[Special Commentary on the US-Iran War] ② Middle Eastern Order After the 2026 Iran War: Structural Instability and the Transformation of Security Strategies

Introduction: How Will the Middle Eastern Order Change After the 2026 Iran War?

The Iran War, which began on February 28, 2026, with airstrikes by Israel and the United States on Iran, appears to be concluding with an agreement between the US and Iran. However, this war is likely to be a significant turning point, heralding changes in the world order beyond a mere military conflict. Above all, the war is expected to bring about substantial changes in the Middle Eastern regional order. The war has weakened the confidence of Gulf countries in the US security umbrella, which they have long relied upon, and has also revealed differences in interests and strategic discord among GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) countries. These changes are highly likely to mark a critical inflection point in the reshaping of the Middle Eastern regional order. The war has made Middle Eastern countries acutely aware of the limitations of the US-centric security system and the necessity of seeking new security strategies to more stably secure their own military deterrence. Consequently, the Middle Eastern order is likely to be reshaped in a direction that maintains cooperation with the United States while diversifying security partners and strengthening self-reliant security capabilities. This paper, therefore, aims to analyze the changes in the Middle Eastern order that have emerged in the wake of the 2026 Iran War, and to examine the security strategies of Iran, Israel, and the Gulf Arab states at its center, as well as the changes in the regional order.

1. The Instability of Gulf Security Revealed by the 2026 Iran War

The 2026 Iran War began with airstrikes by the United States and Israel on Iran. However, despite not being direct belligerents, the countries most involved in the war were Iran and the Arab Gulf monarchies facing it across the Persian Gulf. Since the First Gulf War in 1990, GCC countries have adopted a strategic approach of preparing for regional security threats through military cooperation with the United States, including hosting US military bases on their territories. These US military bases in the Gulf region have served as a crucial hub for US operations from the Eastern Mediterranean to South Asia and as a symbol of regional deterrence (Alexander 2026). Paradoxically, however, this security cooperation has led to the perception of Gulf countries as key US allies, creating a structural limitation that makes them susceptible to involvement in conflicts whenever the United States intervenes in Middle Eastern disputes.

This alliance dilemma was already evident in December 2025, when Iran attacked the Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar in retaliation for US military actions during the "12-day war." Although a large-scale disaster was avoided due to prior warning from Iran, the incident demonstrated that US bases could be both a security asset for Gulf countries and a target for retaliatory attacks. The security vulnerability of Gulf countries became even more apparent in the 2026 war. As airstrikes by the US and Israel on Iran commenced, US bases in the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar, and Kuwait became primary targets for Iranian attacks, with the scope of attacks expanding to critical infrastructure such as airports and oil facilities. The UAE, in particular, faced the most concentrated attacks among Gulf countries, enduring approximately 2,000 drone and 500 ballistic missile strikes, accounting for about 55% of Iran's total attacks on the Gulf region (Nikaeen 2026). Consequently, despite not being direct belligerents, Gulf countries found themselves on the front lines of the war due to their alliances with the United States. This war thus served as an occasion that revealed the structural instability of the existing security cooperation framework and the need to seek new security strategies.

2. Cracks Within the Gulf and the Transformation of the Regional Order

It is highly probable that the transformation of the regional order will accelerate, centered around the Gulf countries that have become the focal point of the battlefield in this war. The first point of note is the potential for division within the Gulf region. This is particularly evident in the heightened tensions between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. As major players in the Gulf region, the two countries have repeatedly engaged in cooperation and competition, and even before the 2026 war, they showed differing interests regarding the Yemen issue. The divergence in their positions became prominent, especially when the UAE supported the Southern Transitional Council (STC) in Yemen. This is considered an example demonstrating the UAE's challenge to the existing Saudi-led Gulf order.

In a similar vein, Saudi Arabia and the UAE displayed significant differences in their stances during the recent war. Saudi Arabia, for one, has maintained the position that military means alone are insufficient to bring about fundamental change (Krasna 2026). It can be inferred that Saudi Arabia believed that attacks from Iran and its proxies could be deterred through diplomatic compromise rather than military pressure. Accordingly, Saudi Arabia is reportedly proposing a non-aggression pact between Iran and Middle Eastern countries (Middle East Eye 2026). This can be analyzed as an approach to manage regional instability through mutual non-aggression and security guarantees, assuming that fundamental change in the Iranian regime itself is difficult.

Conversely, the UAE has maintained a stance that military pressure and the use of force should not be excluded if necessary (Leber 2026). This is considered a different approach from Saudi Arabia, which prioritizes diplomatic compromise. Since signing the Abraham Accords with Israel in 2020, the UAE has continuously expanded security cooperation and, during this war, maintained military cooperation with Israel, including using Israeli Iron Dome interceptors to counter Iranian missiles (The New Arab 2026). Notably, in May 2026, it supported US military operations to ensure freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz. These actions are seen as contrasting with the positions of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, which requested restraint in military operations from the US due to concerns about Iranian retaliation.

Amidst the divergence in positions between Saudi Arabia and the UAE during this war, the UAE announced its withdrawal from OPEC+. The timing of this announcement, coinciding with Saudi Arabia's hosting of an emergency GCC meeting, is particularly noteworthy. The UAE, as one of the major oil-producing countries among OPEC members, had been dissatisfied with the production quotas that had been in place since Russia's participation in OPEC+ (Connelly 2026). This dissatisfaction stemmed from the fact that despite steadily expanding its oil production capacity, its revenue maximization was constrained by production limits (Schneider 2026).

In this context, the UAE's withdrawal from OPEC+ amid the deepening disruption of the Strait of Hormuz and energy markets is assessed as an expression of its will to make more flexible and independent production decisions aligned with its own circumstances. Furthermore, considering President Trump's consistent expressions of dissatisfaction with OPEC+, the UAE's move can also be interpreted as a signal of its intention to strengthen strategic cooperation with the United States. Consequently, this war can be seen as having further exacerbated the strategic fissures within the GCC. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have shown divergent approaches to strategy towards Iran and the regional order, indicating a greater likelihood that the GCC will pursue independent security strategies based on member states' threat perceptions, rather than functioning as a unified actor based on common security interests.

3. Realignment of Alliances and Diversification of Security Cooperation

Shortly after beginning his second term, President Trump chose Saudi Arabia as the destination for his first overseas trip in May 2025 and strongly urged Saudi Arabia to join the Abraham Accords. Subsequently, in May 2026, as the Iran War entered a ceasefire phase, he again presented the Abraham Accords as a key agenda item for reshaping the post-war Middle Eastern order. It is reported that on May 23, 2026, he held consecutive phone consultations with leaders of eight Middle Eastern and Islamic countries, including Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Qatar, the UAE, Egypt, and Pakistan, urging Saudi Arabia and Qatar to join the Abraham Accords in conjunction with the cessation of hostilities and peace negotiations with Iran (Toosi 2026). Trump's approach can be seen as stemming from a plan to reshape the post-war Middle Eastern order in a manner favorable to the US and Israel by linking Gulf countries into a single security axis with Israel.

However, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman implicitly expressed his opposition by not responding to this proposal. Saudi Arabia maintains the position that normalization of relations with Israel cannot proceed without a concrete pathway toward the establishment of a Palestinian state, given the heightened anti-Israeli sentiment during the war. As the "Guardian of the Two Holy Mosques" and claiming leadership of the Islamic world, it is difficult for Saudi Arabia to establish diplomatic relations with Israel while disregarding international public opinion.

Instead, Saudi Arabia is pursuing alternative security alliances with Islamic countries. It recently held high-level meetings with Egypt, Turkey, and Pakistan to explore possibilities for new security cooperation to respond to the Iran War situation (Alhasan 2026). In 2025, it signed a strategic mutual defense treaty with Pakistan. Notably, the fact that Pakistan has deployed JF-17 fighter jets and air defense missiles in Saudi Arabia, which are either joint ventures with China or advanced Chinese weapon systems, suggests a potential indirect expansion of military cooperation between Saudi Arabia and China (Choi 2026). On the other hand, the UAE is expected to expand security cooperation by leveraging the Abraham Accords network, which extends from I2U2 to the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), based on trilateral cooperation among the US, Israel, and the UAE.

Meanwhile, Israel is seeking to conclude a more comprehensive security agreement with the United States to replace the existing decade-long Memorandum of Understanding on military aid (Arnaout 2026). This is assessed as an attempt to seek a new security framework that institutionally integrates military cooperation, moving beyond the existing framework of reliance on US military aid. Saudi Arabia also signed a strategic defense agreement with the United States during Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's visit in 2025. At that time, President Trump approved a large-scale defense package, including F-35 fighter jets, expressing his intent to provide Saudi Arabia with military support comparable to that provided to Israel.

However, the 2026 Iran War revealed that US security commitments are not easily applied equally among allies. While both Gulf countries and Israel are key allies relying on the US security umbrella, during the war, the US directly participated in military operations and provided substantial weapons support for Israel's security, whereas its support for Gulf countries was limited to defensive interception assistance. This differential treatment has weakened the trust of Gulf countries in the United States and has also served as an impetus for competition to secure security guarantees from the US at a level equivalent to that of Israel.

Furthermore, the war has heightened the recognition of the inevitability of relying on the integrated missile defense system established under the US Central Command (CENTCOM) framework to counter Iran's advanced missile and drone threats. Therefore, it is assessed that Gulf countries and Israel will continue to emphasize the maintenance and strengthening of the US-centric security system while simultaneously advocating a dual strategy of expanding security cooperation with various external actors. In other words, the security strategies of Middle Eastern countries in the post-war era are likely to develop in a direction that diversifies security partners while maintaining the United States as a crucial axis of security cooperation.

4. Conclusion and Implications for South Korea

Following the Iran War, the Gulf security order is likely to evolve towards strengthening self-reliant security capabilities and diversifying security cooperation, rather than converging into a US-led collective security system. This war confirmed that US security commitments remain a crucial strategic asset, while also exposing the limitations of the US-centric security alliance system (Azad 2026). Therefore, post-war Gulf countries will prioritize efforts to reduce dependence on any single country and diversify their sources of security, while continuing security cooperation with the United States. While China is unlikely to become a substitute for the US at this stage, it is contributing to broadening the strategic options for Gulf countries through diverse cooperation networks encompassing energy, technology, infrastructure, and finance. Various countries, including Russia, Europe, India, Japan, Turkey, and South Korea, are emerging as key partners for defense industry, advanced technology, and supply chain cooperation. From this perspective, the post-war security strategies of Gulf countries will be pursued in a direction that alleviates dependence on the US. This implies that a "networked world order," characterized by functional and issue-based cooperation rather than bloc-based order, may become increasingly important in the Middle East (Baharoon 2022).

Another change in the post-war Middle Eastern order is the structural deepening of instability in the Gulf region. GCC countries have long been perceived as a 'safe haven' attracting concentrated investment based on political stability and economic prosperity. However, this war demonstrated that the Gulf has also become a strategic space that can be drawn into conflict. This environmental change is occurring in conjunction with a shift in Iran's deterrence strategy. Previously, Iran was assessed to have pursued a 'forward defense' strategy based on the 'Axis of Resistance' amidst 'strategic loneliness' (Reisinezhad 2026). However, it is evaluated that this war has prompted a shift towards a more offensive military strategy. Iran is employing a strategy of increasing the costs of military intervention for the US and Israel by targeting the Strait of Hormuz and strategic infrastructure in the region, which is contributing to the escalation of constant security instability in the Gulf region (Azizi 2026).

In the post-war Middle Eastern order, the Strait of Hormuz is emerging not merely as an energy transport route but as a geopolitical chokepoint significantly impacting international maritime order and global supply chain stability (International Crisis Group 2026). In the past, the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz was considered an unrealistic option that would incur excessive costs for Iran. However, during this war, it emerged as a practical leverage mechanism capable of causing significant shock to the international community through limited blockades and navigation controls. Consequently, not only blockades themselves but also the possibility of blockades have become new strategic tools, and Iran seeks to utilize the Strait of Hormuz as a strategic space beyond a military pressure tool through various leverage points such as imposing transit fees (International Crisis Group 2026).

These potential changes in the post-war Middle Eastern regional security order offer significant implications for South Korea, which has a high degree of dependence on the Middle East in terms of energy and economic security. First, given the reconfirmation of the structural instability of the Strait of Hormuz, it is necessary to enhance the resilience of the energy supply chain through diversification of crude oil and LNG import sources and expansion of strategic reserves. Second, as Gulf countries pursue strategic autonomy by reducing dependence on specific major powers and diversifying security providers within a networked world order, South Korea needs to leverage this as a new opportunity for cooperation. Beyond resource diplomacy, it is necessary to expand functional and middle-power partnership cooperation in key technology areas such as defense, advanced infrastructure, sovereign AI, and data centers. Ultimately, South Korea's Middle East diplomacy should be based on the ROK-US alliance while also pursuing a national interest-centered pragmatic foreign policy that expands tangible benefits in the process of Gulf countries diversifying their security cooperation. ■

References

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■ Kim Kang-seok_Professor, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Ahn So-yeon_Lecturer, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies.

■ Responsible for and edited by: Lee Sang-jun_EAI Researcher
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