[Global NK Commentary] A Strategic Reinterpretation of the 1994 Yongbyon Crisis

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I. Introduction: Why 1994 Now?


Following the US military operation against Iran in February 2026, South Korean security discourse has been shaped around two questions. The first is, 'Is North Korea the next target?'[1] This question leads to the conclusion that a North Korean attack is unlikely, based on ① North Korea's possession of nuclear weapons, ② the absence of a regional 'rogue state' like Israel, ③ the possibility of Chinese or Russian military intervention, and ④ the limitations of US war-fighting capabilities. The second question is, 'Is the joint US-Israeli opening attack against Iran an example of alliance conditions implemented on the battlefield, and how can it be applied to South Korea?'[2] However, instead of leading to a detailed analysis of the fundamental differences between South Korea and Israel, and the security environments of North Korea and Iran, these questions often end with normative and prescriptive declarations that the US and South Korea must respond in a 'close' and 'precise' manner.


Although the two questions are phrased differently, they rest on the same premise: that the US and South Korea view North Korea as a 'threat' without significant distinction. However, this premise itself is subject to verification. The level at which South Korea and the US perceive North Korea differs. For South Korea, the North Korean issue is the paramount strategic task in itself. For the US, however, the North Korean issue may be one means to pursue higher strategic objectives.


The US did not militarily strike North Korea in the early 1990s, when North Korea did not possess nuclear weapons. Instead, during that period, it fought the Gulf War against Iraq, which possessed far superior military power. The same was true in the early 2000s. The explanation that 'because it has nuclear weapons, it cannot be attacked' may be factually correct in isolation, but when viewed diachronically, the cause and effect are reversed. This is because for about 20 years of the 30-year North Korean nuclear crisis, North Korea did not possess nuclear weapons.[3] The logic that nuclear possession functions as deterrence is closer to an additional factor or a post-hoc rationalization that mistakes the effect for the cause. The more fundamental reason lies elsewhere. For the US, the North Korean issue is not a Korean Peninsula security issue but a subordinate issue within the Northeast Asian security structure, particularly concerning its strategy towards China. South Korea's discourse on the North Korean nuclear issue has long overlooked or ignored this structure.


This paper re-examines the 1994 Yongbyon crisis as the first point of tracing the origins of this asymmetrical perception. The dominant narrative is as follows: North Korea pushed ahead with nuclear development, leading the US to prepare for a precision strike on Yongbyon; the crisis was averted by President Kim Young-sam's decision and former President Carter's visit; and the Agreed Framework was reached. This narrative has circulated as textbook fact for over 30 years. However, when this event is viewed through the lens of the interests of each actor and the structural conditions, a completely different outline emerges.

II. The Existing Narrative and Its Gaps


The existing explanation of the 1994 Yongbyon crisis centers on three main propositions. First, the US genuinely had the intent and plan to strike Yongbyon. Second, President Kim Young-sam prevented the war. Third, former President Carter's visit was the decisive turning point that led to the Agreed Framework. This narrative has been repeatedly reproduced through the recollections and testimonies of various parties. Joel Wit, Daniel Poneman, and Robert Gallucci, who were direct participants in the negotiations, emphasize that the war crisis at the time was real.[4] Former President Kim Young-sam also stated in his memoirs that he had prevented the US plan to strike North Korea.[5]


However, this narrative has unexplained gaps. The key variables often cited as having deterred US military action at the time are North Korea's long-range artillery's capability to strike Seoul and the risk of escalation to full-scale war. Yet, Secretary of Defense Perry reported to Clinton that a Yongbyon strike would result in 'tens of thousands of casualties in Seoul within the first few days',[6] and General Luck, Commander of the US Forces in Korea, estimated that total casualties in case of full-scale escalation would reach 'in the millions'.[7] The discrepancy between these two figures is abnormally large. The conclusion of tens of thousands versus millions of casualties for the same event is more reasonably interpreted as having been adjusted and presented according to different political contexts.


More critically, Perry himself later testified: "(The contingency plan to attack the Yongbyon nuclear facilities) was in my desk drawer, but it was not reported to the President, nor was it taken out and placed on the table." [8] The fact that the bombing plan itself was kept in a drawer, despite the casualty estimates being reported to the President, strongly suggests that the figures were used for a different political purpose rather than as part of an actual military plan.


Furthermore, for both the narrative of 'Kim Young-sam prevented it' and 'Carter resolved it' to hold true simultaneously, the premise that the US intended to proceed with the strike on North Korea's nuclear facilities is necessary. However, if this premise is accepted, the narrative of 'Kim Young-sam prevented it' collapses. If it is not accepted, the narrative of 'Carter was decisive' falters. In other words, if the US had actually planned to carry out the bombing, it would have been difficult for Kim Young-sam to stop it with just a phone call. Conversely, if the US's original plan was coercive diplomacy or bluffing (at a level that Kim Young-sam could stop), then Carter's visit should be seen as part of the overall strategy devised by the US, rather than a decisive turning point. To fill this gap, we must first ascertain how threatening North Korea actually was at the time, and what the US 'military option' was truly intended to achieve.

III. The Actual Situation at the Time: An Isolated North Korea and a Staged Crisis


1. Simultaneous Collapse of Strategic Support


North Korea's structural conditions in 1994 were clear: its strategic patrons had simultaneously collapsed. The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 created a critical vacuum in North Korea's security structure. The automatic military intervention clause of the 1961 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance between the USSR and North Korea became defunct in 1992 when Russia downgraded its relations with North Korea to 'normal state relations.' Russia at the time was in the midst of extreme turmoil during its systemic transition, and declassified documents show that Russia had no intention of condoning North Korea's adventurism during this period.[9]


In the same year, the establishment of diplomatic relations between South Korea and China formalized China's departure from North Korea. For China, which was concentrating all its efforts on economic reform and opening up following Deng Xiaoping's Southern Tour, North Korea's adventurism was a threat to its own development strategy.[10] The fact that the North Korean Foreign Ministry submitted a formal protest against the establishment of diplomatic relations between South Korea and China itself serves as evidence that North Korea had internally confirmed the demise of China's willingness to provide military support.[11]


2. Collapse of Actual War-Fighting Capability


The withdrawal of patron states had decisive material consequences. The supply of Soviet-made equipment and parts ceased, and energy imports decreased by approximately 90% from 1990 to 1994.[12] Testimonies from defected military officials consistently confirm that poor maintenance and parts shortages were severe throughout the North Korean military during this period.[13] The extreme food shortages that led to the so-called 'Arduous March' are also worth mentioning.


In other words, in 1994, North Korea could not choose war because it lacked support from China and Russia, as well as its own war-fighting capabilities. North Korea's so-called 'Seoul in flames' threat was less an actual intent to attack and more a form of asymmetric bluffing employed by a regime on the verge of collapse. It is more reasonable to assume that the very situation where conventional deterrence had collapsed explains why North Korea subsequently pursued nuclear weapons. The shock of the 1991 Gulf War would have further reinforced this perception.


3. Structural Constraints on Long-Range Artillery Deterrence


The dispersed deployment and concealment tactics of long-range artillery presuppose sufficient vehicles, fuel, and a smoothly functioning command and communication network. The collapse of the energy supply chain and the halt in Soviet parts supply, confirmed earlier, structurally undermined these tactical prerequisites. Moreover, considering that a significant number of long-range artillery pieces would likely have been eliminated preemptively in an actual operational scenario, the actual retaliatory capability was likely significantly lower than previously estimated.


Of course, counterarguments are possible. One common argument is that the threat of long-range artillery should not be underestimated, citing the example of the 1991 Gulf War, where the US ultimately failed to completely eliminate Iraq's Scud missiles.[14]


However, it was later confirmed that the combat power of the Iraqi army prior to the Gulf War was significantly exaggerated by US intelligence agencies, and that exaggeration was used to gain congressional approval for the war.


4. The Paradox of RSOI: Military Deployment or Negotiation Staging?


Given North Korea's internal and external conditions at the time, another way to verify the claim that the US had actual intent to strike is to examine the method of US force deployment.


What is noteworthy is the method of the three-phase reinforcement plan pursued by the US Department of Defense. The public RSOI (Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration) deployment over several months is at odds with the doctrine of preemptive surprise attack and the tense relationship. Of course, in the theory of coercive diplomacy, the public deployment of forces is itself a key tool. In the Gulf War, the US also publicly assembled troops for months before launching the actual operation by surprise. While theoretically, public assembly and surprise execution are compatible.


However, as discussed above, if the conditions under which the US perceived the threat of North Korean long-range artillery were real, then public force buildup would structurally limit the effectiveness of a strike, as North Korea would likely interpret the RSOI as a signal just before an attack and begin preemptive operation of its long-range artillery. In this regard, the public nature of the RSOI over several months aligns more naturally with the coercive diplomacy hypothesis, which aimed at pressuring negotiations rather than an actual strike. This is also consistent with Perry's testimony mentioned earlier—"(The plan to attack the Yongbyon nuclear facilities) was not reported to the President, nor was it placed on the table." Not reporting the bombing plan to the highest decision-maker while publicly increasing forces strengthens the interpretation that the RSOI was a tool for negotiation pressure rather than actual operational preparation.


Individually, these three analyses—North Korea's structural vulnerability, the exaggeration of long-range artillery deterrence, and the publicity of the RSOI—do not constitute decisive evidence. However, when read cumulatively, they point to a consistent interpretation: the US force buildup was not an operational deployment aimed at actual strikes against North Korea, but a visual staging of coercive diplomacy intended to set the stage for negotiations. This explanation has greater explanatory power than the narrative that North Korea, facing a dual structural crisis of extreme economic collapse and the simultaneous loss of its patrons, actually deterred the world's most powerful military with nothing more than conventional deterrence from its long-range artillery.

IV. Why the Discrepancy: The Structure of Threat Exaggeration and a Two-Pronged Strategy


1. Structural Necessity: What Was North Korea to the US?


Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, US foreign strategy faced a fundamental crisis of legitimacy. With the disappearance of the Cold War adversary, the rationale for the presence of US forces in East Asia needed redefinition. Relations with China were in a phase of expanding and deepening economic interdependence, and at least in the short term, it was difficult to officially designate China as a direct military threat or a potential hegemonic competitor. However, given the uncertainty about China's future trajectory, the US could not preemptively withdraw its forces from the Korean Peninsula and Japan. Maintaining forward-deployed forces in East Asia was a key element of the US's long-term strategy towards China.


Within this structure, North Korea occupied a very special functional position. If North Korea were to collapse or unification were to occur, the justification for the presence of US Forces in Korea would likely be significantly weakened. And if USFK were to disappear, the rationale for the presence of US Forces in Japan would also likely be shaken in a chain reaction. Ultimately, what the US needed was a state where North Korea was a sufficient threat to be criticized, but not so unstable as to collapse or unify. Only when these conditions were met could the US justify its continued military presence in the region without the burden of directly confronting China.


Hardline voices existed both within the US and South Korea. Amendments calling for military action were passed in Congress, and the media extensively covered the North Korean threat daily. However, these hardline stances were separate from the actual policy-making level. As Perry's testimony shows, the Yongbyon bombing plan never reached Clinton's desk. The hardline rhetoric was an environment utilized for the US's higher strategic objectives, not a factor determining them.


2. Specific Interests: How Did Threat Exaggeration Work?


If the US's structural necessity laid the foundation for threat exaggeration, each actor reinforced that direction for their own reasons. However, to understand these specific interests, one core condition must first be confirmed: the US's feint strategy only worked if its true intentions were not discernible to both allies and adversaries.


If South Korea became aware of the US's larger picture—to utilize the North Korean threat rather than eliminate it—it could question the justification for the presence of USFK. Furthermore, if North Korea grasped the US's true intentions, the negotiation leverage would not have been established in the first place. Therefore, the US had to manage South Korea's independent actions by maintaining a tense signal to South Korea that it was 'seriously considering a strike,' while actually exaggerating the potential damage, and simultaneously stage military pressure towards North Korea while keeping an exit open through unofficial channels. The essence of this strategy was to design a new East Asian security structure with the US's strategy towards China in mind.


Behind this structure, the specific interests of each actor also played a role. For the Clinton administration, exaggerating the North Korean threat served three purposes. First, it provided domestic justification for substantial costs associated with North Korean aid (KEDO, light-water reactors, heavy oil). To argue that the 'cost of peace' was cheaper than the 'cost of war,' the cost of war had to be presented as sufficiently high.[15] Second, for Clinton, who faced distrust from the military early in his term due to draft-dodging allegations, the narrative of seriously considering military options was a tool to demonstrate his resolve as commander-in-chief. With the healthcare reform failure putting him on the defensive before the November 1994 midterm elections, tangible achievements in foreign policy and security could be beneficial. Third, for the US military, facing pressure to cut defense budgets after the end of the Cold War, presenting the North Korean threat as significant provided a direct justification for maintaining forces stationed in Korea and deploying new weapon systems like Patriot missiles.[16]


North Korea also benefited from the exaggeration of its threat capabilities in negotiations. South Korea was no exception. The greater the threat, the stronger the justification for the security cooperation system, and the higher the likelihood that the leader's 'decision for peace against the aggressive intentions of a great power' would be considered a political achievement.


Ultimately, each actor also had reasons to inflate the threat. They did not conspire beforehand. However, within the structure created by the US strategy, the rational actions of each actor ultimately converged in the same direction.


3. Execution of the Feint Strategy: Managing South Korea and Designing an Exit


The exaggeration of the threat and the design of an exit were not separate events but two pillars of a single strategy. On one hand, the US made military tensions visible to pressure North Korea and control South Korea, while on the other hand, it quietly opened an avenue for negotiation through unofficial channels. The strategy was only complete when these two pillars operated simultaneously, and its true intent was not to be exposed through either.


The official narrative states that the US intended to strike North Korea, and Kim Young-sam prevented it. However, this narrative only explains a snapshot or the surface of the situation at the time. In reality, voices supporting a strike on Yongbyon existed in both South Korea and the US. Oberdorfer writes that the US was seriously concerned about South Korea's potential for independent action at the time.[17] Related diplomatic cables released by WikiLeaks also repeatedly mention US diplomats referring to the South Korean government's hardline stance on North Korea as something to be 'managed'.[18]Десекретизированные записи телефонных разговоров Клинтона и Ким Ён Сам также свидетельствуют о более жесткой позиции Кореи. В ходе разговора в июне 1994 года Ким Ён Сам призывал к немедленным санкциям, более жестким, чем американские, в то время как Клинтон настаивал на замедлении темпов, ссылаясь на необходимость накопления международного консенсуса. В ходе разговора в октябре того же года Клинтон пришел в ярость, когда Ким Ён Сам публично раскритиковал подход США к Северной Корее как «наивный и склонный к уступкам».[19]


В действительности, скорее всего, Корея того времени теряла последовательность, колеблясь между преувеличенной тревогой и неопределенной жесткой позицией, не сумев понять истинные намерения США. Сам президент Ким Ён Сам, предупреждая посла США в Корее Рейни: «Если США бомбардируют Северную Корею, Южная Корея немедленно превратится в пепел», тем не менее, публично придерживался жесткой риторики: «Нельзя пожимать руку тому, кто обладает ядерным оружием».[20]


Суть тогдашней ситуации заключалась в том, что США сами прекратили наступательные действия, и это стратегическое намерение США должно было быть тщательно скрыто даже от их союзника, Кореи. Это было связано с тем, что в условиях стремительного ослабления мощи Северной Кореи и продовольственного кризиса санкции или применение военной силы несли большой риск неконтролируемого коллапса Северной Кореи. Возможность коллапса Северной Кореи могла потрясти основы системы безопасности в Восточной Азии, к которой стремились США.


Учитывая структурные условия Северной Кореи, упомянутые ранее — исчезновение поддерживающих сил, коллапс способности вести войну, острый дефицит продовольствия — было практически невозможно, чтобы Северная Корея отказалась от переговорного выхода, если бы он был открыт. США знали это. Клинтон разрешил визит Картера, указав условие, что он будет действовать как частное лицо, а не как представитель правительства. Считать визит Картера в качестве частного лица отступлением от официальной дипломатии — недальновидно. Тот факт, что Клинтон разрешил визит Картера, указав условие его частного статуса, предполагает определенный уровень координации между ними. В дипломатической системе управление деликатными неофициальными каналами обычно осуществляется только узким кругом высшего руководства. Критические взгляды некоторых американских дипломатов на Картера, появившиеся в WikiLeaks, следует рассматривать не как результат его самовольных действий, а как бюрократическое неприятие того, что результаты были получены вне контроля Государственного департамента.


Фактически, сразу после визита Картера Клинтон лично обсудил с Ким Ён Сам, как оправдать перед общественным мнением в стране поддержку Северной Кореи, которая приведет к Женевским соглашениям.[21] В этот момент высшая цель американской стратегии в отношении Китая и конкретный ход развития кризиса в Йонбёне в 1994 году соединяются воедино. США не нужно было ни коллапс Северной Кореи, ни ее полное игнорирование. Резкие изменения в северокорейском режиме могли бы принудить к перестройке системы безопасности в Восточной Азии и ослабить или устранить основания для присутствия американских войск. Инсценировка военной напряженности и открытие переговорного выхода через Картера были средствами для достижения этой цели — поддержания Северной Кореи в состоянии управляемой угрозы. США, через нарратив преувеличения и урегулирования кризиса, добились своих целей, не раскрывая своих намерений союзнику, Корее, но при этом демонстрируя координацию с Кореей в процессе фактического урегулирования.

V. Заключение


Доминирующий нарратив кризиса в Йонбёне в 1994 году не корректировался более 30 лет не только из-за простой некомпетентности или халатности. Это также связано с тем, что в структуре фактически не существовало акторов, заинтересованных в изменении нарратива. Для США этот нарратив является историческим активом, поддерживающим управление альянсом и легитимность политики в отношении Северной Кореи. Для правительства Кореи это нарратив, подтверждающий легитимность зависимости от безопасности и исторические заслуги лидера. Для Северной Кореи это также аргумент, усиливающий легитимность ядерной программы.


Однако более фундаментальная проблема заключается не в том, корректируется ли нарратив. Проблема заключается в том, на каком уровне оставался южнокорейский дискурс о безопасности в течение 30 лет его распространения. Анализ Кореи постоянно зацикливался на угрозе (восприятии). Вопросы, находящиеся выше этого уровня, такие как: какое структурное и функциональное значение имеет Северная Корея для великих держав, в чьих интересах разрабатывались соглашения, каковы реальные «красные линии» и с чьей точки зрения они были установлены, — структурно редко поднимаются в южнокорейском дискурсе о безопасности. Это нельзя свести просто к проблеме компетенции отдельных аналитиков. Пока доминирует рамка, ориентированная на восприятие угрозы, неизбежно упускается из виду схема конкуренции великих держав, сосредоточиваясь на тактических расчетах на уровне ниже военных операций.


В конечном счете, истинный вопрос, который кризис в Йонбёне 1994 года ставит перед нами сегодня, спустя 30 лет, — это не просто вопрос об истинности прошлого нарратива. Скорее, это болезненное размышление о том, насколько южнокорейский дискурс о безопасности имел собственное видение в рамках огромной структуры альянса. Теперь южнокорейский дискурс о безопасности должен перейти к более глубоким размышлениям о том, как определить и реализовать нашу стратегическую автономию в условиях быстро меняющегося ландшафта безопасности в Восточной Азии, выходя за рамки простого перечисления угроз со стороны Северной Кореи. Перечитывание записей 1994 года должно быть не отрицанием прошлого, а попыткой подготовиться к новой структуре безопасности, лишь признав асимметрию альянса, с которой мы сталкиваемся. ■

Список литературы

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Noland, Marcus, Sherman Robinson, and Tao Wang. “Famine in North Korea: Causes and Cures.” Economic Development and Cultural Change 49(4), 2001.

Oberdorfer, Don, and Robert Carlin. The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History. 3rd ed. New York: Basic Books, 2014.

Perry, William J. My Journey at the Nuclear Brink. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015.

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Talbott, Strobe. The Russia Hand. New York: Random House, 2002.

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Wit, Joel S., Daniel B. Poneman, and Robert L. Gallucci. Going Critical: The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis. Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2004.

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Мун Чон Ин. «Четыре причины, по которым Северная Корея не может стать следующей целью». 『Ханкёре』, 23 марта 2026 г.

Чо Кап Чжэ, Ким Пхиль Чжэ. «Отказ Ким Ён Сам от бомбардировки Северной Кореи в июне 1994 года: Корея упустила шанс!» 『Нью Дейли』, 7 января 2016 г.

Чо Би Ён. «Последствия военной операции США и Израиля против Ирана». «Sejong Policy Brief», № 2026-18. Исследовательский институт Седжон, 2026.

Хан Сын Джу. «Путь дипломатии». Сеул: Оллим, 2023.

[1] Мун Чон Ин, «Четыре причины, по которым Северная Корея не может быть следующей целью», «Ханкёре», 23 марта 2026 г., https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/opinion/column/1250537.html (дата доступа: 18.04.2026).

[2] Чо Би Ён, «Последствия военной операции США и Израиля против Ирана: изменения на поле боя и роль альянсов», «Sejong Policy Brief», № 2026-18, Исследовательский институт Седжон, 13.04.2026, https://www.sejong.org/web/boad/1/egoread.php?bd=3&itm=&txt=&pg=26&seq=12883 (дата доступа: 18.04.2026).

[3] Считается, что Северная Корея добилась значительной мощности ядерных боеголовок только после второго ядерного испытания в 2009 году.

[4] Joel S. Wit, Daniel B. Poneman, and Robert L. Gallucci, Going Critical: The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), pp. 207–240.

[5] Ким Ён Сам, «Мемуары президента Ким Ён Сама» (Сеул: Чосон Ильбоса, 2001). Хан Сын Джу, в то время министр иностранных дел, также засвидетельствовал о кризисной ситуации и консультациях между Южной Кореей и США в устном интервью для CSIS Beyond Parallel. Han Sung-Joo, “Living History: U.S.-ROK Allied Coordination in Negotiating the 1994 Agreed Framework,” CSIS Beyond Parallel, 5 декабря 2016 г., https://beyondparallel.csis.org/living-history-han-sung-joo/.

[6] William J. Perry, My Journey at the Nuclear Brink (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015), pp. 105–108; Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci, Going Critical, pp. 207–215.

[7] Don Oberdorfer and Robert Carlin, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, 3rd ed. (New York: Basic Books, 2014), pp. 326–328; Michael Mazarr, North Korea and the Bomb (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), pp. 178–181.

[8] Это заявление было повторно процитировано в репортаже KBS о заявлении Пэрри, представленном в мемуарах бывшего министра иностранных дел Хан Сын Джу «Путь дипломатии» (Сеул: Оллим, 2023). KBS, «6月 金泳三 отказался от бомбардировки Северной Кореи, Южная Корея упустила шанс», https://news.kbs.co.kr/news/pc/view/view.do?ncd=3495438. Пэрри также лично засвидетельствовал в интервью SBS: «Я никогда не предлагал президенту Клинтону (план бомбардировки Йонбёна). Я бы предложил его только в случае провала дипломатии». SBS, «[Мировой репортаж] Правда о «бомбардировке Йонбёна»», https://news.sbs.co.kr/news/endPage.do?news_id=N1003297043 (03.12.2015). Это также согласуется с описанием в мемуарах Perry, My Journey at the Nuclear Brink, pp. 105–108. В мемуарах Пэрри вспоминает, что план бомбардировки Йонбёна обсуждался, но в итоге было принято дипломатическое решение.

[9] Celeste A. Wallander, “Lost and Found: Gorbachev’s Perestroika and the End of the Soviet Empire,” in The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Vol. III (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 355–377.

[10] Jae Ho Chung, Between Ally and Partner: Korea-China Relations and the United States (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), pp. 54–61.

[11] Oberdorfer and Carlin, The Two Koreas, pp. 258–261.

[12] Marcus Noland, Sherman Robinson, and Tao Wang, “Famine in North Korea: Causes and Cures,” Economic Development and Cultural Change 49(4), 2001, pp. 741–767.

[13] Ken E. Gause, Тенденции в гражданско-военной сфере Северной Кореи (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2006), pp. 34–41.

[14] Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey Summary Report (Washington: USAF, 1993), pp. 81–88.

[15] Leon V. Sigal, Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), pp. 156–185.

[16] Andrew Bacevich, The New American Militarism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 126–142.

[17] Oberdorfer and Carlin, The Two Koreas, pp. 336–340.

[18] Использована база данных WikiLeaks Cablegate. https://wikileaks.org/plusd.

[19] National Security Archive, Document No. 02: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, Clinton–Kim Young Sam, June 22, 1994, https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/20408-national-security-archive-doc-02-memorandum; Document No. 08: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, Clinton–Kim Young Sam, October 14, 1994, https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/20414-national-security-archive-doc-08-memorandum.

[20] Ким Ён Сам, указанное произведение; Чо Кап Чжэ·Ким Пхиль Чжэ, “В июне 1994 года Ким Ён Сам отказался от бомбардировки Северной Кореи, упустив шанс для Южной Кореи!”, 『New Daily』, 7 января 2016 г., https://www.newdaily.co.kr/site/data/html/2016/01/07/2016010700015.html (дата доступа: 18.04.2026).

[21] Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci, Going Critical, pp. 215–240; Strobe Talbott, The Russia Hand (New York: Random House, 2002), pp. 131–132.

■ Чон Джэ У_Научный сотрудник Корейского института оборонных исследований (KIDA).

■ Ответственные редакторы: Ли Сан Джун_Научный сотрудник EAI; О Ин Хван_Старший научный сотрудник EAI
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