[Global NK Commentary] Assessment of North Korea's 9th Party Congress and Inter-Korean Relations

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The 9th Party Congress Declared a New Stage of Socialist Revolution

Comparing the 7th Party Congress in 2016, the 8th Party Congress in 2021, and the 9th Party Congress held this year, all under Kim Jong-un's leadership, the preparation period for the 9th Party Congress was longer than for the 7th and 8th.[1] However, there were no goal-setting or subsequent plan announcements for various sectors such as the economy, military, and construction; it merely endorsed existing policies.

Nevertheless, North Korea evaluates the 9th Party Congress with the most positive rhetoric, calling it a 'victorious and glorious congress' that has entered a 'new stage of comprehensive socialist development.' North Korea emphasizes that it has entered a new revolutionary phase, entirely different from the past 15 years under Kim Jong-un's leadership.[2] This is a self-assessment that the foundation for a qualitative change in revolutionary development has been laid, as the past five years, despite unprecedented hardships and adversities for the nation, have successfully achieved both the right to survival and the right to development through Kim Jong-un's strong leadership. Therefore, the past five years since the 8th Party Congress are highlighted as a period of pioneering the environment that enables entry into the stage of comprehensive socialist development, leading to the 'complete victory of our-style socialism' (communism) through innovation and progress.

The problem is that although the 9th Party Congress claims to have entered a new stage of revolutionary development, it lacks a vision, goals, and plans commensurate with this new stage. The North Korean authorities state that the very trend of innovation and progress announced and pursued during the 8th Party Congress serves as the strategic guideline that enables the leap into a new stage of revolutionary development.[3] Therefore, despite claiming to have entered a new stage of revolutionary development, North Korea's strategic guideline for comprehensive revolutionary development remains at the level of the 8th Party Congress. Consequently, the strategic guidelines for politics, economy, military, inter-Korean relations, and foreign relations announced at the 9th Party Congress are repetitions of the programs, lines, and policies newly announced over the past five years since the 8th Party Congress.

Despite this, North Korea claims to have entered a stage of comprehensive revolutionary development with the 9th Party Congress, which exhibited several distinct characteristics.

First, it emphasizes 'stabilization and qualitative development' over economic development. The 8th Five-Year Plan for National Economic Development is self-assessed as achieving the most significant results in the past 30 years by largely fulfilling the 12 major goals for people's economic development. The plan for the next five years proposes realizing goals for each indicator in a stage of stable consolidation and gradual qualitative development. However, unlike its previous propaganda methods, North Korea did not disclose specific figures for production volume or achievement rates this time. This change appears to minimize political burdens associated with setting concrete economic growth targets while also indicating a willingness to endure the limitations of economic growth due to prolonged sanctions resulting from the irreversible status as a nuclear state. In other words, while the revolutionary stage has been elevated, the economy has shifted towards a 'regime endurance' character rather than growth, and by reconfirming the '20x10 provincial development policy' as a core initiative, the emphasis is placed on balanced development between urban and rural areas rather than growth.

Second, the discourse on national unification has disappeared. From the 1st to the 8th Party Congresses, North Korea maintained its unification strategy at the Party Congresses, defining inter-Korean relations as an internal national issue. However, at the 9th Party Congress, it declared a final, grave decision to put an end to the abnormal inter-Korean relations of 80 years and establish the relationship with South Korea as one between the most hostile states. By completely dismantling the framework for dialogue and cooperation, the 'discourse on national unification' has disappeared from the Party Congress for the first time in its history. Following the fundamental shift in the strategic direction of its South Korea policy declared at the 8th Central Committee's 9th Plenary Meeting in December 2023, North Korea has proceeded with erasing traces of compatriots and unification, constitutional amendments, the abolition of unification-related organizations, and at the 9th Party Congress, further measures such as amending the Party Rules, strengthening the southern border, enhancing combat readiness against the South, and excluding Kim Yong-chol and Ri Son-gwon from the Political Bureau candidate membership of the Party Central Committee. North Korea emphasizes that the comprehensive development stage of the revolution is a stage of transition to a war preparation system and strengthening combat readiness by adding a policy of hostility towards South Korea to its policy of hostility towards the United States, in order to solidify its 'irreversible nuclear state status.'

Third, the function and nature of the Party Congress have changed. While previous Party Congresses presented development blueprints and announced plans for various sectors, including economic development plans,[4] the 9th Party Congress has shifted its function and nature to 'endorse' policies already underway. In other words, it has transformed from a platform for designing and announcing new policies into a venue for consolidating the regime and strengthening internal unity through regime propaganda. Notably, North Korea focused on maximizing preemptive effects by linking Kim Jong-un's public activities in February with the major achievements of the 9th Party Congress. The Army Founding Day on February 8th, the completion ceremony of Saebyeol Street for the families of war heroes on February 15th, the presentation ceremony of the 600mm super-precision large-caliber multiple rocket launcher and the commencement ceremony of the 5th phase construction in Hwaseong District on February 18th were utilized as opportunities to showcase the leader's accomplishments in safeguarding the right to survival and development. Kim Yo-jong's statements on drones on February 12th and February 18th emphasized the strengthening of the southern border based on the invalidation of the armistice system, grounded in the theory of two hostile states. Ultimately, this trend was reflected in the closing military parade of the 9th Party Congress, which was described as 'the first ceremony to announce the start of the struggle for transformation in a new stage,' featuring a parade of unarmed infantry formations primarily as a display of political loyalty.

Fourth, the 'Five Great Programs for Party Building in the New Era' (political building, organizational building, ideological building, discipline building, and work style building), first proposed by Kim Jong-un in his commemorative lecture at the Party Central Cadre School in October 2022, were adopted as the 'Five Great Lines for Party Building in the New Era' at the 6th Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee in December 2022. At the 9th Party Congress, these were enshrined in the Party Rules as permanent lines for party building, thereby solidifying Kim Jong-un's sole leadership system over the Party Central Committee. It is noteworthy that the new Five Great Lines for Party Building in the Kim Jong-un era can be seen as the beginning of ideological and organizational policy shifts aimed at establishing Kim Jong-unism, which distinguishes him from his predecessors, and a four-generation hereditary succession system. Chronologically, one month after the announcement of the Five Great Programs for Party Building in the New Era, on November 18, 2022, Kim Ju-ae first appeared at the launch of the Hwasong-17 ICBM, and at the 6th Plenary Meeting in December, the 'Programs' were elevated to 'Lines.' Simultaneously, international relations were assessed as having transitioned into a new Cold War system, completely abandoning the principle of 'tit-for-tat' from the previous 'strength against strength, 선대선' principle, explicitly designating South Korea as a 'clear enemy,' and prioritizing a head-on confrontation of 'strength against strength,' including preemptive nuclear attacks against South Korea and the United States. This shift in policy is similar to the sequence followed by Kim Jong-un when he was designated as the successor in 2009, leading to intensified military tensions with the South through the 5th nuclear test (May), the Battle of Daecheongdo (November), the sinking of the Cheonan (March 2010), and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island (July), before officially emerging as the successor by assuming the position of Vice Chairman of the Party Central Military Commission in September 2010.

Furthermore, the personnel reshuffle through the 9th Party Congress, unlike the elite replacements over the past 15 years, involved the advancement of individuals prepared for Kim Jong-unism and the succession of the revolutionary cause, i.e., succession preparations. Kim Yo-jong was appointed as the General Affairs Department Director, overseeing the entire Party, and Choi Son-hui, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, was appointed as the Pyongyang City Party Responsible Secretary, the highest position among provincial party secretaries, suggesting that she has also been assigned domestic affairs and regime management tasks for establishing Kim Ju-ae's succession. Attention should also be paid to the movement of individuals responsible for surveillance and ideological control to key positions. Jung Kyung-taek, Director of the General Political Bureau, was appointed Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, and Ri Il-hwan, Party Secretary in charge of propaganda and agitation, and Kim Jae-ryong, Director of the Party Discipline Inspection Department, were appointed members of the Presidium, the Party's highest policy-making body.

Military Policy Following the Establishment of the 'Adversarial Two-State' System

The issue lies in the inter-Korean relations within the 'comprehensive development stage of revolution' declared at the 9th Party Congress. North Korea's strategic shift in its South Korea policy began at the 6th Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee in December 2022. After designating South Korea as a 'clear enemy,' the 9th Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee in December 2023 defined South Korea as an 'adversarial state' and established a 'state of belligerence,' thereby shifting the inter-Korean relationship from a special relationship based on common ethnicity to an adversarial two-state relationship in a state of conflict. Subsequently, North Korea has erased traces of the nation and unification, reorganized South Korea-facing organizations,[5] and visualized the physical and symbolic severance between the two Koreas by demolishing the Gyeongui and Donghae railway connection roads. It has also expanded military activities, including constructing walls north of the Military Demarcation Line in the DMZ, redeploying heavy weaponry around GP sites, expanding minefields, and increasing military personnel deployment.[6] The 9th Party Congress frames the relationship with South Korea solely as a confrontational military relationship, focusing on border management with an adversarial state and strengthening practical response capabilities.

Therefore, the strengthening of North Korea's military power presented at the 9th Party Congress focuses on enhancing the practical operational readiness of tactical nuclear weapons and modernizing conventional forces, based on the theory of adversarial two states. North Korea demands the 'Three Great Revolutions for Building a Strong Military'—ideological revolution, training and education revolution, and equipment revolution—to build a strong military through the parallel development of nuclear and conventional weapons. First, North Korea presents the ideological revolution of the People's Army as the primary strategic task among the three revolutions. It emphasizes the loyalty of the revolutionary strong military to the supreme leader by thoroughly arming the People's Army politically and ideologically in line with the rapid development of military science and technology and the demands of modern warfare.

Second, the revolution in training and education is closely linked to enhancing the practical operational readiness of nuclear forces. At the 9th Party Congress, North Korea reiterated its policy of expanding and strengthening nuclear forces, stating its intention to pursue the annual increase in the quantity of nuclear weapons and the expansion of nuclear operation means and utilization spaces. This implies a move towards diversifying nuclear weapon delivery systems and conducting multi-domain operations, suggesting the realization of a 'North Korean-style CNI (Conventional-Nuclear Integration).' This involves ① strengthening the parallel development policy of nuclear and conventional weapons, ② deploying nuclear combat forces in practice, and ③ practicing 'nuclear trigger' drills, i.e., operating procedures and proficiency exercises for an integrated nuclear crisis response system, to enhance the practical response capabilities of nuclear combat forces. An increase in North Korean-style CNI exercises is also anticipated.

Third, the equipment revolution aims to develop conventional weapons to an international standard, particularly reflecting trends in defense innovation and multi-domain operations of major advanced countries and the development of advanced weapon systems for future warfare capabilities, including the strengthening of naval power. Regarding naval power enhancement, it calls for rapid development of naval operational capabilities based on the nuclear armament of naval surface and underwater assets.[7] Furthermore, the five development plans included in the 5-Year Defense Development Plan—① a comprehensive system of intercontinental ballistic missiles with enhanced ground and underwater launch capabilities, ② an artificial intelligence unmanned attack system, ③ special assets for attacking enemy satellites in case of emergency, ④ a powerful electronic warfare system to paralyze enemy command and control centers, and ⑤ increasingly advanced reconnaissance satellites—reflect North Korea's enhanced nuclear preparedness and the characteristics of modern warfare. Additionally, accelerating the practical deployment of newly developed weapons is presented as a key task, emphasizing the development and rapid deployment of advanced weapon systems.

Meanwhile, while North Korea emphasized the standardization of Juche weapons at the 7th and 8th Party Congresses, the 9th Party Congress emphasizes the standardization of military bases. It demands standardization for all military bases and requires the formulation and execution of phased plans for the construction of military infrastructure. In particular, it calls for the fortification of the 'southern border' as quickly as possible and the reinforcement of border control and firepower systems, which appears to be the highest priority to be achieved as a mandatory military-strategic directive of the Party.

North Korea is enhancing its offensive capabilities through a rapid fortification of the southern border based on the theory of adversarial two states, coupled with the increased deployment of key strike assets against the South, such as 600mm and 240mm multiple rocket launchers and short-range tactical missiles.[8] This trend in North Korea is thoroughly blocking South Korea's efforts for dialogue and improved relations, highlighting that crisis management on the Korean Peninsula could be dictated by North Korea's threat perception, through coercion against the South based on the possibility of preemptive attack and complete collapse.

Implications and Outlook

The entry into the stage of comprehensive socialist development through the 9th Party Congress can be assessed as a period for the firm establishment of Kim Jong-unism and the construction of a succession framework based upon it. This is particularly true considering that the changes in political ideology and strategies towards the South and foreign countries pursued since the 8th Party Congress have coincided with Kim Jong-un's 'Five Great Lines for Party Building in the New Era' and the beginning of Kim Jong-un's public activities accompanied by Kim Ju-ae. North Korea unusually reported on the historical turning points of the 1st through 8th Party Congresses daily from February 20th to 27th during the 9th Party Congress period (February 19-25). A summary of the main characteristics of the 1st through 4th Party Congresses indicates that this period can be defined as the time when factionalism was purged and the foundation for socialist revolution was laid. In contrast, the 5th and 6th Congresses emphasized the completion of the Juche ideology and the formalization of power succession and the succession system. If we apply the 1st through 6th Party Congresses to the 7th, 8th, and 9th Party Congresses of the Kim Jong-un era, the 7th and 8th Party Congresses can be seen as a period of establishing the foundation of Kim Jong-unism through the execution of Jang Song-thaek and the ideological reform of Party cadres, while the 9th Party Congress can be viewed as a period of completing the issues of Kim Jong-unism and the succession of the revolutionary cause.

Therefore, the fundamental shift in North Korea's strategy towards the South, based on the theory of adversarial two states, can be interpreted as part of strengthening internal ideological consolidation. This is because the 9th Party Congress resolution emphasizes the strengthening of the political and ideological capabilities of the Party, government, and military, along with increasing hostility towards the South and reinforcing border control measures along the entire southern border. While the 8th Party Congress approached the institutional and legal aspects of controlling anti-socialist and non-socialist ideologies, the 9th Party Congress is transitioning towards strengthening war preparedness in response to enemy threats.

Given that the fundamental shift in North Korea's policy towards the South in 2023 has led to an irreversible decision for the most adversarial relationship through the 9th Party Congress, inter-Korean relations are no longer a policy domain where separate lines are established but are merely those of an adversarial state placed under the subordinate line of defense strengthening. Consequently, the central axis of the policy towards the South has shifted to military deterrence, which involves increasing the density and duration of 'preemptive attacks' using strike means such as super-large multiple rocket launchers and short-range missiles, and strengthening the southern border.

It appears highly probable that North Korea's policy towards the South will continue along this trajectory at least until the 10th Party Congress, when the succession of the revolutionary cause is expected to be completed through the formal designation of a successor. The challenge lies in how to enhance crisis management during this period.

North Korea is pursuing quantitative and qualitative advancements in the practical readiness of its nuclear weapons and the modernization of its conventional forces, asserting that peace and stability can be achieved through a balance of power. In contrast, South Korea's policy towards North Korea emphasizes peaceful measures and dialogue for preemptive tension reduction. However, given that North Korea itself claims to have entered a new stage of revolutionary development, South Korea's policy towards North Korea needs to move beyond its existing framework. Crisis management is not achieved through preemptive trust-building. Rather, a shortcut to trust-building can begin with strengthening crisis management preparedness. Therefore, offers of dialogue to North Korea should be made from the perspective of strengthening crisis management preparedness, and efforts for crisis mitigation must be managed and responded to in a way that does not inadvertently send the wrong signal to North Korea, i.e., an opportunity for coercion against the South. ■

[1] The decision to convene the 9th Party Congress and related preparatory measures were made at the 12th Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee, eight months prior to the congress. The 8th Party Congress was convened approximately four months prior, and the 7th Party Congress, although held after a 36-year interval, was convened approximately six months prior.

[2]'Report on the 9th Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea,' KCNA, February 26, 2026.

[3] North Korea cited the need to present 'new struggle lines and strategic and tactical guidelines' as the reason for convening the 8th Party Congress early. The background for the change in strategic guidelines highlighted the 'triple hardships': 1) continued sanctions due to lack of progress in North Korea-US relations, 2) the prolonged COVID-19 pandemic, and 3) severe flood damage. See KCNA, August 19, 2020.

[4] During Kim Il-sung's era, the 1st to 6th Party Congresses announced the Post-War 3-Year Plan, the 1st 5-Year Plan, the 7-Year Plan, the 6-Year Plan, and the 2nd 7-Year Plan. At the 7th Party Congress during Kim Jong-un's era, the Five-Year Plan for National Economic Development Strategy was announced, and at the 8th Party Congress, the new Five-Year Plan for National Economic Development was announced.

[5] On January 15, 2024, the Supreme People's Assembly decided to abolish the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of Korea, the National Economic Cooperation Bureau, and the Kumgangsan International Tourism Bureau. KCNA, January 16, 2024.

[6] For North Korea's increased military activities in the demilitarized zone and the demolition of the Gyeongui and Donghae lines, see The Chosun Ilbo, June 15, 2024, and Yonhap News, October 15, 2024.

[7] Following the 9th Party Congress, Kim Jong-un's first military visit was to the new destroyer 'Choe Hyon' on March 3-4, where he demanded the construction of two 5,000-ton class new destroyers annually during the five-year plan period and expressed satisfaction with the nuclear armament of the navy. KCNA, March 5, 2026.

[8] Before the 9th Party Congress, Kim Jong-un showcased the 600mm super-precision multiple rocket launcher as a weapon for attacks against the South during a presentation ceremony. After the 9th Party Congress, on March 14, he supervised a firepower strike drill involving 12 units of 600mm super-precision multiple rocket launchers. KCNA, March 15, 2026.

■Lee Ho-ryeong_Senior Researcher, Korea Institute for Defense Analyses.

■ In Charge and Edited by: Lee Sang-jun_EAI Researcher

    Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 211) | leesj@eai.or.kr