[Global NK Commentary] A Strategic Reinterpretation of the 1994 Yongbyon Crisis

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I. Introduction: Why 1994 Now?


Following the U.S. military operation against Iran in February 2026, South Korean security discourse has been shaped around two questions. The first is, 'Is North Korea the next target?'[1] This question is answered in the negative regarding the possibility of attacking North Korea, based on the following points: ① North Korea's possession of nuclear weapons, ② the absence of a regional 'rogue state' like Israel, ③ the possibility of military intervention by China and Russia, and ④ the limitations of U.S. war-fighting capabilities. The second question is, 'Is the joint U.S.-Israel opening of hostilities against Iran a case where alliance conditions were realized on the battlefield, and how can it be applied to South Korea?'[2] However, rather than proceeding to a detailed analysis of the fundamental differences between South Korea and Israel, and the security environments of North Korea and Iran, these questions are confined to normative and prescriptive declarations that the U.S. and South Korea must respond in a 'close' and 'precise' manner.


Although the two questions differ in form, they rest on the same premise: that the U.S. and South Korea view North Korea as a 'threat' without significant distinction. However, this premise itself is subject to verification. The level at which South Korea and the U.S. perceive North Korea differs. For South Korea, the North Korean issue is the paramount strategic task in itself. For the U.S., however, the North Korean issue may be one means to pursue higher strategic objectives.


The U.S. did not militarily strike North Korea in the early 1990s, when North Korea did not possess nuclear weapons. Instead, during that period, it fought the Gulf War against Iraq, which possessed far superior military power. The early 2000s were similar. The explanation that 'because it has nuclear weapons, it cannot be attacked' may be true individually, but viewed diachronically, the causal order is reversed. This is because for approximately the first 20 years of the 30-year North Korean nuclear crisis, North Korea did not possess nuclear weapons.[3] The logic that nuclear possession functions as deterrence is either an additional factor or a post-hoc rationalization that interprets the effect as the cause. The more fundamental reason lies elsewhere. For the U.S., the North Korean issue is not a Korean Peninsula security issue but a sub-issue of the Northeast Asian security structure, particularly U.S. strategy toward China. South Korea's discourse on the North Korean nuclear issue has long overlooked or ignored this structure.


This paper re-examines the 1994 Yongbyon crisis as the first point of inquiry to trace the origins of this asymmetrical perception. The dominant existing narrative is as follows: North Korea pushed ahead with nuclear development, prompting the U.S. to prepare for a precision strike on Yongbyon; the war was averted by President Kim Young-sam's decision and former President Carter's visit; and the Agreed Framework was reached. This narrative has circulated as textbook fact for over 30 years. However, when this event is viewed through the lens of the interests of each actor and the structural conditions, a completely different picture emerges.

II. The Existing Narrative and Its Gaps


The core propositions of the existing explanation of the 1994 Yongbyon crisis are three. First, the U.S. had the actual will and plan to strike Yongbyon. Second, Kim Young-sam prevented the war by stopping this. Third, former President Carter's visit was the decisive turning point that led to the Agreed Framework. This narrative has been repeatedly reproduced through the recollections and testimonies of various parties. Joel Wit, Daniel Poneman, and Robert Gallucci, who were direct participants in the negotiations, emphasize that the war crisis at the time was real.[4] Former President Kim Young-sam also stated in his memoirs that he had stopped the U.S. plan to strike North Korea.[5]


However, this narrative has unexplained gaps. The key variable commonly cited as deterring U.S. military action at the time is the North Korean long-range artillery's capability to strike Seoul and the risk of escalation to full-scale war. Yet, Secretary of Defense Perry reported to Clinton that a strike on Yongbyon would result in 'tens of thousands of casualties in Seoul within the first few days,'[6] and General Luck, Commander of the U.S. Forces Korea, estimated the total casualties in case of escalation to full-scale war to be in the 'millions.'[7] The discrepancy between these two figures is abnormally large. The conclusion of tens of thousands versus millions of casualties for the analysis of the same event is more reasonably interpreted as the figures being adjusted and presented according to different political contexts.


More decisively, Perry himself later testified: "(The contingency plan to attack the Yongbyon nuclear facilities) was on my desk, but it was not reported to the President, nor was it put on the table for him." [8] The fact that the bombing plan itself was kept in a drawer while casualty estimates were reported to the President strongly suggests that the figures were used for a different political purpose rather than as actual military plans.


Furthermore, for both the narrative of 'Kim Young-sam stopped it' and the narrative of 'Carter resolved it' to hold simultaneously, the premise that the U.S. intended to proceed with the strike on North Korea's nuclear facilities is necessary. However, if that premise is accepted, the narrative of 'Kim Young-sam stopped it' collapses, and if it is not accepted, the narrative of 'Carter was decisive' falters. In other words, if the U.S. actually planned to carry out the bombing, it would have been difficult for Kim Young-sam to stop it with just a phone call. Conversely, if the U.S.'s original plan was coercive diplomacy or bluffing (at a level Kim Young-sam could stop), then Carter's visit should be seen as part of the overall strategy devised by the U.S., rather than a decisive turning point. To fill this gap, we must first examine how threatening North Korea actually was at the time, and what the purpose of the U.S. 'military option' was.

III. The Actual Situation at the Time: An Isolated North Korea and a Staged Crisis


1. The Simultaneous Demise of Strategic Patronage


The structural conditions of North Korea in 1994 were clear: its strategic patrons had simultaneously disappeared. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 created a critical vacuum in North Korea's security structure. The automatic military intervention clause of the 1961 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance between the USSR and North Korea became defunct in 1992 when Russia downgraded its relations with North Korea to 'normal state relations.' At the time, Russia was in the throes of a severe transition, and declassified documents show that Russia had no intention of condoning North Korea's adventurism during this period.[9]


The establishment of diplomatic relations between South Korea and China in the same year officially signaled China's departure from North Korea. For China, which was concentrating on economic reform and opening up following Deng Xiaoping's Southern Tour, North Korea's adventurism was a threat to its own development strategy.[10] The fact that the North Korean Foreign Ministry submitted an official protest against the establishment of ROK-China relations itself proves that North Korea had internally confirmed the demise of China's willingness to provide military support.[11]


2. Collapse of Actual War-Fighting Capability


The withdrawal of patron states entailed decisive material consequences. The supply of Soviet-made equipment and parts ceased, and energy imports decreased by approximately 90% from 1990 to 1994.[12] Testimonies from defecting military officials consistently confirm that maintenance problems and parts shortages were severe throughout the North Korean military during this period.[13] The severe food shortages that led to the so-called 'Arduous March' are also self-evident.


In other words, North Korea in 1994 could not choose war because it lacked the support of China and Russia, as well as its own war-fighting capabilities. North Korea's threat of turning Seoul into a 'sea of fire' was less an actual intention to attack and more an asymmetrical bluff employed by a regime on the verge of collapse. It is more reasonable to assume that the very situation where conventional deterrence had collapsed is why North Korea pursued nuclear weapons in the future. The shock of the 1991 Gulf War would have further reinforced this perception.


3. Structural Constraints on Long-Range Artillery Deterrence


The dispersed deployment and concealment tactics of long-range artillery presuppose sufficient vehicles, fuel, and a seamlessly functioning command and communication network. The collapse of the energy supply chain and the halt in Soviet parts supply, confirmed earlier, structurally undermined these tactical prerequisites. Furthermore, considering that a significant number of long-range artillery pieces would likely have been eliminated preemptively in an actual operational scenario, the actual retaliatory capability was likely significantly lower than previously estimated.


Of course, counterarguments are possible. A representative argument is that the threat of long-range artillery should not be underestimated, citing the example of the 1991 Gulf War, where the U.S. ultimately failed to completely eliminate Iraq's Scud missiles.[14] However, it has since been confirmed that the combat power of the Iraqi military prior to the Gulf War was significantly exaggerated by U.S. intelligence agencies, and that exaggeration was used to secure congressional approval for the war.


4. The Paradox of RSOI: Military Deployment or Negotiation Staging?


Given North Korea's domestic and international conditions at the time, another way to verify the claim that the U.S. had the actual intention to strike is to examine the method of U.S. force deployment.


What is noteworthy is the method of the three-phase reinforcement plan pursued by the U.S. Department of Defense. The public RSOI (Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration) deployment over several months is at odds with the doctrine of preemptive surprise attack and the tense relationship. Of course, in the theory of coercive diplomacy, the public deployment of forces is itself a key instrument. In the Gulf War, the U.S. also publicly assembled troops for months before launching the actual operation by surprise. While theoretically, public assembly and surprise execution are compatible.


However, if the conditions under which the U.S. perceived the threat of North Korean long-range artillery are as described above, then public force buildup over several months would structurally limit the effectiveness of a strike, as North Korea would likely interpret the RSOI as a signal immediately before a strike and begin preemptive operation of its long-range artillery. In this regard, the public nature of the RSOI over several months aligns more naturally with the hypothesis of coercive diplomacy aimed at pressuring negotiations rather than an actual strike. This is also consistent with Perry's testimony mentioned earlier—"(The plan to attack the Yongbyon nuclear facilities) was not reported to the President, nor was it put on the table for him." Not reporting the bombing plan to the highest decision-maker while publicly increasing forces strengthens the interpretation that the RSOI was a tool for negotiation pressure rather than actual operational preparation.


These three analyses—North Korea's structural vulnerability, the exaggeration of long-range artillery deterrence, and the publicity of RSOI—do not constitute decisive evidence individually. However, read cumulatively, they point to a consistent interpretation: the U.S. force buildup was a visual staging of coercive diplomacy intended to lay the groundwork for negotiations, rather than an operation aimed at an actual strike against North Korea. This explanation has far greater explanatory power than the narrative that North Korea, facing a dual structural crisis of extreme economic collapse and the simultaneous loss of its patrons, actually deterred the world's strongest military power with only conventional deterrence from its long-range artillery.

IV. Why the Discrepancy: The Structure of Threat Exaggeration and Dual Strategy


1. Structural Necessity: What was North Korea to the U.S.?


Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, U.S. foreign strategy faced a fundamental crisis of legitimacy. With the disappearance of the Cold War adversary, the rationale for the U.S. military presence in East Asia needed redefinition. Relations with China were in a phase of expanding and deepening economic interdependence, making it difficult to officially designate China as a direct military threat or potential hegemonic rival, at least in the short term. However, given the uncertainty about China's future trajectory, the U.S. could not preemptively withdraw from the Korean Peninsula and Japan. Maintaining forward-deployed forces in East Asia was a key element of the U.S.'s long-term strategy toward China.


Within this structure, North Korea occupied a very special functional position. If North Korea were to collapse or unification were to occur, the justification for the U.S. Forces Korea's presence would likely be fundamentally weakened. And if the U.S. Forces Korea were to disappear, the rationale for the U.S. Forces Japan's presence would also likely be shaken sequentially. Ultimately, what the U.S. needed was a state where North Korea remained a threat enough to be criticized, but did not actually collapse or unify. Only when this condition was met could the U.S. justify its military presence in the region anew without the burden of directly confronting China.


Hardline voices existed both within the U.S. and South Korea. Amendments urging military action were passed in Congress, and the media extensively covered the North Korean threat daily. However, these hardline stances were separate from the actual policy-making level. As Perry's testimony shows, the Yongbyon bombing plan never reached Clinton's desk. The hardline rhetoric was an environment utilized for the U.S.'s higher strategic objectives, not a determinant of those objectives.


2. Specific Interests: How Threat Exaggeration Operated


If the U.S.'s structural necessity laid the foundation for threat exaggeration, each actor reinforced that direction for their own reasons. However, to understand these specific interests, one core condition must first be confirmed: the U.S.'s feint strategy only worked if its true intentions were not discernible to both allies and adversaries.


If South Korea became aware of the U.S.'s larger picture—that it intended to utilize the North Korean threat rather than eliminate it—it could question the justification for the U.S. Forces Korea's presence. Similarly, if North Korea grasped the U.S.'s actual intentions, the negotiation leverage would not have been established in the first place. Therefore, the U.S. had to manage South Korea's independent actions by maintaining a tense signal of 'seriously considering a strike' while exaggerating the potential damage, and simultaneously, it had to stage military pressure against North Korea while keeping an exit open through unofficial channels. The essence of this strategy was to design a new East Asian security structure with the U.S.'s strategy toward China in mind, requiring this multiplicity.


Behind this structure, the specific interests of each actor also operated. For the Clinton administration, exaggerating the North Korean threat served three purposes. First, it provided domestic justification for substantial aid to North Korea (KEDO, light-water reactors, heavy oil). To argue that the 'cost of peace' was cheaper than the 'cost of war,' the cost of war had to be presented as sufficiently high.


[15] Second, for Clinton, who faced distrust from the military early in his term due to allegations of draft dodging, the narrative of seriously considering military options served as a tool to demonstrate his resolve as commander-in-chief. In the context of being on the defensive following the failure of healthcare reform, visible achievements in foreign and security policy could be beneficial ahead of the November 1994 midterm elections. Third, for the U.S. military, facing pressure to cut defense budgets after the end of the Cold War, presenting the North Korean threat as significant provided a direct basis for maintaining forces stationed on the Korean Peninsula and deploying new weapon systems such as Patriot missiles.[16]


North Korea also benefited from the exaggeration of its threat capabilities in negotiations. South Korea was no exception. The greater the threat, the stronger the justification for the security cooperation system, and the higher the likelihood that the leader's 'decision for peace against the aggressive intentions of a great power' would be considered a political achievement.


Ultimately, each actor also had aspects of inflating the threat for their own reasons. They did not conspire beforehand. However, within the structure created by the U.S. strategy, the rational actions of each actor ultimately moved in the same direction.


3. Executing the Feint Strategy: Managing South Korea and Designing an Exit


The exaggeration of the threat and the design of an exit were not separate events but two pillars of a single strategy. The U.S. simultaneously created military tension to pressure North Korea and control South Korea, while quietly opening an exit for negotiations through unofficial channels. The strategy was only complete when these two pillars operated simultaneously, and its true intent had to be concealed from both sides.


The official narrative states that the U.S. intended to strike North Korea and that Kim Young-sam prevented it. However, this narrative only explains a cross-section or the surface of the situation at the time. In reality, voices supporting a strike on Yongbyon existed in both South Korea and the U.S. Oberdorfer writes that the U.S. was seriously concerned about South Korea's potential for independent action at the time.[17] Related diplomatic cables released by WikiLeaks also repeatedly mention U.S. diplomats referring to the South Korean government's hardline stance on North Korea as something that 'needed to be managed.'[18]Declassified Clinton-Kim Young-sam phone records also show that South Korea took a harder stance. In a June 1994 call, Kim Young-sam urged immediate sanctions, which were stronger than those proposed by the United States, while Clinton urged caution, citing the need to build international consensus. In a call in October of the same year, Clinton was reportedly enraged when Kim Young-sam publicly criticized the U.S. approach to North Korea as "naive and concession-oriented."[19]


In reality, it is likely that South Korea at the time was losing consistency, oscillating between exaggerated anxiety and vague hardline rhetoric without accurately discerning the United States' true intentions. President Kim Young-sam himself warned U.S. Ambassador to Korea James Laney, "If the United States bombs North Korea, our South Korea will be devastated immediately," yet publicly maintained a hardline stance, stating, "We cannot shake hands with those who possess nuclear weapons."[20]


The essence of the situation at the time was that the United States had voluntarily halted its offensive maneuvers, and this strategic intention of the United States had to be kept strictly secret, even from its ally, South Korea. This was because, given North Korea's rapid decline in national strength and its famine, sanctions or the use of military force carried a significant risk of triggering an uncontrollable collapse of North Korea. The possibility of North Korea's collapse could have shaken the foundations of the East Asian security structure that the United States had pursued.


Considering the structural conditions of North Korea previously discussed—the disappearance of its patron, the collapse of its war-making capacity, and severe food shortages—it was realistically impossible for North Korea to refuse an exit from negotiations if one were offered. The United States knew this. Clinton permitted Carter's visit on the condition that he go as a private citizen, not as a government representative. Dismissing Carter's visit as a private citizen as a deviation from official diplomacy is short-sighted. The fact that Clinton permitted Carter's visit, specifying the condition that it be in a private capacity, suggests a certain level of coordination between the two. In diplomatic systems, sensitive unofficial channels are typically operated and shared only among a very small number of top officials. The critical views of some U.S. diplomats toward Carter, as revealed in WikiLeaks, should be interpreted not as a result of Carter's unilateral actions, but as bureaucratic resistance to outcomes that fell outside the State Department's control.


Indeed, immediately after Carter's visit, Clinton directly discussed with Kim Young-sam how to justify the subsequent aid to North Korea, which would lead to the Geneva Agreed Framework, to the domestic public.[21] At this juncture, the overarching U.S. strategy toward China connects with the specific unfolding of the 1994 Yongbyon crisis. What the United States needed was neither the collapse of North Korea nor its complete abandonment. A rapid change in the North Korean regime could have forced a restructuring of the East Asian security order and potentially weakened or eliminated the rationale for the U.S. military presence. The staging of military tensions and the opening of an exit through negotiations via Carter were means to achieve this objective: maintaining North Korea as a manageable threat. Through the narrative of exaggerating and then resolving the crisis, the United States achieved its goals by not revealing its intentions to South Korea, while simultaneously incorporating elements of coordination with South Korea in the actual resolution process.

V. Conclusion


The reason the dominant narrative of the 1994 Yongbyon crisis has remained uncorrected for over 30 years is not simply due to incompetence or negligence. It is also because actors with an interest in revising the narrative have effectively not existed within the structure. For the United States, this narrative is a historical asset supporting alliance management and the justification of its North Korea policy. For the South Korean government, it is a narrative that confirms the justification for security dependence and the personal historical achievements of its leaders. For North Korea, it also serves as an argument strengthening the justification for its nuclear development. Everyone gains significant "assets" from this narrative.


However, the more fundamental issue is not whether the narrative is corrected. The problem lies in the very level at which South Korea's security discourse has remained while this narrative has circulated for 30 years. South Korean analysis has consistently been fixated on the threat (perception). Questions at a higher level, such as what structural and functional meaning North Korea holds for great powers, for whose benefit the agreements were designed, what the actual red lines were, and from whose perspective they were set, are structurally seldom raised in South Korean security discourse. This cannot be reduced to a matter of individual analysts' capabilities. As long as the framework centered on threat perception dominates, it is inevitable to focus on tactical calculations at or below the level of military operations while missing the picture of great power strategic competition above it.


Ultimately, the true question that the 1994 Yongbyon crisis poses to us today, 30 years later, is not simply about the veracity of the past narrative. Rather, it is a poignant reflection on how much independent perspective South Korea's security discourse has secured within the larger structure of the alliance. South Korea's security discourse must now move beyond merely listing North Korean threats to engage in deeper contemplation on how to define and realize our strategic autonomy within the rapidly changing East Asian security landscape. Re-examining the records of 1994 should not be an act of negating the past, but an effort to prepare for a new security structure by confronting the asymmetry of the alliance we face. ■

Bibliography

Bacevich, Andrew. The New American Militarism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.

Chung, Jae Ho. Between Ally and Partner: Korea-China Relations and the United States. New York: Columbia University Press, 2007.

Gause, Ken E. North Korean Civil-Military Trends. Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2006.

Han Sung-Joo. “Living History: U.S.-ROK Allied Coordination in Negotiating the 1994 Agreed Framework.” CSIS Beyond Parallel, December 5, 2016. https://beyondparallel.csis.org/living-history-han-sung-joo/.

Keaney, Thomas A., and Eliot A. Cohen. Gulf War Air Power Survey Summary Report. Washington: USAF, 1993.

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National Security Archive. “The North Korean Nuclear Crisis, 1994.” Electronic Briefing Book. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu.

Noland, Marcus, Sherman Robinson, and Tao Wang. “Famine in North Korea: Causes and Cures.” Economic Development and Cultural Change 49(4), 2001.

Oberdorfer, Don, and Robert Carlin. The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History. 3rd ed. New York: Basic Books, 2014.

Perry, William J. My Journey at the Nuclear Brink. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015.

Sigal, Leon V. Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998.

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Wit, Joel S., Daniel B. Poneman, and Robert L. Gallucci. Going Critical: The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis. Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2004.

Kim Young-sam. *President Kim Young-sam Memoirs*. Seoul: Chosun Ilbo, 2001.

Chung, In Moon. “Four Reasons Why North Korea Cannot Be the Next Target.” *Hankyoreh*, March 23, 2026.

Cho, Gab-je, and Pil-jae Kim. “Kim Young-sam’s Opposition to Bombing North Korea in June 1994: South Korea Missed an Opportunity!” *New Daily*, January 7, 2016.

Cho, Bi-yeon. “Implications of U.S.-Israel Military Operations Against Iran.” *Sejong Policy Brief*, no. 2026-18. Sejong Institute, 2026.

Han, Sung-joo. *The Path of Diplomacy*. Seoul: Ollim, 2023.

[1]Moon, Chung-in. “Four Reasons Why North Korea Cannot Be the Next Target.” *Hankyoreh*, March 23, 2026, https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/opinion/column/1250537.html (Accessed April 18, 2026).

[2] Cho, Bi-yeon. “Implications of U.S.-Israel Military Operations Against Iran: Changes in the Battlefield and the Role of Alliances.” *Sejong Policy Brief*, no. 2026-18. Sejong Institute, April 13, 2026, https://www.sejong.org/web/boad/1/egoread.php?bd=3&itm=&txt=&pg=26&seq=12883 (Accessed April 18, 2026).

[3]North Korea is assessed to have secured a meaningful nuclear warhead yield only after its second nuclear test in 2009.

[4] Joel S. Wit, Daniel B. Poneman, and Robert L. Gallucci, Going Critical: The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), pp. 207–240.

[5] Kim, Young-sam. *The Memoirs of President Kim Young-sam*. Seoul: Chosun Ilbo, 2001. Han Sung-joo, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, also testified about the crisis situation and ROK-U.S. consultation process in a CSIS Beyond Parallel oral history interview. Han Sung-Joo, “Living History: U.S.-ROK Allied Coordination in Negotiating the 1994 Agreed Framework,” CSIS Beyond Parallel, December 5, 2016, https://beyondparallel.csis.org/living-history-han-sung-joo/.

[6] William J. Perry, My Journey at the Nuclear Brink (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015), pp. 105–108; Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci, Going Critical, pp. 207–215.

[7] Don Oberdorfer and Robert Carlin, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, 3rd ed. (New York: Basic Books, 2014), pp. 326–328; Michael Mazarr, North Korea and the Bomb (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), pp. 178–181.

[8]This statement was re-cited in a KBS report on Perry's remarks, introduced in former Minister of Foreign Affairs Han Sung-joo's memoir *The Path of Diplomacy* (Seoul: Ollim, 2023). KBS, “June 1994, Kim Young-sam’s Opposition to Bombing North Korea: South Korea Missed an Opportunity,” https://news.kbs.co.kr/news/pc/view/view.do?ncd=3495438. Perry also directly testified in an interview with SBS, “I never proposed [the bombing of Yongbyon] to President Clinton. I would have proposed it only if diplomacy failed.” SBS, “Truth of the ‘Yongbyon Bombing Theory’,” https://news.sbs.co.kr/news/endPage.do?news_id=N1003297043 (December 3, 2015). This is consistent with the account in Perry's memoir, Perry, My Journey at the Nuclear Brink, pp. 105–108. In his memoir, Perry recalls that the plan to bomb Yongbyon was discussed but the conclusion was a diplomatic solution.

[9] Celeste A. Wallander, “Lost and Found: Gorbachev’s Perestroika and the End of the Soviet Empire,” in The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Vol. III (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 355–377.

[10] Jae Ho Chung, Between Ally and Partner: Korea-China Relations and the United States (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), pp. 54–61.

[11] Oberdorfer and Carlin, The Two Koreas, pp. 258–261.

[12] Marcus Noland, Sherman Robinson, and Tao Wang, “Famine in North Korea: Causes and Cures,” Economic Development and Cultural Change 49(4), 2001, pp. 741–767.

[13] Ken E. Gause, North Korean Civil-Military Trends (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2006), pp. 34–41.

[14] Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey Summary Report (Washington: USAF, 1993), pp. 81–88.

[15] Leon V. Sigal, Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), pp. 156–185.

[16] Andrew Bacevich, The New American Militarism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 126–142.

[17] Oberdorfer and Carlin, The Two Koreas, pp. 336–340.

[18] Utilizing the WikiLeaks Cablegate Database. https://wikileaks.org/plusd.

[19] National Security Archive, Document No. 02: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, Clinton–Kim Young Sam, June 22, 1994, https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/20408-national-security-archive-doc-02-memorandum; Document No. 08: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, Clinton–Kim Young Sam, October 14, 1994, https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/20414-national-security-archive-doc-08-memorandum.

[20] Kim Young-sam, op. cit.; Cho Gab-je and Kim Pil-jae, “North Korea Bombing Opposition by Kim Young-sam in June 1994, Korea Missed Opportunity!”, 『New Daily』, January 7, 2016, https://www.newdaily.co.kr/site/data/html/2016/01/07/2016010700015.html (Accessed: April 18, 2026).

[21] Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci, Going Critical, pp. 215–240; Strobe Talbott, The Russia Hand (New York: Random House, 2002), pp. 131–132.

■ Jeon Jae-woo_Senior Researcher, Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA).

■ Editor: Lee Sang-jun_EAI Research Fellow; Oh In-hwan_EAI Senior Research Fellow
    Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 211) | leesj@eai.or.kr