[Global NK Commentary] Trump's NSS and NDS, and North Korea

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Trump's Strategy Documents and North Korea

The Trump administration, since its second term began, has released two key national security documents: the National Security Strategy (NSS) released in November last year and the National Defense Strategy (NDS) released in January this year. The NSS outlines the core national security challenges perceived by the U.S. government and the overall approach to address them. The NDS, authored by the Department of Defense, specifies these priorities into military guidelines and strategic frameworks, detailing how to respond to the evolving security environment. So, how do these two documents reflect Trump's global strategy, and what are their implications for North Korea?

On the surface, the answer is somewhat anticlimactic. The NSS contains no direct mention of North Korea. The NDS is relatively more explicit, but the attention devoted to North Korea is limited compared to past strategy documents. Nevertheless, North Korea is treated as an independent threat in the assessment of the 'strategic environment.' The NDS states, "North Korea poses a direct military threat to the U.S. treaty allies, South Korea and Japan," and warns that "North Korea's nuclear capabilities are increasingly capable of threatening the U.S. homeland, and their scale and sophistication are expanding." This extends to the expression of "a clear and imminent risk of nuclear attack."

However, this threat perception, contrary to expectations, is not significantly different from that of previous administrations. Emphasizing North Korea's nuclear and conventional capabilities is not new in U.S. global military strategy documents. In this regard, the NDS's description of North Korea is closer to a product of bipartisan continuity than a 'Trumpian shift.' So, where can the unique characteristics of the second Trump administration's perception and approach toward North Korea be found? The answer lies not in how the NSS and NDS directly mention North Korea, but in the broader global strategic framework these documents present. How competition is defined, how threats are prioritized, and how the role of military power is envisioned—it is within this framework that the substantive implications for North Korea become apparent.

NSS, NDS, and the 'Donroe Doctrine'

The strategy documents of the second Trump administration outline the framework of what can be called the 'Donroe Doctrine.' This is a concept that reinterprets President James Monroe's Monroe Doctrine of 1823 in a Trumpian manner. Its core lies in refocusing U.S. strategic attention on the Western Hemisphere while significantly reducing interest and engagement in the Indo-Pacific region. The NSS and NDS explicitly define the Western Hemisphere as a "Trumpian supplement to the Monroe Doctrine." The goal of "protecting the homeland and securing access to key geographic spaces in the region" directly reflects Trump's long-standing concerns focused on homeland security issues such as immigration, drug trafficking, and border control. While the Indo-Pacific region is not entirely excluded, its emphasis is considerably reduced compared to the first Trump administration or the Biden administration. The deterioration of relations between President Trump and Indian Prime Minister Modi during Trump's second term symbolically illustrates this strategic shift.

The relative de-prioritization of the Indo-Pacific is closely linked to the readjustment of U.S.-China relations. The Trump administration criticizes the past thirty years of China policy as being based on flawed assumptions and demands a fundamental rebalancing of the relationship. The NDS states that the U.S. will "deter China in the Indo-Pacific through strength, not confrontation," and aims for "a relationship based on stable peace, fair trade, and mutual respect." This means maintaining deterrence while avoiding direct conflict. The NSS also sets the restoration of the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific as its top objective, arguing that this will allow both the U.S. and China to enjoy a 'decent peace.' This peace is maintained by strength but is not an order unilaterally imposed by the U.S.; rather, it is described as an order with which China can also coexist. In this sense, Trump's diplomatic rhetoric shows an unexpected similarity to the 'new type of great power relations' proposed by President Xi Jinping in 2012. At the time, President Xi emphasized non-confrontation, mutual respect for core interests, and win-win cooperation, stating that "the Pacific is wide enough to accommodate both China and the United States."

However, the pursuit of stability with China is presented alongside clear burden-sharing responsibilities for allies. The NSS and NDS urge Indo-Pacific allies to "take greater responsibility for collective defense." In particular, allies like South Korea must assume primary responsibility for their own defense, and the U.S. role is redefined as "important but more limited support." This is likely to bring about changes in the role and scale of U.S. forces stationed on the Korean Peninsula. In summary, Trump's regional strategy emphasizes strategic reduction, selective deterrence, and allied burden-sharing over continuous forward deployment.

Second-Term Trump Security Strategy and the North Korea Issue

The security strategy of the second Trump administration is distinctly different from not only previous administrations but also from Trump's own first term. This requires careful analysis and prompt policy adjustments. To evaluate U.S. policy concerning the Korean Peninsula and North Korea, one must approach it within the context of these global strategic shifts. Nevertheless, South Korea's perception and policy toward North Korea still heavily rely on the experience of Trump's first term, and its limitations are becoming increasingly apparent. So, what do the new NSS and NDS imply for future North Korea policy?

The starting point is the indirect impact of the Western Hemisphere-centric strategy on the Korean Peninsula. Superficially, this strategy may seem unrelated to Northeast Asia. However, Trump's strategy connects individual issues with a larger logic. Trump's perceptions of Venezuela, Greenland, and even Canada are in the same context. Western Hemisphere-centricity is combined not only with domestic political issues of immigration and drugs but also with economic security considerations such as energy, critical minerals, and supply chains. From this perspective, North Korea may no longer be treated solely as a nuclear issue. If Trump's interest shifts to North Korea's mineral resources or tourism potential, the already limited interest in denuclearization could further weaken. Korea must carefully consider North Korea's position within Trump's China strategy and the realigned Indo-Pacific vision, rather than simply comparing Venezuela's Maduro with North Korea's Kim Jong Un.

In a second Trump term, the Indo-Pacific is still mentioned, but its strategic importance has significantly diminished. It was once a core pillar of U.S. global leadership, but it is now being redefined as a space for maintaining the balance of power and sharing alliance responsibilities. This is particularly evident in China policy. Deterrence is maintained, but its premise is no longer confrontation but coexistence. If the U.S. pursues a 'peaceful coexistence' with China, North Korea's approach may also be realigned with similar logic. Despite Trump's personal preference for summit diplomacy, U.S. interest and willingness to invest in the North Korean issue are weakening. Consequently, China's influence on the Korean Peninsula is likely to increase. In this context, the U.S.-China summit scheduled for April deserves special attention. China's existing Korean Peninsula goals of denuclearization, peace and stability, and the establishment of a peace regime may be readjusted within Trump's new strategic framework. If the summit agrees to the 'peaceful coexistence' vision, China may seek a more active role in the North Korean issue, which could open space for the resumption of inter-Korean dialogue. Whether Xi Jinping agrees to Trump's proposal remains uncertain, but the possibility is higher than ever. The 'peaceful coexistence' proposed by the Trump administration aligns with Xi Jinping's 'new type of major-country relations,' and the 'denial defense' strategy against the first island chain (FIC) is much more favorable to China than the Air-Sea Battle or Multi-Domain Operations proposed by previous administrations. Even if Xi Jinping does not accept Trump's proposal, it is clear that both the U.S. and China view the North Korean issue not in isolation but within the framework of the broader regional order. If the perceptions of the two great powers regarding the Indo-Pacific regional order converge, the Korean Peninsula issue may also be discussed within that framework, and even the possibility of a grand bargain cannot be ruled out. Trump may also use this opportunity to restart summit diplomacy with Kim Jong Un and focus on his personal interests. North Korea, which has strengthened a multipolar order through the restoration of relations with Russia and China, may also explore re-engagement with Washington through Beijing in response to changes in U.S.-China relations. The South Korean government must closely monitor how North Korea aligns with China during the U.S.-China summit process following the 9th Party Congress.

Simultaneously, Trump's emphasis on burden-sharing fundamentally redefines Korea's role. This entails not only increased defense responsibilities but also the obligation to lead diplomatic outcomes. Korea has positioned itself as a 'pacemaker,' but under the 'Donelon Doctrine,' it must become a true 'peacemaker.' Realistically, only South Korea possesses the political will and resources to mobilize the sustained efforts necessary for negotiations with North Korea. While progress in inter-Korean relations is limited without advancements in U.S.-North Korea relations, only Korea can set the agenda and play a mediating role. North Korea is reinforcing its 'hostile states' discourse, while the U.S. views the Korean Peninsula within the broader Indo-Pacific balance of power and the 'peaceful coexistence' of U.S.-China relations. Under these conditions, neither North Korea nor the U.S. is likely to initiate negotiations first.

Ultimately, the remaining option is South Korea. Although it is a challenging task, efforts to keep the door for dialogue open and explore paths for U.S.-North Korea negotiations and changes in inter-Korean relations cannot cease. While Trump's strategy documents seem to increasingly deviate from security commitments to the Korean Peninsula, only the existence of a credible negotiation platform for the North Korean issue can create the conditions for meaningful change on the Peninsula. ■

■ Jihwan HWANG_Professor of International Relations, University of Seoul.

■ Responsible Editor: Sangjun LEE_Research Fellow, EAI

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 211) | leesj@eai.or.kr