[Global NK Commentary] Prospects for Inter-Korean Relations Following North Korea's Constitutional Revision

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A revision to North Korea's constitution was adopted at the first session of the 15th Supreme People's Assembly held in March. The actual constitutional revision is understood to have taken place between March 22nd and 24th, but the news reached South Korea in early May. The government's method of disclosure was also unusual; it was conveyed through the explanation of a civilian expert rather than a direct explanation from a government official. According to analyses by some media outlets, the North Korean constitutional revision was such a critical issue, intertwined with complex internal matters of North Korea, that the government sought to preemptively block any potential for misunderstanding.

North Korea's first constitution, the 'Constitution of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea,' was enacted on September 9, 1948, and has since undergone a total of 13 amendments. Among these, several revisions were significant at the Korean Peninsula level, including the 1972 revision, which introduced the presidential system as the core of power structure reform; the 1998 revision, which established the Chairman of the National Defense Commission to realize 'military-first politics'; and the 2016 revision to strengthen the party-state relationship. However, previous North Korean constitutional revisions, in a sense, were all related to the goal of how to more effectively achieve unification from North Korea's perspective. This current revision, in contrast, is on a different level due to its anti-unification character.

The key points of the recent North Korean constitutional revision can be summarized into approximately three main areas. First, the element that most captures our attention is Article 2, known as the 'territory clause.' By pursuing 'two Koreas' on the peninsula, North Korea negates the 'pursuit of unification' between the South and the North and institutionally establishes a 'relationship between separate states.' Second, by enshrining the expression 'establishment of the Suryong's unitary leadership system' in the preamble of the constitution, it clarifies that the Suryong directly oversees all state affairs, exercises command over nuclear forces, and possesses absolute power not subject to recall by the 'Supreme People's Assembly.' Third, the phrase 'socialist' has been deleted from the official title 'Socialist Constitution of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.' This deletion has two aspects: internally, it signifies a reduction in 'support as a socialist state' for the people, and externally, it emphasizes the aspiration to be a 'normal state' by considering improved relations with capitalist countries.

Indeed, since North Korea's assertion of 'two hostile states' first became known in December 2024, there have been various interpretations within South Korea and the international community. While there may be differences in opinion on specific details, the general interpretation is that North Korea has acknowledged a complete defeat in its system competition with South Korea. A more proactive interpretation suggests that, considering the specificity of North Korean society, which prioritizes leadership security over national security, North Korea has ultimately decided that the method for its sustained survival is to sever its special relationship with South Korea and establish a separate state-to-state relationship.

Regardless of North Korea's true intentions behind the constitutional revision, realistically, conceptually, and policy-wise, South Korea now requires an inter-Korean policy and unification policy on a completely new level. Regardless of North Korea's stance, South Korea could potentially maintain its position while respecting its own constitutional values. However, from North Korea's perspective, approaching South Korea within a national context or engaging in any dialogue or effort related to denuclearization has, in essence, become a 'constitutionally violating act.' Furthermore, in inter-Korean policy, North Korea's reaction is a crucial factor in policy decisions. With the recent constitutional revision as a pretext, North Korea is now highly likely to refuse any unification-related efforts undertaken by South Korea.

In this context, examining the two distinct voices emerging within our society regarding North Korea's constitutional revision is simultaneously intriguing and profoundly serious. Those with a relatively conservative stance tend to avoid attributing significant meaning to the recent constitutional revision. They explain it as one of the 14 constitutional amendment cases that have occurred thus far, emphasizing that regardless of whether North Korea defines inter-Korean relations as 'two hostile states' or 'two friendly states,' its ultimate goal of unification centered on North Korea remains unchanged. They argue that North Korea is employing various tactics to define its relationship with South Korea while maintaining its objective. Conversely, those with a progressive stance tend to take the significance of North Korea's constitutional revision seriously. It is no exaggeration to say that all of North Korea's words and actions since 1948 have been related to unification; they explain that there must be a significant background that needs to be confirmed and analyzed for such a sudden institutional severance of relations between the South and the North. Furthermore, considering the current reality of completely severed inter-Korean relations, they emphasize that North Korea's constitutional revision could actually present a meaningful opportunity for improving relations for South Korea as well.

Coincidentally, shortly after the North Korean constitutional revision became known in South Korea, on May 18th, our government officially released the 2026 'Unification White Paper.' In this document, the Ministry of Unification states the need to 'transition inter-Korean relations into a peaceful two-state relationship oriented towards unification.' Whether the recently released 'Unification White Paper' represents the South Korean government's final official stance in response to North Korea's 'two-state theory' is debatable. Various debates have unfolded within South Korean society following the release of the Unification White Paper, and given the symbolic nature of North Korean and unification issues, the President has not yet made any related statements. Some experts cautiously predict that an announcement that can be considered the government's official position may be made through the congratulatory address on the upcoming August 15th Liberation Day.

Whether viewed from a conservative or progressive perspective, there is an interesting commonality regarding the constitutional revision: North Korea's attempt to become a so-called 'normal state' through this revision. While the definition of a normal state may vary uniquely by country, it is highly probable that North Korea will strive to develop its diplomatic relations. Considering Chinese President Xi Jinping's visit to Pyongyang on June 8th and the subsequent extensive promotion of 'congratulatory diplomacy' with President Putin, North Korea's constitutional revision could be the most crucial preparatory step for its transformation into a 'normal state.' A more proactive interpretation views this as an effort to secure North Korea's space, taking into account the potential conclusion of the Iran war and the reshaping of the Middle East order, as well as the possibility of ending the Ukraine war. This is also indicated by the status of nuclear forces enshrined in the constitution and the substantial support provided through China and Russia, suggesting that North Korea no longer faces an urgent crisis that needs immediate resolution.

Finally, the author wishes to draw attention to precisely this aspect: the area that North Korea now believes it has moved beyond the need for immediate resolution. For decades, North Korea has intentionally employed a strategy of 'routinizing crisis,' and according to Max Weber's explanation, the charismatic leadership passed down from Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-il, to Kim Jong-un was suited to this era of crisis. However, with the advent of a situation where it feels it has overcome crisis, the crisis that underpinned charismatic leadership has disappeared. Consequently, through the recent constitutional revision, the existing charismatic leadership has been transformed into an everyday leadership, institutionalized at the highest level through the constitution. If North Korea's aspiration for a normal state is true, then an opportunity through diplomacy is approaching us in some form, and I believe meticulous preparation is necessary. ■

■ Park In-hwi_Dean, Graduate School of International Studies, Ewha Womans University.

■ Editor: Lee Sang-jun_EAI Research Fellow; Oh In-hwan