[Global NK Commentary] The Iran War and CRINK: Structural Change and the Korean Peninsula Issue

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The Iran War and CRINK: Why Should They Be Viewed Together?

The Iran War, which began on February 28, 2026, with surprise airstrikes by the United States and Israel (Operation Epic Fury), appears superficially confined to the Middle East. However, its strategic implications extend beyond the region. The Iran War amplifies the strategic competition between the U.S. and China, shakes the threat perceptions and postures of allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific, and has the character of 'multi-regional strategic interconnectedness' that prompts a readjustment of responses from China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea (CRINK).

Although CRINK is not an exclusive bloc or alliance, the Iran War serves as a catalyst that strengthens strategic solidarity among them, as they share dissatisfaction that the principles, rules, and institutions of the existing order undermine their interests.[1] Particularly, given the significant 'functional wartime alignment' where solidarity is triggered and reinforced under the condition of war, the claims for a multipolar order by revisionist states following the Iran War are becoming increasingly visible as a change in the international structure. On the foundation of structural shifts, the CRINK states are developing their loose strategic alignment into strategic solidarity through multipolarism and anti-hegemony discourse centered on China, and North Korea is strategically utilizing these changes to justify and strengthen its 'nuclear-state status' and 'doctrine of two states in hostile relations.'[2] Therefore, North Korea-Russia military cooperation, Iran-Russia drone cooperation, and North Korea-China new strategic cooperation should not be viewed as separate individual collaborations, but rather as a single flow developing into strategic solidarity under the common norm of anti-hegemony. Furthermore, since North Korea is embedding the de facto establishment of two hostile states and nuclear possession within anti-U.S., anti-hegemony, and anti-militarism discourse, the issues of North Korean denuclearization and stability on the Korean Peninsula can be seen as operating in conjunction with the changes in the international structure of CRINK.

Structural Change and the Iran War

The driving force behind CRINK's consolidation is 'structure.' The transition from a unipolar to a multipolar order satisfies the respective interests of all four nations.

For China, multipolarization signifies the weakening of the U.S.-led unipolar order, which legitimizes its discourse of 'great changes unseen in a century' and its vision of a 'community of shared future for mankind.' China utilizes CRINK as an 'agency' to realize its own world order, inducing North Korea's parallel pursuit of nuclear and conventional weapons and military modernization to impose costs on the U.S. on the 'eastern front.' For Russia, multipolarization is the strategic environment that enables the prolongation of the war in Ukraine and the endurance of Western sanctions. International sanctions have been rendered ineffective by North Korea's supply of ammunition and personnel and Iran's provision of drones, while multipolar discourse provides both legitimacy for the invasion and justification for anti-Western alignment. For Iran, multipolarization is a pathway to regime survival and evasion of sanctions. By joining the SCO and BRICS, it has secured diplomatic and economic avenues within the multipolar system, while its asymmetric denial capability in the Strait of Hormuz disperses U.S. military and diplomatic resources and lessens the burden on CRINK states. For North Korea, multipolarization provides discourse that solidifies its status as a nuclear-weapon state, frames the 'doctrine of two states in hostile relations' as an 'international and regional issue,' and expands its diplomatic space for hedging against both China and Russia through 'asymmetric equidistance.'

Although the interests pursued by these four nations differ, their objectives converge in their shared desire for the 'weakening of the U.S.-led unipolar order,' a structural change. The scene at the 2025 September Beijing Victory Day parade, where Xi Jinping stood alongside Putin and Kim Jong Un, with the Iranian president positioned behind them, can be seen as a signal that visually demonstrated this convergence.

Furthermore, the very outcome of the Iran War creates a favorable structure for CRINK. Many experts consider a 'Strategic Freeze'—a frozen conflict without a decisive victory—as the most realistic outcome of the Iran War, with Russia and China being the biggest beneficiaries. The fact that the U.S. expends ammunition needed for the Indo-Pacific in the Middle East and is tied down there benefits China and Russia. Additionally, in the 'Wild Card' scenario, where Iran effectively acquires nuclear weapons through technology and arms transfers from Russia and North Korea, the military-technological nexus of CRINK could pose a threat that fundamentally alters the regional balance.

[3]This not only destabilizes the Middle East but also the Indo-Pacific region and the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, the Iran War is bringing about changes in the international structure in at least the following three aspects.First, the amplification of the U.S.-China strategic competition structure. The Iran War has shifted U.S. strategic attention and resources from the Indo-Pacific to the Middle East. Despite the Trump administration's second National Security Strategy prioritizing the Indo-Pacific and explicitly mentioning a reduction in Middle East focus, the outbreak of war with Iran directly contradicted that strategy.

[4] The consumption of approximately 50% of key munitions, such as THAAD and Patriot missiles, served as a warning of a vacuum in preparations for a high-intensity conflict with China.[5] Conversely, China avoided direct intervention by maintaining a 'restrained observation,' leading to a 'constructive strategic stability' between the U.S. and China.[6] Paradoxically, the more the U.S. intensified its confrontation with Iran, the more pressure on Russia was eased, thus accelerating the Sino-Russian alignment that the U.S. had sought to prevent.[7][7]

Second, the demonstration of 'asymmetric leverage' and the re-evaluation of North Korea's strategic value. Iran's greatest leverage was not its nuclear weapons or missiles, but the blockade of Hormuz; it was assessed that only one or two drones were sufficient to disrupt navigation.[8] Furthermore, by selectively allowing passage only to ships linked to friendly nations, Iran set a precedent where access to strategic locations depends not on 'open norms' but on 'political relationships.'[9] This prompts a re-evaluation of the strategic value of North Korea's geopolitical location (Tumen River corridor, Rajin logistics axis, access to the East Sea). At the same time, the fact that Iran became a target of decapitation and preemptive strikes is interpreted by North Korea as a lesson on 'vulnerability in the absence of nuclear deterrence,' serving as a basis for accelerating the pace of parallel development of nuclear and conventional weapons.

Third, AI-driven warfare and the drone nexus. The Iran War demonstrated a 'revolutionary shortening of decision time' through targeting that combined large language models with Maven Smart Systems, while Iran countered with a volume of drones and missiles. In this asymmetric context, North Korea is likely to develop deterrence and response strategies based on increased production of drones and missiles in the future. Furthermore, North Korea's dispatch of over 10,000 technical personnel to Russia suggests that the consolidation of CRINK states could expand into the military sector, developing into a 'drone-cyber-missile complex nexus.'

China's Strategic Calculus and Spillover to the Korean Peninsula

1) China's Sequential Summit Diplomacy and the Evaporation of 'Denuclearization'

The repercussions of the Iran War became visible in diplomatic outcomes during a series of summit meetings centered around China in May-June 2026: U.S.-China (May), China-Russia (May), and North Korea-China (June). While the U.S.-China summit maintained the facade of 'managed competition,' China announced that the U.S. had agreed to build a 'constructive strategic stability relationship,' which would provide 'strategic guidance' for U.S.-China relations for the next three years or more.[10] Four days later, the joint statement from the China-Russia summit strongly criticized the U.S. and Israeli attack on Iran as a violation of international law, deliberately highlighting the 'temperature difference' compared to the preceding U.S.-China meeting. It also explicitly stated positions on joint responses to U.S. missile defense systems (Golden Dome) and U.S.-Japan missile deployments, vigilance against Japanese remilitarization, and opposition to sanctions and pressure on North Korea.[11]

Subsequently, during the North Korea-China summit (June 8-9), which marked President Xi Jinping's first foreign visit of the year and his first visit to Pyongyang in seven years, China's view of the multipolar order became even clearer. In an article for the visit, President Xi Jinping excluded 'issues on the Korean Peninsula,' 'denuclearization,' and 'peaceful dialogue,' repeatedly emphasizing 'strategic cooperation,' 'opposition to hegemony and power politics,' and 'multipolarization of the world' instead.[12] Kim Jong Un also pledged to 'maintain North Korea-China friendship as the primary strategic undertaking' and expressed support for China's 'community of shared future for mankind' and 'Global Four Initiatives.'[13] The issue is that China's traditional three principles for the Korean Peninsula (denuclearization, peace and stability, dialogue and negotiation), as shown in <Table 1>, have been gradually phased out since their peak in the May 2025 White Paper, and have been effectively dismantled with the rise of 'multipolar order,' 'strategic cooperation,' and 'anti-hegemony' in their place.[14] This should be viewed not as a mere change in rhetoric, but as a restructuring of China's policy framework toward the Korean Peninsula itself, and a structural change that has already entered the consolidation phase.

In particular, it is noteworthy that China applied 'community of shared future for mankind' and the 'Global Four Initiatives (GDI, GSI, GCI, GGI)' to the North Korea-China summit. This is because it aligns with the trend of consolidating a multipolar order by integrating the China-centric world order with the SCO, BRICS, and the Belt and Road Initiative.[15] The discourse of multipolarism and anti-hegemony serves as an ideological adhesive binding the loose alignment of CRINK and is evolving into strategic language through which China incorporates North Korea, Russia, and Iran into its own-led order.

<Table 1> Gradual Elimination of 'Denuclearization' and 'Korean Peninsula Issues' in Chinese Official Documents

Source: Compiled by the author based on official Chinese documents and summit statements.

2) Spillover to the Korean Peninsula: The Theory of Hostile States and the Structural Transformation of North Korea-China Relations

The Iran War and CRINK's pursuit of multipolarization are reinforcing the logic of North Korea's "theory of hostile states" by linking with it. North Korea, one day before the North Korea-China summit, through a statement by Kim Yo Jong, demanded recognition of its status as a nuclear-weapon state and the elimination of denuclearization discourse, and through a statement by the Deputy Director General of the General Equipment Department of the Ministry of National Defense, emphasized symmetric and asymmetric military measures, citing U.S. arms sales to South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan.[16]In other words, North Korea is leveraging China's "anti-hegemony and anti-Japanese militarism" framework to reframe its nuclear-weapon state status and hostile states theory as an "international and regional issue between North Korea and China."

Consequently, three changes are emerging regarding the Korean Peninsula issue. First, the collapse of functional separation. By removing the three principles for the Korean Peninsula and denuclearization from North Korea-China relations, North Korea's nuclear program and hostile states theory have shifted from a "cost" of cooperation to an "asset." Second, asymmetric equidistance. Kim Jong Un is broadening diplomatic space between Russia and China, while China seeks to re-integrate North Korea, which is leaning towards Russia, into its orbit. Third, dual asymmetry. This refers to a state where two asymmetries in different directions operate simultaneously on the Korean Peninsula. One is North Korea's "asymmetric equidistance," a hedging strategy where North Korea broadens its diplomatic space by adjusting the distance between the two great powers in its favor without becoming completely subordinate to either. The other is China's "asymmetric leverage," where China converts North Korea's geopolitical value—its parallel development of nuclear and conventional capabilities and critical points such as the Tumen River corridor and access to the East Sea—into a "means of imposing costs on the United States" with almost no direct cost to itself. As North Korea's existence and provocations tie down U.S. attention and resources on the "eastern front" of the Indo-Pacific, it creates a structure where North Korea bears the burden and China reaps the strategic dividends.

In essence, as North Korea enhances its strategic value between Russia and China, and China seeks to use North Korea as a leverage against the U.S. again, North Korea and China become important strategic cards for each other. Furthermore, the more the unstable end of the Iran War ties down the U.S. in the Middle East, the greater the cost-imposing effect of the North Korean card on the eastern front becomes. Thus, the Iran War can be a variable accelerating the "dual asymmetry" dynamic. Additionally, North Korea's theory of hostile states also favorably contributes to developing a "new strategic cooperative" relationship between North Korea and China. The policy of "national borderization" of the Military Demarcation Line and the replacement of the "southern border firepower posture" with new and modernized weapons, emphasizing the "construction of the most powerful artillery force," is[17]aimed at major military bases, airfields, ports, and power facilities in South Korea, as well as U.S. military bases in South Korea.

Assessment and Implications

The Iran War is not merely a regional conflict in the Middle East but a prime example of "multiregional strategic interconnectedness" linked to the Indo-Pacific and the Korean Peninsula, with its repercussions culminating in the multipolar diplomacy of the China bloc, leading to the tacit acceptance of North Korea's nuclear program and the consolidation of CRINK. In particular, the elimination of the "denuclearization" norm necessitates a fundamental re-examination of the premises of South Korean foreign and security policy.

First, the utility of the China role theory needs to be examined and redesigned. The China role theory was predicated on the assumption that China shared the goal of North Korean denuclearization and would cooperate in pressuring and mediating with North Korea. If this premise is no longer valid, it is necessary to re-establish the principles of engagement with China and redesign China policy.

Second, adjustments are needed in the direction, strategy, and approach of North Korea policy. As North Korea and China attempt to structurally shift towards multipolarism by substituting the "North Korean nuclear threat" with the "anti-Japan and anti-hegemony and regional stability" framework, we must uphold the language of denuclearization norms on the international stage and block the de facto acceptance of North Korea's status as a nuclear-weapon state. In particular, we must proactively manage the "revival of Japanese militarism" frame to prevent it from being exploited as a point of relaxation in ROK-U.S.-Japan security cooperation, while demonstrating "strategic empathy" for the U.S.'s multiregional crises, positioning ourselves as an "indispensable ally," and reinforcing the credibility of extended deterrence.

Third, the response to CRINK needs to be refined. While avoiding overestimating CRINK as a monolithic bloc, its binding factors must be controlled to the greatest extent possible. We must precisely identify and selectively approach "cracks" such as North Korea's wariness of China, the uncertainty of its alignment with Russia, and the divergence of interests between China and Russia. Simultaneously, focus must be placed on specific nodes such as North Korea-Russia military cooperation, new strategic cooperation between North Korea and China, and the nexus of drones, cyber, and missiles. In particular, the issue of North Korea, China, and Russia advancing into the East Sea through the Tumen River is directly linked to our maritime and security interests and requires careful management. ■

[1] Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Richard Fontaine, “The Axis of Upheaval: How America’s Adversaries Are Uniting to Overturn the Global Order,” Foreign Affairs, April 23, 2024.

[2] Victoria Leukavets, “Cracking the CRINK: Belarus’s Relations with Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea,” Policy Brief, 2026.3.31, tsikhanouskaya.org. Defining CRINK as 'functional wartime alignment'.

[3] Chase Metcalf & Michael Posey, “From Bargain to Breakdown: Five Strategic Futures for the Iran War,” Small Wars Journal, April 6, 2026.

[4] Jeffrey Taliaferro, “4 ways the war in Iran has weakened the US in the great power game,” Defense One, April 13, 2026.

[5] Mark F. Cancian & Chris H. Park, “Last Rounds? Status of Key Munitions at the Iran War Ceasefire,” CSIS, April 21, 2026; Seth G. Jones, “Is the United States Prepared for a War with China?” CSIS, May 12, 2026.

[6] Patricia M. Kim et al., “Beijing’s approach to the conflict in Iran and its implications for China,” Brookings, May 2026.

[7] Jordan Ryan, “Iran War Unravels U.S. Strategy and Strengthens Russia–China Axis,” Toda Peace Institute, March 24, 2026.

[8] Daniel Byman, “Iran’s Strait of Hormuz Gambit and the Limits of U.S. Military Power,” CSIS, April 20, 2026.

[9] Kari Heerman and David Wessel, “Chokepoints and coercion: Iran’s challenge to maritime openness,” Brookings, June 8, 2026.

[10] "Xi Jinping Holds Talks with U.S. President Trump", 2026.5.14. (www.mfa.gov.cn) Chinese official statement on the U.S.-China summit.

[11]"Joint Statement on Strengthening Comprehensive Strategic Partnership and Deepening Good-Neighborly Friendship and Cooperation between the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation," 2026.5.21. (www.gov.cn).

[12]"Carrying Forward and Moving Forward Together, Writing a New Chapter in China-North Korea Traditional Friendship," Xinhua/Rodong Sinmun, 2026.6.8. (Op-ed by Xi Jinping during his visit to North Korea)

[13]Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, "Xi Jinping Holds Talks with General Secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea and Chairman of State Affairs Commission Kim Jong Un," 2026.6.8; Korean Central News Agency, 2026.6.9.

[14]Lee Ho-ryeong, "Strategic Implications of the 2026 North Korea-China Summit: The Evaporation of 'Denuclearization' and the Structural Transformation of North Korea-China Relations," KIDA Security Strategy FOCUS No. 26-41, 2026.6.25.

[15] Jeong Jae-heung, “2026 Global Geopolitical Crisis and the Emergence of a New International Order: Focusing on Sino-Russian Strategic Cooperation,” Sejong Focus, March 4, 2026.

[16] Korean Central News Agency, Statement by Kim Yo Jong and Announcement by the Vice Director of the General Bureau of Equipment of the Ministry of National Defense, June 7, 2026.

[17] Korean Central News Agency, June 26, 2026.

■ Lee Ho-ryeong_Senior Research Fellow, Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA).

■ Lee Sang-jun_Research Fellow, EAI; Oh In-hwan_Senior Research Fellow, EAI

    Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 211) | leesj@eai.or.kr