Solutions Differ from the Past:

Dual and Complex Measures, Not Unilateral Containment or Unilateral Engagement

The view emphasizing "hedging"—opposing both blind appeasement of North Korea and blind pressure on North Korea—is emerging as the mainstream perception.

“Moving Beyond the Dichotomy of National Solidarity vs. ROK-US Solidarity”

As political polarization deepens in South Korean society, approaches to security issues, particularly North Korea's nuclear program and the ROK-US alliance, have been framed by the dichotomy of "national solidarity versus ROK-US solidarity." Throughout the Roh Moo-hyun administration, security debates have unfolded within this black-and-white logic, and public perception has been significantly influenced by this dichotomous thinking. Emphasizing the ROK-US alliance has naturally led to opposition to the withdrawal or reduction of US Forces Korea and a strengthening of hardline policies towards North Korea.

While the current debate between ruling and opposition parties, and between progressives and conservatives, has not yet escaped this dichotomous framework, the public is increasingly moving beyond black-and-white thinking regarding both North Korea and the United States. That is, the public perceives a coexistence of vigilance towards the threat from North Korea and anxiety about a unilateral pre-emptive strike by the United States. Consequently, attitudes towards North Korea and the US vary depending on the situational logic. This explains why public attitudes may appear inconsistent or logically contradictory.

“Opposed to unilateral engagement with North Korea, but also opposed to severing relations, such as suspending tours to Mt. Geumgang”

In other words, attitudes towards North Korea fluctuate between engagement and containment depending on the situation, and attitudes towards the United States are a mix of anti-American and pro-American sentiments depending on the issue. While vigilance towards North Korea leads to a cautious approach to unification and an emphasis on reciprocity rather than unilateral engagement, it does not mean a desire to abolish the engagement policy.

“ROK-US alliance is necessary for North Korean deterrence, but the possibility of a pre-emptive strike is also high”

The public, rather than unilaterally rejecting or expecting too much from the United States, calls for the maintenance and strengthening of the ROK-US alliance while simultaneously preparing for potential concerns raised by the US. While the importance of the ROK-US alliance is emphasized due to the North Korean nuclear test, half of the public believes there is a high possibility that the US will launch a pre-emptive strike against North Korea's nuclear weapons development. One of the reasons many people agree with the equation "sanctions on North Korea = war" is the concern that the US might launch a pre-emptive strike without regard for our intentions.

Possibility of US military action regarding North Korea's nuclear weapons development

“Reality Over Ideology: A Pluralistic and Complex Diagnosis”

This complex and realistic situational awareness leads to diverse perspectives in diagnosing the North Korean nuclear issue. The public is wary of Bush's unilateral approach, as much as North Korea's determination to develop nuclear weapons. Criticisms of the government being dragged along by North Korea coexist with voices pointing out the conflicting interests among the Six-Party Talks participants. Under these perceptions, unilateral containment and unilateral engagement are not realistically feasible.

Primary cause of difficulties in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue

(3) Public Desired Solutions and Prospects for North Korea

1. Solutions

“Utilize all dialogue,” “Carefully consider sanctions and PSI,” “Avoid severing relations and military attacks on North Korea”

"Desirable" solutions to the North Korean nuclear issue

2. "Resolution will be reached by accepting North Korea's nuclear possession": Ultimately accepting North Korea's nuclear weapons

Regarding solutions to the North Korean nuclear issue, dialogue is, of course, considered. Furthermore, over half of the public realistically considers sanctions or maritime blockades—excluding severance of relations or military action—as potential measures, reflecting widespread security concerns and vigilance towards North Korea. However, while relying on US security deterrence, there is also distrust. Consequently, the public lacks a clear solution for fundamentally resolving North Korea's nuclear development itself. This perception naturally reinforces a pessimistic outlook on resolving the North Korean nuclear issue.

Prospects for resolving the North Korean nuclear issue