[Commentary] An Era of Chaos, New Visions for the Future, and Middle Power Response Strategies

YouTube link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0vTIjDLGLZA&si=XIRhzvUFywaS1cnd

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The Future of the World Order and the Possibility of New Visions

Oh Inhwan: Professor, thank you very much for joining us. My first question is about the future of the global order. In a recent article you contributed to the Ideas newsletter, you pointed out that in the early 1990s, scholars and experts, including Francis Fukuyama with his 'End of History,' all presented visions for the future, but today's intellectuals are failing to offer what comes next. Following that argument, my question is this: Do you truly believe that new visions are more likely to emerge from the non-Western world? And in relation to this, do you see the emerging international order as a significantly new order, rather than a reform or reconfiguration of the existing one?

Ayşe Zarakol: Thank you. First, thank you for the invitation. It's an honor to speak with the East Asia Institute. Yes, the article you mentioned was for the Ideas newsletter. In it, I discussed how at the end of the Cold War in the 1990s, Western intellectuals, albeit controversially, presented comprehensive visions for the world that followed. In that piece, I discussed not only Fukuyama, who argued, 'We have reached the end of history, so there is nothing after this,' but also Huntington's 'Clash of Civilizations' thesis and Robert Kaplan. In contrast, I think there is a palpable sense of anxiety today, particularly in the West, that what has been called the 'liberal international order' is over or ending.

But in practice, apart from some philosophers sponsored by the MAGA movement or some tech companies, nobody is saying what comes next. There are attempts to save the liberal international order, a backward-looking vision of 'we can fix this,' or a tendency to fall back on 20th-century analogies to World War II or the interwar period, although these are diminishing by the day. So most of the frameworks that Western intellectuals are using tend to look at the past, not at what comes next. That was the core of what I wanted to emphasize.

And I concluded the essay by saying that if new visions emerge, they are more likely to come from the non-Western world. This is because the non-Western world, what is sometimes called the 'Global South'—though I think that's a misnomer—is not that. Not all non-Western countries are part of what used to be called the Third World, the 'Global South.' But the non-Western world, even if it benefited from the liberal international order, does not have the same emotional attachment to it. And I think not having that emotional attachment is actually helpful when thinking about what comes next. It allows for more innovative thinking.

Oh Inhwan: Yes, I also agree that the non-Western world has less emotional attachment to the liberal international order (LIO). However, recently, despite the anxiety you mentioned, David Lake and Thomas Risse, among others, have recompiled and published writings on the LIO. I believe it was published in February. They emphasize the resilience of the LIO despite several crises. They seem more hopeful about the LIO returning or being reconfigured to some extent. So, I think there is still a perceptual or emotional distance between those who support the LIO and the rest.

Ayşe Zarakol: Yes. There are writings that say so. Institutions do not disappear overnight. They are often repurposed by new regimes for new purposes. I am currently writing a popular world history book that covers from the beginning to the present. And I was just writing about the Warring States period and the Qin and Han dynasties in Chinese history. I found that in each period, even when they were against the institutions of the old order, they repurposed those institutions for new purposes. That's just one example, but I think it's generally true.

So I have no doubt that many institutions and agreements of the liberal international order, including economic aspects like the hegemony of the US dollar, will show resilience. What I am skeptical about is whether they will continue to be used for liberal purposes, or even ostensibly liberal purposes. Because it is always debatable whether the liberal international order was actually liberal. But I think it is now much more likely that some institutions and alliances will be used for illiberal purposes, and for American imperialism 2.0.

Oh Inhwan: Yes. So, you are saying that some features of the international order, such as economic aspects, may persist, but the purpose of that order may not be liberal as it was before.

Ayşe Zarakol: Exactly. It's about what shows resilience. Is it the resilience of ideas, or the resilience of some agreements, alliances, and institutions?

The US-Iran-Israel Conflict and the Structure of the New World Order

Oh Inhwan: Yes, that's good. Let's move on to the second question. This question examines the US-Iran, or US-Israel-Iran, conflict as a stress test for the emerging order. The ongoing US-Israel-Iran conflict seems to represent one of the two categories you distinguish: disorder or unorder, and you could clarify that distinction as you apply your framework. This conflict seems to encapsulate many of the fault lines you've written about—the unraveling of the post-1945 order, the loss of normative authority in the West, the agency of non-Western actors, and the question of who writes the rules. From a long-term perspective, what do you think this conflict reveals about the actual structure of the emerging order?

And regardless of the military and diplomatic outcomes, what do you anticipate will be the more lasting consequences of this conflict for the future international order, or disorder, once the immediate chaos subsides?

Ayşe Zarakol: Yes, thank you. The distinction between disorder and unorder is not one I created. Mark Leonard, the Director of the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), has published a new book on order, and his distinction is as follows: there is order, and then there is disorder, which is a state where the memory and expectations of order still remain. So, what is happening now appears to be disorder because we still have expectations about how order should function. And at some point, there is actually no order. It's not even disorder; it's a state where no new order has formed. I think that's a useful distinction. However, I disagree with him. I don't think we are there yet.

There have certainly been periods in history when everything truly collapsed. Going back to antiquity, if you look at the collapse of the Bronze Age in Western Asia, for about 100 years, some cultural elements persisted, and then there's a gap in the archaeological record. That is perhaps disorder or unorder. I think we are still in a period of disorder, and by disorder, as I said, I mean a state where there are ideas about how things should function, and an expectation that there should be one international order. Some people, like Lake and Risse, say the order is still intact, while others say, no, it's over. So there is no consensus, and it is fragmented.

And it is quite transactional. Middle powers are hedging, and other countries are trying to set the direction for the next order. To me, that is disorder. It's not quite unorder, but the consensus has broken down, and some are still stuck in the past, while others are not. And the situation in the Strait of Hormuz, or the Iran-Israel-US war, is a good example of that. We've been living with that situation for two months, and the UK is predicting travel disruptions due to severe aviation fuel shortages this summer. At the same time, interest in this conflict seems to have waned. It has become part of the scenery, like the Gaza conflict or the war in Ukraine. In fact, these are major conflicts, not minor ones, yet they are fragmented. Because nobody can keep track of everything, people only pay attention to the conflicts that directly affect them, and we exist in a situation where we can't even track daily whether the straits are closed or open. To me, that is the very definition of disorder.

And I think this situation will continue for some time. I don't expect any consensus or a new order to be recreated in the near future. More conflicts will be added to this fragmented landscape, and every country will have to figure out how to survive in this chaotic world on its own.

Oh Inhwan: Yes, I don't know if you've read the brief memo that Director Jeon Jaesung and I wrote, but in it, we characterized the current state as 'hybrid unstable'.

Ayşe Zarakol: Yes, I fully agree with that view.

Oh Inhwan: Yes. This is not sphere of influence politics or great power politics. Trump claims a sphere of influence in the Western Hemisphere, but by the same logic, he doesn't recognize China's sphere of influence in the Pacific or Russia's influence. So, there are two different organizing principles applied to different regions. We also largely agree with your view.

Ayşe Zarakol: Yes. People are trying to fit these old concepts onto the current situation, but I don't think they really fit. I agree.

Middle Power Survival Strategies: Korea's Opportunities and Challenges

Oh Inhwan: Yes, this is the third question. Although you briefly touched upon middle power hedging and survival strategies, the final question holds particular significance for the East Asia Institute audience. In your NSI interview, you mentioned that countries accustomed to unpredictability, like those in the Global South or non-Western regions, might be better prepared for this environment than many Western countries. In that context, Korea occupies a unique position. It is a former peripheral state that has become one of the most successful beneficiaries of the post-Cold War liberal order, yet geographically it lies on the suture line where the organizing principles of the United States and China meet in the Indo-Pacific.

Drawing on your research on stigma, hierarchy, and the agency of states that have historically been outsiders to the order defined by the West, what advice would you offer to countries like Korea, or other middle powers that must navigate this crisis or fragmentation of the order?

Ayşe Zarakol: Yes, that is precisely one of the arguments I made in that interview and in my current lectures on disorder. I believe that countries like Korea are well-positioned to navigate this period of disorder—which I suspect will last longer than we think. The historical parallel I drew in my recent book, 'Before the West,' is another long period of disorder that ended around the 17th century. That disorder was unfavorable to the old hegemons of the 16th century, primarily Asian empires from the Ottomans to the Ming, and the Habsburgs in Europe.

And when all the dust settled, the actual winners were the emerging smaller states of Western Europe, such as England and France. While it's not an exact parallel, I think periods of disorder are more favorable to emerging states than to established hegemons. Therefore, under structural pressures like AI, financialization, and climate change, the old hegemons of the 20th century, such as the United States, China, and Russia, may be more thinly spread and face greater challenges because they are larger states.

And there may be a moment when middle powers are in a more favorable position. Especially countries like Korea, which, as you mentioned, are beneficiaries of the old order but not top-tier powers, and are materially well-positioned to enter a period of disorder. At the same time, as discussed earlier, they are more open to diverse strategies because they lack the same emotional attachment. If you look at Europe, for example, there are many middle powers there, but they are so attached to the 20th-century order that it's difficult for them to think outside the box. The period of disorder is a difficult time, wherever you are. We all have to learn to live with high levels of uncertainty, volatility, and rapid change.

But I think countries like Korea are better positioned to navigate it.

Oh Inhwan: Yes. I hope Korea can leverage its historical and political position.

Ayşe Zarakol: Yes.

Oh Inhwan: Although we are on the same side as Japan on some issues, I believe there are differences between Korea and Japan in their approach to the liberal international order.

Ayşe Zarakol: There is nothing wrong with acknowledging the positive aspects of the liberal order. It's not that it must be completely rejected. However, the world is changing, and we all have to adapt. How well we can adapt depends on how well we can let go of the past.

Limitations of Mainstream International Relations Theory and the Search for New Analytical Frameworks

Oh Inhwan: Yes. Since we seem to have enough time, I will ask the fourth question as well. The final question is about what mainstream international relations theory understands correctly and what it misunderstands about the current international order's issues and status. A recurring theme in your work, from 'After Defeat' to 'Before the West' and your essays on the essentialist trap, is that mainstream IR theories like realism, liberalism, and much of constructivism are built upon assumptions derived from a relatively narrow slice of West European history. And this becomes particularly constraining at moments like the present, when the order they have normalized is unraveling.

So, where do mainstream IR frameworks help us understand the pressing issues of our time, including the conflicts in Gaza, Iran, and Ukraine, and where do they mislead us? And what are the alternative concepts or starting points, such as disorder or unorder, that could replace them?

Ayşe Zarakol: Yes, if we talk about schools of thought in international relations like realism and liberalism, those are 20th-century late forms of very old ideas that have existed not only in the West but also in Eastern philosophy, etc. If you contrast constructivism with a kind of materialism or empiricism, that too is a debate as old as humanity. What is the world made of? So I don't think there's anything wrong with the schools themselves. It's just that we shouldn't be stuck in their 20th-century late versions. We need to update them again.

And one of my arguments has always been this: the more history we know, especially beyond European history, the more we can update these theories for the 21st century. The 20th-century versions had many blind spots. When I was a graduate student—and this is something I touch upon, though not directly, in Before the West—nobody discussed the possibility that the liberal international order could end or collapse. It was like a teleology of the Western order becoming the universal international order. That 'end of history' thesis was also in international relations theory. I've also mentioned the idea of spheres of influence.

Now people try to read what Trump is doing and what China is doing through the lens of late 19th-century spheres of influence. But this is not the era of European empires, and the world is not what it used to be. Of course, I don't dispute the argument that great powers compete. They always have. But why should we read these only through the lens of a very short period of history?

There are many more sovereign states and actors now. We've also talked about middle powers, but we need to broaden our horizons. Even this discussion we've had about a long period of chaos, there was no space for it in late 20th-century international relations theory. Again, because not enough history has been studied. ■

■Ayşe ZarakolProfessor, University of Cambridge.

■ Hosted and Edited by:Lee Sang-junEAI Research Fellow
Contact: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 211) | leesj@eai.or.kr

Video Script

Thank you for the invitation. Professor, my first question is about the future of the global order. In your recent Ideas Letter, you mentioned that in the early 1990s, scholars and experts offered forward-looking visions, not to mention Francis Fukuyama's "End of History." But today's intellectuals seem unable to offer what is to come. Following your argument, my question is this: Do you think that new visions are more likely to come from the non-Western parts of the world?

And do you think that such a new order would be something entirely new, rather than a reformed or reshaped version of the existing order? >> Thank you. First, thank you for the invitation. I'm delighted to be speaking with the East Asia Institute. Yes, in the piece you mentioned, I was making the argument that in the early 1990s, when the Cold War ended, Western intellectuals seemed to have a vision, arguably a comprehensive vision, of what was to come after. And there I discuss Fukuyama, and others you mentioned.

He says nothing is to come because we've reached the end of history. So does Huntington's clash of civilizations thesis, and Robert Kaplan too. In contrast, I think there's a palpable sense of anxiety, particularly in the West, that the so-called liberal international order is over or is ending.

But nobody, except perhaps some MAGA circles and some tech-company-sponsored philosophers, is saying what is to come. It seems to be an attempt to salvage the liberal international order, which is shrinking by the day, but it is. This is a vision looking back to the past. Or it goes back to analogies with the early 20th century, World War I, or

Visions of a New International Order and the Role of the Non-West

the interwar period. So the frameworks that most Western intellectuals are working with tend to look back to the past, rather than focusing on the future or what is to come. That was the point I was making. And I argued in the essay that if new visions are to emerge, they are more likely to come from the non-Western parts of the world. Because the non-Western parts of the world, the non-Western countries, like Korea, which I think is a misnomer, all the global

South, as it's called, which is not, I think, a misnomer, non-Western countries like Korea, are not all the Global South. That's what used to be called the Third World. But let's call it the non-Western world. They don't have the same emotional attachment to the liberal international order. Even though they have benefited from it. And I think not having that emotional attachment helps when thinking about what is to come. It allows for more innovation.

>> Yes, I agree that people in the non-Western world have less emotional attachment to the liberal international order (LIO). But as you pointed out, recently, David Lake and Thomas Risseeuw, among others, have written together about the LIO. It was published in February, and it emphasizes the resilience of the LIO. They seem to be more hopeful or optimistic about the return of the LIO, or some reshaped version of it, despite various crises. So I think there is a gap, a perceptual or emotional gap, between those who continue to advocate for the LIO and the rest. >> Yes. But I think they write in this way. Institutions never disappear overnight. They are often repurposed by new regimes. I'm now writing a book on trade from the very beginning to the present day.

And I was just writing about the Warring States period in Chinese history, the Qin and Han dynasties. And you know >> [Laughter] >> each era recycles the institutions of the previous order, sometimes in opposition to it.

I think that's just one example. I think that's generally true. So I have no doubt that many of the institutions, the arrangements, many aspects of the liberal international order, like the hegemony of the US dollar, will prove resilient. What I'm skeptical about is whether they will continue to be used for liberal purposes, or even nominal liberal purposes. Because we can always debate whether the liberal international order was ever really liberal.

But I think it's much more likely now that these institutions, alliances, etc., will be used for illiberal purposes, and perhaps for US imperial project 2.0. >> So some features or aspects of the international order, for example, the economic aspects, may remain, but the purpose of the order may not be as liberal as it used to be.

Test Bed for the Emerging Order: The U.S.-Israel-Iran Conflict

>> Exactly. So what is resilient then? Are ideas resilient, or are some arrangements, alliances, institutions? >> Yes. Okay, let's move to the second question. It's about the US-Iran or US-Israel-Iran war or conflict as a crucible of the emerging order. This ongoing conflict between the US, Israel, and Iran seems to demonstrate disorder or non-order, one of which you distinguished. Professor.

And if you could clarify that distinction and apply that framework. And the current conflict seems to involve many of the fault lines that you've mentioned several times: the unraveling of the post-1945 order, the loss of normative authority in the West, the agency of non-Western actors, and the question of who will write the rules. So what do you think this conflict reveals about the actual structure of the emerging order in the long run? And once the immediate turmoil subsides, whatever the military or

diplomatic outcome, what do you anticipate will be the more lasting consequences of this conflict for the international order, or disorder, or non-order, going forward? >> Yes, thank you. Um, the distinction between disorder and non-order is not mine. Mark Leonard, who is the director of the European Council of Foreign Relations, has a new book out on non-order. And the distinction he makes is that we have order, and then we have disorder, where the memory and expectations of order still

exist. So what's happening now seems like disorder because we have all these expectations of how order should work. And then there's a point of non-order. It's not even disorder. It's just that, a new order has not been created. And I think that's a useful distinction. I disagree with him. I don't think we're there yet.

Historically, there have certainly been periods when things really collapsed. You can think of the Bronze Age collapse in ancient Western Asia, for example. And for about 100 years, some cultural elements persist, and then the archaeological record goes blank. That would be a transition from disorder to non-order, perhaps.

I think we are still in a period of disorder. And that is, as I say, we have ideas about how things should work. We have expectations that there should be an international order. We still have people like Rainy and Lison saying the order is still here. Others say, 'No, it's over.' So there's no consensus. It's fragmented.

And very transactional. Middle powers are hedging, and other powers are trying to plan the path of the next order. Yes, so for me, that's disorder. It's not chaos, but the consensus has broken down, and some are still stuck in the past. Others are, anyway. So the situation in the Strait of Hormuz, or the Iran-Israel-US war, is a good example of that. We've lived with it for about two months. But almost again, it's

almost disappeared from the headlines. Even though it's something that everyone says will cause a serious energy crisis. It's already affecting Asia. It's already producing these effects. The UK, where I live, is expected to have a major jet fuel shortage this summer, which could affect travel, etc. To that extent. At the same time, attention has shifted elsewhere. It has become part of the landscape, as Gaza and Ukraine have been. And they are major conflicts, but they are fragmented, and nobody can pay attention to all of them. So people have pet conflicts that they follow if they are directly affected.

almost disappeared from the headlines. An issue that is expected, as it were, to cause a serious energy crisis. It's already having these effects in Asia. In the UK, where I live, there's an expected jet fuel shortage this summer, which could affect travel and so on. Despite the seriousness of the situation, attention has shifted elsewhere.

To Gaza or the war in Ukraine, which, despite being major conflicts, have become part of the landscape in people's consciousness. Because people cannot pay attention to all the conflicts, they tend to focus only on those that directly affect them.

We're in a situation like whether the straits are closed or open. It's impossible to follow that on a daily basis, and unless you're really focused, you wouldn't know. For me, that's the definition of disorder, and I think these situations will persist for quite some time.

It will not create a new order anytime soon. We will add more conflicts to this fragmented landscape, and each country will have to figure out how to survive in this chaotic world.

>> I don't know if you've read the short memo from the Council of Councils by Ian and John. We argue that we are in a hybrid and unstable state of order. >> Yes, I fully agree. >> This is not sphere politics or great power politics, because they don't support Chinese influence or Russian influence in the Pacific War. Those are two different organizing principles that apply to different regions. So we also

agree almost entirely with what you said. >> Yes, people try to fit old concepts to the current situation, but I don't think it works very well. I agree. >> But the last question might be very important for the audience here at AII. In your NSI interview, you observed that countries that are accustomed to unpredictability, namely countries in the Global South or non-Western countries, might be better prepared for this environment than Western countries. And in light of your remarks,

Korea is in a peculiar position. It has been a peripheral country in the past, but it has become one of the most successful beneficiaries of the post-Cold War liberal order, yet its geopolitical location places it on the boundary between the organizing principles of the US and China in the Indo-Pacific. Based on your research on the stigma, hierarchy, and agency of countries that have historically been on the periphery of the Western-centric order, what advice would you give to countries like Korea or other middle powers,

Middle Power Strategies: Opportunities in Chaos and Korea's Position

that have to navigate these complex crises or fragmentation of order? >> Yes, I >> [Laughter] >> One of the arguments I made in that interview, and I make it in my lectures on 'chaos' that I give. I think countries like Korea can do well in this period of chaos. This period, I think, will be longer than we think. One of the comparisons I make in my last book, 'Before the West,' goes back to the 17th century.

That is, a long period of chaos. That chaos was detrimental not only to Asian empires like the Ottoman Empire or the Ming Dynasty in the 16th century, but also to the Habsburgs in Europe. But the winners in the end were the emerging small European states, like Britain, France, etc., in Western Europe.

Of course, it's not an exact parallel, but I think these periods of chaos are more conducive to rising states, non-status quo states, than to status quo states. So in the competition between the US, China, and Russia, the old regime great powers of the 20th century, due to structural pressures, namely AI, financialization, climate change, etc.

are larger states, more spread out, and have greater challenges. There may come a moment when middle powers are in a more advantageous position. Especially countries like Korea, which are beneficiaries of the old order but not the top players, are materially well-positioned to enter a period of chaos. At the same time, as we've discussed, there's also the lack of the same emotional attachment.

>> [Laughter] >> So you could say they are more open to different strategies. For example, there are many middle powers in Europe, but they are so attached to the 20th-century order that they cannot think outside the box. Of course, it will be a difficult time no matter where you are. In times of chaos, everyone has to adapt to a high degree of uncertainty, volatility, and rapid change.

But I think countries like Korea can cope better with this situation. Yes. >> I hope Korea can leverage the position it has enjoyed historically and politically. And while we are on the same side as Japan on some issues, I think there are differences between Japan and Korea in how we approach the LIO >> and there's nothing wrong with acknowledging the benefits. The way we approach it.

But at the same time, the world is moving, so we all have to adapt. >> Yes. >> And how well we can adapt depends on how well we can let go of the past. >> The last question is about what mainstream international relations theory gets right and wrong about the current international order or the status quo.

Limitations of Mainstream International Relations Theory and Alternative Concepts

One of the recurring themes in your books, from 'After the Fall' to 'Before the West,' and in your essays on 'Essential in Trap,' is that mainstream international relations theory—realism, liberalism, even constructivism—is largely based on assumptions from a relatively narrow European history. And these assumptions become particularly limiting at a time like now, when the normalized order is unraveling or coming apart. So the question is,

How do the frameworks of mainstream international relations theory help us read the pressing issues of our time, including the conflicts in Gaza, Iran, and Ukraine, and where do they mislead us? And what, instead, would you propose as concepts or starting points, such as chaos or disorder?

>> Yes, I think if you talk about realism and liberalism, they are very late 20th-century versions, and they are very old ideas that have existed in philosophy, not only in the West but also in Eastern philosophy, etc. Or if you contrast constructivism with materialism or empiricism, that's also a very old debate that has gone on as long as people have existed. What is the world made of?

I don't have a problem with the schools themselves. It's just that we shouldn't be stuck in the late 20th-century versions. We need to update them again. My argument is always that the more history we know, especially beyond European history, the more we can update these theories for the 21st century.

There were many blind spots in the 20th-century versions. When I was a graduate student, and I talk about this directly in 'Before the West,' the idea that the liberal international order could end or unravel was not something anyone discussed. It was like a teleology of the endless expansion of the Western order, which was becoming a universal international order.

There was also an eschatological view of history in international relations theory. We've already mentioned the discussion of spheres of influence. Regarding spheres of influence, people are now trying to read what Trump is doing or what China is doing through the lens of late 19th-century spheres of influence. But these are not European empires, and the world is not the same as it was. Again, I have no problem arguing about great power competition.

Of course, they compete. They always have. But why should we read this through the lens of a very short period of history? There are many more sovereign states, actors, now. We've talked about middle powers. We need to broaden our perspective.

Also, even the discussion of long periods of chaos that we've discussed, there was no room for that in late 20th-century international relations theory. Again, it's because not enough history has been studied.