North Korea and the World: Deepening of the North Korea-China-Russia Triangular Alliance and its Implications for Korean Peninsula Security

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IVNRmevPtdA

■ Author: Park Won-gon_Director of the EAI Center for North Korean Studies. Professor of North Korean Studies at Ewha Womans University.

■ Contact and Editing: Lim Jae-hyun_EAI Researcher

    Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) | jhlim@eai.or.kr

Video Transcript

Analysis of China-Russia Summit: Strengthening Anti-US Alliance and Korean Peninsula Issues

There was much anticipation about whether Kim Jong Un would appear at this North Korea-China summit. He did not. Welcome to Park Won Gon's North Korea and the World. Today, we will analyze the China-Russia summit held on May 20th and the North Korea-China summit held on June 8th and 9th. In a previous video, we covered the US-China summit. There have been a great many international events in the past month or two.

The fact that bilateral summits are continuously being held among countries connected to the Korean Peninsula has a significant impact on our security. In particular, messages regarding North Korea issues are emerging from these summits in various forms. Even the absence of a message can be interpreted as a message, allowing for diverse interpretations, which we believe holds significant meaning for us. Therefore, we will analyze these developments. First, let's examine the China-Russia summit. After Chinese President Xi Jinping's state visit to the US at the invitation of President Trump, he again invited Russian President Vladimir Putin as a state guest to Beijing for a summit, just two months later. The most striking feature of this summit becomes apparent when compared to the US-China summit. The post-summit statement from the US-China meeting was less than two pages long, in the form of a US fact sheet. In other words, it was a very concise statement and not a joint communiqué. While the US and China each issued their own statements, this time,

the joint statement between Russia and China spans a full two pages. It is a very extensive document, titled 'Joint Statement on Deepening Comprehensive Strategic Cooperative Partnership and Promoting Lasting Friendship and Cooperation.' The title itself is lengthy, reflecting the detailed and multifaceted cooperation between the two countries. Firstly, it is evident that China and Russia share a common worldview. The statement includes the phrase 'multipolar international order and more equitable governance' in its opening. This aligns with North Korea's assertion of a 'fair and just multipolar order.' The multipolar international order pursued by China, Russia, and North Korea is not merely a multipolar order; it is one that is equitable for them and designed to counter the United States.

While this statement does not explicitly name the United States, it clearly exhibits an anti-US orientation. For instance, it includes phrases such as 'resolutely oppose hegemonism and unilateralism' and 'infringing upon the sovereignty of other countries and suppressing the economic and scientific-technological development of other countries.' In summary, China and Russia have characterized actions such as the US attempt to oust President Maduro in Venezuela and the potential for war with Iran as violations of other countries' sovereignty. Furthermore, they argue that blocking China's high-end semiconductor exports and prohibiting technology exports 'undermines the principles of free trade.'

While, as repeatedly stated, the United States is not explicitly named, the intent is clear from the content. Ultimately, China and Russia are unequivocally stating their desire to see the US dethroned from its superpower status and replaced by a multipolar order where China holds equivalent hegemonic power. Moreover, Russia's decision to align with China is clearly demonstrated in this joint statement. It is evident that they have once again affirmed their commitment to strengthening and solidifying the anti-US bloc through a triangular alliance and cooperation framework involving North Korea, China, and Russia.

Secondly, based on this shared worldview, their stance on the Korean Peninsula issue, particularly their support for North Korea, is noteworthy. This is because there is no mention of 'denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.' Instead, it only includes the content of 'safeguarding peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.' However, more importantly, it states, 'opposing threats to North Korea's security through diplomatic isolation, economic sanctions, and military pressure.' This refers to the economic sanctions currently imposed on North Korea,

Tumen River Access Project and Opposition to the Three-Axis System

which is referred to as military pressure, implying a response to North Korea's nuclear advancements. Diplomatic isolation, while partly self-inflicted by North Korea's nuclear development leading to UN sanctions resolutions, is also framed as detrimental to North Korea's security. This clearly demonstrates China and Russia's unwavering support for North Korea. Additionally, the statement mentions the 'Tumen River Initiative,' which, according to the 'Eastern Border Agreement' signed by China and Russia in 1991, involves continued trilateral consultations with North Korea on the issue of Tumen River access. In 1991, China and Russia discussed the issue of access to the East Sea via the Tumen River. This summit indicates their intention to realize this. China fundamentally lacks direct access to the East Sea. To reach the East Sea, it must pass through the Tumen River, which borders North Korea for most of its length and Russia at its mouth. Therefore, China's access to the East Sea via the Tumen River requires cooperation with North Korea and Russia. The fact that this is included in the China-Russia summit agenda signifies a significant development. This is because it indicates that North Korea, China, and Russia are moving beyond symbolic cooperation, such as Kim Jong Un's appearance at the China Victory Day parade last September, to engage in practical trilateral cooperation and projects, thereby elevating the existing trilateral alliance to a new level. This aspect warrants attention. Furthermore, China and Russia not only support North Korea but also specifically raise concerns about South Korea, which is directly exposed to the existential threat of North Korea's nuclear program, and the 'Three-Axis System,' a deterrence strategy pursued by South Korea and the United States as part of their alliance. The phrase 'opposing preemptive strikes, deep precision strikes, Kill Chain, Mass Punishment and Retaliation, and the Korean Air and Missile Defense System by countries possessing launch capabilities' clearly refers to the deterrence capabilities being developed by South Korea and the United States. 'Preemptive strikes by countries possessing launch capabilities' refers to our Kill Chain. The Three-Axis System's Kill Chain aims to preemptively identify and attack North Korean nuclear assets before they can be used. KMPR refers to Mass Punishment and Retaliation, which involves attacking North Korea's key command centers if it launches a nuclear weapon. KAMD refers to the Korean Air and Missile Defense System. China and Russia have explicitly stated their opposition to these specific elements. They also mention 'decapitation operations against the enemy and disarmament as serious destabilizing factors.' This clearly indicates their opposition to one component of South Korea's Three-Axis System, represented by KMPR, which aims to eliminate North Korea's key leadership in the event of a nuclear attack. They also express opposition to the fundamental elements of what is called 'tailored deterrence' or 'integrated nuclear and conventional strike.' Therefore, China and Russia's position is essentially that North Korea's nuclear development is an unavoidable choice for its own security, while South Korea and the United States' efforts to deter it are provocative acts that undermine security.

This allows them to exit, and the fact that the three countries will discuss this is included in the Russia-China summit. This is significant. This is because North Korea, China, and Russia are moving beyond mere symbolic cooperation, and by undertaking practical trilateral cooperation and projects, such as Kim Jong Un's appearance before President Xi Jinping at the Chinese Victory Day celebration last September, they are elevating the existing trilateral solidarity to a new level. It is worth paying attention to this aspect. Furthermore, China and Russia are not only siding with North Korea, but South Korea is existentially threatened by North Korea's nuclear program. China and Russia are raising specific objections to the 'three-axis system,' a deterrence strategy pursued by South Korea and the United States as part of their alliance. The statement, 'Countries not possessing nuclear weapons oppose pre-emptive strike capabilities, deep precision strikes, Kill Chain, mass punishment and retaliation, and the Korean Air and Missile Defense system,' clearly targets the deterrence capabilities being developed by South Korea and the United States.

The more concerning aspect is that at the end of these statements, China and Russia declared that they would jointly respond to this issue, including North Korea. Thus, they have unequivocally expressed their intention to counter South Korea and the United States while fully supporting North Korea. What is even more concerning is that while North Korea, China, and Russia are strengthening their ties, South Korea-US cooperation has been weakening recently. Although South Korea, the United States, and Japan have been closely cooperating through the Camp David Accords and conducting joint exercises to counter the North Korean threat, the last such exercise was a joint naval exercise in international waters south of Jeju Island in March 2025. No exercises have been held for over a year since then. While there were plans for further exercises, reports indicate that the US proposed them in 2026, but South Korea effectively rejected them for various reasons, leading to only US-Japan or US-only exercises.

This is a declaration of their actions. What is more concerning is that at the end of this statement, China and Russia declared that the three countries, including North Korea, would jointly respond to this issue. Therefore, they have clearly expressed their intention to respond to South Korea and the United States while fully supporting North Korea. What is even more concerning is that while North Korea, China, and Russia are strengthening their ties, South Korea-US-Japan cooperation has been weakening recently. South Korea, the United States, and Japan have been closely cooperating through the recent Camp David Accords and have continuously held joint exercises to counter the North Korean threat. However, the last joint exercise was a South Korea-US naval exercise in international waters south of Jeju Island in March 2025, and no exercises have been conducted for over a year since then. While there were plans for this, according to reports in 2026, the United States proposed joint exercises, but South Korea effectively refused for various reasons, and only US-Japan or US-only exercises are being conducted.

Analysis of North Korea-China Summit: Restoration of Relations and Economic Cooperation

The cooperation between North Korea, China, and Russia, contrasted with the relatively weakened cooperation between South Korea and the US, naturally raises concerns about South Korea's security. Next, I will discuss the North Korea-China summit in conjunction with these developments. President Xi Jinping visited Pyongyang. This was his first visit to North Korea in seven years, since 2019, and it marked the seventh summit between North Korea and China since Kim Jong Un took power. The previous summit was in September of last year, when Kim Jong Un visited Beijing at the invitation of President Xi Jinping for China's Victory Day celebrations. This visit by President Xi Jinping can be seen as a reciprocal visit. This holds several significant implications, including the fact that North Korea was the first foreign destination for President Xi Jinping this year.

As those interested will know, President Xi Jinping's recent activities have primarily involved foreign leaders visiting China. It has been over half a year since the start of the year, and President Xi Jinping has rarely traveled abroad, and has also rarely left Beijing. This visit to North Korea marks his first departure from Beijing since his inspection tour of Guangdong Province on November 6th and 10th of last year. This confirms the significant importance President Xi Jinping places on North Korea. Following the Victory Day celebrations in September last year, President Xi Jinping's visit to Pyongyang was necessary to finalize the North Korea-China relationship. It is widely understood, without needing further explanation, that relations between North Korea and China had not been optimal. These issues were once again evident during this visit. Therefore, President Xi Jinping's visit was essential for North Korea and China to normalize their relations. Since Kim Jong Un visited China, President Xi Jinping's visit to Pyongyang completes this normalization process.

In contrast, South Korean President Lee Jae-myung visited China, and President Xi Jinping also visited South Korea. From North Korea's perspective, this comparison with South Korea's diplomatic activities is notable. Therefore, President Xi Jinping's visit to Pyongyang was deemed necessary. From China's perspective, regarding its strategic economic relationship with the US, as discussed during the recent US-China summit where 'constructive strategic stability' was mentioned, this signifies a commitment to compete within an institutionalized framework, a proposal that the US has essentially accepted. Now, from this standpoint, China intends to utilize North Korea as a strategic asset, thereby seeking to strengthen its alliance with the US. This aligns with the cooperative relationship observed between China and Russia discussed earlier. Through this, China aims to assert its influence on the Korean Peninsula, a move largely directed at the United States.

From North Korea's perspective, normalizing relations with China is crucial. Although it has been closely aligned with Russia, economic recovery and the advancement of Kim Jong Un's economic construction plans, particularly the '20 cities and counties' initiative formalized at the 9th Party Congress, require significant economic support and cooperation from China. This is one of the primary reasons. Furthermore, there is a high probability of a summit between North Korea and the United States, possibly after the US midterm elections.

Normalization of North Korea-China Relations and Substantive Economic Cooperation

In any case, before a potential US-North Korea summit, Kim Jong Un needs to secure China's backing. From this perspective, his visit to Pyongyang was significant. Let's examine the agreements reached by both sides. Although no joint statement was issued, official remarks from North Korea's Rodong Sinmun and China's People's Daily and Xinhua News Agency provide insights for analysis. The key keyword in the Rodong Sinmun report is 'special.' The phrase 'the relationship between China and North Korea is very special' appears. It is described as special due to 'traditional friendship, common socialist threats, and unwavering inheritance.' In other words,

the repetition of the word 'special' three times emphasizes the exceptionally close relationship between China and North Korea. This suggests that relations between the two countries had previously been strained. Rodong Sinmun also states, 'Since Kim Jong Un's visit to China for Victory Day in September, relations between North Korea and China have been developing.' The term 'developing' implies that relations, which were not good, are improving. This can be interpreted as an acknowledgment that relations were indeed not optimal. Furthermore, Kim Jong Un referred to 'the friendship between North Korea and China as the Party's most important strategic undertaking.' Simultaneously, Kim Jong Un stated that 'relations with Russia are the top priority.' This implies that both relationships are of paramount importance, with relations with Russia being the highest priority and relations with China being a strategic undertaking of the Party. Therefore, Kim Jong Un has essentially made a declaration.

This signifies his intention to fully restore relations with China, in addition to his close ties with Russia, as reported in Rodong Sinmun. Another point is the shared values between China and North Korea, particularly the emphasis on their socialist identity. This is significant because there are few socialist countries remaining in the world today. The party-to-party relationship between socialist states is a very special one. Therefore, by emphasizing shared socialist values, they are reinforcing the closeness of their relationship. Finally, the statement mentions 'drawing a blueprint for the future together.' This implies that despite past issues, they intend to move forward by restoring strained relations. They plan to strengthen exchanges and cooperation in various fields, including politics, economy, and culture, and further develop high-level exchanges. This indicates a desire to move beyond the previous suboptimal relationship towards a better one. The declaration carries significant weight,

and it reflects their commitment to normalizing relations after a period of strain. China has also made its own statements, emphasizing the need to 'strengthen exchanges in fields such as diplomacy, law enforcement, and the military.' Furthermore, it states the need to 'expand practical cooperation in areas such as trade, agriculture, construction, science and technology, and health and medicine.' Additionally, it calls for 'expanding people-to-people exchanges by fully reopening border crossings and resuming civil aviation and international passenger train services.' These three points, within a broader framework, are highly significant. President Xi Jinping's remarks are remarkably specific. Synthesizing these three points, China's intention is to strengthen economic cooperation and non-military exchanges with North Korea. While Russia is strengthening cooperation with North Korea as a patron in military, space, satellite, and energy-related hard power aspects, China is expected to play a supportive role in areas crucial for North Korea's survival, such as trade, agriculture, science and technology,

health, and medicine. Under sanctions, North Korea will likely seek breakthroughs through its relationships with China and Russia. President Xi Jinping's remarks are insightful; for example, the mention of 'reopening trade and borders' suggests a heightened possibility of resuming economic activities previously conducted between China and North Korea, focusing on supply chains for food, fertilizer, essential goods, and light industry raw materials. In agriculture and construction, this could involve support with fertilizers, agricultural machinery, and seeds. In science and technology and health and medicine, it could involve providing essential medicines, epidemic prevention equipment, and hospital facilities that North Korea needs. These three areas fall within the scope of humanitarian aid. From China's perspective, it will not overtly violate UN Security Council resolutions, which it has agreed to and supported. Therefore, cooperation is likely to occur in gray areas or through circumvention of sanctions, rather than outright violations. Another aspect of cooperation, as mentioned, involves

opening borders, resuming train services, and the planned completion of the second Yalu River Bridge (New Yalu River Bridge) by the end of this year. Although completed in 2014, it has been neglected for a decade due to insufficient customs facilities and connecting roads on the North Korean side. Construction has reportedly resumed, with potential opening by the end of the year. President Xi Jinping's remarks to Kim Jong Un before COVID-19, promising to 'send 1 million Chinese tourists,' were significant. While it is unlikely that North Korea could accommodate such a large number, even a substantial influx of tourists, particularly to key projects like the Wonsan-Kalma tourist area, could revitalize North Korea's tourism sector. Consequently, North Korea-China relations are likely to normalize rapidly, leading to substantive economic cooperation.

Absence of Kim Ju Ae's Appearance and Future Outlook

As mentioned in the North Korea-China summit, the agreement on the Tumen River outflow, signed in 1991, was likely discussed to some extent, although not included in the official announcement. This may proceed as a project involving South Korea, and overall, it is clear that the relationship between North Korea and China will become very close in the future. We anticipate a situation where this can be directly confirmed soon. One more thing to add is that there was much attention on whether Kim Ju Ae would appear at this North Korea-China summit.

In conclusion, Kim Ju Ae did not appear. I believe there are several reasons for this. First, when North Korea designates a successor, they typically have them appear together in official settings. When Kim Ju Ae accompanied Kim Jong Un on his visit to Beijing last September, she was seen once behind Kim Jong Un upon the train's arrival, but then disappeared entirely. Therefore, Kim Ju Ae's movements could not be tracked. It is uncertain whether official meetings took place, but given her absence from public view during President Xi Jinping's visit, the possibility of private engagements cannot be ruled out. If so, why did she not make a public appearance?

The main reason is that the core of the North Korea-China summit was the restoration of relations. If Kim Ju Ae had appeared in such a context, the focus of domestic and international media might have shifted to her, diluting the significance of North Korea's visit and President Xi Jinping's trip. There might have been concerns about a loss of focus. Additionally, while it is important for Kim Ju Ae to meet with Chinese leaders to gain recognition of her legitimacy, reports indicate that Kim Jong Il and Kim Jong Un also met privately in the past. Therefore, there is also an aspect of not revealing her publicly. In this regard, we can find reasons for Kim Ju Ae's absence. Furthermore, given her young age and gender, and the fact that North Korea is a male-dominated society, questions remain about the possibility of a female leader, which could also be a reason for her not making an official appearance yet.

Conclusion: Challenges for Peace on the Korean Peninsula and Inter-Korean Relations Improvement

To conclude, considering the recent phenomena, including the US-China summit, the Russia-China summit, and the North Korea-China summit, this is by no means a comfortable situation for the Korean Peninsula, especially for South Korea. The bilateral or trilateral relations of these countries, particularly North Korea, China, and Russia, may increase their level of cooperation through projects like the Tumen River Project. In contrast, cooperation between South Korea and the United States has not shown signs of strengthening since the emergence of President Trump. In this context, I believe deep and serious consideration is needed on how we can improve inter-Korean relations and achieve peace on the Korean Peninsula. Thank you for watching.