[Commentary] Strategic Ambiguity and the Role of Middle Powers: India's Choices in a Changing International Order

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gPmQTVdZRRw&si=bOSjGQ1e3UlUuFlW

Video Script

The Significance and International Political Implications of the India-EU Trade Agreement

Let me ask the first question. In light of very significant developments surrounding India's foreign policy, I would first like to ask about the trade agreement between the European Union and India. After 19 years, the EU and India have concluded a major free trade agreement (FTA) and a security agreement. Is this a direct response to Trump's trade pressure, and does it strengthen India as a genuine third pole beyond US-led frameworks like the Quad in the Indo-Pacific?

Yes, it's a very good question. As you know, this deal is called the 'mother of all deals.' Yes and no. On one hand, the EU has been working for a long time to participate in India's growth story and to gain market access into what has been one of the most protected markets in the world.

So this is something the EU has hoped for for a very long time. But it is true that Trump's tariffs made India rethink trade deals. So what we see from this trade deal is a number of things. There are tangible wins for both sides, for example, for German car manufacturers, it's a huge win, tariffs close to 110% come down to about 10%. But it's not just cars.

There are other EU winners apart from cars. Large machinery, pharmaceutical, food and beverage exporters. And on the Indian side, there are also big winners, textiles and apparel industries, which gain market access to the EU market. Same for chemicals and plastics, jewelry. So there are big wins for both sides, but what is really interesting, in relation to your question about India as a third pole, is that India is now clearly willing and trying to diversify.

There was a strategic alignment between the US and India, and the Trump administration and the Biden administration both made efforts to pull India into strategic partnership. There was bipartisan consensus in the US about the importance of strategic partnership with India. But it seems things have changed with President Trump's second term.

As soon as President Trump took office, Prime Minister Modi immediately reached out to several countries, including India. Vice President Biden visited India almost immediately, but there was no traction. Then there were tariffs of 50% imposed on India, and this was a huge shock. So what this EU deal shows is that India is diversifying.

It shows that India is now willing to do these trade deals. And over time, this could create a pole centered around the EU, beyond India. Because if the EU strikes these deals, it means that a lot of future trade will be structured around the EU's regulations and rules. Away from US regulations and rules. So you will have a greater degree of being an EU-regulated country, and less of a US influence.

So it signifies that not only India is moving towards a multipolar world, but the EU itself is moving towards a multipolar world as a pole. When I heard about the trade deal, I thought India and the EU, especially lately, the EU is reconsidering the viability of NATO and trying to distance itself from the US. So India is working with the EU to balance against the pressure from President Trump.

But suddenly, there is a US-India trade deal again. It is confusing. With reports that Washington is lowering tariffs and that India has reduced its reliance on Russian oil, has India moved from strategic autonomy to a transactional alignment with the US, or has it moved towards the concept of what we call multi-alignment these days? Could you comment on that?

Yes, I am very skeptical about a new trade deal between the US and India. I know you asked about it and whether we should cover it. But if you think about it, all the announcements about a great trade deal between the US and India have come from one source, and that source is President Trump on Truth Social. But if you look at the reactions from Prime Minister Modi and Minister Goyal, they have been much more cautious and ambiguous about the deal.

Very cautious and ambiguous. And there are no specifics on the ground. For example, even on Truth Social, President Trump said that tariffs would go from 50% to 18%, but 18% is higher than the tariffs imposed on India when President Trump first took office. So India is still worse off than before President Trump took office.

And on top of that, President Trump said on Truth Social that India had agreed to stop buying Russian oil. There has been no comment from the Indian government on this at all. Not a single word. There has been no confirmation. There has been no mention of this from any official source. And the bottom line is that we don't know if it's actually true.

It might happen in a very gradual and slow way, but so far, there has been nothing from Indian officials or any statement that shows that it is true. So yes, you can say that there is a trade deal between the US and India, but the details are very thin, and all mentions have come from President Trump's Truth Social feed and from the USTR. There has been almost nothing from the Indian side. So I am a bit cautious before calling it a trade deal.

Excellent. Very interesting. As of February 2026, President Trump is facing criticism from his domestic and international allies. So, was President Trump's announcement influenced by India's decision to engage with the EU, or was it a demand for India to stop importing Russian oil to spur the Ukraine war negotiations?

Yes. It is very difficult to predict why he acts the way he does, especially in this presidential term. But I think the EU's move to strike that deal with India was definitely a catalyst. It is a big deal. It shows that India, which has essentially not been enthusiastic about trade deals historically, is now enthusiastic about striking trade deals. That is a big shift. And India is a huge market. And if India

is willing to enter into a much more binding agreement with the EU, it shows that India is now structuring its trade towards the EU, moving away from the US. This may not have immediate effects, but it will have effects in the long run, perhaps in 10 years. So this is not just a backlash against India's strategic autonomy, but it is also a sign that India cannot be taken for granted. And that is why the trade deal was struck.

in India. So I think that sent a very strong signal to President Trump, and I think that influenced his decision to make that announcement. It's very interesting. You mentioned that he sent a strategic signal to President Trump. European leaders visiting Beijing these days, that could also put pressure on President Trump. Even though the US is the most powerful country in the world, the actions or moves of its allies and strategic partners can put pressure on President Trump's decisions and thinking.

I think that is very insightful. Especially with the EU, it's a big deal. Because the EU's rules and regulations are very different from those of the US. For example, if you look at health and safety regulations, the health and safety regulations for products coming out of the EU are very different from those in the US. Whether it's food or cosmetics. So if you tailor your products to a specific market and adhere to all the rules and regulations of that market, and that is a major market. So if India strikes a trade deal with the EU and now tailors its products to the EU market, then in 10 years, it will be more bound by EU rules and regulations than by US rules and regulations. That essentially marginalizes the US. So I think that would have an impact.

And that is something that you see in the various trade deals that are emerging. In a longer perspective, you have published excellent articles and books concerning India's foreign policy, particularly its strategic narrative. India is often called a hesitant great power, a country that has strong capabilities but is not fully committed to certain blocs, especially the Western bloc. Does that limit or weaken India's leadership role, or is strategic ambiguity actually India's main leverage?

That is an excellent question. I think it is both. Because in one sense, it limits India's ability to shape the international order.

The order. It limits its leadership capacity, because it does not solidify its partnerships with any bloc. On the other hand, it provides India with a lot of flexibility in its relationships with other countries. It gives it a lot of leverage. So in one sense, it is a handicap and at the same time a strength. It is really both. And this again, you can see it at play in its relationship with the US. On the one hand, because of India's strategic autonomy, it could buy oil from Russia, and the Biden administration looked the other way. And then the Trump administration comes in and cracks down on it, but again, India decides to move towards CEU, exercising its strategic autonomy.

So it is both a handicap and a strength. All right. Let's move to a more comprehensive perspective on the changing world order. At the end of last year, the National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy were released. So there are many interpretations of America's grand strategic shift.

And now it appears to me that the US applies different logic and different rules in different regions. For example, in the Western Hemisphere, the logic of spheres of influence is strong, but the US does not seem to recognize China's sphere of influence in the Pacific, and in Eastern Europe, spheres of influence by Russia are very limited. How can you explain this theoretically? Applying 20th-century international relations theory to America's grand strategy makes it very difficult to explain. What are your thoughts on America's grand strategy?

Again, a truly fascinating question. I always tell my students that just because a theory is interesting and compelling and has stood for a while does not mean that it is without its flaws. And I think that is what we see in the theory of power transition. The theory of power transition argues that the challengers in the system are very focused.

Right. If you look at the theory of power transition, no matter how you conceptualize the international system, there are always great powers, and eventually there are challengers to those great powers, and the challengers are disgruntled rising great powers. The challengers are disgruntled with the way power is distributed in the international system. They are disgruntled with the way public goods are distributed, and therefore, conflicts arise with the great power, and wars arise.

Right. This does not leave any room for discussion about what happens when the great power changes the rules of the game, as you pointed out. It leaves no room for discussion about what happens when the great power, not the challenger, is the one breaking the international order. And what is particularly interesting in the case of the US is that the US, after World War II, with the help of its allies and partners, created the liberal international order. And what we see here is now

a move away from the liberal international order. And I do not want to say this is just about the Trump administration. The Biden administration has also moved away from the liberal international order. So it is not just the Trump administration that has decided to undermine the liberal international order. Under the Biden administration, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan talked about the rules-based order, but when he talked about diversifying supply chains and friend-shoring, that was essentially

a move towards these smaller groups and blocs, and a move away from the broad multilateral cooperation that was the bedrock of the liberal international order. So both the Biden administration and the Trump administration have done so. And I do not think the theory of power transition has a good explanation for this. And I think there is another piece that I would add to this. I would say there is another thing that needs to be explained.

So one consequence of the great power actually breaking the order that it created, if students or junior faculty are interested, I think it's fragmentation. And what we see now is a fragmentation into what I called a contested order. And interestingly, the fragmentation comes not necessarily from the states that we see as revisionist states, but from partners and allies. Because these partners and allies now

feel betrayed by the US or feel uncertainty from the US and are therefore trying to fragment the order. And whether they will maintain it, or whether multiple orders will emerge as a response to US actions, is an open question. And I do not think there are good international relations theories for the phenomenon that we are observing today in real time.

Right. Your point about the hegemon being able to be revisionist in terms of power transition is a very good point. The last question is about the future international order. It is yet to be determined. But President Trump's experimentation with very different foreign policy options, for example, tariff protectionism, and what some people call neo-isolationism, and what some people call offshore balancing and deterrence. All of these can have corrective measures because they can have unintended consequences.

As we have already seen, and after the midterm elections, the electoral outcomes are unknown, but in the history of US domestic politics, there may be a year or two after the midterm elections when foreign policy shifts reflect the views of the American people, and a new president can set new directions for US foreign policy. What will emerge after all these experiments is yet to be determined. So, can we talk about the key components or variables that will shape the future international order? It is very difficult. But will we maintain this fragmentation, or can we build a more cooperative international order?

Yes. Well, I like to be optimistic and I think we can. I think there are a few factors at play. First, it will be interesting to see whether Trumpism will outlast President Trump. This is his last term. So can Trumpism survive without President Trump? And that is an open question. I do not think anyone knows the answer.

When we talked about the Biden administration, we know that they too have moved away from the rules-based order. But it remains to be seen how quickly and intensely the successor of President Trump will continue his policies. So we do not know that. So I think that is one variable. Another variable that we do not really mention is that the US occupies so much space. Especially President Trump is so huge.

And I think it consumes so much time and energy and coverage. But what is interesting is that if you look at China, China has not really presented a clear vision for a Chinese order. I do not see that coming from the Chinese Communist Party. And there are many unknown factors in China as well. One thing I would say is that we have seen purges in the Chinese military recently. And it will be interesting to see how China thinks about the international order going forward.

Because during China's rise, in the 1990s, early 2000s, one could argue that China was rising by utilizing the rules-based order, not by challenging it. So if you look at the Belt and Road Initiative, if you look at the AIIB, these were not in violation of the principles of the rules-based order.

The consequence of that was that China slowly used those rules to consolidate its power, but it did not fundamentally violate our thinking about the rules-based order in terms of economic cooperation, multilateral cooperation, and multilateral institutions.

So I have not seen anything, and I would love to hear your opinion. I have not seen President Xi Jinping or anyone in China present an alternative to the liberal international order, a Chinese path, or a Chinese alternative. Beyond the fact that it is not liberal. That it proposes. I think that is one unknown. And finally, the third one is that this is not an unknown. This is something that we can say with certainty. What we have today is a state of fluidity. We are actually seeing fluidity in real time. And I do not think it is an exaggeration to say that this is a dangerous time in world politics. Because we are actually transitioning from a bipolar world to a unipolar world, and now we are entering an era of multipolarity.

All of this is fluid, with the liberal international order being broken by the US, China not having presented an international order, and partners and allies trying to figure out their own roles in all of this. So the one thing that we can say with certainty is that we are not only in a fluid time but also a dangerous time. And what comes next, we will see.

Right. Your point about the hegemon being able to be revisionist in terms of power transition is a very good point. The last question is about the future international order. It is yet to be determined. But President Trump's experimentation with very different foreign policy options, for example, tariff protectionism, and what some people call neo-isolationism, and what some people call offshore balancing and deterrence. All of these can have corrective measures because they can have unintended consequences.

You mentioned the absence of an alternative to the international order. China has proposed an international order, but it is neither new nor sophisticated. I think the core is whether China is ready to play the role of a hegemonic power that can provide international public goods. This is a difficult task that requires consensus among the Chinese people domestically and recognition from the international community. The demand for international public goods is immense, given all the problems the international community is facing today. Thus, there is an argument that a coalition of middle powers, a collaboration of like-minded states, can offer an alternative to great power politics. Recently, we have been discussing how the influential embassies of great powers have not been very beneficial to South Korea or other middle powers. After Prime Minister Kahn's speech, we have been talking about the Kahn Doctrine, but some say it is a good thing and very idealistic.

But do middle powers have the policy tools to build a new international order? You have studied middle power cooperation extensively, so could you add to this point? Yes, I do not think middle powers can do it alone. So I think cooperation is really important, and Prime Minister Kahn's speech in Davos was very important in that regard. It was a kind of call to arms for cooperation. For middle powers to chart a path forward together. What is interesting is, again, if you go back to the IR theory literature, the concept of middle powers is not very well defined. Who is a middle power? Traditionally, it has been states that define themselves as middle powers. Canada is called a middle power and is a middle power because it is a mid-sized country. Australia also calls itself a middle power and is a middle power because it is a mid-sized country. But it is not territorially dependent. There are also smaller states that exert influence beyond their capabilities in international relations. South Korea is one such country, and so is Singapore. Singapore is a small country that exerts influence beyond its capabilities. So what is interesting is that the focus on middle powers is not just on the Western partners of the US. It is on how middle powers traditionally define themselves. And truly consider partnerships between middle powers in Asia, perhaps in Africa, and in Latin America and Brazil. I think that would be a game-changer. That would truly be a game-changer. And we can see steps moving in that direction. We started this conversation with the India-EU trade agreement. I consider India a middle power. So what you see there is something is happening. Because these partners and allies are coming together and moving away from US-centric trade rules and regulations towards something else. And I think that can make a difference. So you are right. Middle powers are not powerful on their own, but such partnerships have a lot of potential and a lot of leverage, I think. Especially when you start to define middle powers beyond the West.

The interview has concluded. Thank you very much.

■ Go to English Video & Transcript

1. The Significance and International Political Implications of the India-EU Trade Agreement

Jeongseong: Then let me ask the first question. In light of the very significant developments surrounding India's foreign policy, I would first like to ask about the agreement between the EU and India. After 19 years, the EU and India have concluded a major FTA and a security agreement. Is this a direct response to the trade pressure of the Trump era? And do you think this strengthens India as a true third pole in the Indo-Pacific region, beyond US-led frameworks like the Quad?

Manjari Miller: Yes, very good question. As you know, the recent agreement is being called the ‘mother of all deals.' On one hand, the EU has been striving for a long time to be part of India's growth story and to gain market access into what has essentially been one of the most protected markets in the world. So this is something the EU has hoped for for a very long time. But at the same time, I think Trump's tariffs have really made India rethink trade agreements. So what we see from this trade agreement is a number of things. There are tangible wins for both sides, which I think is very interesting. For example, for German car manufacturers, it's a huge win, tariffs that were close to 110% are now down to about 10%.

But it's not just cars, there are other EU winners, such as large machinery, pharmaceutical, and food and beverage exporters. And on the Indian side, there are also big winners, such as the textile and apparel industries, which now have access to the EU market. Same for chemicals, plastics, jewelry. So there are big wins for both sides. But what I think is really interesting, and this also touches upon the professor's question about seeing India as a third pole, is that what we see from this agreement is that India is now clearly wanting and trying to diversify. As you know, there has been a strategic alignment between the US and India, and the first Trump administration and the Biden administration both made really extensive efforts to deepen cooperation with India and bring it into its strategic partnership.

There is bipartisan consensus within the US about the importance of India as a strategic partner. However, it seems things have changed with President Trump's second term. As you may recall, immediately after President Trump took the oath of office, Prime Minister Modi reached out. India was one of the first countries to reach out. JD Vance, the Vice President, visited India almost immediately, as you know, but it did not turn the situation around, and then there were tariffs of 50% imposed on India. I think that was a huge shock. So what this EU agreement shows is that India is diversifying, and it shows that India is now willing to strike these trade agreements, which in time could make not just India, but also the EU, a pole.

Because essentially what we are seeing now, if the EU is striking these agreements, it means that a lot of future trade will actually revolve around the EU's regulations and rules. Meaning, away from US regulations and rules. So you will have a greater degree of being an EU-regulated country, and US influence will be much less. Therefore, it's not just India becoming a pole, but the EU also becoming a pole. So we see a move towards a truly multipolar world.

India's Strategic Autonomy and Evolving Relationship with the US

2. India's Strategic Autonomy and Evolving Relationship with the US

Jeongseong: When I saw the news about the trade deal, I thought India and the EU, especially lately, the EU is reconsidering the viability of NATO and trying to distance itself from the US. So India is trying to work with the EU to balance against any pressure from the EU. President Trump, but suddenly there is news of a US-India trade deal again. So it is confusing. With reports that Washington is lowering tariffs and that India is reducing its reliance on Russian oil, has India moved away from strategic autonomy towards a more transactional alliance with the US? Or is it what we call 'multi-alignment' these days, could you comment on that?

Manjari Miller: Yes. I am very skeptical about a new trade deal between the US and India. I know that was what the professor asked me and asked if we should cover it. But if you think about it, all the announcements about a great trade deal between the US and India have come from one source. And that source is President Trump on 'Truth Social.' On the other hand, if you look at the reactions from Prime Minister Modi and Minister Goyal, they have been much more cautious. They have been very careful and reserved about the deal, and on the ground, no specifics have actually been confirmed. For example, even on 'Truth Social,' President Trump said, 'Well, the tariffs will go from 50% to 18%.'

But 18% is higher than the tariffs that were imposed on India when President Trump first took office. So in any case, India is still worse off than before President Trump took office. And on top of that, President Trump said again on 'Truth Social' that India had agreed to stop buying Russian oil. There has been no comment from the Indian government on this at all. Not a single word. No confirmation. No official source has mentioned this. The bottom line is that we don't know if it's true. It may happen in a very gradual, slow manner.

But so far, there has been no statement or any content from Indian officials that shows that it is actually true. So, yes, there has been talk of 'Oh, now the US has a trade deal with India.' But the details are so thin. And all the mentions have come only from President Trump's 'Truth Social' feed and from the USTR. And there has been almost no response from the Indian side. So I'm a little hesitant to call it a trade deal.

2. India's Strategic Autonomy and Shifting Relations with the US

Jeongseong: When I saw the news about the trade deal, I thought India and the EU, especially lately, the EU is reconsidering the viability of NATO and trying to distance itself from the US. So India is trying to work with the EU to balance against any pressure from the EU. President Trump, but suddenly there is news of a US-India trade deal again. So it is confusing. With reports that Washington is lowering tariffs and that India is reducing its reliance on Russian oil, has India moved away from strategic autonomy towards a more transactional alliance with the US? Or is it what we call 'multi-alignment' these days, could you comment on that?

Manjari Miller: Yes. I am very skeptical about a new trade deal between the US and India. I know that was what the professor asked me and asked if we should cover it. But if you think about it, all the announcements about a great trade deal between the US and India have come from one source. And that source is President Trump on 'Truth Social.' On the other hand, if you look at the reactions from Prime Minister Modi and Minister Goyal, they have been much more cautious. They have been very careful and reserved about the deal, and on the ground, no specifics have actually been confirmed. For example, President Trump said on 'Truth Social,' 'Well, the tariffs will go from 50% to 18%.'

But 18% is higher than the tariffs that were imposed on India when President Trump first took office. So in any case, India is still worse off than before President Trump took office. And on top of that, President Trump said again on 'Truth Social' that India had agreed to stop buying Russian oil. There has been no comment from the Indian government on this at all. Not a single word. No confirmation. No official source has mentioned this. The bottom line is that we don't know if it's true. It may happen in a very gradual, slow manner.

However, there has been no statement or content from Indian officials to date to show that this is indeed the case. So, yes, there was talk of, 'Oh, the US has now struck a trade deal with India.' But the details are so scant. And all the mentions have come from President Trump's Truth Social feed and from the USTR. And there has been virtually no response from the Indian side. So I'm a little hesitant to call it a trade deal.

Correlation between the Trump Administration and India-EU Cooperation

3. Correlation between the Trump Administration and India-EU Cooperation

Chung: Excellent. Very interesting. As of February 2026, President Trump is facing criticism domestically and from his allies. So do you think President Trump's announcement influenced the Indian government's move to cooperate with the EU? Or is he intending to facilitate the Ukraine war negotiation process by demanding India stop importing Russian oil?

Manjari Miller: Yes, I think so. Especially with President Trump, it's very difficult to predict why he takes certain actions during his term. But I would say that the EU's conclusion of that agreement with India certainly served as a catalyst. It's a big deal. Essentially, what this shows is that India, which has historically not been very enthusiastic about trade agreements, is now showing enthusiasm for concluding trade agreements. That's a big shift. India is a huge market. If India is willing to enter into an agreement with the EU that is much more legally binding, this shows that India is now aligning its trade architecture towards the EU rather than the US. This does not necessarily have an immediate effect.

But in the long run, say, in about a decade, it certainly will. So what you're seeing is not just strategic autonomy, but a pushback from India showing that it cannot be taken for granted. There were direct dealings between India and Russia, and I think that sent a very strong signal to President Trump. And I think that has something to do with his decision to announce it.

Chung: Very interesting. You mentioned a "strategic signal" to President Trump. European leaders are visiting Beijing these days, and that could also put some pressure on President Trump. Even though the US is the number one and the most powerful country in the world, the actions or movements of its allies and strategic partners can put pressure on President Trump's decisions and thinking. I think that's a very insightful point.

Manjari Miller: I think this is a big deal, especially for the EU. Because the EU's rules and regulations are very different from those of the US. Let's take health and safety, for example. The EU's health and safety regulations for products, whether it's food or cosmetics or anything else, are very, very different from those of the US. So what this means is that if you are producing products targeting a specific market and adhering to all the rules and regulations of that market, then that becomes your primary market. If India enters into a trade agreement with the EU and now tailors its products for the EU market, it means that in 10 years, India will be bound by those rules and regulations, not those of the US. That essentially excludes the US, and so I think it will have an impact. You can see that in the various trade agreements that are emerging.

India's Strategic Ambiguity: A Weakness or a Strength?

4. India's Strategic Ambiguity: A Weakness or a Strength?

Chung: From a longer-term perspective, you have published excellent papers and books on Indian foreign policy, particularly on its strategic narrative. India is often called a "rising power quietly," possessing strong capabilities but not fully integrated into any particular bloc, especially the Western bloc. Does that limit or weaken India's leadership role? Or is strategic ambiguity actually India's primary source of leverage?

Manjari Miller: That's an excellent question. I think it's twofold. In some ways, it limits India's ability to shape the international order. Because it doesn't solidify partnerships with any particular bloc, its leadership capacity is limited. On the other hand, it provides India with a lot of flexibility in its relationships with other countries. It gives India a lot of leverage. So in some ways, it's a hindrance and a strength. It's really both. We can see this playing out in its relationship with the US. On the one hand, India's strategic autonomy has allowed it to purchase Russian oil, and the Biden administration has tolerated it. Then the Trump administration came in and cracked down on it. But once again, India has exercised its strategic autonomy and decided to move towards the EU. So it's both a hindrance and a strength.

The Changing International Order and America's Strategic Choices

5. The Changing International Order and America's Strategic Choices

Chung: Yes, that's good. Let's move on to a more comprehensive view of the changing world order. Late last year, the National Security Strategy (NSS) was released, and the Defense Strategy (NDS) was also released. So there are many interpretations of the shift in America's grand strategy. As I see it now, the US seems to apply different logic and rules to different regions. For example, it pursues an active sphere of influence logic in the Western Hemisphere, but it does not seem to recognize China's sphere of influence in the Pacific, and it only very limitedly recognizes Russia's sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. So how can this be explained theoretically? It's very difficult to explain by applying 20th-century international relations theories to this US grand strategy. What are your views on America's architecture?

Manjari Miller: Yes, again, a very interesting question. I always tell my students that just because a theory is interesting, compelling, and has stood the test of time doesn't mean it's flawless. I think we can see that with power transition theory. Power transition theory is too focused on the challenger to the system. If you look at power transition theory, it suggests that no matter how we think about the international system, there are always great powers. And then eventually, a challenge arises to that great power. That challenger is a dissatisfied rising power. The challenger is dissatisfied with how power is distributed in the international system. It's dissatisfied with how public goods are distributed. So a conflict arises with the great power, and as a result, war occurs.

However, this, as you just pointed out, leaves no room to discuss what happens when the great power changes the rules of the game. What happens when the great power, not the challenger, is the one that breaks the state order? What I find particularly interesting in the case of the US is that after World War II, the US, with the help of its allies and partners, created this order, the liberal international order. And what we are witnessing now is a departure from the liberal international order. I don't want to say this is only about the Trump administration. The Biden administration has also moved away from the liberal international order. So it's not just the Trump administration that has decided to undermine the liberal international order. Under the Biden administration, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan has talked about a rules-based order.

But, as you know, when we talk about diversifying supply chains and friend-shoring, that is essentially a move towards smaller groups and blocs, and a departure from the broad multilateral cooperation that was the bedrock of the liberal international order. So both the Biden administration and the Trump administration have done that. I don't think power transition theory has a great explanation for this. Another point that I think needs explanation, and I'm saying this for students or young, aspiring professors who are interested: one of the consequences when the great power actually breaks the order it created is fragmentation, I think. What you're seeing now is fragmentation into conflicting orders, as you yourself mentioned. Interestingly, that fragmentation is not coming from the states we consider revisionist states, but rather from allied and partner states. This is because these allies and partners now feel betrayed by the US or are uncertain about the US, and are therefore scrambling to divide the order. It remains to be seen whether they will maintain the order or whether multiple orders will emerge in response to US actions. I don't think there are any great international relations theories that can explain some of the phenomena we are witnessing today in real time.

Variables and Prospects for the Future International Order

6. Variables and Prospects for the Future International Order

Chung: Excellent. Your point about the hegemonic power potentially being revisionist in terms of power transition is a very good one. My last question is about the future international order. We don't know yet, but President Trump's experiments with very different foreign policy options, such as tariff protectionism, sometimes neo-isolationism, sometimes offshore balancing and restraint. There might be some correction, as we are already seeing some negative consequences. After the midterm elections, we don't know the election results yet, but historically, in US domestic politics, there has been a shift in foreign policy direction following the midterm elections, reflecting the views of the American people.

In one or two years, a new president might emerge and set a new direction for US foreign policy. We don't know yet what will emerge after all these experiments are over. So, can you talk about the main components or variables that will shape the future international order? It's very difficult, but will we maintain this fragmentation, or can we build a new type of more cooperative international order?

Manjari Miller: Well, I would like to be optimistic that we can. I think there are a few factors at play here. The first is that it will be interesting to see if Trumpism outlasts President Trump. This is his last term. So can Trumpism survive without President Trump? This is an open question. As I mentioned, when we talk about the Biden administration, they have also moved away from a norms-based order. But we have to see to what extent, how quickly, and how intensely the successor to President Trump will continue his policies. So we don't know that. I think that's one variable. Another variable that we haven't really discussed is that President Trump and the US occupy too much space. President Trump, in particular, is such an overwhelming presence.

I think it consumes a lot of time, energy, and coverage. But if you look at China, it's interesting that China has not articulated a clear vision for its order. I haven't seen that coming from the Chinese Communist Party. China also has many unknown factors. One of the things on the table now is the purge within the Chinese military. It will be interesting to see how China thinks about the international order going forward. For a significant part of China's rise in the 1990s and early 2000s, I would argue that China was not revising the norms-based order. China was utilizing the norms-based order to rise.

If you look at the Belt and Road Initiative, if you look at the AIIB, these do not violate the principles of the norms-based order. As a result, China was using those rules to consolidate its power, but it was not fundamentally violating the norms-based order as we think of it in terms of economic cooperation, multilateral cooperation, and multilateral institutions. I haven't seen Xi Jinping or anyone in China present what China's path or alternative to the liberal international order is, other than the fact that they are not liberal. I'll put that on the table. I think that's an unknown.

Finally, the third point, this is not an unknown, and it's something we can say with certainty: we are in a fluid state today. We are truly witnessing fluidity in real time. And I don't think it's an exaggeration to say that this is a dangerous time in world politics. Because we are truly transitioning from a bipolar order to what Samuel Huntington called a uni-multipolar world, and now we are truly entering an era of multipolarization where all of this is fluid, the liberal international order is being undermined by the US, China is not articulating an international order, and partners and allies are trying to find their place within it. So one thing we can say with certainty is that we are not only in a fluid period, but also a dangerous one. And I am keenly interested to see what comes next.

The Potential and Limits of Middle Power Cooperation

7. The Potential and Limits of Middle Power Cooperation

Chung: Excellent. My final question is related to your point about the absence of an alternative to the international order. China has proposed an international order, but it's not new and not sophisticated. I think the real point is whether China is prepared to take on the role of a hegemonic power that can provide all the necessary international public goods. This is a really tough job that requires consensus among the Chinese people domestically and recognition from the international community. But the demand for international public goods is enormous, considering all the problems the international community is facing today. So there is an argument that coalitions of middle powers, such as the Quad, can offer some kind of alternative to great power politics.

We talk about great power cooperation these days, specifically the joint rule of great powers, which is not very beneficial for South Korea or other middle powers after Prime Minister Kahn's meaningful speech. So we talk about the Kahn Doctrine, but some say that while it's a good thing and very idealistic, do middle powers really have the policy tools to build a new international order? You have studied middle power cooperation extensively, so could you elaborate on this?

Manjari Miller: Yes, I think middle powers cannot do it alone. So I think it's really important that they act in cooperation. And I think Prime Minister Kahn's speech in Davos was very important in that regard. Because it was like a "call to arms" for corporations and middle powers to find a way forward together. What I find interesting is that, going back to the international relations theory literature, middle powers are not a well-defined concept. Who is a middle power? And, you know, who do you consider a middle power? Traditionally, it has been states that define themselves as middle powers. Canada calls itself a middle power and is a middle power because it's a middle-sized country. Australia also calls itself a middle power and is a middle power because it's a middle-sized country. But they are not really territorially independent. I mean, there are also smaller countries that punch above their weight in international relations. South Korea is one of them. Singapore is another.

Singapore is a small country that punches above its weight. So what I find interesting is seeing the interest in middle powers that is not just focused on the Western partners of the US. Because traditionally, middle powers have defined themselves. And looking at what partnerships between middle powers in Asia, perhaps in Africa, as well as in Europe, might look like. And in Latin America and Brazil too. You know, so I think that will be a game-changer. I really think that will be a game-changer. And you can see the steps towards it. We started this conversation with the India-EU agreement. I consider India a middle power.

So what you are seeing there is something happening. Because these partners and allies are coming together and moving away from trade dominated by US rules and regulations towards something else. And I think that can make a difference. Yes, middle powers by themselves, a single middle power alone, does not have influence, but such partnerships, especially if they start defining middle powers outside the West, I think have a lot of potential and a lot of influence.

Chung: Okay. That concludes our interview. Excellent. Thank you very much.

Manjari Miller: Thank you very much. ■

■ Manjari Miller, Professor, University of Toronto.

■ In charge and edited by: Lee Sang-jun, EAI Research Fellow
Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 211) | leesj@eai.or.kr