[Global NK Comment] Strategic Reinterpretation of the 1994 Yongbyon Crisis

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I. Introduction: Why 1994 Now?


Following the US military operation against Iran in February 2026, South Korean security discourse has been shaped around two questions. The first is, 'Is North Korea the next target?'[1] This question is concluded by arguing against the possibility of a North Korean attack based on ① North Korea's nuclear possession, ② the absence of a regional 'rogue state' like Israel, ③ the possibility of Chinese and Russian military intervention, and ④ the limitations of US war-fighting capabilities. The second question is, 'Is the joint US-Israeli opening attack on Iran a case where alliance conditions were realized on the battlefield, and how can it be applied to South Korea?'[2] However, rather than proceeding to a detailed analysis of the essential differences between South Korea and Israel, and the security environments of North Korea and Iran, these questions stop at normative and prescriptive declarations that the US and South Korea must respond in a 'close' and 'precise' manner.


Although the two questions differ in form, they rest on the same premise. That is, the US and South Korea view North Korea as a 'threat' without significant difference. However, that premise itself is subject to verification. The level at which South Korea and the US view North Korea differs. For South Korea, the North Korean issue is the paramount strategic task in itself. For the US, however, the North Korean issue may be one means to pursue higher strategic objectives.


The US did not militarily strike North Korea in the early 1990s, when North Korea did not possess nuclear weapons. Instead, during that period, it fought the Gulf War against Iraq, which possessed far superior military power. The early 2000s were similar. The explanation that 'because it has nuclear weapons, it cannot be attacked' may be true individually, but when viewed diachronically, the causal order is reversed. This is because for about the first 20 years of the 30-year North Korean nuclear crisis, North Korea did not possess nuclear weapons.[3] The logic that nuclear possession functions as a deterrent is closer to an additional factor or a post-hoc rationalization that reads the outcome as the cause. The more fundamental reason lies elsewhere. For the US, the North Korean issue is not a Korean Peninsula security issue but a sub-issue of the Northeast Asian security structure, particularly of its strategy towards China. South Korea's discourse on the North Korean nuclear issue has long overlooked or ignored this structure.


This paper re-examines the 1994 Yongbyon crisis as the first point of tracing the origins of this asymmetrical perception. The dominant narrative is as follows: North Korea pushed ahead with nuclear development, leading the US to prepare for a precision strike on Yongbyon; the war was averted by President Kim Young-sam's decision and Carter's visit; and the Agreed Framework was reached. This narrative has been circulated as textbook fact for over 30 years. However, when this event is re-examined through the lens of the interests of each actor and structural conditions, a completely different outline emerges.

II. The Existing Narrative and Its Gaps


There are three core propositions in the existing explanation of the 1994 Yongbyon crisis. First, the US actually had the will and plan to strike Yongbyon. Second, Kim Young-sam prevented the war by stopping it. Third, Carter's visit was the decisive turning point that led to the Agreed Framework. This narrative has been repeatedly reproduced through the recollections and testimonies of various parties. Joel Wit, Daniel Poneman, and Robert Gallucci, who were direct parties to the negotiations, emphasize that the war crisis at the time was real.[4] Former President Kim Young-sam also stated in his memoirs that he had stopped the US plan to attack North Korea.[5]


However, this narrative has unexplained gaps. The key variable commonly cited as deterring US military action at the time is the capability of North Korean long-range artillery to strike Seoul and the risk of escalation to full-scale war. Yet, Secretary of Defense Perry reported to Clinton that a strike on Yongbyon would result in 'tens of thousands of casualties in Seoul within the first few days',[6] and General Luck, Commander of the US Forces in Korea, estimated that total casualties in case of escalation to full-scale war would reach 'millions'.[7] The discrepancy between these two figures is abnormally large. The conclusion of tens of thousands versus millions of casualties for the analysis of the same event is more reasonably interpreted as the figures being adjusted and presented according to different political contexts.


More decisive is Perry's own later testimony. He stated, "(The contingency plan to attack the Yongbyon nuclear facilities) was in my desk drawer, but it was not reported to the President, nor was it taken out and placed on the table."[8] The fact that the bombing plan itself was kept only in the drawer, despite reporting the estimated damage to the President—this contradiction strongly suggests that the figures were used for other political purposes rather than actual military planning.


Furthermore, for both the narrative of 'Kim Young-sam stopped it' and the narrative of 'Carter resolved it' to be simultaneously valid, the premise that the US intended to proceed with the attack on North Korea's nuclear facilities is necessary. However, the moment this premise is accepted, the narrative of 'Kim Young-sam stopped it' collapses, and if it is not accepted, the narrative of 'Carter was decisive' falters. In other words, if the US had actually planned to carry out the bombing, it would have been difficult for Kim Young-sam to stop it with just a phone call. Conversely, if the US's original plan was coercive diplomacy or bluffing (at a level that Kim Young-sam could stop), then Carter's visit should be seen as part of the overall strategy devised by the US. To fill this gap, we must first ascertain how threatening North Korea actually was at the time, and what the purpose of the US's 'military option' possibility truly was.

III. The Actual Situation at the Time: Isolated North Korea and a Staged Crisis


1. Simultaneous Collapse of Strategic Support


The structural conditions of North Korea in 1994 were clear. Its strategic patrons had simultaneously disappeared. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 created a critical vacuum in North Korea's security structure. The automatic military intervention clause of the 1961 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance between the USSR and North Korea became defunct in 1992 when Russia downgraded bilateral relations to 'normal state relations.' At the time, Russia was in the throes of extreme systemic transition, and declassified documents show that Russia had no intention of condoning North Korea's adventurism during this period.[9]


The establishment of diplomatic relations between South Korea and China in the same year officially signaled China's departure from North Korea. For China, which was concentrating on economic reform and opening up following Deng Xiaoping's Southern Tour, North Korea's adventurism was a threat to its own development strategy.[10] The fact that the North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs submitted a formal protest against the establishment of ROK-China relations itself demonstrates that North Korea internally recognized the demise of China's willingness to provide military support.[11]


2. Collapse of Actual War-Fighting Capability


The withdrawal of patron states had decisive material consequences. The supply of Soviet-made equipment and parts ceased, and energy imports decreased by approximately 90% from 1990 to 1994.[12] Testimonies from defected military officials consistently confirm that poor maintenance and parts shortages were severe throughout the North Korean military during this period.[13] The extreme food shortages that led to the so-called 'Arduous March' are beyond mention.


In other words, North Korea in 1994 could not choose war because it lacked support from China and Russia, as well as its own war-fighting capabilities. North Korea's so-called 'Sea of Fire' threat against Seoul was less an actual intention to attack and more a form of asymmetrical bluff employed by a regime on the verge of collapse. It is more reasonable to assume that the very situation where conventional deterrence had collapsed is what explains North Korea's subsequent pursuit of nuclear weapons. The shock of the 1991 Gulf War would have further reinforced this perception.


3. Structural Constraints on Long-Range Artillery Deterrence

The dispersed deployment and concealment tactics of long-range artillery presuppose sufficient vehicles, fuel, and a seamlessly functioning command and communication network. The collapse of the energy supply chain and the cessation of Soviet parts supply, confirmed earlier, structurally undermined these tactical prerequisites. Moreover, considering that a significant number of long-range artillery pieces would likely have been preemptively eliminated in an actual operational scenario, the actual retaliatory capability was likely significantly lower than previously estimated.


Of course, counterarguments are possible. Arguments such as not underestimating the threat of long-range artillery, citing the example of the 1991 Gulf War where the US ultimately failed to completely eliminate Iraq's Scud missiles, are representative.[14]


However, it has since been confirmed that the combat power of the Iraqi army prior to the Gulf War was significantly exaggerated by US intelligence agencies, and that exaggeration was used to secure congressional approval for the war.


4. The Paradox of RSOI: Military Deployment or Negotiation Staging?


Given North Korea's internal and external conditions at the time, another way to verify the claim that the US actually intended to strike is to examine the method of US force deployment.


What is noteworthy is the method of the three-phase reinforcement plan pursued by the US Department of Defense. The public RSOI (Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration) deployment over several months is at odds with the doctrine of preemptive surprise attack and the tense relationship. Of course, in the theory of coercive diplomacy, the public deployment of forces is itself a key instrument. In the Gulf War, the US also publicly assembled troops for months before launching the actual operation by surprise. While theoretically, public assembly and surprise execution are compatible.


However, as discussed above, if the conditions under which the US perceived the threat of North Korean long-range artillery were true, then the public buildup of forces would structurally limit the effectiveness of a strike, as North Korea would likely interpret the RSOI as a signal just before the attack and begin preemptive use of its long-range artillery. In this regard, the public nature of the RSOI over several months aligns more naturally with the hypothesis of coercive diplomacy aimed at pressuring negotiations rather than an actual strike. This is also consistent with Perry's testimony mentioned earlier—"(The plan to attack the Yongbyon nuclear facilities) was not reported to the President, nor was it placed on the table." Publicly building up forces while not reporting the bombing plan to the highest decision-maker strengthens the interpretation that the RSOI was a tool for negotiation pressure rather than actual operational preparation.


These three analyses—North Korea's structural vulnerability, the exaggeration of long-range artillery deterrence, and the publicity of RSOI—do not constitute decisive evidence individually. However, when read cumulatively, they point to a consistent interpretation: the US military buildup was not an operational deployment aimed at an actual strike against North Korea, but a visual staging of coercive diplomacy with negotiations in mind. This explanation has far greater explanatory power than the narrative that North Korea, facing a dual structural crisis of extreme economic collapse and the simultaneous loss of its patrons, actually deterred the world's strongest military power with only conventional deterrence like long-range artillery.

IV. Why the Discrepancy: The Structure of Threat Exaggeration and Dual Strategy


1. Structural Necessity: What Was North Korea to the US?


Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, US foreign strategy faced a fundamental legitimacy crisis. With the disappearance of the main adversary of the Cold War, the reason for the US military presence in East Asia needed redefinition. Relations with China were in a phase of expanding and deepening economic interdependence, and it was difficult to officially designate China as a direct military threat or a potential hegemonic rival, at least in the short term. However, given the uncertainty about China's future trajectory, the US could not preemptively withdraw its forces from the Korean Peninsula and Japan. Maintaining forward-deployed forces in East Asia was a key element of the US's long-term strategy towards China.


Within this structure, North Korea occupied a very special functional position. If North Korea were to collapse or unification were to occur, the justification for the US Forces in Korea's presence would likely be fundamentally weakened. And if the US Forces in Korea were to disappear, the rationale for the presence of US Forces in Japan would also be likely to be shaken sequentially. Ultimately, what the US needed was a state where North Korea was perceived as a threat enough to be criticized, but without actually collapsing or unifying. Only when this condition was met could the US justify its continued military presence in the region without the burden of directly targeting China.


Hardline voices existed both within the US and South Korea. Amendments calling for military action were passed in Congress, and the media extensively covered the North Korean threat daily. However, these hardline stances were separate from the actual policy-making level. As Perry's testimony shows, the Yongbyon bombing plan never reached Clinton's desk. The hardline rhetoric was the environment used for the US's higher strategic objectives, not the variable determining them.


2. Specific Interests: How Threat Exaggeration Worked


While the US's structural necessity laid the groundwork for threat exaggeration, individual actors reinforced this direction for their own reasons. However, to understand these specific interests, one core condition must first be confirmed: the US's feint strategy only worked if its true intentions were not deciphered by both allies and adversaries.


If South Korea were to learn of the US's larger picture—using the North Korean threat rather than eliminating it—it could question the justification for the US Forces in Korea's presence. Furthermore, if North Korea were to grasp the US's true intentions, the negotiation leverage would not be established in the first place. Therefore, the US had to manage South Korea's independent actions by maintaining signals of tension, such as 'seriously considering a strike,' while actually exaggerating the potential damage, and simultaneously keep an unofficial channel open for negotiation with North Korea while staging military pressure. The essence of this strategy was to design a new East Asian security structure with the US's strategy towards China in mind, requiring this multiplicity.


Behind this structure, the specific interests of each actor also played a role. For the Clinton administration, exaggerating the North Korean threat served three purposes. First, it provided domestic justification for substantial aid to North Korea (KEDO, light water reactors, heavy oil). To argue that the 'cost of peace' was cheaper than the 'cost of war,' the cost of war had to be presented as sufficiently high.
[15] Second, for Clinton, who faced distrust from the military due to draft-dodging allegations early in his term, the narrative of seriously considering military options was a tool to demonstrate his resolve as commander-in-chief. With the healthcare reform failure putting him on the defensive ahead of the November 1994 midterm elections, visible achievements in foreign and security policy could be beneficial. Third, for the US military, facing pressure to cut defense budgets after the end of the Cold War, presenting the North Korean threat as significant provided a direct justification for maintaining forces on the Korean Peninsula and deploying new weapon systems like Patriot missiles.[16]


North Korea also benefited from the exaggeration of its threat capabilities in negotiations. South Korea was no exception. The greater the threat, the stronger the justification for the security cooperation system, and the higher the likelihood that the leader's 'decision for peace against the aggressive intentions of a great power' would be considered a political achievement.


Ultimately, each actor also had aspects of inflating the threat for their own reasons. They did not conspire beforehand. However, within the structure created by the US strategy, the rational actions of each actor ultimately pointed in the same direction.


3. Execution of the Feint Strategy: Managing South Korea and Designing an Exit

The exaggeration of the threat and the design of an exit were not separate events but two pillars of a single strategy. The US, on one hand, used military tension to pressure North Korea and control South Korea, while on the other hand, quietly opened an exit for negotiation through unofficial channels. The strategy was only complete when these two pillars operated simultaneously, and its true intentions were not to be exposed to either side.


The official narrative states that the US intended to strike North Korea and that Kim Young-sam stopped it. However, this narrative only explains a snapshot or the surface of the situation at the time. In reality, voices supporting a strike on Yongbyon existed in both South Korea and the US. Oberdorfer writes that the US was seriously concerned about South Korea's potential independent actions at the time.[17] Related diplomatic cables from WikiLeaks also repeatedly mention US diplomats referring to the South Korean government's hardline stance on North Korea as something to be 'managed'.[18] Les enregistrements déclassifiés des conversations entre Clinton et Kim Young-sam montrent également que la Corée était plus ferme. Lors d'une conversation en juin 1994, Kim Young-sam a appelé à des sanctions immédiates plus strictes que celles des États-Unis, tandis que Clinton a ralenti le rythme au motif de la construction d'un consensus international. Lors d'une conversation en octobre de la même année, Clinton s'est mis en colère lorsque Kim Young-sam a critiqué publiquement l'approche américaine envers la Corée du Nord comme étant « naïve et orientée vers la concession ».[19]


Il serait plus réaliste de considérer que la position de la Corée à l'époque était incohérente, oscillant entre une anxiété exagérée et une rhétorique de fermeté vague, sans comprendre les véritables intentions des États-Unis. Le président Kim Young-sam lui-même a averti l'ambassadeur américain en Corée, Laney, en disant : « Si les États-Unis bombardent la Corée du Nord, la Corée du Sud sera immédiatement réduite en cendres », tout en maintenant publiquement des déclarations fermes telles que « On ne peut pas serrer la main de ceux qui possèdent l'arme nucléaire ».[20]


La nature de la situation à l'époque résidait dans le fait que les États-Unis avaient eux-mêmes arrêté leur manœuvre offensive, et cette intention stratégique américaine devait être gardée secrète même pour leur allié, la Corée. En raison du déclin rapide de la puissance nationale de la Corée du Nord et de la famine, les sanctions ou l'usage de la force militaire comportaient un risque élevé de provoquer un effondrement incontrôlable de la Corée du Nord. La possibilité d'un effondrement de la Corée du Nord était une question susceptible de ébranler les fondements de la structure de sécurité en Asie de l'Est que les États-Unis poursuivaient.


Compte tenu des conditions structurelles de la Corée du Nord mentionnées précédemment – la disparition des puissances tutélaires, l'effondrement de la capacité de mener une guerre, et la grave pénurie alimentaire – il était pratiquement impossible pour la Corée du Nord de refuser une issue de négociation tant qu'elle était ouverte. Les États-Unis le savaient. Clinton a autorisé la visite de Carter à Pyongyang à condition qu'il s'y rende en tant que représentant privé et non officiel du gouvernement. Considérer la visite de Carter en tant que représentant privé comme une déviation de la diplomatie officielle est une vision à courte vue. Le fait que Clinton ait autorisé la visite de Carter en spécifiant la condition de sa visite en tant que représentant privé suggère qu'il y avait un certain niveau de coordination entre les deux parties. Dans le système diplomatique, l'utilisation de canaux non officiels sensibles est généralement partagée uniquement par une très petite élite au plus haut niveau. Les critiques de certains diplomates américains à l'égard de Carter, apparues sur WikiLeaks, doivent être interprétées non pas comme une conséquence de l'action 독단적 de Carter, mais comme une réticence bureaucratique face à des résultats sortant du contrôle du Département d'État.


En fait, immédiatement après la visite de Carter à Pyongyang, Clinton a discuté directement avec Kim Young-sam de la manière de justifier au public national le soutien à la Corée du Nord qui mènerait à l'Accord-cadre de Genève.[21] À ce stade, l'objectif supérieur de la stratégie américaine envers la Chine se connecte avec la manière dont la crise de Yongbyon de 1994 s'est déroulée concrètement. Ce dont les États-Unis avaient besoin, ce n'était ni de faire s'effondrer la Corée du Nord, ni de la laisser complètement à elle-même. Un changement rapide du régime nord-coréen aurait forcé une réorganisation de la structure de sécurité en Asie de l'Est et aurait pu affaiblir ou faire disparaître le fondement de la présence des troupes américaines. La mise en scène de tensions militaires et l'ouverture d'une issue de négociation par l'intermédiaire de Carter étaient des moyens pour atteindre cet objectif – maintenir la Corée du Nord dans un état de menace gérable. Par la narration de l'exagération et de la résolution de la crise, les États-Unis ont atteint leurs objectifs en ne révélant pas leurs intentions à la Corée tout en ajoutant une apparence de coordination avec la Corée lors du processus de résolution réel.

V. Conclusion


La raison pour laquelle le récit dominant de la crise de Yongbyon de 1994 n'a pas été corrigé depuis plus de 30 ans n'est pas simplement due à l'incompétence ou à la négligence. C'est aussi parce qu'il n'y avait pratiquement aucun acteur ayant un intérêt à modifier ce récit au sein de la structure. Pour les États-Unis, ce récit est un atout historique qui soutient la gestion de leurs alliances et la légitimité de leur politique envers la Corée du Nord. Pour le gouvernement sud-coréen, c'est un récit qui confirme la légitimité de sa dépendance en matière de sécurité et les réalisations historiques du dirigeant individuel. Pour la Corée du Nord également, il sert d'argument pour renforcer la légitimité de son développement nucléaire. Tous tirent des « actifs » importants de ce récit.


Cependant, le problème plus fondamental n'est pas la correction du récit. Le problème réside dans le niveau auquel le discours sud-coréen sur la sécurité est resté figé pendant que ce récit circulait pendant 30 ans. L'analyse sud-coréenne s'est constamment focalisée sur la (perception de la) menace. Les questions qui se situent au-dessus, telles que la signification structurelle et fonctionnelle de la Corée du Nord pour les grandes puissances, les intérêts pour lesquels les accords ont été conçus, quelles étaient les véritables lignes rouges et de quel point de vue elles ont été définies, ne sont pas structurellement soulevées dans le discours sud-coréen sur la sécurité. Cela ne peut être réduit à un simple problème de capacité individuelle des analystes. Tant que le cadre axé sur la perception de la menace prévaut, il est inévitable de se concentrer sur des calculs tactiques en dessous du niveau des opérations militaires et de manquer la dynamique de la compétition stratégique des grandes puissances qui se situe au-dessus.


En fin de compte, la véritable question que la crise de Yongbyon de 1994 nous pose aujourd'hui, plus de 30 ans plus tard, n'est pas simplement la véracité du récit passé. Il s'agit plutôt d'une autocritique douloureuse sur la mesure dans laquelle le discours sud-coréen sur la sécurité a acquis sa propre perspective au sein de la vaste structure de l'alliance. Le discours sud-coréen sur la sécurité doit désormais aller au-delà de la simple énumération des menaces nord-coréennes pour engager une réflexion plus approfondie sur la manière de définir et de réaliser notre autonomie stratégique dans un paysage de sécurité en Asie de l'Est en mutation rapide. La relecture des archives de 1994 ne doit pas être une négation du passé, mais un effort pour préparer une nouvelle structure de sécurité en reconnaissant l'asymétrie de l'alliance à laquelle nous sommes confrontés. ■

Bibliographie

Bacevich, Andrew. The New American Militarism. Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2005.

Chung, Jae Ho. Between Ally and Partner: Korea-China Relations and the United States. New York : Columbia University Press, 2007.

Gause, Ken E. North Korean Civil-Military Trends. Carlisle : Strategic Studies Institute, 2006.

Han Sung-Joo. “Living History: U.S.-ROK Allied Coordination in Negotiating the 1994 Agreed Framework.” CSIS Beyond Parallel, 5 décembre 2016. https://beyondparallel.csis.org/living-history-han-sung-joo/.

Keaney, Thomas A., et Eliot A. Cohen. Gulf War Air Power Survey Summary Report. Washington : USAF, 1993.

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National Security Archive. “The North Korean Nuclear Crisis, 1994.” Electronic Briefing Book. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu.

Noland, Marcus, Sherman Robinson, et Tao Wang. “Famine in North Korea: Causes and Cures.” Economic Development and Cultural Change 49(4), 2001.

Oberdorfer, Don, et Robert Carlin. The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History. 3e éd. New York : Basic Books, 2014.

Perry, William J. My Journey at the Nuclear Brink. Stanford : Stanford University Press, 2015.

Sigal, Leon V. Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea. Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1998.

Talbott, Strobe. The Russia Hand. New York : Random House, 2002.

Wallander, Celeste A. « Lost and Found: Gorbachev’s Perestroika and the End of the Soviet Empire. » Dans The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Vol. III. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2010.

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Wit, Joel S., Daniel B. Poneman, et Robert L. Gallucci. Going Critical: The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis. Washington : Brookings Institution Press, 2004.

Kim Young-sam. 『김영삼 대통령 회고록』. Séoul : Chosun Ilbo, 2001.

Moon Chung-in. « Quatre raisons pour lesquelles la Corée du Nord ne peut pas être la prochaine cible ». 『Hankyoreh』, 23 mars 2026.

Cho Gab-je et Kim Pil-jae. « L'opposition de Kim Young-sam au bombardement de la Corée du Nord en juin 1994 a fait manquer une opportunité à la Corée ! » 『New Daily』, 7 janvier 2016.

Cho Bi-yeon. “Implications of the U.S.-Israel Military Operation Against Iran.” *Sejong Policy Brief*, no. 2026-18. Sejong Institute, 2026.

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[1]Moon Chung-in, “Four Reasons Why North Korea Cannot Be the Next Target,” *Hankyoreh*, March 23, 2026, https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/opinion/column/1250537.html (accessed April 18, 2026).

[2]Cho Bi-yeon, “Implications of the U.S.-Israel Military Operation Against Iran: Changes in the Battlefield and the Role of Alliances,” *Sejong Policy Brief*, no. 2026-18, Sejong Institute, April 13, 2026, https://www.sejong.org/web/boad/1/egoread.php?bd=3&itm=&txt=&pg=26&seq=12883 (accessed April 18, 2026).

[3]North Korea is assessed to have secured a meaningful nuclear warhead yield only after its second nuclear test in 2009.

[4]Joel S. Wit, Daniel B. Poneman, and Robert L. Gallucci, Going Critical: The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), pp. 207–240.

[5]Kim Young-sam, *The Memoirs of President Kim Young-sam* (Seoul: Chosun Ilbo, 2001). Han Sung-joo, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, also testified about the crisis situation and ROK-U.S. consultations in an oral interview for CSIS Beyond Parallel. Han Sung-Joo, “Living History: U.S.-ROK Allied Coordination in Negotiating the 1994 Agreed Framework,” CSIS Beyond Parallel, December 5, 2016, https://beyondparallel.csis.org/living-history-han-sung-joo/.

[6]William J. Perry, My Journey at the Nuclear Brink (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015), pp. 105–108; Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci, Going Critical, pp. 207–215.

[7]Don Oberdorfer and Robert Carlin, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, 3rd ed. (New York: Basic Books, 2014), pp. 326–328; Michael Mazarr, North Korea and the Bomb (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), pp. 178–181.

[8]This statement was re-cited in a KBS report on Perry's remarks, introduced in the memoir *The Path of Diplomacy* (Seoul: Ollim, 2023) by former Minister of Foreign Affairs Han Sung-joo. KBS, “June 1994 Kim Young-sam’s Opposition to Bombing North Korea: South Korea Missed an Opportunity,” https://news.kbs.co.kr/pc/view/view.do?ncd=3495438. Perry also directly testified in an interview with SBS, “I never proposed [the bombing of Yongbyon] to President Clinton. I would have proposed it only if diplomacy failed.” SBS, “World Report: The Truth About the ‘Yongbyon Bombing Theory’,” https://news.sbs.co.kr/news/endPage.do?news_id=N1003297043 (December 3, 2015). This is consistent with the account in Perry's memoir, My Journey at the Nuclear Brink, pp. 105–108. In his memoir, Perry recounts that the plan to bomb Yongbyon was discussed but the conclusion was a diplomatic solution.

[9]Celeste A. Wallander, “Lost and Found: Gorbachev’s Perestroika and the End of the Soviet Empire,” in The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Vol. III (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 355–377.

[10]Jae Ho Chung, Between Ally and Partner: Korea-China Relations and the United States (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), pp. 54–61.

[11]Oberdorfer and Carlin, The Two Koreas, pp. 258–261.

[12]Marcus Noland, Sherman Robinson, and Tao Wang, “Famine in North Korea: Causes and Cures,” Economic Development and Cultural Change 49(4), 2001, pp. 741–767.

[13]Ken E. Gause, Tendances civils et militaires en Corée du Nord (Carlisle : Strategic Studies Institute, 2006), pp. 34–41.

[14] Thomas A. Keaney et Eliot A. Cohen, « Gulf War Air Power Survey Summary Report » (Washington : USAF, 1993), pp. 81–88.

[15] Leon V. Sigal, « Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea » (Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1998), pp. 156–185.

[16] Andrew Bacevich, « The New American Militarism » (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 126–142.

[17] Oberdorfer et Carlin, « The Two Koreas », pp. 336–340.

[18] Utilisation de la base de données WikiLeaks Cablegate. https://wikileaks.org/plusd.

[19] National Security Archive, « Document No. 02: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, Clinton–Kim Young Sam », 22 juin 1994, https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/20408-national-security-archive-doc-02-memorandum ; « Document No. 08: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, Clinton–Kim Young Sam », 14 octobre 1994, https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/20414-national-security-archive-doc-08-memorandum.

[20] Kim Young-sam, op. cit. ; Jo Gab-je et Kim Pil-jae, « 1994년 6월 金泳三의 北爆 반대, 한국은 기회를 놓쳤다! » [En juin 1994, l'opposition de Kim Young-sam à un bombardement de la Corée du Nord a fait manquer une opportunité à la Corée], 『뉴데일리』, 7 janvier 2016, https://www.newdaily.co.kr/site/data/html/2016/01/07/2016010700015.html (consulté le 18.04.2026).

[21] Wit, Poneman et Gallucci, « Going Critical », pp. 215–240 ; Strobe Talbott, The Russia Hand (New York : Random House, 2002), pp. 131–132.

■ Jeon Jae-woo_Chercheur au Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA).

■ Responsable et éditeur : Lee Sang-jun_Chercheur à l'EAI ; Oh In-hwan_Chercheur principal à l'EAI
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