[EAI Issue Brief] Analysis of the Impact of the US-Iran Conflict on Future North Korea-US Summits

1. Executive Summary

The escalating military conflict between the United States and Iran in the Middle East is analyzed to significantly influence North Korea's strategy toward the US. North Korea is expected to further reinforce its existing perception that the irreversible acquisition of nuclear deterrence is essential for national survival through the situation in Iran and solidify its judgment that US offers for dialogue are difficult to trust. If a North Korea-US summit between Kim Jong Un and Trump is realized in the future, North Korea is projected to employ strategies such as: ▲continuing qualitative and quantitative enhancement of nuclear deterrence, ▲insisting on the 'cessation of hostile policy' as the top negotiation agenda, ▲excluding sanctions relief from the agenda, and ▲maintaining principled tactics toward the US independent of personal relations with Trump, based on the coercive US stance and sanctions policy confirmed in the Iran situation. In particular, the reinforced perception that Iran is vulnerable to direct US military pressure because it is not a nuclear-weapon state could further accelerate North Korea's nuclear armament.

2. Analysis of the Situation Prior to the US Airstrikes on North Korea

2.1. North Korea's Pre-existing Perception of the US-Iran Conflict

North Korean media has recently assessed that relations between the US and Iran are "escalating to a dangerous stage" and has reported in detail on the US's acts of military threat and intimidation against Iran.[1] The specific details of the reports are as follows.

• US Military Pressure: It was reported that "the US is further heightening military threats against Iran by deploying the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier strike group 'Abraham Lincoln' to the Middle East,[2] conducting air force readiness training,[3] and deploying the special reconnaissance aircraft 'WC-135R' for detecting signs of nuclear activity."[4] These movements were interpreted as an attempt to coerce Iran into abandoning its peaceful nuclear rights and returning to negotiations.[5]

• Israeli Intervention: There were reports that Israel had completed preparations for a military attack on Iran,[6] and it was reported that Israel had carried out attacks on Iranian-related figures and facilities, such as the airstrike on the Iranian embassy in Syria and the assassination of the Hamas political bureau chief,[7] while criticizing that "Israel's military recklessness is becoming indiscriminate."[8]

• Iran's Hardline Response: Iran declared its "firm stance to respond" to US military threats,[9] and it was reported that Iran warned of an "immediate, comprehensive, and unprecedented" response, considering any form of attack as a "total war."[10] Iran had deployed 1,000 strategic drones in advance,[11] and stated that it would consider US and Israeli bases and facilities as legitimate targets in case of an emergency.[12] Furthermore, the report cited instances where Iran seized US oil tankers, condemning the US's attempts to plunder oil.[13]

• Efforts to Neutralize Sanctions: It was reported that Iran acknowledged the immense economic losses caused by US sanctions and argued that it should minimize the impact of sanctions by promoting production and trade development and strengthening economic cooperation with regional partners, rather than waiting for sanctions relief.[14]

2.2. North Korea's Strategic Stance Toward the US

North Korea is establishing its own strategy toward the US, centered on strengthening nuclear deterrence against the US's hostile policy and military threats.

• Declaration of Irreversible Nuclear-Weapon State Status: North Korea has enshrined "the state's irreversible status and capability as a nuclear-weapon state" in its highest law,[15] and emphasized that any attempt to deny this will be thoroughly rejected.[16]

• Redefining Dialogue Conditions: Vice Department Director Kim Yo Jong stated that US-DPRK contact would "only be a hope for the US,"[17] and that a meeting would not occur if the US "fails to accept the changed reality and clings only to past failures."[18] Furthermore, she argued that the negotiation agenda of "denuclearization measures in exchange for sanctions relief" from the past must now be reframed as "cessation of hostile policy in exchange for the resumption of US-DPRK talks."[19] North Korea explicitly stated that it has completely excluded the issue of sanctions relief from the agenda for talks with the US.[20]

• Strengthening Nuclear Forces: North Korea reported that it would "respond with strategic means to the strategic threats of enemies including the US,"[21] and that it must possess and strengthen "stronger war deterrence, that is, more evolved, multifaceted, and offensive nuclear attack capabilities."[22] This includes the development and successful test of the underwater strategic nuclear weapon system 'Haeil',[23] and strategic cruise missile launch drills.[24]

• Separation of Relations with Trump Personally: While not denying the fact that Chairman Kim Jong Un and President Trump have a "not bad" personal relationship, Vice Department Director Kim Yo Jong[25]"If the personal relationship between the leaders of the US and North Korea is placed on the same line as the objective of denuclearization, it can only be interpreted as a mockery of the other party."[26]Furthermore, it cautioned that tactical approaches toward the U.S. and nuclear plans should not be adjusted based on the relationship with President Trump.[27]

3. Impact of U.S.-Iran Conflict on North Korean Strategy

The current military conflict situation between the U.S. and Iran is analyzed to have the following key impacts on North Korea's judgments and strategies in preparation for future Kim Jong Un-Trump summit meetings.

3.1. Strengthening the Legitimacy and Necessity of Nuclear State Status

• Because Iran is not a nuclear-weapon state, it is vulnerable to direct U.S. military pressure (deployment of nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, air force training, etc.),[28] and is exposed to the threat of military attack from Israel,[29] which will further strengthen North Korea's perception that irreversibly securing nuclear deterrence is essential for national survival.[30]North Korea will judge that its "irreversible nuclear-weapon state status" plays a decisive role in deterring U.S. military aggression, based on the situation in Iran.[31]

3.2. Maintaining a Hardline Stance Against the U.S.

• Iran's warning of "all-out war" against U.S. military threats and its declaration of "immediate, comprehensive, and unprecedented" response[32] bears similarities to North Korea's hardline policy toward the U.S. North Korea can use Iran's firm resolve to defend its sovereignty as a basis for justifying its own strategic autonomy. This will influence North Korea to maintain a hardline stance in future talks with Trump, insisting on its core demands such as the "termination of the hostile policy toward North Korea" without making concessions on the nuclear issue.[33]

3.3. Deepening Skepticism Regarding U.S. Credibility

• North Korea reported claims that Iran accused the U.S. of "not wanting genuine dialogue but only seeking to impose its will on other countries."[34] Furthermore, Iran's criticism of U.S. attempts to seize Iranian oil and its emphasis on U.S. "hegemonic ambitions"[35] demonstrate North Korea's fundamental distrust of dialogue and agreements with the U.S. This will lead North Korea to maintain a skeptical view regarding the possibility of future summit talks.

3.4. Neutralizing Sanctions and Strengthening the Self-Reliance Line

• Iran's assertion that it must strengthen production and trade development and economic cooperation with regional partners to neutralize U.S. sanctions[36] aligns with North Korea's self-reliance line. North Korea has already stated that it has excluded the issue of sanctions relief from the agenda for negotiations with the U.S.,[37] and North Korea will likely judge, based on the Iranian example, that it is important to continue its own efforts for survival and development despite external pressure. This could lead to even lower expectations for sanctions relief in future talks and, conversely, provide grounds for more strongly demanding the withdrawal of the U.S. hostile policy.

3.5. Securing Legitimacy for Strengthening Military Power, Especially Nuclear Deterrence

• The situation where the U.S. poses military threats to Iran, such as deploying nuclear-powered aircraft carriers,[38] will once again confirm the legitimacy of strengthening self-defense military capabilities, especially nuclear deterrence, for North Korea.[39]North Korea can strengthen the logic that if it did not possess nuclear weapons, it would be in greater danger, given that the U.S. poses military threats even to non-nuclear Iran. This will push North Korea to further accelerate the strengthening of its nuclear forces and to make the maintenance of nuclear deterrence a core prerequisite for negotiations, rather than discussing disarmament.

4. Future Scenarios and North Korea's Short-Term Response Strategy

Depending on the unfolding of the U.S.-Iran conflict, North Korea's future strategy in preparation for the Kim Jong Un-Trump summit meetings could develop as follows.

4.1. Scenario 1: Escalation and Prolongation of the U.S.-Iran Conflict

• Expected North Korean judgment: The perception will be strengthened that Iran is more vulnerable to U.S. hegemonic pressure because it is not a nuclear-weapon state, and that irreversibly maintaining nuclear deterrence is essential for national survival.[40]North Korea will judge that dialogue with the U.S. is merely "buying time" and that the U.S. is highly likely to break its promises.[41]An increase in U.S. military involvement in the Middle East could be perceived as an opportunity for North Korea to take relatively bolder actions, as it disperses U.S. resources.

• North Korea's short-term response strategy:

Continued strengthening and showcasing of nuclear deterrence: North Korea will accelerate the qualitative and quantitative enhancement of its nuclear forces and continue to conduct tests of new strategic weapons, such as the underwater-launched strategic nuclear attack weapon system 'Haeil,' to showcase its deterrence against the U.S.[42]This serves as a response to U.S. sanctions and military pressure and further solidifies its status as a nuclear-weapon state.[43]

Adherence to 'Withdrawal of Hostile Policy' as the Top Priority Condition: North Korea will refuse to discuss denuclearization in summit talks with the U.S., clearly present the "withdrawal of the hostile policy" as a prerequisite, and maintain a hardline stance excluding sanctions relief from the negotiation agenda.[44]North Korea will maintain principled tactics toward the U.S., unswayed by personal relationships with Trump.[45]

Strengthening Self-Reliance and Reducing Dependence on the U.S.: To minimize the impact of external sanctions, North Korea will further strengthen its self-reliance line and, similar to Iran's emphasis on economic cooperation with regional partners,[46] may seek economic and political alliances with anti-U.S. blocs.

Condemnation of U.S. Double Standards: North Korea will continuously condemn the U.S.'s coercive approach and military threats toward Iran, highlighting the U.S.'s "Yankee arrogance and brazen, gangster-like double standards" to raise questions about U.S. credibility in the international community.[47]

4.2. Scenario 2: A Lull in US-Iran Conflict and a Shift Towards Dialogue

• North Korea's Expected Judgment: It will closely monitor the possibility that the U.S. may actively pursue dialogue with North Korea to reduce its burden in the Middle East. However, it will still suspect that the U.S.'s objective for dialogue is merely to 'buy time' and that it intends to seize North Korea's nuclear weapons.[48] It will maintain its existing stance that genuine dialogue is difficult without a 'significant change in attitude' from the U.S.[49]

• North Korea's Short-Term Response Strategy: Maintaining Flexible Pressure: If the U.S. engages in dialogue, North Korea will attempt to increase its negotiating leverage by demanding a 'significant change in attitude' from the U.S. rather than immediately accepting a meeting.[50] North Korea may show gestures to ease military tensions, but this will be done within the framework of maintaining its policy of strengthening nuclear deterrence.

Emphasizing 'Management' of Nuclear Deterrence: Even during a period of dialogue, it will continuously showcase its capabilities in controlling and managing its nuclear deterrence, emphasizing that the U.S. bears the responsibility to ensure that North Korea's nuclear weapons do not pose a threat.[51]

Repeated Demand for 'Withdrawal of Hostile Policy': Even if dialogue resumes, North Korea will make it clear that the core agenda is the 'withdrawal of the hostile policy,' not denuclearization, and will criticize the U.S.'s coercive stance observed in the Iran situation, casting doubt on its sincerity.[52]

5. Conclusion and Implications

The military conflict between the U.S. and Iran will serve as an opportunity for North Korea to further deepen its conviction in the absolute necessity of nuclear deterrence and its distrust of the U.S.'s willingness to engage in dialogue. If a Kim Jong Un-Donald Trump summit is realized in the future, North Korea is expected to maintain a firm strategy based on the lessons learned from the Iran situation: ▲emphasizing the irreversibility of its status as a nuclear-weapon state, ▲adhering to a dialogue agenda focused on the 'withdrawal of the hostile policy,' and ▲strengthening its self-reliance line. It is also made clear that the personal relationship with President Trump will not fundamentally alter North Korea's strategy towards the U.S.[53] Consequently, the U.S. will likely face pressure to present concrete and irreversible measures for the 'withdrawal of the hostile policy,' going beyond 'denuclearization,' in order to resume dialogue with North Korea. ■

[1] Rodong Sinmun, February 6, 2026; Rodong Sinmun, February 1, 2026.

[2] Rodong Sinmun, February 6, 2026; Rodong Sinmun, February 1, 2026; Rodong Sinmun, January 29, 2026.

[3] Rodong Sinmun, February 6, 2026; Rodong Sinmun, February 1, 2026.

[4] Rodong Sinmun, February 6, 2026

[5] Rodong Sinmun, February 1, 2026.

[6] Rodong Sinmun, June 4, 2025.

[7] Rodong Sinmun, June 4, 2025.

[8] Rodong Sinmun, June 4, 2025.

[9] Rodong Sinmun, February 1, 2026.

[10] Rodong Sinmun, February 6, 2026; Rodong Sinmun, January 29, 2026.

[11] Rodong Sinmun, February 6, 2026

[12] Rodong Sinmun, January 29, 2026.

[13] Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), January 29, 2024, KCNA commentary: "The U.S.'s Oil Plundering Scheme Caught Red-Handed."

[14] Rodong Sinmun, January 3, 2026.

[15] Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), July 29, 2025, Vice Department Director Kim Yo Jong: "U.S.-North Korea Contact Will Only Be a 'Hope' for the U.S."

[16] Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), July 29, 2025, Vice Department Director Kim Yo Jong: "U.S.-North Korea Contact Will Only Be a 'Hope' for the U.S."

[17] Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), July 29, 2025, Vice Department Director Kim Yo Jong: "U.S.-North Korea Contact Will Only Be a 'Hope' for the U.S."

[18] Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), July 29, 2025, Vice Department Director Kim Yo Jong: "U.S.-North Korea Contact Will Only Be a 'Hope' for the U.S."

[19] Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), July 10, 2020, First Vice Department Director Kim Yo Jong: "U.S.-North Korea Talks Futile Without Change in U.S. Stance."

[20] Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), July 10, 2020, First Vice Department Director Kim Yo Jong: "U.S.-North Korea Talks Futile Without Change in U.S. Stance."

[21] Rodong Sinmun, February 22, 2025.

[22] Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), March 24, 2023, "Important Weapons Test and Strategic Purpose Launch Drill - Guided by General Secretary Kim Jong Un."

[23]"Korean Central News Agency" 2023-03-24 Important Weapons Test and Launch Drill for Strategic Purposes - Guided by General Secretary Kim Jong Un.

[24]"Korean Central News Agency" 2023-03-24 Important Weapons Test and Launch Drill for Strategic Purposes - Guided by General Secretary Kim Jong Un.

[25]"Korean Central News Agency" 2025-07-29 Vice Department Director Kim Yo Jong: U.S.-North Korea Contact Will Only Be a "Hope" for the U.S..

[26]"Korean Central News Agency" 2025-07-29 Vice Department Director Kim Yo Jong: U.S.-North Korea Contact Will Only Be a "Hope" for the U.S..

[27]"Korean Central News Agency" 2020-07-10 First Vice Department Director Kim Yo Jong: U.S.-North Korea Talks Are Futile as Long as the U.S. Position Does Not Change.

[28]"Rodong Sinmun" 2026-02-06, "Rodong Sinmun" 2026-02-01, "Rodong Sinmun" 2026-01-29, "Rodong Sinmun" 2026-01-03.

[29]"Rodong Sinmun" 2025-06-04.

[30]"Korean Central News Agency" 2025-07-29 Vice Department Director Kim Yo Jong: U.S.-North Korea Contact Will Only Be a "Hope" for the U.S..

[31]"Korean Central News Agency" 2025-07-29 Vice Department Director Kim Yo Jong: U.S.-North Korea Contact Will Only Be a "Hope" for the U.S..

[32]"Rodong Sinmun" 2026-02-06, "Rodong Sinmun" 2026-01-29.

[33]"Korean Central News Agency" 2020-07-10 First Vice Department Director Kim Yo Jong: U.S.-North Korea Talks Are Futile as Long as the U.S. Position Does Not Change.

[34]"Rodong Sinmun" 2026-02-06.

[35]"Korean Central News Agency" 2024-01-29 KCNA Commentary: The U.S.'s Caught-in-the-Act Oil Plunder Scheme.

[36]"Rodong Sinmun" 2026-01-03.

[37]"Korean Central News Agency" 2020-07-10 First Vice Department Director Kim Yo Jong: U.S.-North Korea Talks Are Futile as Long as the U.S. Position Does Not Change.

[38]"Rodong Sinmun" 2026-02-06, "Rodong Sinmun" 2026-02-01, "Rodong Sinmun" 2026-01-29.

[39]"Rodong Sinmun" 2025-02-22, "Korean Central News Agency" 2023-03-24 Important Weapons Test and Launch Drill for Strategic Purposes - Guided by General Secretary Kim Jong Un, "Korean Central News Agency" 2025-09-13 KCNA Commentary -- The Destruction of the Balance of Power on the Korean Peninsula and in the Region Will Not Be Tolerated Even for an Instant.

[40]"Korean Central News Agency" 2025-07-29 Vice Department Director Kim Yo Jong: U.S.-North Korea Contact Will Only Be a "Hope" for the U.S., "Rodong Sinmun" 2025-02-22, "Korean Central News Agency" 2023-03-24 Important Weapons Test and Launch Drill for Strategic Purposes - Guided by General Secretary Kim Jong Un, "Korean Central News Agency" 2025-09-13 KCNA Commentary -- The Destruction of the Balance of Power on the Korean Peninsula and in the Region Will Not Be Tolerated Even for an Instant.

[41]"Korean Central News Agency" 2020-07-10 First Vice Department Director Kim Yo Jong: U.S.-North Korea Talks Are Futile as Long as the U.S. Position Does Not Change.

[42]"Korean Central News Agency" 2023-03-24 Important Weapons Test and Launch Drill for Strategic Purposes - Guided by General Secretary Kim Jong Un.

[43]"Rodong Sinmun" 2025-02-22, "Korean Central News Agency" 2025-09-13 KCNA Commentary -- The Destruction of the Balance of Power on the Korean Peninsula and in the Region Will Not Be Tolerated Even for an Instant.

[44]"Korean Central News Agency" 2020-07-10 First Vice Department Director Kim Yo Jong: U.S.-North Korea Talks Are Futile as Long as the U.S. Position Does Not Change.

[45]"Korean Central News Agency" 2020-07-10 First Vice Department Director Kim Yo Jong: U.S.-North Korea Talks Are Futile as Long as the U.S. Position Does Not Change.

[46]"Rodong Sinmun" 2026-01-03.

[47]"Rodong Sinmun" 2025-02-22.

[48]"Korean Central News Agency" 2020-07-10 First Vice Department Director Kim Yo Jong: U.S.-North Korea Talks Are Futile as Long as the U.S. Position Does Not Change.

[49]"Korean Central News Agency" 2020-07-10 First Vice Department Director Kim Yo Jong: U.S.-North Korea Talks Are Futile as Long as the U.S. Position Does Not Change.

[50]"Korean Central News Agency" 2020-07-10 First Vice Department Director Kim Yo Jong: U.S.-North Korea Talks Are Futile as Long as the U.S. Position Does Not Change.

[51]"Korean Central News Agency" 2020-07-10 First Vice Department Director Kim Yo Jong: U.S.-North Korea Talks Are Futile as Long as the U.S. Position Does Not Change.

[52]"Korean Central News Agency" 2020-07-10 First Vice Department Director Kim Yo Jong: U.S.-North Korea Talks Are Futile as Long as the U.S. Position Does Not Change.

[53]KCNA, July 29, 2025, Vice Department Director Kim Yo Jong: US-DPRK engagement will only be America's 'hope', KCNA, July 10, 2020, First Vice Department Director Kim Yo Jong: Unless the US changes its stance, US-DPRK talks are meaningless.

■ Jeon, Jae-sung_Director, East Asia Institute; Professor, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Seoul National University, Oh, In-hwan_Senior Researcher, East Asia Institute; Lecturer, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Seoul National University, Choi, In-ho_Senior Researcher, Institute for Global Social Studies, Seoul National University.

■ Responsible Editor: Lee, Sang-jun_Researcher, East Asia Institute
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