[Special Commentary on the US-Iran War] ④ The Iran War: The Rise of Space Intelligence Warfare and Military-Industrial Complex 2.0

Advanced Warfare vs. Cost-Effective Warfare

The Iran War provided an unfiltered glimpse into 21st-century advanced warfare. In the early stages of the war, the United States concentrated on neutralizing Iran's air defense systems and naval forces by mobilizing advanced weaponry. Having achieved its initial military objectives, the US assessed that Iran would not be able to blockade the Strait of Hormuz. Iran's high dependence on the Strait of Hormuz also supported this assessment. The US anticipated that the economic impact would be greater for Iran itself than for any other party, thus making a blockade a factor that could threaten the survival of the Iranian leadership.

It was impossible for Iran to counter the US's all-out offensive. However, Iran demonstrated greater resilience than expected. Facing an absolute disadvantage in economic power, Iran focused on striking key US strategic assets rather than engaging in large-scale airstrikes. Iran's alternative was an asymmetric strategy of selectively targeting high-value US strategic assets. In the approximately 40 days since the start of the war, Iran used about 6,400 missiles and drones. Although most were intercepted, some managed to penetrate the air defense systems and successfully strike expensive radar facilities located in Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Qatar. Iran thus demonstrated the power of its asymmetric capabilities through missiles and drones.

Iran's strategy proved to be exceptionally cost-effective. The US expended a significant portion of its weapons inventory to thwart Iran's attacks. The depletion rates for specific weapons were 25% for JASSM, 32% for Tomahawk, and 61% for Patriot. The unit price for these weapons ranges from $2.6 million to $3.9 million. In contrast, the Iranian drones used in these attacks cost only $20,000 to $50,000 per unit. Furthermore, the US approved a total of $45 billion in Foreign Military Sales (FMS) in the first quarter of 2026 alone. This was because countries like Saudi Arabia, which had depleted their weapons inventories due to Iranian attacks, requested approval for arms sales worth $9 billion from the US, including Patriot PAC-3. This is the outcome of an asymmetric strategy.

The Transparent Battlefield

A new point of attention in the Iran War is the close integration of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) into military operations. The Iran War is special in three aspects. First, ISR was utilized very extensively. ISR was employed in almost all US operations, including intelligence gathering, airstrikes on nuclear facilities, neutralization of air defense systems, and maritime blockade. As of February 28, 2026, the integrated commercial satellite constellation shortened the re-imaging cycle for Iran's nuclear and defense infrastructure to hourly intervals. This brought about a fundamental change in the relationship between the speed of conflict and the availability of imagery compared to any past operation. Consequently, the US executed various space-based operations within 96 hours of the operation's commencement, including GPS jamming, electronic warfare countermeasures, and expanded collection of commercial satellite imagery.

21st-century warfare is no longer carpet bombing warfare where munitions were used limitlessly. Warfare begins with the collection of high-resolution, high-speed imagery of the adversary's key military facilities before direct engagement. The core of 21st-century advanced warfare lies in the in-depth analysis of collected data through AI to rapidly determine strike priorities and execute precision strikes. It is no exaggeration to say that ISR capabilities against an adversary can determine the outcome of a war even before it begins. This is why 21st-century advanced warfare is referred to as a 'transparent battlefield.' ISR-based advanced warfare is generally observed as an irreversible change.

Democratization and Commercialization of ISR

Second, the 'democratization of ISR' using space assets has become a reality. It has been confirmed on the battlefield that ISR capabilities using space assets are no longer the exclusive domain of superpowers like the United States. As demonstrated by Iran and Ukraine, ISR capabilities have become strategic assets that can be accessed relatively easily, even by non-superpowers. ISR capabilities play a crucial role in overcoming, to some extent, the disadvantages in conventional military strength as well as advanced military capabilities.

Third, the democratization of ISR has been made possible by actively leveraging the improved technologies of commercial satellite and service providers. Outer space is a complex domain where militarization and commercialization proceed simultaneously. As vividly demonstrated by the case of SpaceX in the United States, the US is making all-out efforts to maintain its lead in the space industry and rapidly convert this into space military capabilities. This is no exception in ISR. Satellite service providers are moving away from their past business strategies of primarily targeting the niche market of commercial remote sensing with high-resolution, high-speed imaging capabilities, and are pursuing a change by providing ISR-based data to parties involved in conflicts.

The Other Side of the Iran War: China's ISR Support

The democratization of ISR is not solely due to Iran's expanded direct accessibility. China's support behind Iran's asymmetric attacks is gradually being revealed. From China's perspective, the Russia-Ukraine War provided an opportunity to indirectly collect information related to the war, particularly about the capabilities of advanced US weapons such as Patriot missile systems and F-16 fighter jets.

For China, the US-Iran War was a stage to directly acquire, and even test, information on the US's advanced warfighting capabilities. In particular, this war presented a golden opportunity to acquire real battlefield information on the US's detection-tracking-interception capabilities for missiles and drones. This is another reason why China actively pursued cooperation with Iran. Based on satellite imagery and geospatial information provided by China, Iran was able to identify key US military assets relatively quickly and accurately, which was also used to prioritize targets. This information was the last resort for Iran, which was at an absolute disadvantage in military power, to sustain the war.

It has been revealed that MizarVision, a Chinese satellite imagery company, provided Iran with images analyzing US military deployments before the war began. This company, known as Meentropy Technology, is an open-source intelligence (OSINT) startup. Meentropy Technology analyzed data collected from commercial satellites to provide Iran with observational intelligence on US troop movements. The Trump administration imposed sanctions on three Chinese satellite companies, including Meentropy Technology, Earth Eye, and Chang Guang Satellite Technology, in May 2026.

While the US government's sanctions were an expected measure, China's reaction, which had been cautious about escalating the conflict, was somewhat surprising. Less than a month after the sanctions were announced, in June 2026, Chang Guang Satellite Technology released high-resolution satellite photos of the headquarters of Nvidia and Apple, symbols of the US's advanced industries. These photos were of such high resolution that they could capture not only the exteriors of Nvidia and Apple but also the status of construction sites. Given that Chang Guang Satellite Technology is reportedly linked to the People's Liberation Army, there may be controversy over whether it is purely a civilian company. Considering that the Jilin-1 satellite, which took these photos, is itself a commercial remote sensing satellite constellation, China's intention to showcase its reconnaissance capabilities against key adversary facilities by mobilizing commercial satellites of civilian satellite companies can be inferred.

This is not the first time Chinese satellite information has been used militarily. Starting with the provision of satellite imagery to Russia's mercenary Wagner group in the Russia-Ukraine War in November 2022, Chinese companies have also reportedly provided satellite information to the Houthi militia. When a satellite owned by Mino Technology, which transferred ownership to Russia in 2024, was used to reconnoiter Ukraine, the UK sanctioned Mino Technology in February 2026, citing its destabilizing effect on Ukraine. As indirect military cooperation through satellite reconnaissance has sharply increased in recent years, China has come to be nicknamed 'space mercenary'.

ISR Innovation

A similar phenomenon occurred in ISR. US companies such as Maxar Technologies and Planet Labs, which dominate the commercial Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT) market, began to be actively utilized by the US government for battlefield observation. Maxar Technologies and Planet Labs play complementary roles in integrating ISR into military operations. While Maxar Technologies provides 90% of the GEOINT used by the US government as foundational national security data, Planet Labs, operating hundreds of small satellites, photographs the entire Earth daily. By combining Maxar Technologies' high-resolution data with Planet Labs' global observation data, the US government can dramatically reduce the time required for collecting and analyzing military data, such as identifying military equipment, analyzing strike damage, and tracking troop movements. Even before the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine War, the US demonstrated its ability to make decisions indicating Russia's military buildup through Maxar Technologies' ISR data.

The Emergence of Military-Industrial Complex 2.0: 'Faster, Cheaper, More'

ISR innovation was further enhanced by the military integration of AI. In May 2021, the Israel-Hamas War became known as the world's first 'AI War' as Israel integrated AI into military operations for target identification and weapon system operation. Israel's ability to integrate AI technology into military operations was the result of efforts to cooperate not only with its own AI startups but also with US big tech companies such as Amazon, Google, and Microsoft.

The Iran War starkly demonstrated that intelligence fusion, combining human intelligence (HUMINT), ISR, and AI, has emerged as the dominant factor in warfare. The US's acquisition of formidable military capabilities was also the result of organically integrating the capabilities of emerging tech companies like Palantir. Palantir's 'Maven Smart System' significantly reduced the decision-making time from target list creation to strike priority determination by integrating large volumes of battlefield data collected from satellites and drones onto a single platform. As a result, it took only 24 hours to strike 1,000 targets within Iran during the execution of Operation Epic Fury.

Neo primes such as Palantir, SpaceX, and Anduril are harbingers of the transformation of the military-industrial complex. Having fully experienced the effects of Iran's cost-effective warfare, the Trump administration accelerated the reorganization of the traditional military-industrial complex centered around big primes. The big primes were too busy replenishing depleted inventories, leading to President Trump's dissatisfaction. This is where the neo primes stepped in. They championed a new defense paradigm symbolized by 'faster, cheaper, more' and actively adopted innovative approaches to weapons development. The core of this was the rapid conversion of commercial technologies into military-grade technologies with modifications. This marks the advent of Military-Industrial Complex 2.0.

South Korea's Response

(1) Transition to a New Defense Paradigm

Nations that have witnessed the nature of advanced warfare are increasingly engaging in competition for the military integration of advanced technologies. This is particularly evident in Middle Eastern countries that have experienced war. Even Iran's Supreme Leader, Sayyid Ali Khamenei, urged to 'conquer AI,' highlighting the critical importance of military integration of advanced technologies. A prime example is the UAE's acquisition of a 30% stake in the Israeli AI drone detection company Thirdeye Systems through its state-owned defense company EDGE, and its joint venture with US-based Anduril to jointly produce AI-enhanced drones. Turkey, a strong player in drones, is also intensely focused on developing drones equipped with AI image processing software, primarily through STM and Baykar Defense. As competition for the integration of advanced technologies intensifies, South Korea needs to rapidly pursue a transition to a new defense paradigm. The core of this will be a dual strategy of enhancing traditional defense industry's indigenous innovation capabilities while strengthening cooperation with leading neo primes.

(2) Preparing for the Militarization and Commercialization of ISR

The advantage, and also the disadvantage, of commercialization is its high degree of sharing and accessibility. Satellite imagery provided by private companies offers the advantage of sharing information not only within the government but also with allies and partners without revealing the source or collection methods. This facilitates military cooperation and, furthermore, joint operations with allies. On the other hand, ISR provided by private companies through paid services carries the critical risk of unlimited access. Accelerating this trend are platforms that enhance satellite imagery and analysis. SkyFi, which includes over 50 satellite service providers such as Vantor, Planet Labs, Satellogic, Umbra, and ICEYE, is a prime example. SkyFi does not own its own satellites but operates a platform that integrates the diverse services of satellite service providers. Users of this service can combine and use imagery and analysis from various companies as needed. This significantly enhances the convenience of satellite imagery services while also presenting side effects due to the dramatically increased accessibility. It is not impossible for hostile nations like Iran or non-state actors to access this data. As the commercialization of space accelerates, there is a need to prepare for the new phenomenon of accelerated militarization of ISR in the military domain.

(3) Establishing New Boundaries Between State and Private Sector

While the military use of ISR is indeed rapidly increasing, there are still barriers to overcome. Commercial imagery is not military intelligence in itself. For satellite imagery to have military value, the ability to combine it with analysis based on GEOINT and classified military information is essential. However, existing fragmented governance often hinders the collection, analysis, and utilization of new types of information. Firstly, there are delays in the military adoption of commercial services. Furthermore, while there is consensus on the principle that commercial satellite information needs to be actively integrated, there are delays in establishing practical implementation plans.

To address these issues, fundamental efforts to redefine the boundaries between government and corporations must precede. As the utilization of commercial technologies or services expands, cases where the boundaries between public and private sectors become blurred are frequent. The fact that Maxar provides 90% of GEOINT to the US military, as mentioned above, is a prime example of blurring the boundaries between government and corporations. This is because Maxar's facilities and equipment used for ISR can be considered core national infrastructure. To more actively utilize private commercial technologies and services, it is necessary to establish elastic yet clear boundaries between the state and the private sector. ■

■Lee Seung-ju_Professor, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Chung-Ang University.

■ Contact and Editing: Lee Sang-jun_EAI Researcher
Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 211) | leesj@eai.or.kr