[Global NK Commentary] An Evaluation of North Korea's 9th Party Congress Economic Plan: The Background Behind Adopting a Managerial Plan Despite Declaring the 8th Term a Success

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(This article is a modified and supplemented version of Jeong Seung-ho, 2026, “Evaluation of North Korea’s 9th Party Congress: Overall Economy” KDI North Korean Economic Review, 28(3).)

I. Background

At the final plenary meeting of the 8th term held in December 2025, Chairman Kim Jong-un declared, "The five-year plan, along with this year's economic development goals, has been completed." He expressed strong confidence, characterizing the past five years as "a historic turning point year that has charged the momentum for transitioning to a new stage." This assessment is not limited to North Korea's internal official announcements. According to estimates by the Bank of Korea, after recording negative growth from 2020 to 2022, the North Korean economy shifted to positive growth of 3.1% in 2023 and 3.7% in 2024. With the GDP in 2019 (immediately before the COVID-19 pandemic) set at 100, the estimated GDP level for 2024 is 101.8, indicating a recovery to pre-pandemic levels. Notably, the Bank of Korea cited the implementation of domestic policy initiatives such as the Five-Year Plan for National Economic Development and the "20x10 Provincial Development Policy," as well as increased manufacturing, construction, and mining due to expanded North Korea-Russia cooperation, as drivers of 2024 growth.

Based on these official assessments and external estimates, it was projected that the new economic plan to be presented at the 9th Party Congress would deviate from the 8th Party Congress's (2021) strategy focused on "consolidation and reinforcement" and move towards a more aggressive growth strategy, similar to that presented at the 7th Party Congress (2016).

However, the policy direction of the 'New Five-Year Plan' actually announced at the 9th Party Congress differed from expectations. As indicated by the phrases 'consolidation of stability' and 'gradual qualitative development,' the plan was largely managerial, inheriting a significant portion of the policy direction from the 8th Party Congress. While the summary report evaluated the past five years as "the most distinct and significant achievements in the economic field in over 30 years" and the dawn of a "new phase of comprehensive socialist development," the actual content of the economic plan prioritized stable management over aggressive growth. Furthermore, the sector-specific tasks for key industries such as metallurgy, chemicals, and electricity were presented in a manner that lacked significant specificity compared to previous Party Congresses.

Therefore, this article compares the main contents of the 9th Party Congress economic plan with those of the previous 7th and 8th Party Congresses, and analyzes the background behind North Korea's choice of such a managerial plan, despite declaring the success of the 8th term, focusing on internal and external uncertainties. It also presents prospects for the new five-year plan and implications for inter-Korean relations.

II. Main Contents and Characteristics of the 9th Party Congress Economic Plan

1. Evaluation of Economic Achievements

The 9th Party Congress evaluated the economic achievements of the past five years more actively than any previous Party Congress. The summary report officially declared the "basic completion" of the Five-Year Plan for National Economic Development, defining it as "the most distinct and significant achievement in the economic field in over 30 years." It also characterized North Korea's current stage of development as a "phase of comprehensive socialist development," asserting that the overall economy has entered a path of sustained growth. However, the phrase "the possibility of lifting the entire economy simultaneously has been opened" used in the report is noteworthy. The basis for these achievements also centers on policy implementation outcomes such as the provincial development policy, rural changes, housing construction, and the building of hospitals and greenhouse farms, as well as improvements in living conditions, rather than industrial production performance.

This stands in stark contrast to the previous two Party Congresses. The 7th Party Congress (2016) assessed that it had strengthened the material and technological foundation of the self-reliant national economy and laid the groundwork for building an economic power, but it did not explicitly determine whether the plan had been achieved. The 8th Party Congress (2021) publicly acknowledged the failure to meet the goals of the Five-Year Plan for National Economic Development and pointed to internal issues such as "failure to establish plans based on scientific calculations" and "inefficient work methods," in addition to external factors.

〈Table 1〉 Comparison of Economic Achievement Evaluations by Party Congress

2. Policy Direction of the Economic Plan

While strongly promoting its achievements, the 9th Party Congress presented the economic plan itself in a direction that emphasizes stability and sustainability over aggressive growth strategy. The setting of the economic development direction as "consolidation of stability" and "gradual qualitative development" clearly illustrates this. 'Qualitative development' here appears to refer to improving productivity through technological innovation and management improvements in the production process, rather than quantitative expansion of production volume. It can be interpreted that the policy goals are set in a direction to induce increased production through productivity improvement, acknowledging the limitations in expanding input due to ongoing resource constraints caused by sanctions against North Korea.

Changes are also evident in policy priorities. While the 7th and 8th Party Congresses focused policy weight on the normalization and production expansion of key industries such as electricity, coal, and metallurgy, the 9th Party Congress shows a shift with policy tasks directly related to people's livelihoods, such as provincial development, rural transformation, and public health, being brought to the forefront.

〈Table 2〉 Comparison of Policy Directions of Economic Plans by Party Congress

3. Key Sectoral Tasks

The most prominent feature of the 9th Party Congress in terms of sectoral tasks is that the targets for leading sectors and key industries are significantly more abstract compared to previous Party Congresses. For core industries such as electricity, coal, and metallurgy, the task of "qualitative strengthening" of the production base was presented, but specific production targets, power plant construction plans, and equipment expansion plans could not be found in the publicly released report. This contrasts with the 7th Party Congress, which specifically mentioned the construction of the Tanchon Power Plant, mechanization of coal mining, and the establishment of a Juche iron production system.

However, it is difficult to conclude that specific plans have not been prepared. The 9th Party Congress resolution states that "the work carried out by the 8th Central Committee has been analyzed and summarized in detail through the notification of materials and the work summary report," and the Political Bureau meeting held during the Party Congress announced that "the draft five-year plans for 20 major sectors of the people's economy were reviewed and approved." This suggests that while specific figures for each sector exist internally, they may have been omitted from the public report due to considerations of internal and external uncertainties.

In contrast, relatively specific tasks were presented in the sectors of agriculture, local development, and public health. In agriculture, alongside grain production targets, expansion of rice processing capacity, a seed revolution, and reclamation of tidal flats were specified, and the continued promotion of the "20x10 policy for local development" was confirmed. In particular, designating tourism as "a new industry to drive the nation's economic development and civilizational progress" is a distinction from previous Party congresses, and can be seen as reflecting an intention to utilize the tourism sector, which is not a direct target of sanctions against North Korea, as a new growth engine.

Table 3: Comparison of Major Tasks by Sector in Party Congresses

The core characteristic of the 9th Party Congress economic plan is that it emphasized stability and sustainability over an aggressive growth strategy, and presented economic policies centered on qualitative growth and strengthening the production base. At the same time, the targets and tasks for key industries such as metals, chemicals, and electricity remained at a more abstract level compared to previous Party congresses. Since not all specific details of the Party Congress documents have been released, there are limitations to interpretation. Nevertheless, these characteristics can be seen as a result of reflecting the internal and external uncertainties facing the North Korean economy. The following section examines the major constraints in this regard.

III. Background of Adopting a Managed Plan: Internal and External Uncertainties

1. Internal Environmental Uncertainties

Internal uncertainties can be broadly summarized into three categories. First is market instability. In North Korea, the dollar exchange rate and rice prices showed relatively stable trends in 2019, before the COVID-19 pandemic, at approximately 8,000 won and 5,000 won, respectively. However, after the reopening of the border, starting in the latter half of 2024, the exchange rate began to surge to over 13,000 won, and as of March 2026, it exceeded 41,300 won, reaching about five times the long-term average. Rice prices also rose with a lag, soaring to about 26,300 won in September 2025, 5.5 times the long-term average, before slightly declining to the current level of around 18,000 won. Such rapid price instability is highly likely to reduce the real purchasing power of residents and increase the burden of livelihood.

[Figure 1] Trends in North Korea's Market Exchange Rate and Rice Prices (Jan. 2019 - Mar. 2026)

(Unit: North Korean Won)

Source: Daily NK, North Korea Market Trends

Second is the constraint on state fiscal capacity. North Korea's budget revenue growth rate recorded about 5% in the early years of Kim Jong Un's rule (2012-16), but fell to 3.3% during the period of intensified sanctions (2017-19), and significantly decreased to around 1% during the COVID-19 border lockdown period (2021-23). Although there has been a rebound to the 2-3% range since 2024, considering the prolonged fiscal deterioration, it is difficult to consider the state's fiscal conditions as sufficiently recovered (Lee Jong-gyu, 2022, 2025). This fiscal constraint served as a key background for adopting a strategy of emphasizing productivity improvement over increased production through investment expansion, i.e., "qualitative strengthening." In a situation where financing for facility investment and infrastructure expansion is difficult, a managed plan was an unavoidable choice.

Third is the instability of the rural society. Intensified state control over the distribution of food and goods, high-intensity COVID-19 quarantine measures, and prolonged economic hardship have placed a particular burden on rural areas, leading to increased discontent and outward migration among rural residents. Kim Jong Un himself mentioned at an expanded Politburo meeting in January 2024 that "the failure to smoothly supply even basic daily necessities to local residents is a serious political problem," presenting the resolution of the gap between the central and local regions as a task that must be carried out. The fact that measures related to local development and rural stability were presented more concretely at the 9th Party Congress than tasks in priority sectors can be seen as a reflection of this social background.

2. External Environmental Uncertainties

External uncertainties largely stem from relations with Russia and China. Firstly, cooperation with Russia has recently acted as a factor for some recovery in the North Korean economy, but there are significant uncertainties regarding its sustainability and ripple effects. According to the Bank of Korea's 2024 industrial growth rate estimates, the heavy and chemical industries (10.7%) and construction (12.3%) show notable growth, which is interpreted as a reflection of increased demand for military supplies due to the Russia-Ukraine war. However, this cooperation is highly dependent on the war situation and is structurally unstable. If the war ends, the current trade structure centered on military supplies may become difficult to maintain, and given the poor logistics infrastructure and the low complementarity between the two countries' trade structures, it is argued that long-term expansion of North Korea-Russia trade is unlikely (Jung and Lee, 2024). Indeed, the market prices of energy and flour expected to be supplied from Russia are not stabilizing but rather showing an upward trend, indicating that the effects of external cooperation are not being sufficiently transmitted to the livelihood sector.

Next, relations with China are also a significant factor of uncertainty. China appears to be managing the level of cooperation with North Korea within a certain range, considering the international sanctions regime and its foreign policy strategy. Given that China has positioned itself as a responsible actor in the international order and presented the upholding of the UN-centered international system and international legal order as key principles of its foreign policy (Lee Jae-young et al., 2023), it is difficult for China to choose active cooperation with North Korea in a way that directly undermines UN sanctions. Furthermore, as confirmed by China's distancing itself by defining the North Korea-Russia summit and treaty as a "bilateral matter between North Korea and Russia" even after their meeting and treaty signing, the possibility of North Korea-China-Russia trilateral cooperation developing into an institutionalized alliance is limited. Consequently, in a context where it is difficult to set an aggressive economic plan based on support from Russia or expanded economic cooperation with China, North Korea's establishment of a new five-year plan emphasizing stability and management can be seen as a realistic choice.

IV. Assessment and Implications

Despite highly evaluating the achievements of the past five years, the 9th Party Congress economic plan prioritized stability and qualitative strengthening over an aggressive growth strategy. In particular, for priority sectors and key industries, the presentation of sector-specific tasks remained at an abstract level compared to previous Party congresses, while relatively concrete tasks were presented for sectors directly connected to people's livelihoods, such as local development, rural areas, public health, and tourism. These characteristics can be seen as a combined result of internal factors such as market instability, fiscal constraints, and rural instability, and external factors such as the structural limitations of North Korea-Russia and North Korea-China cooperation. It is also possible that publicly presenting specific goals to domestic and international audiences posed a political burden for the North Korean authorities.

Several structural limitations are anticipated in the implementation process of the new five-year plan. First is the tension in resource allocation between the military and civilian sectors. The 9th Party Congress's military sector emphasized not only the existing line of parallel development of nuclear weapons and the economy but also the modernization of conventional weapons and forces. Given the limited resource conditions, resource allocation is likely to continue to lean towards the military sector, which could consequently constrain investment in sectors related to the civilian economy and people's livelihoods.

Second, while the "20x10 policy for local development" may hold political significance, its economic limitations are clear. The approach of repeatedly establishing similar consumer goods production facilities in various cities and counties conflicts with the principles of economies of scale and division of labor. In a situation where marketization has significantly advanced, strengthening production and distribution centered on state-owned local factories is also likely to shrink the income and efficiency of the existing market sector. Furthermore, with the import of mass consumer goods in 2025 exceeding pre-COVID-19 levels, price and quality competition with low-cost Chinese consumer goods could also pose a significant burden on the operation of newly established local factories.

In contrast, the emphasis on the tourism sector offers important implications. The capacity of the Wonsan-Kalma tourist area alone is about 20,000 people, making stable operation difficult with demand from China and Russia alone. Ultimately, for such large-scale tourist areas to achieve profitability, it is necessary to accommodate a certain level of demand from South Korea. In this regard, despite North Korea's official declaration of "hostile inter-state relations," tourism has the potential to serve as a realistic point of contact for the resumption of limited inter-Korean cooperation in the future. ■

References

Lee Jae-young, Lee Yong-jae, Yoon Jeong-hyun, and Jeong Seung-ho, "Response Strategies to Changes in China-Russia-North Korea Economic Relations Amid US-China Supply Chain Reorganization Competition," Korea Institute for National Unification, 2023.

Lee Jong-gyu, "North Korea's Fiscal Trends and Key Issues," KDI North Korea Economic Review, April 2022.

_______, "North Korea Economy: 2024 Assessment and 2025 Outlook," KDI North Korea Economic Review, January 2025.

Jung, Seungho, and Jongmin Lee. “Economic Implications for North Korea of Strengthened Relations with Russia Amid the Russia-Ukraine War.” The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, 36(4): pp.449~473, 2024.

Rodong Sinmun, "Work Summary Report of the Central Committee at the 7th Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea," May 8, 2016.

_______, "On the Report Delivered by Comrade Kim Jong Un at the 8th Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea, Guiding the Struggle for Socialist Construction in Our Own Way," January 9, 2021.

_______, "Let Us Carry Forward the Great Victory and Glory Achieved Through Indomitable Pioneering Struggle to Continuous Achievements and Leaps Forward on a New Journey - Report on the 9th Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea," February 26, 2026.

_______, "Let Us Thoroughly Implement the Decisions of the 9th Party Congress: Important Tasks Facing the Key Industry Sector," March 6, 2026.

_______, "On the Settlement of Accounts of the State Budget for Juche 112 (2023) and the State Budget for Juche 113 (2024) of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea," January 16, 2024.

■ Author: Jeong Seung-ho_Professor, Department of International Trade and Logistics, Incheon National University.

■ Editor: Lee Sang-junEAI Fellow; Oh InhwanEAI Senior Fellow

Inquiries: 02-2277-1683 (ext. 211) | leesj@eai.or.kr