[Global NK Commentary] Strategic Ambiguity in North Korea's Discourse on a Multipolar World Order

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I. Shifting Liberal International Order and North Korea's Response Discourse

The Trump administration has prioritized the notion that the liberal international order, maintained for the past 80-odd years, has constrained US national interests, and is seeking to build a new international order. In this process, it is posing fundamental challenges to existing international norms, but a clear vision for an alternative order has not been sufficiently presented. Simultaneously, strategic choices that risk conflict with allies are causing considerable confusion and uncertainty in the international community. This move by the US, which prioritizes its own interests and shakes the foundations of the existing order, is not just a US issue but has significant implications for other countries as well. As common norms and agreements regarding the international order weaken, a situation arises where each country competitively proposes different international order discourses to justify its own interests.

For the past 30 years since the end of the Cold War, North Korea has intermittently raised discourse opposing the US unipolar system. However, recently, amidst a visible relative decline of the US, intensifying US-China strategic competition, and a series of international political events such as the war in Ukraine, it has been developing a more comprehensive discourse on the international order.

The core concepts presented by North Korea are multipolarization and a new Cold War. It has already revealed its perception of the possibility of multipolarization of the international order in the 21st century, and around the 2020s, it has attempted to define the current international situation using the term 'new Cold War.' Recently, discussions on multipolarization have been appearing more frequently and systematically.[1]

In this context, North Korea's discourse on multipolarization can be understood as an attempt to redefine its position and strategy within the changing international order, going beyond mere rhetoric. Analyzing the nature of the multipolar international order as perceived by North Korea and the political and strategic implications of that discourse will provide important insights into understanding the future situation on the Korean Peninsula, Northeast Asian international politics, and furthermore, the changes in the global order.

II. Evolution of North Korea's Perception of the International Order: Formation of Multipolarization and New Cold War Discourse

In recent years, North Korea has redefined the international order in terms of "the collapse of the unipolar system and the advent of multipolarization." This concept, repeatedly appearing in the Rodong Sinmun and official party and state discourse, goes beyond a simple perception of world affairs. It is closer to an order discourse constructed to justify North Korea's diplomatic and military lines within the changing international environment and to institutionalize them.

This perception is clearly revealed in documentary form in the comprehensive treaty on strategic partnership signed between North Korea and Russia. The preamble of the treaty criticizes hegemonic ambitions and attempts to impose a unipolar world order, while emphasizing the need to establish a multipolar international system based on the primacy of international law in international relations. It can be interpreted as an attempt to explicitly declare rejection of the existing US-centric order while presenting normative principles for an alternative order.

Article 6, through the expression "establishment of a just and multipolar new world order," demonstrates that the discourse on multipolarization is being codified and institutionalized through a legal document, a treaty between states. Multipolarization is not merely a prospect or hope in North Korean discourse, but has become a strategic concept for defining and actively intervening in the ongoing transformation of the international order.

The concept of multipolarization began to appear intermittently in North Korea's official discourse in the early 21st century. In the early 2000s, North Korea perceived the international order as a confrontation between the US-led unipolar system and forces oriented towards multipolarization. It specifically pointed to the US missile defense system and its strategy of world domination as key examples of unipolarization, arguing that cooperation among great powers centered on China and Russia, along with the solidarity of regional states, was forming an objective trend towards multipolarization. At this time, multipolarization was presented as an "unstoppable demand of the era" and a historical trend foreshadowing changes in the future international strategic structure.[2]

Since the mid-2000s, North Korea's discourse on multipolarization has evolved to focus more on specific actors and institutions. The strengthening cooperation between China, Russia, and India, the growth of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), the European Union's pursuit of independent security capabilities, and the collective solidarity of developing countries are all presented as examples driving the practical multipolarization of the world. North Korea assessed that these trends were working to check the arbitrariness and high-handedness of the US and promote the democratization of international relations, defining multipolarization as the key path to realizing a just international order and a world of self-determination.[3]

Since 2008, the discourse on multipolarization has moved beyond criticism of the international order to increasingly take on the character of an alternative order theory. North Korea defines multipolarization as a historical trend that accelerates the weakening and international isolation of the US-centric order, while arguing that regional integration and interstate cooperation are transforming the world strategic structure itself. In particular, the movements of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, BRICS, and the solidarity of African and Latin American nations are presented as key driving forces for the formation of a new international order, and multipolarization is explained not as a prospect or possibility, but as a structural transformation of the international order already underway.[4]

Along with the discourse on multipolarization, North Korea has also presented the concept of a new Cold War relatively actively since the late 2000s. While assuming that the international community does not want a repeat of the Cold War, North Korea attributes the spread of concerns about a "new Cold War" to the conflict and contradictions between multipolar forces and unipolar forces. Specifically, it formulated the logic that in a situation where the balance of power collapsed after the end of the Cold War, the US has continued its high-handedness and arbitrariness, and as resistance and checks against this have intensified, the structure where the maintenance of unipolarity and the trend towards multipolarization clash has triggered discussions of a "new Cold War."[5]

Subsequently, North Korea linked the possibility of a new Cold War in Northeast Asia more directly to military configurations. It argued that the US's efforts to strengthen military cooperation and alliance structures with Japan and South Korea, and to maintain long-term military systems, were working to maintain and strengthen the Cold War structure in Northeast Asia. Furthermore, it defined the trilateral military cooperation among the US, Japan, and South Korea as the formation of a new military bloc, and advocated for the need to liquidate the legacies of the Cold War for regional peace and security. In this context, the new Cold War functions not merely as a diagnosis of international affairs, but as a concept to justify vigilance and response to alliance realignments and military deployments.[6]

Chairman Kim Jong Un explicitly used the term 'new Cold War,' formalizing North Korea's perception of the international order at the highest leadership level. The term 'new Cold War' became firmly established through his policy speech at the Supreme People's Assembly in September 2021. He defined the core of the change in the structure of international relations as a transition to a new Cold War structure, and at the 6th Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea in December 2022, he diagnosed that "the structure of international relations has clearly shifted to a new Cold War structure, and the trend of multipolarization is accelerating."[7]

III. An Undefined Multipolar World: The Structural Ambiguity of North Korean Discourse

North Korea currently uses the concept of a 'multipolar world' more frequently than the concept of a 'new Cold War.' The term 'new Cold War' presupposes clear bloc confrontation and implies the inevitability of US-China confrontation. Since China and Russia also use the concept of a multipolar order but do not pursue hostile confrontation or bloc formation with the US, it seems difficult for North Korea alone to use the term 'new Cold War.'[8]

The problem lies in the concept of 'multipolarity' used by North Korea. North Korea uses the term 'multipolarization' most frequently and also uses the concept of a 'multipolar world' often. It also uses the adjective 'multipolar.' However, it does not use related international political concepts such as 'multipolar system,' 'great power cooperation system,' or 'spheres of influence.' Multipolarization is not so much a clear state concept as it is a transitional aspect of change from a unipolar system. It is interesting that the concept of what kind of world will emerge after this transitional phase of multipolarization is unclear. Whether multipolarization will lead to a cooperative system among multiple great powers, or a system of confrontation, or a competition among multiple spheres of influence, or whether a relationship among multiple poles like a multipolar system is possible – the lack of clarity regarding the state that will emerge after the transition is a characteristic of North Korea's discourse.

The multipolar world presented by North Korea is not simply a state of power balance, but a new normative order that replaces the Western-led international order. Multipolarization is not merely a phenomenon of increasing great powers, but seems to signify a transformation of the international order where the self-determination and sovereignty of each country are substantially restored. In North Korean discourse, multipolarization means the dismantling of the "rules-based international order" led by the US and the West, and it advocates for the establishment of a world order based on international law, respect for sovereignty, and political equality as an alternative. Here, multipolarization is defined not as an end in itself, but as a transitional mechanism for ending imperialism and domination.

The order that North Korea ultimately aims for is the "self-determination of the entire world," which signifies a de-imperialist international system where all countries and nations choose their own path of development without external coercion or subjugation. North Korea emphasizes that this multipolarization is a historical inevitability. North Korea believes that "no matter how desperately imperialists may struggle, they can never erase the progressive humanity's aspiration and struggle to establish a self-determined new world and a multipolar world order," and expresses its conviction that "the demise of the old and the victory of the new is an unstoppable law of historical development."[9]

North Korea's discourse on the international order begins with a fundamental negation of the existing order. North Korea combines the 'decline of the West' and the 'rise of multipolarization' as a single historical law, thereby justifying its own strategic choices. The multipolar world presented by North Korea is not simply a state of power dispersion, but is set as a transitional phase of a new normative order formed amidst a historical turning point where the Western-centric unipolar order is collapsing. The collapse of Western imperialism leads to multipolarization, and it is argued that "as long as humanity aspires for anti-imperialism and self-determination, a fair and just new world will surely be built" and "anti-imperialism and self-determination exert a strong force in weakening the imperialist domination system and transforming the world order."[10]

The concept of multipolarization here is constructed in a significantly different way from the balance of power among great powers or the competition among multiple poles in international relations theory. The main line of confrontation in multipolarization is not set as US vs. China/Russia, but as West vs. Non-West, or more precisely, hegemonic powers vs. the majority of sovereign states in the world.

In this narrative, China and Russia clearly emerge as important actors. China is depicted as an emerging power shifting the center of the world economy, and Russia as a strong resisting power neutralizing Western military and strategic superiority. However, in North Korean discourse, these countries are not often explicitly described as poles equivalent to the US. China and Russia are presented as drivers and facilitators of multipolarization, but they are not positioned as the central axis organizing and managing the multipolar world.

North Korea's concept of multipolarization rarely includes precise comparisons of national power or analyses of power distribution structures. Distinctions between poles based on objective indicators such as China's GDP, Russia's military power, or the US's technological capabilities are marginalized in North Korean discourse. Instead, moral language such as "the world majority," "justice," "historical trends," and "the decline of imperialism" is used as the main basis for justifying multipolarization. Multipolarization is constructed not as a result of scientific power distribution analysis, but as the sum total of moral and political rejection of Western hegemony.

If North Korea understands the multipolar order as a tripolar system of the US, China, and Russia, it would naturally place itself as a subordinate unit within that system, i.e., within the sphere of influence of China or Russia. However, North Korean discourse explicitly rejects such a great-power-centric restructuring of the order. Instead, North Korea redefines multipolarization as the collective emergence of sovereign states and portrays it as a loose coalition of various non-Western countries, including China and Russia.

Of course, North Korea's concept of a multipolar world shares discourse with China and Russia to some extent. All three countries criticize the Western-centric normative order, especially the 'rules-based international order,' as a tool of hegemony applied hypocritically and selectively. However, China views multipolarization as a matter of orderly management rather than disorder, and approaches it as a plan to expand its influence by redesigning and institutionalizing rules rather than rejecting them. Russia uses multipolarization as a strategic language to justify resistance to Western norms and the redistribution of geopolitical power, and seeks to realize it through military conflict and non-Western solidarity. Even under the same term 'multipolarization,' North Korea centers its logic on ideology and survival, China on institutions and management, and Russia on power and conflict, and these differences in perception are likely to exacerbate the instability and complexity of the multipolar order itself.

In this context, North Korea's discourse on multipolarization inherently contains structural uncertainty. If China and Russia are clear poles, North Korea's pursuit of self-determination directly conflicts with the issue of great-power dependence. North Korea resolves this contradiction by redefining the actors of multipolarization not as great powers, but as a collection of sovereign states. This discourse structure is also linked to North Korea's fundamental distrust of great-power cooperation systems or spheres of influence.

North Korea has historically perceived systems where a few great powers manage the world as imperialist collusion. Therefore, a structure where the US, China, and Russia implicitly divide and manage the world cannot be recognized as a legitimate multipolar order within North Korea's discourse of self-determination.

What North Korea desires is not a balance between great powers, but a structure that constrains the arbitrary power of great powers themselves. Therefore, North Korea positions itself not with China or Russia, but within a community of identity with Third World countries, the Global South, and weaker nations. North Korea explains that "multilateral cooperation organizations such as BRICS are invigorating the process of global multipolarization" and claims that "the Western world has no choice but to recognize that BRICS has emerged as a distinct and powerful pole in the establishment of a new international economic order and the construction of a multipolar world." This is a different logic from emphasizing the emergence of other great powers besides the US, such as China and Russia.[11]

The language of imperialism, neo-colonialism, and subjugation through aid, which repeatedly appears in North Korean discourse, functions as a universal critical logic targeting not only the West but all great powers in general. This logic is a standard that can potentially be applied to the expansion of economic and military influence by China and Russia, and it provides a theoretical shield that allows North Korea to refuse pressure or conditional support from these countries in the future.

North Korea's proposed multipolar order has a dual discourse structure designed to justify strategic cooperation with China and Russia while also guarding against their great-power ambitions. However, precisely because of this duality, North Korea's multipolarization fails to present a concrete vision of the future order. The answers to who constitutes the poles, what the rules between the poles are, and how the self-determination of weaker nations is institutionally guaranteed are intentionally left blank. This uncertainty is not simply a theoretical flaw, but can be seen as strategic ambiguity chosen by North Korea to maintain diplomatic flexibility. Multipolarization should be viewed not as a meaning of alliance or subjugation to a specific great power, but as a discursive device to secure political space that neutralizes US pressure.

The multipolar world presented by North Korea appears, on the surface, to be a consistent worldview. The narrative of the decline of Western hegemony, the rise of the non-Western world, the emergence of anti-Western great powers such as China and Russia, the collective resistance of sovereign states, and the formation of a new international order are presented as a single historical flow. However, when theoretically deconstructed, the three core concepts that form its foundation – self-determination, anti-Westernism, and multipolarization – reveal contradictory relationships rather than being fully integrated.

First, the subject that North Korea emphasizes, the line of self-determination, is essentially based on the Westphalian concept of sovereignty. It is the principle that all states have the right to choose their own system and development path without external interference. Here, a tension arises between self-determination and multipolarization. The principle of self-determination presupposes the equal sovereignty of all states, but multipolarization implies an order where a few great powers hold structural superiority. If a multipolar order is managed by a few poles, including China and Russia, the self-determination of weaker nations like North Korea will inevitably be limited. This is likely why North Korea redefines the poles of multipolarization not as explicit great powers, but as a collection of sovereign states.

The tension between self-determination and anti-Westernism is also evident. Self-determination is, in principle, a neutral concept; whether a country allies with the US or cooperates with China should be that country's sovereign choice. However, North Korea's anti-Western discourse includes a moral judgment that defines cooperation with the West itself as submission or subjugation. At this moment, self-determination transforms from a universal principle of sovereignty into a conditional value recognized only when belonging to a specific bloc, the anti-Western bloc. This results in North Korea limiting the concept of self-determination itself.

The combination of multipolarization and anti-Westernism is also theoretically unstable. Multipolarization is an analytical concept concerning the distribution of power, while anti-Westernism is a matter of historical responsibility and moral legitimacy. North Korea combines these two to create a narrative of Western decline and the rise of a just majority, but it does not discuss the possibility that multipolarization might intensify competition among great powers and regional power struggles.

These conceptual tensions are also revealed in how North Korea perceives great-power cooperation systems or spheres of influence. While North Korean discourse superficially criticizes US hegemony, at its core lies a distrust of systems where a few great powers manage the world. A structure where the US, China, and Russia implicitly divide and manage the world is nothing more than new imperialism to North Korea. Therefore, North Korea reinterprets multipolarization not as a concert of great powers, but as the collective resistance of sovereign states.

However, this reinterpretation is likely to increasingly diverge from the reality of power structures. North Korea's emphasis on solidarity with the Third World and the Global South is also a strategy to paper over this contradiction. North Korea positions itself not as part of the socialist bloc or the China-Russia bloc, but within the historical solidarity of weaker nations that have fought against imperialism. Criticisms of imperialism, neo-colonialism, and subjugation through aid are directed at the West, but also serve as normative standards applicable to all great powers in general. This provides a theoretical basis for North Korea to define any future economic or military pressure from China and Russia as an infringement of its sovereignty.

Ultimately, North Korea's discourse on multipolarization has a dual nature: it serves as a shield to protect self-determination and a tool to justify dependence on great powers. This contradiction is not merely a theoretical inconsistency but a structural dilemma in North Korean diplomacy. The more North Korea approaches China and Russia to avoid US pressure, the greater the possibility of conflict with their great-power interests. Multipolarization is a discursive device to preemptively resolve this conflict, but in the long run, it may itself transform into a new constraint.

IV. Development and Prospects of North Korea's Multipolarization Strategy

The reason North Korea has prominently featured the discourse on multipolarization in recent years is less an interpretation of international affairs and more an effort to expand its strategic space within the changing environment. Multipolarization, rather than being a consistent vision of order for North Korea, has functioned as a strategic rhetoric to relativize US pressure, coordinate relations with China and Russia, and simultaneously maintain its self-determination.

Through its discourse on multipolarization, North Korea seeks to undermine the structure where nuclear possession and regime survival are deemed abnormal within the US-centric unipolar order, and to establish nuclear possession as a means of security for sovereign states. This is consistent with its efforts to define denuclearization as an anachronistic demand and to solidify nuclear weapons as a constitutional status. North Korea criticizes the Trump administration's 'America First' policy while emphasizing the legitimacy of the multipolarization discourse. North Korea criticizes that "the more the current US administration pursues unilateral policies based on 'America First,' which prioritizes exclusive US interests, the more the trend of global multipolarization will accelerate, leading to the total bankruptcy of the evil empire, the US, and imperialism."[12]

At the same time, multipolarization serves as a bargaining chip towards China and Russia, emphasizing anti-Western solidarity while pursuing a prospect of maintaining self-determination and solidarity among weaker nations by placing them at the forefront, thereby guarding against great-power dependence. This perception is likely to lead to a strategy of pursuing long-term confrontation and limited negotiation in relations with the US while advancing nuclear capabilities, and maintaining both strategic closeness and structural caution in relations with China and Russia. Ultimately, the discourse on multipolarization functions as an ideological asset for defending self-determination in North Korean diplomacy and a practical tool for broadening options among great powers, embodying both the core implications and structural limitations of North Korea's foreign strategy.

These changes pose important policy challenges for South Korea. First, there is the issue of South Korea developing its own discourse on how it perceives the changing international order and how it will design a desirable international order. In a situation where the discourse on the future of the international order presented by the US is in extreme chaos, an order perspective is needed that protects South Korea's national interests, is morally justifiable, and is effective when redefining relations with North Korea. If discourses such as the nuclear non-proliferation norms presented by the US or the West are fundamentally shaken, and if these phenomena are rationalized by the order discourse of multipolarization, South Korea will face significant difficulties not only in its nuclear deterrence strategy but also in maintaining a rules-based order in the future.

Second, South Korea needs to pay attention to the fact that North Korea's discourse on multipolarization does not automatically stabilize its relations with China and Russia. North Korea maintains a fundamental distrust of great-power dependence, which means that relations between North Korea, China, and Russia could expose tensions and rifts at any time in the long run. South Korean diplomacy needs to present a new dialogue framework that considers sovereignty, regional security, and the future of the Korean Peninsula together in this process.

В-третьих, существует вероятность структурной уязвимости положения Кореи в условиях распространения дискурса о многополярности. Если США, Китай и Россия попытаются перераспределить Корейский полуостров в соответствии со своими стратегическими интересами, Северная Корея будет стремиться напрямую участвовать в переговорах как суверенное государство, в то время как Южная Корея, вероятно, окажется в трудном положении в условиях конкуренции между великими державами. Хотя Южная Корея поддерживает союз с США, политика альянса США меняется, и пересмотр отношений с Китаем и Россией является насущной задачей. Корея должна активно предлагать правила и принципы, на которых должны основываться стабильность и суверенитет Корейского полуострова в меняющемся миропорядке. Кроме того, в отношениях с Северной Кореей необходимо не только управлять противостоянием и разрывом, но и укреплять убедительность в пространстве дискурса о миропорядке и суверенитете. ■

[1] Seok, Sang Hun. 2025. “Crafting a Multipolar World: Pyongyang's Evolving Narratives,” The RUSI Journal 170(3): 74–82.

[2] «Многополярность мира — неостановимое требование эпохи», «Нодон синмун», 5.9.2000.

[3] «Мир становится многополярным — неостановимая тенденция», «Нодон синмун», 4.3.2006.

[4] «Многополярность мира — неостановимый международный поток», «Нодон синмун», 22.2.2008.

[5] «Предпосылки возникновения теории «Новой холодной войны»», «ЦТАК», 7.6.2008.

[6] «Следует устранить обстановку холодной войны в Северо-Восточной Азии», «ЦТАК», 10.3.2011.

[7] Пак Вон Гон, «Мир новой холодной войны в представлении Северной Кореи», Институт восточноазиатских исследований, «Аналитический бюллетень», 9 марта 2023 г.

[8] Ли Дон Рюль, «Восприятие Китаем «новой холодной войны» Северной Кореи и его расчеты», Институт восточноазиатских исследований, «Аналитический бюллетень», 27 февраля 2023 г.; Чан Се Хо, «Позиция России по отношению к восприятию Северной Кореей новой холодной войны», Институт восточноазиатских исследований, «Аналитический бюллетень», 23 марта 2023 г.

[9] «Что означает усиливающаяся с Запада опасность войны?», «Нодон синмун», 24 августа 2025 г.

[10] «В непоколебимой антиимпериалистической самостоятельности — справедливый новый мир», «Нодон синмун», 8 июня 2025 г.

[11] «Усиливающееся стремление к многополярности», «Нодон синмун», 10 мая 2025 г.

[12] ««Америка прежде всего» — абсолютизация исключительных интересов США активно будет способствовать многополярности всего мира». «Нодон синмун», 15 марта 2025 г.

■ Чон Джэ Сон_Директор EAI, профессор факультета политологии и международных отношений Сеульского национального университета.

■ Ответственный редактор: Ли Сан Джун_Исследователь EAI

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