[Global NK Commentary] There Is No Whiplash: South Korea’s Consistent Foreign Policy After the Early Election

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On June 3, 2025, South Korean voters elected Lee Jae-myung, the long-time leader of the opposition party, in an early presidential election. President-elect Lee had narrowly lost the 2022 presidential election to former President Yoon Suk-yeol, but emerged as the frontrunner after Yoon’s failed state of emergency, subsequent impeachment, and removal from office in December 2024. Lee positioned himself as the most viable alternative to Yoon, and was inaugurated hours after his election victory.

Tensions on the Korean Peninsula intensified under the conservative Yoon Suk-yeol administration. North Korea advanced its nuclear program and delivery systems, and escalated its ideological attacks on South Korea. Yoon justified his short-lived state of emergency by declaring his intent to "eradicate anti-state forces" and counter China’s malign influence on South Korean democracy (Kim, 2024a). Relations between Seoul and Beijing deteriorated as China’s assertive foreign policy deepened and its strategic competition and trade war with the United States intensified (Easley and Y. Kim, 2024). The international environment also worsened due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and its cooperation with North Korea, escalating conflicts in the Middle East, and Trump’s pressure on allies and friends to shoulder more of the burden of maintaining the rules-based international order.

Domestically, the legal battles between Yoon and Lee following the 2022 presidential election exacerbated South Korea’s political polarization. After prosecutors indicted Lee on five separate charges, he consolidated his control over the Democratic Party and expanded its parliamentary majority through a landslide victory in the general election. The opposition party exercised its parliamentary power through special prosecutor bills, impeachment motions against cabinet members, and budget impasses, blocking key legislative initiatives of the conservative ruling party. Since Lee’s inauguration, the Democratic Party still holds an overwhelming majority in the National Assembly. Thus, Lee possesses greater policy-making authority than Yoon did during his tenure, when he faced a divided government.

Lee’s campaign platform and inaugural address emphasized moderate pragmatism. However, his past political positions and actions drew fierce criticism from conservatives in South Korea and attracted the attention of observers watching from abroad. His references to "our North Korean leaders Kim Jong-il and Kim Il-sung," his assertion that joint ROK-Japan military exercises could serve as a pathway for the "re-invasion of colonial powers," and his claim that South Korea need not "say 'xièxie' (谢谢)' to China and Taiwan and intervene in cross-Strait issues" generated considerable controversy (Kim, 2024; Chae, 2022; Song, 2025).

Following the impeachment of a conservative president who prioritized military deterrence, economic security, and alliance cooperation, many experts anticipated that the new president, who led the progressive party’s transition, would pursue a sharply differentiated foreign policy. Lee was expected to represent an evolution of engagement policy, inheriting the legacy of Presidents Kim Dae-jung, Roh Moo-hyun, and Moon Jae-in. However, one month into the Lee administration, foreign policy exhibits calculated continuity rather than upheaval. What explains the limited scope of foreign policy change following South Korea’s dramatic political transition?

The ROK-U.S. Alliance: Still the Bedrock of South Korean Foreign Policy

One reason for the unexpectedly limited changes in South Korean foreign policy is the continued strategic importance of the ROK-U.S. alliance. Despite Trump’s imposition of tariffs, demands for increased burden-sharing, and critical remarks and tweets directed at South Korea, Seoul cannot afford to sever ties with Washington, align with China, or pursue independent nuclear armament.

South Koreans often refer to "security with America, economy with China" (Anmi-gyeongjung, 安美經中) (Sohn, 2019). However, Anmi-gyeongjung does not signify a strategic choice between the U.S. and China. This discourse reflects a motivation to simultaneously enjoy the benefits derived from relations with two competing superpowers while mitigating their friction and managing risks. Therefore, it is closer to political-economic pragmatism than 'hedging' in international relations theory.

South Korea’s status as a steadfast U.S. ally is based on its national interests; therefore, the new government has no reason to reconsider the alliance structure. However, as South Korea’s national power grows, discussions about its autonomy are expected to naturally increase. It is also politically beneficial for the government to demonstrate efforts to protect national interests and avoid excessive dependence on other countries. Furthermore, Trump-style deal-making, which leverages uncertainty, raises questions about U.S. extended deterrence, necessitating significant caution from South Korean leaders (Ham, 2025).

However, it is unlikely that a progressive South Korean administration would advocate for independent deterrence, the redeployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons, or South Korea’s potential nuclear armament (Jun, 2025). The progressive camp considers such policies neither pragmatic nor cost-effective. During the Yoon Suk-yeol administration, South Korean conservatives grew frustrated with the ineffectiveness of any policy toward North Korea and sought to pressure China to cooperate on North Korean issues or at least refrain from condoning Pyongyang’s actions (Easley and Chow, 2024).

Conversely, the progressive camp in South Korea adopts an approach that avoids unnecessarily antagonizing North Korea or China. The Yoon administration frequently spoke of the Kim Jong-un regime’s demise and made unvarnished remarks on issues sensitive to China (Kim, 2024b). As an opposition leader, Lee Jae-myung often engaged in undiplomatic behavior. However, as president, he is likely to adopt a more diplomatic stance. As part of this, South Korea will seek to avoid the impression of being entirely dependent on the United States. Nevertheless, the ROK-U.S. alliance will remain as important to South Korea as it was before the six months of political turmoil from December 2024 to June 2025.

ROK-Japan Relations: If It Ain’t Broke, Don’t Fix It

A second reason for the unexpected continuity in South Korean foreign policy stems from the value of relations with Japan, another U.S. ally. The progressive camp in South Korea, including Lee Jae-myung during his time as opposition leader, has faced criticism for weaponizing anti-Japanese sentiment against Japan and domestic political rivals. However, the current anti-Japanese stance has diminished political utility, stemming from situational differences between the present and the periods of the Roh Moo-hyun and Moon Jae-in administrations (Easley, 2023b).

Past administrations that prioritized engagement policy toward North Korea did not prioritize relations with Japan, even believing that conflict with Japan could lead to improved inter-Korean relations. However, following the collapse of the Hanoi U.S.-North Korea summit and the COVID-19 pandemic, the Kim Jong-un regime halted its diplomatic overtures. While diplomatic channels may not be entirely severed, North Korea has responded to South Korean outreach with measures such as the "Law on the Rejection of Anti-Ideological and Cultural Infiltration" and the "Theory of Two States in Hostile Relations" (Ha, 2024; Kim, 2025). Therefore, there is little room for cooperation with Japan to further deteriorate inter-Korean relations; rather, friendly relations with Japan could provide a foundation for South Korea to re-engage with North Korea from a position of strength.

South Korean public opinion and civic groups are relatively less focused on historical issues compared to previous decades. However, Japan must still make greater efforts toward reconciliation with South Korea and respect the sensitivities surrounding its colonial past and aggression in the last century. While Japanese nationalist forces still have the potential to negatively impact ROK-Japan relations, generational change in South Korean society has led to increased interest in economic opportunities over historical grievances.

With the rules-based international order under pressure, South Korea and Japan increasingly need each other for stable deterrence and engagement in Asia, and for economic security cooperation. The two countries are cooperating to enhance the resilience of critical technology and material supply chains and can strengthen export controls and sanctions enforcement capabilities. ROK-Japan cooperation is becoming more relevant not only in cyber, maritime, and energy security but also in development cooperation. Integrated efforts with the United States can make ROK-Japan cooperation more efficient and effective, thereby enabling trilateral cooperation among the ROK, the U.S., and Japan to provide public goods for the international order (Easley and S. Kim, 2024).

Perception of the Threat of Illicit ROK-Russia Transactions

A third reason for the unexpected lack of change in South Korean foreign policy is the increasingly negative role of Russia on the Korean Peninsula (Easley, 2025). Russia’s illicit invasion of Ukraine not only violates the UN Charter but also paralyzes the functioning of the UN Security Council and relevant bodies dealing with North Korean issues. Putin’s war connects the European and Indo-Pacific security domains, complicating efforts to pursue engagement policy with North Korea and potentially conflicting with China’s interests.

While policymakers and analysts primarily discuss how South Korea manages its security relationship with the United States and its economic relationship with China, the real issue is North Korea’s utilization of Russia for military development and China for economic gain. Russia’s military trade, utilization of North Korean forces, technology transfers, and potential joint military exercises could trigger an arms race in East Asia. Furthermore, Russia’s de facto recognition of North Korea as a nuclear-weapon state contradicts China’s long-standing policy of denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula (Lee, 2023).

Russia vetoed the extension of the UN Panel of Experts monitoring sanctions implementation against North Korea, blocked the possibility of multilateral dialogue similar to the Six-Party Talks, and made it difficult for European countries to engage with North Korea due to Pyongyang’s material support for Putin’s war effort. Russia’s blatant violation of UN sanctions threatens regional security, which is contrary to China’s interest in regional stability. Until Russia’s unproductive policies are resolved, it is difficult to expect North Korea to accept South Korea’s diplomatic approach or for the confrontation between blocs in East Asia to ease (Leoni and Tzinieris, 2024).

A Time for Pragmatic Engagement

No major shift in the new South Korean administration’s foreign policy has been observed yet. Such a major shift may not be desirable, but the new administration’s rhetorical changes can create space for diplomacy. Stakeholders on the Korean Peninsula should refrain from demanding concessions as preconditions for dialogue and instead focus on pragmatic engagement. In short, they should avoid self-defeating actions and pursue low-hanging fruit.

As part of efforts to avoid unproductive actions, Trump should reduce political and economic pressure on allies and friends, and Japan should continue to refrain from provoking historical disputes. North Korea should cease nuclear and intercontinental ballistic missile tests, as well as cyber and maritime attacks. Chinese leaders should recognize that provoking anti-Chinese sentiment in South Korea through coercive economic measures and overlapping exclusive economic zones and gray-zone tactics in the West Sea is unwise (Easley, 2023a).

President Lee Jae-myung has an opportunity to achieve meaningful diplomatic results with low costs early in his term. In his first month, Lee met with Japanese Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru at the G7 Summit in Canada, and both governments commemorated the 60th anniversary of diplomatic relations with forward-looking events emphasizing people-to-people exchanges and functional cooperation. Lee may also meet with Trump in early August to sign a trade agreement to avoid excessive tariffs. If Chinese President Xi Jinping visits South Korea for the APEC Summit in November, there will be a significant opportunity to normalize relations in a manner that establishes a more cooperative balance between Seoul and Beijing.

Inter-Korean relations remain challenging, but gradual improvement is possible. Restoring the September 19 Inter-Korean Military Agreement may be difficult, but recent events suggest an implicit understanding of reciprocity between the two Koreas. Pyongyang ceased sending trash balloons during South Korea’s political turmoil, and the Lee administration has restrained civic groups from sending leaflets to the North since taking office. The day after the Lee administration ordered a halt to loudspeaker broadcasts, North Korea ceased its noise broadcasts that had alarmed residents near the border. South Korea’s repatriation of six North Korean fishermen in July 2025 also aligns with a pattern of indirect coordination without direct communication between the two Koreas. While South Korea’s adherence to democratic legal procedures, transparent cooperation with the UN Command, and full prioritization of human rights are important considerations, if mutual restraint expands to include drones and jamming, and leads to the reactivation of military communication lines, the two Koreas can rebuild trust and reduce the risk of unintended escalation.

The cautious approach typically taken by new administrations involves appointing key personnel, reviewing past policies, addressing domestic issues, and developing a consistent foreign policy based on strategic realities and political constraints. However, given the current international challenges, the Lee administration has no time to waste. Under the sentiment of "Anything but Yoon," it is undesirable to "throw the baby out with the bathwater" by making a drastic policy shift. Instead, the Lee administration must strengthen trilateral cooperation with the United States and Japan to persuade China, and ultimately North Korea, that relations with South Korea offer far greater value than a likely losing bet on Russia’s revisionist agenda. ■

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■ Author: Leif-Eric EASLEY (Ph.D. in Political Science, Harvard University) is a professor at Ewha Womans University, where he lectures on international security and political economy. He expresses his gratitude to research assistant Choi Dabin for her excellent research support.

■ Editor: OH Inhwan_Senior Research Fellow, EAI; JUNG Jonghyuk_Research Fellow, Korea National Diplomatic Academy

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