[Global NK Commentary] Which is the True Nuclear Korea?

■ Go to the original text of Global NK Zoom&Connect

South of the 38th parallel, two Koreas divided by nuclear weapons exist.

In the first Korea, government officials are pursuing the development of capabilities that support the option of nuclear weapons. These capabilities include uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing facilities that can produce fuel for nuclear bombs, nuclear-powered submarines, and military commands that plan nuclear operations. In this Korea, some politicians and officials state they will start a nuclear weapons program someday, while others concur to keep options open. We will refer to this policy as 'deliberate hedging'.

The second Korea pursues the same capabilities—the same nuclear facilities, submarines, and command structures—but its officials claim these acquisitions are unrelated to a nuclear weapons program. Instead, they pursue these capabilities to enhance Korea’s energy security and conventional deterrence against North Korea. We will refer to this policy as 'inadvertent weapons capability'.

In a notable contribution published by the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network, Foreign Minister Cho Hyun makes a strong case for the second Korea. He writes, “The peace and prosperity of the Republic of Korea are not based on nuclear armament or any illusions about it, but on a broader foundation of security, economic strength, and an open and democratic society.” Minister Cho offers several reasons why a nuclear weapons program would “undermine the foundation of our own strengths.” He concludes that adherence to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is “not simply a matter of principle but a logical strategic imperative.”

This essay is the most persuasive rebuttal of the case for nuclear weapons presented by a South Korean government official to date. Most experts and officials with whom we have spoken agree with Minister Cho’s views, but few will say so publicly.

However, Minister Cho’s written remarks do not help distinguish between two Koreas with the same policies and capabilities. Both 'deliberate hedging' and 'inadvertent weapons capability' are forms of nuclear latency, a term political scientists use to describe states that have accumulated the technical capacity to produce nuclear weapons in a short period but have not actually done so. The only difference between the two Koreas is the stated intent of the incumbent government. The problem with nuclear latency is that a country’s nuclear status can change rapidly when intent changes.

How can we tell which Korea is the real one? Is there really a difference?

Minister Cho’s contribution is not just a statement of the government’s denuclearization intent, but a clear and precise explanation of why a nuclear weapons program would be a threat to South Korea’s national security and prosperity. If this government and its successors follow this logic, they should use Minister Cho’s statement to further reduce the risk that South Korea will face the military, diplomatic, and economic costs of nuclear latency.

The South Korean government should chart a new course by building a sustainable domestic consensus for a Korea that remains non-nuclear. This third Korea should adopt a policy of 'active nonproliferation' instead of pursuing the precarious status of nuclear latency. This policy presupposes that proactive steps to strengthen South Korea’s commitments will reinforce its nuclear energy industry and conventional deterrence posture.

While there is room for disagreement, the most powerful steps the government could take toward active nonproliferation would be to scale back its development of enrichment and reprocessing capabilities and its plans for nuclear-powered submarines. We have spent a significant portion of our careers trying, without success, to understand why many South Koreans believe the marginal benefits of these programs justify their high costs and risks. As long as these programs continue, serious questions will remain about the future intentions of South Korea’s leaders. Nevertheless, recognizing the reality that these programs will likely continue, how can South Korea reduce the risks of nuclear latency?

First, the government must commit to changing public opinion that perceives nuclear weapons as necessary. More than 70 percent of the population supports a nuclear weapons program, a figure frequently cited by some politicians and nuclear advocates. This figure reflects anxieties about North Korea’s threats and the future of the U.S. alliance, but it tends to decline when respondents are also asked about the risks of nuclear proliferation. However, as long as this figure persists, future governments could claim a mandate for nuclear weapons development, and governments and markets worldwide will worry about South Korea’s intentions.

To shift public opinion, senior civilian and military officials must actively rebut the ambiguous suspicions that fill domestic and international media regarding South Korea’s nuclear intentions. They must consistently explain why South Korea’s superior conventional forces are its most effective form of deterrence, why a nuclear weapons program would be detrimental to the country, and why keeping the nuclear weapons option open would harm South Korea’s commercial nuclear energy goals. As Minister Cho writes, proliferation would “risk isolation, invite persistent sanctions, and forfeit the international standing that makes Korea a global leader.”

Second, the government should introduce legislation that solidifies South Korea’s non-nuclear status and make it robust enough to be difficult to circumvent or weaken. This legislation should also prohibit nuclear activities without legitimate peaceful purposes, such as research and development aimed at nuclear weapons development, the production of enriched uranium or plutonium beyond commercial demand (i.e., prohibiting stockpiling), uranium enrichment above 20 percent U-235, and the casting of uranium or plutonium metal.

Finally, the government should cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to develop and implement new transparency measures that supplement South Korea’s existing safeguards agreements. In this regard, South Korea could pioneer a leading approach to building stronger nonproliferation norms, particularly around the most sensitive nuclear activities such as enrichment and reprocessing. Examples of such measures could include introducing a broad environmental monitoring regime or proposing experimental special inspections that could enhance confidence that undeclared nuclear activities are not occurring.

Minister Cho’s contribution points the way toward a more secure and prosperous South Korea. As Iran’s case demonstrates, even keeping the nuclear weapons option open is dangerous. If South Korea’s adversaries feel insecure, 'nuclear latency' could inadvertently trigger the very conflict South Korea seeks to deter. The government should adopt a bold policy of active nonproliferation to reduce the risks of nuclear proliferation and invest instead in South Korea’s true security and strengths. ■

■ Adam Mount_Independent Scholar; Toby Dalton_Senior Fellow and Co-Director, Nuclear Policy Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

■ Editor: Lee Sang-jun_Research Fellow, EAI; Oh Inhwan_Senior Research Fellow, EAI

Contact: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 211) | leesj@eai.or.kr