Finding a New Direction for South Korean Policy Toward North Korea

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North Korea's Strategic Shift After the 9th Party Congress and the Advent of a New Policy Environment

North Korea's 9th Party Congress once again demonstrated that South Korea's future North Korea policy requires a fundamental paradigm shift. Through this Party Congress, North Korea solidified its status as a nuclear-armed state as an irreversible national reality and redefined South Korea not as an internal partner within the nation, but as the most hostile state-to-state adversary. Furthermore, recognizing the weakening of the US-centric international order and the advent of a multipolar world, it clearly stated its intention to further strengthen its lines of self-reliance, self-sufficiency, and self-defense. These changes should be viewed not merely as a shift in North Korea's rhetoric toward the South or a temporary negotiation tactic, but as the fundamental framework of a national strategy that North Korea intends to maintain for decades to come.

South Korea's North Korea policy is no longer sufficient with the familiar combinations of past dialogue and pressure, engagement and sanctions, or peace and denuclearization. While emphasizing the necessity of peace and dialogue in seeking a direction for North Korea policy is natural, concrete policy concepts that sufficiently reflect North Korea's changed strategy and the structural transformation of the international order have not yet been clearly presented. Especially as North Korea denies the inter-Korean relationship itself, positions South Korea as a direct target of nuclear deterrence, and strengthens its stance of not viewing North Korea-US relations within the framework of denuclearization negotiations as in the past, the South Korean government must establish new, long-term, and fundamental principles for its North Korea policy.

The most significant change is the transformation of the international order. North Korea views the current world as an era where US hegemony is weakening and multipolarity is advancing. From North Korea's perspective, the United States remains an adversary, but at the same time, it is no longer an absolute hegemonic power that can unilaterally dictate the international order and pressure all nations as it did in the past. North Korea emphasizes the conclusion that US hegemonic policies are shaking the existing international order, and as a result, only those with power can guarantee survival and development. In the report of the 9th Party Congress, North Korea reiterated the logic that possessing nuclear weapons is the only means to deter imperialist aggression and formalized the irreversibility of its status as a nuclear-armed state.

However, North Korea's perception of international affairs coexists with a certain degree of realism and a significant possibility of miscalculation. While the relative weakening of US hegemony is a clear trend, the United States remains the world's strongest power in terms of military, financial, technological, and alliance networks. Even if the US-led liberal international order has become less consistent than in the past, it does not mean that a situation has arrived where the US has no choice but to make decisive concessions in negotiations with North Korea. North Korea may judge that the need for negotiation with the US has decreased in the multipolar era, but in reality, it is more likely that the North Korean issue will gradually be pushed down the priority list amidst the complex intersection of interests among major actors such as the US, China, Russia, Europe, and Japan.

Furthermore, the current international order is unlikely to solidify into a clear bipolar new Cold War as North Korea claims. While the US and China are in strategic competition, they maintain deep interdependence in terms of economy, technology, supply chains, and finance. For a considerable period, US-China relations are likely to continue in a form of managed competition amidst tension and competition, and weaponized interdependence, rather than complete severance. In this process, North Korea may become a strategic asset to China, but at the same time, it will remain a burden. While China may tacitly condone North Korea's nuclear possession, it is highly unlikely to grant it international recognition or accept it as a nuclear state. China, as a potential future leader, will inevitably prioritize the role of the UN system and international organizations, and it is difficult to see the complete collapse of the nuclear non-proliferation regime as being in its long-term interest.

Nevertheless, it is also true that the non-proliferation regime is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain its former binding force. North Korea has already advanced its nuclear weapons development to a considerable level and has institutionally solidified its policy of not abandoning nuclear weapons by legislating and constitutionalizing its nuclear armament. Even if the US maintains denuclearization as its official goal, its actual policy is likely to rapidly shift towards a deterrence-centered model. It is increasingly likely that, without legally recognizing North Korea as a nuclear weapons state, it will be treated as a dangerous actor that effectively possesses nuclear weapons, focusing on extended deterrence, arms control approaches, crisis management, and preventing nuclear use. This creates a very difficult strategic environment for South Korea. While the ultimate goal of denuclearization cannot be abandoned, policy cannot be designed by ignoring the reality of North Korea acting as a de facto nuclear state.

Second, North Korea's internal strategy faces the dual challenges of regime perpetuation and economic performance. At this Party Congress, North Korea highlighted its achievements over the past five years and presented new development tasks such as regional development, rural construction, housing construction, healthcare, education, tourism, and the information industry. This indicates that the North Korean regime seeks to secure legitimacy not just as a military state, but also through improving the lives of its citizens and achieving economic results. However, the development plans presented by North Korea remain within the framework of a self-reliant economy, state control, political-ideological mobilization, and military priority. It is difficult to achieve a new leap in economic development without opening up to the outside, expanding markets, fostering an innovation ecosystem, and attracting international investment.

The advent of the AI era, in particular, will further deepen North Korea's long-term vulnerabilities. Although North Korea mentioned advanced technology fields such as the artificial intelligence industry, space industry, and new energy industry at this Party Congress, these industries actually require an open knowledge network, free movement of high-level talent, large-scale data, semiconductor and cloud infrastructure, international research cooperation, and a private innovation ecosystem. A closed dictatorial regime like North Korea may achieve certain results in limited AI applications for military purposes or strengthening cyber capabilities, but it is very difficult to achieve an AI transformation that revolutionizes the entire national economy. Conversely, South Korea possesses world-class competitiveness in AI, semiconductors, biotechnology, digital platforms, defense technology, and financial technology, making it highly likely that the technological, industrial, and living standard gap between North and South Korea will expand exponentially in the future.

This could have two contradictory effects on North Korea. One is an increase in regime instability. As North Korean citizens come into contact with external information and the development of South Korean society, the pressure of comparison will inevitably increase. This is precisely why North Korea is extremely wary of the influx of Korean Wave content and the spread of external information. The other is the strengthening of military obsession. If North Korea cannot catch up to South Korea in economic development and cannot overcome its disadvantage in regime appeal, the North Korean regime is likely to maintain regime cohesion through nuclear weapons, military power, internal control, and anti-South rhetoric. Therefore, the AI era may not necessarily lead North Korea to become a more open and rational economy, but could also push it towards stronger control and military dependence in the short term.

Third, North Korea's obsession with nuclear weapons will intensify. At the 9th Party Congress, North Korea explicitly stated the expansion and strengthening of nuclear forces, the exercise of its status as a nuclear-armed state, an increase in the number of nuclear weapons, and the expansion of nuclear delivery vehicles and operational space. It also demonstrated its will to develop nuclear forces as a practical deterrence tool, not just a political symbol, by mentioning an integrated nuclear crisis response system, nuclear weapon operation training, and various nuclear response operation possibilities. This signifies that North Korea views nuclear weapons as the ultimate guarantee for regime survival and as a central asset for its strategy toward South Korea, the US, and other foreign powers.

In this context, the possibility of denuclearization has become very slim. North Korea perceives the abandonment of nuclear weapons as the abandonment of regime security, and in negotiations with the US, it is likely to consider only limited agendas such as nuclear disarmament, nuclear freeze, sanctions relief, and normalization of relations. While it is natural for South Korea to continue to aim for complete denuclearization, its actual policy operations will require a complex approach of deterrence against a nuclear-armed North Korea, crisis management, arms control, strengthening extended deterrence, and inducing long-term change. The problem is that such a realistic recognition could be misunderstood as acknowledging North Korea's possession of nuclear weapons. Therefore, South Korea faces the difficult task of developing a sophisticated strategy based on the premise of de facto nuclear threats, without legally or politically recognizing North Korea's nuclear possession.

Fourth, North Korea's issue is likely to be de-prioritized internationally in a global multi-theater environment. Major international security issues are unfolding simultaneously, including the war in Ukraine, instability in the Middle East following the Iran conflict, tensions in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, US-China strategic competition, China's nuclear buildup, global supply chain restructuring, and climate and energy crises. From the US perspective, the most important military challenge is increasingly shifting towards containing China, particularly responding to China's naval, missile, nuclear, space, and cyber capabilities in the Indo-Pacific. In this process, North Korea may not completely disappear from US strategic attention, but it will be difficult to be treated as an independent issue with high priority as it was in the past.

This has significant implications for South Korea. The core variable of the ROK-US alliance is likely to shift from simply deterring North Korea to the extent to which South Korea participates in US containment of China and its Indo-Pacific strategy. The US will demand that South Korea go beyond defending against North Korea and expand its role in containing China, supply chain security, advanced technology cooperation, maritime security, and cyberspace/space domains. However, the deeper South Korea becomes involved in China strategy, the more North Korea may define this as hostile ROK-US-Japan military cooperation and escalate military tensions. Therefore, South Korea needs a sophisticated strategy to manage the linkage between strengthening the ROK-US alliance and participating in China strategy, while simultaneously maintaining deterrence against North Korea.

In this situation, US extended deterrence will remain the core pillar of South Korean security. As North Korea's nuclear capabilities advance and the US dedicates more resources to its China strategy, doubts about the credibility of US extended deterrence may grow within South Korea. If the US pursues negotiations focused on limiting North Korea's ICBM capabilities or seeks partial agreements with North Korea in a manner that prioritizes the safety of the US mainland, South Korea's security anxieties will be further amplified. Therefore, South Korea must ensure that US extended deterrence is institutionalized not just as a declaration, but in actual planning, training, asset deployment, nuclear consultations, and decision-making structures during crises.

Fifth, the direction of North Korea-Russia relations is an important variable in North Korea's strategy. Russia's war in Ukraine will inevitably end in some form. How Russia re-establishes its relationship with Europe after the war will significantly impact the sustainability of North Korea-Russia relations. If Russia remains isolated from Europe in the long term after the war, it is likely to seek to maintain military and political cooperation with North Korea. Conversely, if space for limited normalization of relations emerges between Europe and Russia, the strategic attention and resources that Russia can provide to North Korea may decrease.

However, what Russia can provide to North Korea is limited in any case. Russia lacks the capacity to foster North Korea's long-term economic prosperity, and it will need to invest significant resources in post-war reconstruction and reorganizing its own economy. Ultimately, the core assets that Russia can provide to North Korea are likely to be military technology, energy, food, diplomatic support, and space for evading international sanctions. While this may help strengthen North Korea's short-term military capabilities, it could have a negative impact on North Korea's self-reliant economic development. Military cooperation and a war-mobilization-oriented economic relationship will only make North Korea a more militarized survival state, making it difficult to transition into a normal developmental state.

Sixth, North Korea's strategy toward South Korea possesses both defensive and offensive characteristics. North Korea's definition of South Korea as a hostile two-state relationship stems, in part, from a deep anxiety about South Korean societal influence. Korean Wave content, information inflow, South Korea's economic prosperity, and its free socio-cultural environment pose the most fundamental threat to the North Korean regime. North Korea's attempt to deny the concept of the nation and eliminate the 특수성 (special nature) of inter-Korean relations is a defensive measure aimed at blocking the impact of South Korean societal appeal on North Korean citizens.

However, on the other hand, it is also an offensive strategy. By defining South Korea not as an internal partner but as a hostile nation, North Korea seeks to expose South Korea to the possibility of nuclear attack and maximize political deterrence. The more South Korea denies North Korea's status as a nuclear-armed state and demands denuclearization, the more North Korea will define this as a challenge to its constitutional status and sovereignty. North Korea's statement at the Party Congress that it has nothing to discuss with South Korea and will permanently exclude South Korea from the category of compatriots signifies a fundamental change in this strategy toward South Korea.

Ultimately, North Korea is likely to treat South Korea as an object of deterrence and pressure rather than a negotiation partner. The space for inter-Korean dialogue may shrink, the risk of military conflict may increase, and crisis management channels may weaken. As North Korea moves further away from international attention, it may try to enhance its visibility by threatening South Korea and Japan. If it deems that nuclear and missile provocations alone are insufficient to gain attention, new provocations in cyber attacks, gray zone incidents, military tensions in the West Sea and the Demilitarized Zone, and in space and electronic warfare domains cannot be ruled out.

All these changes demand a fundamental re-examination of South Korea's North Korea policy. North Korea is no longer a country that can only come to the negotiating table due to economic hardship, nor is it a partner with whom gradual reconciliation and cooperation can be pursued within the framework of the inter-Korean national community. At the same time, North Korea is not a fully self-reliant and stable nuclear power, nor is it a country that can become a winner in the multipolar era. North Korea relies more on nuclear weapons but its economic development prospects are weakening; it relies externally on China and Russia but cannot guarantee complete security and prosperity from them; and it defines South Korea as an adversary while fearing the widening gap with South Korea the most—a contradictory state.

Therefore, South Korea's new North Korea policy must avoid both of the following illusions. One is the expectation that North Korea will soon collapse or change its strategy solely through external pressure. The other is the expectation that North Korea will return to the framework of past inter-Korean relations if only there is the will for dialogue and cooperation. North Korea is likely to weaken in the long term, but it can endure for a considerable period in the short term through nuclear weapons, military provocations, internal control, and a balancing strategy toward external powers. Therefore, South Korea must establish a long-term North Korea policy that looks at least 30 years ahead. This should not be a mere government-by-government North Korea policy, but a new national strategy that comprehensively considers the changes in the international order, the transformation of technological civilization, the sustainability and vulnerabilities of the North Korean regime, the reality of nuclear threats, changes in the ROK-US alliance, and the widening gap between North and South Korea.

New Principles for South Korea's North Korea Strategy

South Korea's North Korea strategy must begin with the recognition that we are in a period of great transformation in the international order. The current changes are not simply a change of government or a temporary shift in the diplomatic environment, but a structural transformation comparable to the changes that occurred when the US hegemonic era began after the end of the Cold War in 1991. Since the end of the Cold War, the Korean Peninsula issue has been dealt with under the conditions of a US-centric order, a liberal international order, a nuclear non-proliferation regime, the ROK-US alliance, and the relative stability of US-China relations. However, these conditions are now being shaken simultaneously. The relative weakening of US hegemony, the prolonged US-China strategic competition, Russia's departure from the international order, the rise of the Global South, the weakening of nuclear non-proliferation norms, and the full-fledged intensification of AI and advanced technology competition are all occurring at once. In this situation, South Korea's North Korea policy must not be merely a management strategy for inter-Korean relations, but a national strategy that redefines the position of the Korean Peninsula within the changing international order.

The North Korean nuclear issue and the Korean Peninsula issue are international in nature. While the special nature of inter-Korean relations exists and the historical context within the nation is important, the North Korean nuclear issue is already closely linked to the security order of Northeast Asia, US-China strategic competition, the nuclear non-proliferation regime, the ROK-US alliance, the UN sanctions regime, and the foreign strategies of Russia and China. Therefore, South Korea's North Korea policy cannot be designed solely based on dialogue and tension reduction within the Korean Peninsula. It is necessary to first determine the direction in which the international order is changing, whether these changes are short-term changes over the next few years, mid-term changes over more than a decade, or structural changes that will continue for more than 30 years. The policy timeline must also be adjusted accordingly.

What is needed now are principles for North Korea policy that look at least 10 years into the future, toward the mid- to long-term. Through the 9th Party Congress, North Korea has formalized the permanent status of a nuclear-armed state, a hostile two-state relationship with South Korea, a line of self-reliance, self-sufficiency, and self-defense, and a survival strategy within a multipolar world order. At this Party Congress, North Korea defined its nuclear forces as the basic guarantee for national survival and the right to development, and declared a hostile state relationship with South Korea, excluding the concept of compatriots. This should be viewed not as a temporary tactic for negotiation, but as North Korea's long-term strategic direction. South Korea must also, instead of a five-year government-specific North Korea policy, develop a grand strategic approach that considers both the changes in the international order and the long-term changes in the North Korean regime.

First, South Korea must reaffirm the principle of North Korean denuclearization at the level of international non-proliferation norms. North Korean denuclearization is not merely a matter of South Korean security. If North Korea's nuclear possession is de facto or legally tolerated, it will have significant repercussions for Northeast Asia as a whole and the global nuclear order. If the trend of North Korea's nuclear armament being legalized or tacitly accepted internationally solidifies, discussions on nuclear armament in Northeast Asia, including South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan, could rapidly spread. This would also affect the nuclear strategies of China and Russia, and create chain reactions in the security orders of the Indo-Pacific and Europe. The normative basis of the global non-proliferation regime will be further weakened, and the possibility of nuclear war will inevitably increase in the long term.

Therefore, South Korea must realistically acknowledge North Korea's nuclear threat but must not recognize North Korea's nuclear possession as a legitimate status. While policy-wise, deterrence, arms control approaches, crisis management, and strengthening extended deterrence are necessary, normatively, the principle of denuclearization must be maintained. This is not an unrealistic slogan, but a matter of preserving the minimum safety net of the international order. The moment the goal of North Korean denuclearization is completely abandoned, the UN sanctions regime and non-proliferation norms are likely to be rapidly nullified. Economic sanctions would also lose their international legitimacy, and China and Russia would gain justification for more openly supporting North Korea. Ultimately, abandoning the principle of North Korean denuclearization may seem like a short-term acknowledgment of reality, but it could lead to far more dangerous consequences for South Korean security in the long term.

Second, South Korea must maintain a minimum strategic consensus with China on North Korean denuclearization. It has become difficult for China to publicly exert strong pressure on North Korean denuclearization. Amidst intensifying US-China strategic competition, China views North Korea as a buffer zone and a geopolitical asset in its strategic competition with the US. However, China does not genuinely view North Korea's nuclear possession as desirable. If North Korea's nuclear weapons are legitimized, discussions on nuclear armament in South Korea and Japan could intensify, US Indo-Pacific nuclear strategies and missile defense systems could expand, and a nuclear arms race in Northeast Asia could accelerate. This conflicts with China's long-term security interests as well.

Therefore, in its relations with China, South Korea should not simply raise the issue of North Korean denuclearization as a means of pressuring North Korea. Rather, it should continue strategic dialogue with China on the maintenance of non-proliferation norms, the prevention of a Northeast Asian nuclear domino effect, inter-Korean crisis management, and the deterrence of North Korea's potential use of nuclear weapons. Even if China finds it difficult to publicly call for North Korean denuclearization, it should be made to share the perception that North Korea's nuclearization destabilizes the Northeast Asian order. This is a limited but important space for South Korea to cooperate with China amidst US-China competition. South Korea must persuade China that the North Korean nuclear issue is not just a problem for the US and South Korea, but a problem that exacerbates China's own long-term security environment.

Third, South Korea must re-establish its strategy toward the US based on the premise of changes in US strategy toward North Korea. It is highly likely that future US policy toward North Korea will find it difficult to return to comprehensive negotiations centered on denuclearization as in the past. Even if President Trump pursues renewed North Korea-US summits, the possibility of substantial progress in North Korean denuclearization is very low. North Korea has already solidified its status as a nuclear-armed state in its constitution and party line, and the US is also in a situation where it is difficult to make the North Korean issue a top diplomatic priority. It is also highly likely that the US administration after Trump will not fundamentally reset its relationship with North Korea. Rather, the US is likely to invest more strategic resources in containing China, the Taiwan Strait, European security after the Ukraine war, Middle East instability, and advanced technology competition.

In this situation, the priority of the North Korean issue within the US may gradually decrease. The US may be more interested in limiting direct threats to the US mainland, preventing nuclear use, managing crises, and maintaining extended deterrence, rather than North Korea's complete denuclearization. This could create a very dangerous situation for South Korea. If the US pursues limited agreements focused on the threat of North Korea's ICBMs, or attempts to manage North Korea-US relations without adequately considering the nuclear threat to South Korea, the credibility of the ROK-US alliance could be weakened.

Therefore, South Korea must systematize its strategic discussions with the US much more thoroughly. Cooperation on North Korea policy between South Korea and the US should go beyond mere policy coordination and become a process of building a shared strategic understanding of where the North Korean issue fits within the US's China strategy, nuclear strategy, extended deterrence, alliance strategy, and arms control initiatives. South Korea must continuously emphasize to the US that the North Korean nuclear issue is not only about the safety of the US mainland but is also linked to the credibility of the entire Northeast Asian alliance network. If US extended deterrence weakens or the North Korean nuclear issue is reduced to narrow threat management centered on the US, security anxieties in South Korea and Japan will increase, and the Northeast Asian nuclear order could fall into greater instability. Therefore, South Korea must actively intervene to ensure that US policy toward North Korea is designed within the strategic balance of the entire Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia.

Fourth, South Korea must prepare a long-term response strategy to Russia's support for North Korea. Following the war in Ukraine, North Korea-Russia relations have emerged as an important axis in North Korea's foreign strategy. Through military cooperation with Russia, North Korea seeks to alleviate its diplomatic isolation, obtain military technology and economic compensation, and enhance its strategic value amidst the changes in the international order. However, Russia's war in Ukraine will inevitably enter a new phase in the form of a ceasefire or armistice at some point. The way Russia re-establishes its relationship with Europe at that time will significantly impact the future of North Korea-Russia relations.

When discussing North Korea policy, South Korea should not consider its strategy toward Russia and Europe separately. How European countries will deal with Russia after the war in Ukraine, whether Russia will remain isolated from Europe in the long term, whether space for limited normalization of relations will emerge, and whether Russia will become more dependent on Asia and North Korea are all connected to the Korean Peninsula issue. If Russia remains isolated from Europe in the long term, it is likely to further strengthen military cooperation with North Korea. Conversely, if Russia feels the need for post-war reconstruction and normalization of foreign relations, excessive military cooperation with North Korea may become a burden.

Therefore, South Korea must strengthen strategic dialogue with Europe and emphasize that Russia's military technology support to North Korea is a problem that threatens both European and Northeast Asian security. The issue of North Korean denuclearization is no longer just a matter for South Korea, the US, and China, but is also connected to the European security order. The military technology, missile technology, space/reconnaissance technology, and electronic warfare technology that Russia can provide to North Korea will not only worsen security on the Korean Peninsula but are also directly related to international sanctions regimes and Europe's strategy toward Russia. South Korea must ensure that the North Korean issue is not excluded from the process of reorganizing European security after the war in Ukraine and must pursue diplomacy that increases the cost for Russia to use North Korea as a strategic card.

Fifth, South Korea must continuously point out the limitations in North Korea's perception of international affairs. North Korea interprets the current international order as a decline in US hegemony, an advancement of multipolarity, and the rise of anti-US and self-reliant forces. However, the actual international order is much more complex than North Korea imagines. The world is not simply moving from a US-centric unipolar order to a bipolar order of North Korea-China-Russia versus South Korea-US-Japan. While US-China strategic competition will continue, economic interdependence and supply chain linkages, climate and finance, technological standards, and competitive cooperation with the Global South will also operate in a complex manner. The interests of Russia and China are not entirely aligned, and Global South countries will not unilaterally be incorporated into a North Korea-style anti-US alliance.

Rather, the international order of the future is likely to be a complex order where transactions and selective cooperation between great powers, competition in specific sectors, and limited compromises coexist. In such an order, North Korea may hold a certain strategic value, but this value is not unlimited. China needs North Korea but does not want a situation where North Korea's nuclear armament and provocations trigger a nuclear domino effect in Northeast Asia. Russia can utilize North Korea, but it lacks the capacity to foster North Korea's long-term economic prosperity. The US must manage the North Korean issue, but it is unlikely to make it a top priority. Ultimately, the comprehensive support that North Korea expects is unlikely to materialize, and economic difficulties will continue.

South Korea must consistently present these realities to both the international community and North Korea. The idea that North Korea can achieve long-term prosperity solely through nuclear weapons and anti-US alliances is a miscalculation. If North Korea completely severs relations with South Korea and relies solely on China and Russia, it is highly likely that North Korea will become more militarized and trapped in an isolated economic structure. This is a choice that, rather than strengthening regime security, shrinks the regime's potential for development in the long term. South Korea must continuously demonstrate that, contrary to the North Korean regime's propaganda logic, completely excluding relations with South Korea is not a rational choice for North Korea's long-term survival and development.

Sixth, South Korea must prepare new responses to inter-Korean cooperation that are not mechanically bound by North Korea's hostile two-state theory. North Korea's designation of South Korea as a hostile nation and its denial of the special nature of inter-Korean relations represent a significant change. However, South Korea does not need to abandon the historical, national, humanitarian, and peaceful dimensions of inter-Korean relations in the same way. North Korea's two-state theory may help defend its regime in the short term by blocking the possibility of cooperation with South Korea, but its long-term benefit for North Korea is uncertain. North Korea will find it difficult to achieve long-term development by completely severing ties with South Korea's economic power, technological capabilities, cultural influence, and international standing.

Therefore, South Korea must prepare a new concept for inter-Korean relations that transcends the framework of North Korea's two-state theory, rather than acknowledging or accepting it. The past concept of a national community is insufficient to explain the changed reality, and a simple state-to-state relationship concept cannot fully encompass the historical uniqueness of the Korean Peninsula and the possibility of long-term integration. South Korea must seek a new policy concept that encompasses peaceful coexistence, humanitarian cooperation, crisis management, reduction of mutual threats, improvement of citizens' lives, and the possibility of long-term integration. This must be prepared in advance, even if North Korea does not respond to dialogue. North Korea policy is not only necessary when North Korea is willing to cooperate immediately, but must be more meticulously prepared when North Korea refuses cooperation.

New inter-Korean cooperation should not be designed around large-scale economic cooperation or political events as in the past. In a situation where North Korea strengthens its nuclear arsenal and designates South Korea as a hostile nation, unconditional cooperation is neither possible nor desirable. However, possibilities for long-term cooperation should be kept open in areas such as humanitarian issues, health, disaster response, climate, environment, infectious diseases, food security, border region safety, prevention of accidental clashes, separated families, information access, and improvement of citizens' lives. Even if North Korea insists on a hostile two-state theory, South Korea must continue to prepare the minimum space for inter-Korean cooperation in terms of the lives and safety of the residents on the Korean Peninsula and the peace of future generations.

Seventh, the advent of the AI era must be reflected as a key variable in South Korea's North Korea strategy. In the future, the gap between North and South Korea will expand beyond mere differences in economic scale or military spending to a gap in technological civilization as a whole. AI, semiconductors, quantum technology, biotechnology, space, robotics, autonomous weapons, cyber, and the data economy will become core components of national capabilities. While North Korea may strengthen its asymmetric capabilities in some military and cyber domains, it will be difficult to achieve comprehensive development in the AI era due to its closed political system, sanctions, limited infrastructure, weak industrial base, and poor data ecosystem.

In this regard, South Korea is likely to have an absolute advantage over North Korea in the long term. However, this advantage should not be used solely as a means of pressure. South Korea must strengthen its ability to deter and defend against North Korea based on its technological superiority in the AI era, but at the same time, it must prepare for the possibility of cooperation to improve the lives of North Korean citizens and design the future of the entire Korean Peninsula in the long term. AI-based crisis prediction, prevention of military conflict, disaster response, healthcare support, improvement of agricultural productivity, environmental monitoring, border region management, and humanitarian assistance systems could become new areas for inter-Korean cooperation in the future. Even if the North Korean regime does not accept this immediately, South Korea must be prepared technologically, institutionally, and diplomatically for future cooperation.

Ultimately, South Korea's new North Korea strategy must combine the principle of denuclearization, deterrence capabilities, international cooperation, the ROK-US alliance, strategic dialogue with China, multi-layered diplomacy including Russia and Europe, long-term preparation for North Korean change, and technological superiority in the AI era. This is not a matter of simply choosing one among past Sunshine Policy, pressure policy, engagement policy, or sanctions policy. It is a matter of a long-term national strategy regarding what kind of Korean Peninsula South Korea will create within the changing international order.

The core of this strategy is long-term confidence. North Korea can secure short-term deterrence through nuclear weapons, but it cannot catch up to South Korea in terms of the economy and technological civilization of the AI era, international trust, quality of life for its citizens, and institutional dynamism. South Korea must not squander this advantage through hasty unification theories or short-term pressure tactics. Rather, it should develop a mature North Korea strategy that combines long-term peace, maintenance of non-proliferation norms, improvement of the lives of North Korean citizens, management of the Korean Peninsula crisis, and the possibility of future cooperation. Mid- to long-term North Korea policy must begin with these new principles. ■

■ Jeon Jae-seong_President of the East Asia Institute; Professor of Political Science and International Relations, Seoul National University.

■ Edited by: Lee Sangjun_EAI Researcher; Oh Inhwan_EAI Senior Researcher

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 211) | leesj@eai.or.kr